Sittings · Document

Draft report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-02-12

Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

Amendment 1

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to President von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech in September 2025, which emphasised the importance and urgency of taking action to promote democratic resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 2

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular to Article 2 thereof on the EU’s founding values, Article 10 thereof on democratic life and Article 21 thereof on external action,	– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular to Article 5 thereof, which defines the limits of the Union’s competences and lays down the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as Article 2 thereof on the EU’s founding values, Article 10 thereof on democratic life and Article 21 thereof on external action,

Or. en

Amendment 3

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations;

Or. en

Amendment 4

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular Article 18 guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and Article 19 guaranteeing the right to freedom of opinion and expression;

Or. en

Amendment 5

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 4 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights1a
	_________________
	1a https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG

Or. en

Amendment 6

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the 2024 European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA),

Or. en

Amendment 7

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 16 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to joint communication (2025/977) to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening EU economic security,

Or. en

Amendment 8

Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Saskia Bricmont, Diana Riba i Giner, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Hannah Neumann, Leoluca Orlando, Chloé Ridel, Brando Benifei, Lucia Yar, Raffaele Topo, Marco Tarquinio, Daniel Freund, Pierfrancesco Maran

Motion for a resolution

Citation 19 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act),

Or. en

Amendment 9

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine21 , and to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine22 ,	deleted
_________________
21 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/512/oj.
22 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 10

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/266 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas23 , and to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263 of 23 February 2022 concerning restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas24 ,	deleted
_________________
23 OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 109, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/266/oj.
24 OJ L 42 I, 23.2.2022, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/263/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 11

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus25 , and to Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus26 ,	deleted
_________________
25 OJ L 285, 17.10.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/642/oj.
26 OJ L 134, 20.5.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/765/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 12

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 25

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine27 , and to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine28 ,	deleted
_________________
27 OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 20, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1532/oj.
28 OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1529/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 13

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 26

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1603 of 31 May 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea29 , and to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1602 of 31 May 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea30 ,	deleted
_________________
29 OJ L, 2024/1603, 31.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1603/oj.
30 OJ L, 2024/1602, 31.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1602/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 14

Petras Auštrevičius, Dainius Žalimas, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Citation 28 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 22 January 2026 on the attempted takeover of Lithuania's public broadcaster and the threat to democracy in Lithuania,

Or. en

Amendment 15

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure32 ,	deleted
_________________
32 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0230.

Or. en

Amendment 16

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure32 ,	– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Russian Federation and its aggression against Ukraine, as well as its hostile actions against the Member States, including its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure32 ,
_________________	_________________
32 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0230.	32 Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0230.

Or. en

Amendment 17

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 30

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2025 on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report33 ,	deleted
_________________
33 OJ C, C/2025/6259, 19.12.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/6259/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 18

Sandra Kalniete

Motion for a resolution

Citation 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2025 on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine34a and having regard to its resolution of 22 of October 2025 on the Council's position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2026, which mentions the memorial project in Brussels34b
	_________________
	34a Texts adopted: P10 TA(2025)0006
	34b Texts adopted: P10_TA(2025)0244

Or. en

Amendment 19

Petras Auštrevičius, Dainius Žalimas, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Citation 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 23 January 2025 on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine,

Or. en

Amendment 20

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders,

Or. en

Amendment 21

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 21 january 2026 on Addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights sanctions regime (so-called “EU Magnitsky Act”),

Or. en

Amendment 22

António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron

Motion for a resolution

Citation 33 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representative titled "The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe´s decade-long campaign to censor the Global Internet and how it harms American speech in the United States" identifies grave interference by the European Commission in member states' elections and consistently maps regulatory efforts to censor free speech,

Or. en

Amendment 23

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Citation 34 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the measures for strengthening integrity, independence and accountability adopted by its Conference of Presidents on 8 February 202337a,
	_________________
	37a PV CPG 08.02.2023 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/organes/conf_pres_groupes/proces_verbal/2023/02-08/CPG_PV(2023)02-08_EN.pdf

Or. en

Amendment 24

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism38 ,	deleted
_________________
38 OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 18.

Or. en

Amendment 25

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 50 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission’s White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030,

Or. en

Amendment 26

Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Eszter Lakos, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Andrey Kovatchev

on behalf of the PPE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the United States National Security Strategy published in November 2025,

Or. en

Amendment 27

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 52

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the political guidelines for the 2024-2029 Commission term, presented by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s Choice’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 28

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 53 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the preliminary findings of the Commission of 06 February 2026 regarding TikTok's failure to comply with the Digital Services Act with regards to risk assessments in relation to its recommender systems and addictive design features;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 54

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation,	– having regard to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (2018, strengthened in 2022) endorsed by the European Commission and the European Board for Digital Services on 13 February 2025 as a code of conduct pursuant to Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act), with the conversion taking effect on 1 July 2025 ;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 56

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 31

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 61 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission Opinion of 13 February 2025 on the assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation within the meaning of Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065;

Or. en

Amendment 32

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation – a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How It Harms American Speech in the United States, Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, published on February 3, 202649a,
	_________________
	49a https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf

Or. en

Amendment 33

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 77

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield entitled ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, published by its Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs in October 202551 ,	deleted
_________________
51 Study – ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs, Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs, October 2025.

Or. en

Amendment 34

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 77 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Eurobarometer of November 2025, which indicates that European citizens identify growing distrust towards democratic institutions (49%), foreign information manipulation and disinformation, including in electoral contexts (42%), and the lack of transparency of AI-driven political content online (32%) as the most serious challenges to democracy, and which further shows that accurate and accessible information is considered the most essential element of free and fair elections (53%), alongside concerns about voters relying on disinformation (79%), cyberattacks (71%) and foreign interference (70%);

Or. en

Amendment 35

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Citation 78

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,	– having regard to the report of the Council of Europe on “Safety of Journalists platform 2024 report: serious concern about the use of spyware against journalists, abusive lawsuits and journalists in exile”;

Or. en

Amendment 36

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Citation 82 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to ongoing discussion in the Parliament regarding the impact of social media influencers on public,

Or. en

Amendment 37

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 84 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the findings of the report of the Polish State Commission for the Examination of Russian Influence on the Internal Security of the Republic of Poland in the years 2007–2022,

Or. en

Amendment 38

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 86

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Influencer Handbook, produced by Finland’s Mediapooli in 2020,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 39

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 86

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Influencer Handbook, produced by Finland’s Mediapooli in 2020,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 40

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 86 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the US National Security strategy of 05 December 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 41

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Citation 88 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in November 2025 and the National Defence Strategy published in January 2026;

Or. en

Amendment 42

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Citation 88 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS),

Or. en

Amendment 43

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 89

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the report by Reporters Without Borders of 25 September 2025 entitled ‘The Propaganda Monitor: The Russian Edition’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 44

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 90

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute on 1 November 2025 entitled ‘Influencers as news creators: implications for media regulation’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 45

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 91

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the article published by the AlgoSoc Consortium on 28 October 2025 entitled ‘1 in 10 Dutch citizens are likely to ask AI for election advice. This is why they shouldn’t’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 46

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 93

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the special report by NewsGuard of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘A Well-funded Moscow-based Global “News” Network has Infected Western Artificial Intelligence with Russian Propaganda’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 47

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 94 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the analyses and recommendations of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,

Or. en

Amendment 48

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 95 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Norman Lewis, A Shield Against Democracy: The European Democracy Shield and the Future of Free Speech, MCC, 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 49

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 95 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the analyses and recommendations of EUvsDisinfo of the European External Action Service,

Or. en

Amendment 50

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 95 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Majority Staff Report, The Digital Services Act and the Transatlantic Threat to Free Speech, 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 51

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 95 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report of the National Security Foundation (Fundacja Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego) on the elections in Poland,

Or. en

Amendment 52

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Citation 95 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Majority Staff Report, The Foreign Censorship Threat to Free Speech – Part II, 2026

Or. en

Amendment 53

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 96

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the investigative report published by VSquare, Delfi Estonia and partner media organisations on 26 February 2024 entitled ‘Kremlin Leaks: Secret Files Reveal How Putin Pre-Rigged his Reelection’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 54

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 96

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the investigative report published by VSquare, Delfi Estonia and partner media organisations on 26 February 2024 entitled ‘Kremlin Leaks: Secret Files Reveal How Putin Pre-Rigged his Reelection’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 55

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 97

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Social Media Influencers and Content Creators, published by the Aspen Institute Germany in 2024,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 56

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 97

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Social Media Influencers and Content Creators, published by the Aspen Institute Germany in 2024,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 57

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Citation 98

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the article published by Debunk.org on 4 May 2023 entitled ‘Kremlin spent 1.9 billion USD on propaganda last year, the budget exceeded by a quarter’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 58

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 98

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the article published by Debunk.org on 4 May 2023 entitled ‘Kremlin spent 1.9 billion USD on propaganda last year, the budget exceeded by a quarter’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 59

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 99

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the statement by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 December 2024 on measures in response to the EU’s 15th sanctions package against Russia, in which it announced the expansion of the list of EU officials and citizens prohibited from entering the country,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 60

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the article by the Russian News Agency TASS of 28 December 2024 entitled ‘Russia substantially expands blacklist of EU officials in response to sanctions – MFA’,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 61

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission press release of 18 December 2023 on its opening of formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act against X to assess possible breaches of its obligations, in particular as regards the mitigation of systemic risks linked to the design and functioning of its recommender systems, as well as obligations related to risk assessment, content moderation, advertising transparency and access to data for researchers;

Or. en

Amendment 62

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Prama et al. entitled ‘Political Biases on X before the 2025 German Federal Election’, published in March 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 63

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission press release of 30 April 2024 on its opening of formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act against Meta platforms, in particular as regards its handling and reduction of political content on its online platforms;

Or. en

Amendment 64

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Prama, Vishal and Grabowicz entitled ‘Algorithmic Biases on X before the 2025 Polish Presidential Election’, published in March 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 65

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Weinmann, Denkovski and Giannaccini entitled ‘Filtered for You: Algorithmic Bias on TikTok and Instagram in Germany’, published in January 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 66

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Global Witness entitled ‘TikTok and X Recommend Pro-AfD Content to Non-Partisan Users Ahead of the German Elections’, published in January 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 67

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Global Witness entitled ‘TikTok Algorithm Continues to Push Multiple Times More Far-Right Content to Users Ahead of Romanian Election’, published in February 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 68

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Verwiebe et al. entitled ‘Digitalisiert, politisiert, polarisiert? Eine Analyse von Social-Media-Feeds junger Menschen zur Bundestagswahl 2025 auf TikTok, YouTube, Instagram und X’, published in January 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 69

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Katzy-Reinshagen et al. entitled ‘Wahlkampf im Feed? Wie TikTok mit parteipolitischen Inhalten im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2025 umgeht’, published in February 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 70

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 100 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the report by Matlach et al. entitled ‘Recommending Hate: How TikTok’s Search Engine Algorithms Reproduce Societal Bias’, published in February 2025;

Or. en

Amendment 71

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Citation 101

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the statement by TikTok of December 2024 on continuing to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 72

Fredis Beleris

Motion for a resolution

Citation 101 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the 2024 Youth Survey on the views and priorities of young people (aged 16-30) across the EU, focusing on their political priorities, attitudes towards the European Union, sources of information, exposure to disinformation, political engagement, and voting behaviour in the 2024 European elections

Or. en

Amendment 73

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Citation 102 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Committee of the Regions, establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 74

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Citation 102 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the European Parliament’s decision to establish a Scrutiny Working Group on NGO financing within the Budgetary Control Committee;

Or. en

Amendment 75

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Citation 102 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness2030 and the Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 76

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Citation 102 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2017 on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions,

Or. en

Amendment 77

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– – having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2025 on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process (2025/2042(INI));

Or. en

Amendment 78

Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Marta Wcisło, Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the 2025 US National Security Policy, published on 5 December 2025, which requires urgent and ambitious European action in response,

Or. en

Amendment 79

Csaba Dömötör, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Virginie Joron, António Tânger Corrêa

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 80

Csaba Dömötör, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Virginie Joron, António Tânger Corrêa

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the reports and recommendations of the European Court of Auditors, in particular the special report 11/2025: Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs;

Or. en

Amendment 81

Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to President von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech in September 2025 highlighting the importance and urgency of action for democratic resilience,

Or. en

Amendment 82

Csaba Dömötör, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Virginie Joron, António Tânger Corrêa

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the statement by Meta Platforms, Inc. of 7 January 2025 entitled “More Speech and Fewer Mistakes”, announcing the termination of its third-party fact-checking programme on the grounds that it had led to excessive content removal and censorship of legitimate public debate;

Or. en

Amendment 83

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 November 2025 on access to reliable news as part of the European Democracy Shield,

Or. en

Amendment 84

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to relevant studies and Commission actions on the impact of digital advertising and on the use of online content for AI purposes,

Or. en

Amendment 85

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Citation 104 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the European Parliament’s work on copyright and generative artificial intelligence,

Or. en

Amendment 86

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas on 12 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a joint communication on the establishment of the European Democracy Shield, setting out a series of measures to empower, protect and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU;	A. whereas on 12 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented, after considerable delay, a joint communication on the establishment of the European Democracy Shield, setting out a series of measures to empower, protect and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU; whereas certain suggestions by the Commission risk contributing to further centralisation of powers at EU level at the expense of Member States’ democratic prerogatives; whereas the proposed measures fail to reflect the existing democratic deficits, shortcomings in oversight, recent scandals, double standards and evident lack of objectivity within the EU institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 87

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A a. Whereas democratic resilience and European security are increasingly inseparable; whereas hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation are deliberately used as instruments of warfare and coercion; whereas strengthening the European Democracy Shield therefore also contributes to the Union’s security and defence autonomy;

Or. en

Amendment 88

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A a. whereas foreign information manipulation campaigns often operate through low-cost, low-intensity and persistent tactics; whereas responses to such activities must remain proportionate, evidence-based and firmly anchored in the rule of law, so as to avoid normalising permanent emergency-style intervention in the information space;

Or. en

Amendment 89

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A a. whereas Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; whereas this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers;

Or. en

Amendment 90

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A a. whereas the Democracy Shield provides a unique opportunity to build an effective, whole-of-society defence of European democracy, freedom, competitiveness, and prosperity;

Or. en

Amendment 91

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital A b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A b. whereas Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers;

Or. en

Amendment 92

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital A c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	A c. whereas the European Commission has failed to comply with calls from the European Parliament to include, in its annual rule-of-law report, a dedicated chapter assessing the situation within the EU Institutions themselves;

Or. en

Amendment 93

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the free societies constitute the centrepiece of the european democracy shield and no Brussels institutions can replace or influence democratic processes in Member States; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the strenghtening of the EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which should be appropriately situated within the EEAS, alongside long-established bodies such as the East StratCom Task Force, which possess a well-established working methodology and have successfully cooperated for years with the European Parliament, the Commission, the Member States, partner organisations and the expert community;

Or. en

Amendment 94

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield contains several positive recommendations and proposals, such as the establishment of an European Centre for Democratic Resilience, the extension of its scope to accession countries and EU neighbourhood, or the full enforcement of key EU legislation; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure similar to the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);

Or. en

Amendment 95

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield, but it raises doubts as to the respect for the national identities of the Member States as provided for in Article 4(1) TEU and the exclusive responsibility of the Member States for national security as set out in Article 4(2) TEU; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);

Or. en

Amendment 96

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); whereas such a structure should not duplicate existing tools, capabilities and competences, but instead consolidate them into a single entity with a clear vision, mandate, real powers and financing;

Or. en

Amendment 97

Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience is promoted as a framework for exchange and operational cooperation and coordination among participating Member States, EU candidate countries and potential candidates, and EU institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 98

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas European Democracy Shield should complement, and not duplicate or replace, the work of Member States´s security and intelligence services and law enforcement authorities, as well as relevant Union´s bodies and institutions in this field;

Or. en

Amendment 99

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);	B. whereas the European Centre for Democratic Resilience constitutes the centrepiece of the European Democracy Shield; whereas both Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), had already called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation; ;

Or. en

Amendment 100

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B a. whereas the voluntary nature of participation in the proposal underpinning the European Centre for Democratic Resilience may create structural limitations and practical obstacles to its effective functioning, undermining the Centre’s capacity to act and coordinate response in the face of threats to democratic processes across the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 101

Jaroslav Bžoch, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B a. whereas Parliament’s two Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2), have previously called for the establishment of an EU structure to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI);

Or. en

Amendment 102

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B a. whereas in its Communication the Commission did not find a legal basis for the establishment of the Centre;

Or. en

Amendment 103

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital B b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B b. whereas almost three years after the adoption of the European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission the vast majority of those recommendations have not yet been implemented, despite their central importance for safeguarding fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law against the misuse of spyware and intrusive surveillance technologies;

Or. en

Amendment 104

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital B b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B b. whereas the EEAS has for years undertaken effective actions to monitor and address Russia and China as FIMI actors, in cooperation with NATO and G7 institutions, including through exposure activities, political attribution, and the adoption of sanctions; whereas the Commission has limited competences in this field;

Or. en

Amendment 105

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital B c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	B c. whereas, under the auspices of the EU, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is already operational; whereas NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence has for several years carried out highly effective work in this area; whereas the Commission receives analytical products prepared by these bodies and may request additional analyses from them where necessary; whereas there is therefore no need to create additional structures that would duplicate existing capacities or strip long-established entities of their competences in order to subordinate such activities to the Commission, which lacks the corresponding mandate;

Or. en

Amendment 106

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is not a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns, as hostile actions, carried out in a sophisticated and tailor-made manner, deliberately target the societies of the Member States; whereas such sophisticated attacks cannot be countered by a centralized EU body; whereas the EU is not suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation; whereas significant variations in Member States’ capacities are necessary in view of the diversity of the Member States; whereas the Commission does not have a mandate to replace the capacities of the Member States in breach of the principle of subsidiarity; whereas the assertion that there is a lack of overarching strategic frameworks and no strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence as a basis for a dangerous expansion of the Commission’s competences is not true; whereas such actions can be carried out effectively through cooperation between the Member States, EEAS, NATO, various partners, including civil society, in which context the Commission may play a supporting role within the limits of the competences conferred upon it;

Or. en

Amendment 107

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI attacks demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the Member States and the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas national and European elections are the principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas these campaigns disparage particular candidates or political parties, attempt to discredit the electoral process itself, instrumentalise divisive issues and attempt to discredit traditional media; whereas EU and Member States institutions are also intensively attacked; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 108

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework or functioning transnational and/or European cooperation mechanisms linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 109

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns and other forms of malign attacks; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 110

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to anticipate, prevent, detect and take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 111

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is a principal focus of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU is suffering from a fragmented approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no overarching strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;	C. whereas recent EEAS reports on FIMI threats demonstrate an increasingly granular understanding of malicious actor methodologies, technical infrastructure and intended narratives, yet this situational awareness has not been translated into sustained operational mechanisms that enable the EU to take timely, coordinated countermeasures; whereas the EU’s institutional nexus is one of the targets of hostile information manipulation campaigns; whereas the EU lacks a coherent approach to countering FIMI and disinformation, with significant variations in Member States’ capacities and no recommended strategic framework linking operational response to threat intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 112

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	C a. whereas the organisation and conduct of elections, including the regulation of political speech and media environments, remain the competence of the Member States in accordance with Articles 4(2) TEU and 5 TEU; whereas Union action in this area must remain strictly limited to foreign-directed interference and must not extend to the governance of domestic democratic discourse;

Or. en

Amendment 113

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	C a. whereas the European Parliament plays a central role in democracy protection and promotion in as outside of the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 114

Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 115

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 116

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation;

Or. en

Amendment 117

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation;

Or. en

Amendment 118

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) already exist as components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation and provide advisory support to Member States´s competent authorities, as well as to relevant Union bodies and institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 119

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to improve exchange of good practices, trainings, capacity and resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level harmonisation;

Or. en

Amendment 120

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;	D. whereas the ECNE, the Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) can be valuable components of the EU’s overall resilience to FIMI and disinformation, yet their effectiveness is substantially limited by the absence of a dedicated EU operational structure with the authority to coordinate resilience-building activities and rapid response and escalation mechanisms connecting national operational capacities to EU-level coordination;

Or. en

Amendment 121

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D a. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability through a vast set of hybrid tactics that includes, inter alia, cyberattacks, the sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, subversive political influence and coordinated, continuous attempts to interfere in the democratic functioning of our countries through foreign information manipulation and interference , especially in electoral processes; whereas the use of these hybrid tactics by foreign malign actors represent a fully fledged security threat to the EU and its Member States with a signfiicant impact on democracy;

Or. en

Amendment 122

Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas any democratic structure should include representatives of opposition parties or at least as observers; whereas the projects concerning the EDMO, the ECNE and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience make no mention of that; whereas there is a practice in certain parliaments whereby the committee on finance is chaired by the opposition;

Or. fr

Amendment 123

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D b. whereas the geopolitical environment is undergoing a rapid transformation, marked by an increasingly transactional and coercive posture by certain partners traditionally regarded as allies; whereas the recurrent use of political and economic pressure, including tariff threats and attempts to impose unilateral strategic demands by the United States, undermines mutual trust and exposes the Union’s strategic vulnerabilities; whereas such practices highlight the urgent need for the Union to strengthen its strategic autonomy and its capacity to safeguard its sovereignty, security and democratic decision-making processes in all circumstances;

Or. en

Amendment 124

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D c. whereas, compared to the 2021 version, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 4 December 2025 reflects a radical shift in long-standing US foreign policy, for example in its assessment of the challenges posed by aggressor state Russia and rival China, and includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; whereas the NSS was publicly welcomed by the Kremlin’s spokesperson and met with concern in several EU capitals; whereas the NSS groundlessly blames the EU for blocking US efforts to end the war in Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 125

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D d. whereas complementary to viewing democracy through a security lens and placing issues such as FIMI at the forefront of the democracy shield, EU-internal threats to democracy should equally be addressed, prioritised and resourced;

Or. en

Amendment 126

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D e. whereas FIMI and disinformation attacks are enabled by the structural and business model vulnerabilities of key digital infrastructure, social media services in particular;

Or. en

Amendment 127

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D f. whereas foreign information manipulation and interference operations are seldom isolated but are typically employed in combination with other hostile actions such as economic and political pressure or even military threats, or used for the purpose of shaping the strategic environment in preparation for other malign operations and activities;

Or. en

Amendment 128

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital D g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	D g. whereas poverty, socio-economic deprivation and marginalisation can leave certain segments of society particularly exposed and vulnerable to external interference and hostile information operations;

Or. en

Amendment 129

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 130

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU;	E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU; whereas ultimately European citizens are the primary victims of these practices, as their access to reliable information, capacity to form independent opinions and meaningful participation in democratic life are directly weakened, while public security and societal stability are also put at risk;

Or. en

Amendment 131

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU;	E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation often extend beyond individual Member States, including attack on the very essence of the European project and the transatlantic bond; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU; whereas these challenges require the Union to draw lessons from its own mistakes rather than to suppress legitimate criticism;

Or. en

Amendment 132

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU;	E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation can extend beyond individual Member States and in the such cases, may constitute an attack on the very essence of the European values on which EU is founded ; whereas FIMI operations systematically often target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU and/or of its Members States while advancing the interests and objectives of third countries;

Or. en

Amendment 133

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU;	E. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU and democratic processes in its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 134

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E a. whereas foreign interference in the Union has not been limited to external disinformation campaigns, but has also exploited internal weaknesses within EU institutions and Member States, including corruption, conflicts of interest, opaque lobbying practices and insufficient ethical safeguards, thereby undermining democratic resilience from within;

Or. en

Amendment 135

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E a. whereas not all forms of polarising, controversial or coordinated political communication constitute foreign information manipulation and interference, even when originating abroad; whereas democratic societies are inherently characterised by contestation, disagreement and activism, including large-scale lawful mobilisation and campaigning;

Or. en

Amendment 136

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E b. whereas senior political leaders from Member States have, after leaving office, assumed high-level positions in state-controlled enterprises of hostile third countries, notably in the Russian energy sector, in particular Gazprom, most notably former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, whose post-office appointments exemplify the revolving door phenomenon and raise serious concerns about strategic dependency, foreign leverage and the credibility of the political leadership in certain influential Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 137

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E c. whereas documented meetings and contacts between senior EU officials, including former Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders and individuals closely associated with sanctioned Russian oligarchs such as close Putin's ally Oleg Deripaska, have revealed serious shortcomings in transparency, ethical oversight and risk awareness within EU institutions, thereby creating opportunities for undue foreign influence;

Or. en

Amendment 138

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E d. whereas the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal has demonstrated, according to ongoing judicial investigations and widely reported media findings, that a third country was allegedly able to penetrate the European Parliament through financial inducements, intermediaries and covert networks, including cases of influential MEPs and Commission's DG MOVE director; whereas these developments have exposed serious structural weaknesses in the Union’s internal integrity, ethics and security frameworks and shown that foreign interference can operate from within EU institutions themselves;

Or. en

Amendment 139

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E e. whereas serious allegations, commonly referred to as the so-called “Greengate” affair, indicate that certain non-governmental organisations benefiting from Union funding may have been tasked to exercise disproportionate and non-transparent influence on legislative processes; whereas public debate and media reporting have also raised questions regarding the political responsibility of senior Commission figures, including former Executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans, in relation to funding structures and policy coordination; whereas these developments raise concerns about institutional capture, misuse of public funds and the risk of indirect foreign or ideological interference;

Or. en

Amendment 140

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E f. whereas reports and parliamentary initiatives have raised serious concerns that Union funds allocated to certain organisations may have been diverted, directly or indirectly, to actors linked to extremist or terrorist movements, including Hamas, highlighting critical deficiencies in funding controls, monitoring mechanisms and political accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 141

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E g. whereas the Union’s credibility in countering foreign information manipulation and interference is fundamentally weakened if external threats are addressed while internal vulnerabilities, corruption, conflicts of interest and politically sensitive scandals within EU institutions are downplayed, ignored or treated with double standards;

Or. en

Amendment 142

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital E h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E h. whereas the existence of a Russian spying network has been confirmed by the court verdict in the case of former MEP Nathan Gill, which, as revealed by the Polish services, delivered speeches from the parliamentary floor written by Russian intelligence in exchange for bribes and took part in initiatives orchestrated by them, such as the observation of fake elections or referendums in territories occupied by Russia; whereas, according to the findings of the Polish services, which provided the Parliament’s authorities with information on the scheme and methods of its operations, the Russian authorities were paying a network involving several MEPs; whereas there is therefore a need for stricter integrity rules for MEPs and high-level EU officials;

Or. en

Amendment 143

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;	F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency; whereas each country has its own specific characteristics, also stemming from historical circumstances, as a result of which some Member States, such as Poland or the Baltic States, display greater resilience to Russian disinformation and the manipulation of history than other countries which have historically maintained closer cooperation with Russia;

Or. en

Amendment 144

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;	F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency; whereas while contributing with valuable insights upon request or their own initiative these institutions work in silos and are not appropriately interlinked, which leads to a fragmentation of their work and thus lack of cooperation in protection against interference campaigns;

Or. en

Amendment 145

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;	F. whereas some individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency; whereas these agencies have adopted a strictly fact-based, technical, and non-partisan approach;

Or. en

Amendment 146

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;	F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable;

Or. en

Amendment 147

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, most notably in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;	F. whereas individual Member States that have invested in dedicated operational structures, with clear statutes and mandates, as well as sufficient funding and staffing, demonstrate what is achievable, for example in the cases of France’s VIGINUM and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency;

Or. en

Amendment 148

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	F a. whereas disinformation must not serve as a convenient pretext to obscure deliberately pursued policies that have benefited certain capitals and the Russian Federation at the expense of the key security interests of other Member States, and which have been detrimental to European solidarity; whereas, to date, no parliamentary committee of inquiry has been established, either at Union or national level, to clarify the circumstances surrounding the construction of the notorious Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines;

Or. en

Amendment 149

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	F a. whereas almost three years after the adoption of the European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission the vast majority of those recommendations have not yet been implemented, despite their central importance for safeguarding fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law against the misuse of spyware and intrusive surveillance technologies;

Or. en

Amendment 150

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	F a. whereas in order to prevent such initiatives from having chilling effects on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion, a thorough impact assessment is required;

Or. en

Amendment 151

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses, sustained investment in innovation, research and technological development and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders; whereas innovation, including the development of trustworthy AI systems, detection tools and resilient digital infrastructure, must be regarded as a central component of the Union’s defensive and preventive strategy; whereas the effectiveness of any regulatory or technical framework ultimately depends on sustained political will, consistent enforcement and the readiness of Member States and Union institutions to translate commitments into concrete and timely action;

Or. en

Amendment 152

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of the national and European institutions in view of the fact that legal regulations are often violated ; whereas without specialised technological equipment and tools, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders; whereas key AI technologies are controlled by third-country entities, which have the greatest influence on the content generated and way AI systems operate and produce outputs for users, and whereas EU Member States do not have sovereign AI capabilities of their own;

Or. en

Amendment 153

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders; whereas the appropriate response to these challenges is not the creation of yet another EU-level institution, but rather closer cooperation between the Member States and their competent services, cooperation with IT companies, as well as with like-minded allies within NATO and G7 partners facing similar threats;

Or. en

Amendment 154

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational and research capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders; whereas the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) introduces rules requiring online platforms to label AI-generated content; whereas enforcing these rules will require genuine compliance from the online platforms and strict oversight from the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 155

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders; whereas AI companies have scaled back, instead of increased, their safety measures to counter the spread and generation of disinformation on their services, whereas AI companies have failed to prevent “data poisoning” of their services;

Or. en

Amendment 156

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas, while AI facilitates disinformation campaigns, it also provides tool to improve our capacity to detect, analyse and counter them; whereas without harmonised EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;

Or. en

Amendment 157

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders;	G. whereas the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake technologies is outpacing the adaptive capacity of fragmented national institutions and making old-school solutions, such as transparency or best efforts obligations obsolete; whereas without coordinated EU responses and clear operational capabilities, the technological advantage will increasingly favour attackers over defenders threatening the core basis of our democracies;

Or. en

Amendment 158

Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	G a. Whereas artificial intelligence technologies, including deepfakes, generative content and automated bots, significantly amplify the scale, speed and credibility of disinformation campaigns; whereas while the cost of content creation has fallen dramatically, distribution through engagement-based recommender systems remains the decisive factor in achieving large-scale societal impact;

Or. en

Amendment 159

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences and to safeguard the information space; whereas the effectiveness of this regulatory framework depends on the full, timely and consistent enforcement of these legislative instruments; whereas uneven and delayed implementation across Member States, notably with regard to the EMFA, risks undermining their collective impact and weakening the Union’s capacity to protect the integrity of the public sphere and the right of citizens to receive reliable and pluralistic information;

Or. en

Amendment 160

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences; whereas enhanced information-sharing and mutual assistance, including in the deployment of technological tool, between Member States and Union institutions and bodies is envisaged; whereas the regulations should be revised in a manner that allows for the observance of the freedom of expression and the freedom to receive and impart information, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 161

Sander Smit

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences; whereas any such enforcement should only aim to mitigate systemic risks of disinformation and must not result in the limitation of freedom of speech or the silencing of unpopular opinions or political dissent; whereas, in any such enforcement, the starting point must be that citizens retain the space and freedom to independently form their own assessments of information;

Or. en

Amendment 162

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences; whereas it is therefore particularly important to combine structured support for Member States in the effective and timely implementation of these instruments with the capacity for swift and proportionate corrective action where shortcomings, delays or incomplete transposition risk undermining the Union’s democratic resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 163

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences; whereas the EU has come under increased pressure from the US President's administration, including threats of tariffs, personal sanctions against the EU officials, and visa bans, due to introducing rules aimed at creating a safer, more transparent, and more accountable digital environment

Or. en

Amendment 164

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences and in no way serving as a pretext for restricting freedom of expression in the public sphere, including online;

Or. en

Amendment 165

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), the Political Ads Regulation and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) has been slow in many cases establishing a window of opportunity for malicious actors to exploit the lack of FIMI defences in European legislation;

Or. en

Amendment 166

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive FIMI defences;	H. whereas the concurrence of the early stages of the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) establishes a window of opportunity to build comprehensive hybrid defences;

Or. en

Amendment 167

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation; whereas these threats are not new and, over the past decade, Member States, online platforms, experts and societies themselves have developed a range of tools capable of effectively countering such threats;

Or. en

Amendment 168

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification and monetization of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation, and (h) LLM Grooming - maliciously feeding LLMs with biased, deceptive, or false narratives to influence its training;

Or. en

Amendment 169

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new and constantly changing manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, (g) planting of disinformation narratives leading to so called data poisoning of AI models, and (h) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;

Or. en

Amendment 170

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake targeted media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content;

Or. en

Amendment 171

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems designed to drive engagement through polarisation;

Or. en

Amendment 172

Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by hybrid threats, disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;	I. whereas democratic societies in the EU are increasingly being targeted by disinformation and FIMI, with a particular intensity in the digital sphere; whereas the online space enables the proliferation of new manipulation techniques, including: (a) the inauthentic use of social media through automated software programmes, fake social media accounts and the use of troll factories, bot-driven amplification and engagement, (b) the use of astroturfing and flooding techniques to influence online public debate, (c) the personalisation, tracking and micro-targeting of individuals, (d) websites designed to mimic official sources, (e) the artificial amplification of divisive content, (f) the use of synthetic content, such as deepfakes and other AI-generated content, and (g) recommender systems purposefully designed to drive engagement through polarisation;

Or. en

Amendment 173

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. Whereas, according to the latest Eurobarometer Autumn 2025 survey, citizens express very high concern for disinformation (69%), hate speech (68%), fake content created by artificial intelligence (AI) such as deepfake videos or false information (68%), the protection of personal data online (68%), and threats to freedom of speech (67%); whereas the control of social media by a few big companies is a significant concern across the European Union, with 64% of respondents saying they are "highly worried" about this;

Or. en

Amendment 174

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas common approaches, methodologies, data models, and taxonomies of information manipulation tactics, techniques, threat actors, and narratives, can enable effective large-scale collaboration by democracy defenders in disrupting FIMI, disinformation, and influence operations; whereas support for such common approaches and collaboration among open source intelligence researchers, fact-checkers, media actors, and policy-makers, should be significantly scaled up to increase resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 175

Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas the use of the term “hybrid threats” risks securitising and instrumentalising migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, framing vulnerable individuals as tools or threats rather than as rights-holders, and thereby undermining their dignity, safety, and the Union’s obligations under international and human rights law;

Or. en

Amendment 176

Eugen Tomac

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas foreign interference in elections, including FIMI, algorithmic manipulation and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, has evolved from isolated incidents into systemic threats to the integrity of electoral processes and democratic governance, as evidenced by recent elections in several Member States and neighbouring countries;

Or. en

Amendment 177

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas the use of automated tools, algorithmic publishing systems and AI-assisted content creation is increasingly integrated into media and civic communication; whereas expression conveyed through such tools may remain protected where it reflects human intention, editorial direction or rule-based design;

Or. en

Amendment 178

Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas the Democracy Shield provides for a unique opportunity to build effective whole-of-society defence of European democracy, freedom, competitiveness, and prosperity;

Or. en

Amendment 179

Stefano Cavedagna, Nicolas Bay

Motion for a resolution

Recital I a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I a. whereas covert funding of Islamist groups in the Union by third countries constitutes a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic process;

Or. en

Amendment 180

Stefano Cavedagna, Nicolas Bay

Motion for a resolution

Recital I b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	I b. whereas the European Commission should not impose the use of electronic voting on Member States, due to the principle of national sovereignty, even with the aim of combating electoral fraud;

Or. en

Amendment 181

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas platforms’ algorithms are “broken by design”, divisive by nature and are easily manipulated by malicious actors; whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers; whereas platform’s algorithms could be manipulated by their owners and shareholders to bring forward political content and silence opposition, thus preventing, demoting or distorting the visibility of publication;

Or. en

Amendment 182

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers; whereas such influence can be particularly detrimental for vulnerable groups, including children and young people, who may be less equipped to critically assess persuasive or manipulative content and are therefore more exposed to risks of misinformation, harmful narratives and undue behavioural targeting;

Or. en

Amendment 183

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential and dangerous than traditional publishers, while their business models are largely driven by attention-based economics and algorithmic amplification, creating structural incentives for polarisation, sensational content and increased vulnerability to manipulation;

Or. en

Amendment 184

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed are in an advantageous position due to their access to users' online profiles, and thus they, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, primarily with a view to maximising their own financial gain , making them more influential than traditional publishers;

Or. en

Amendment 185

Saskia Bricmont, Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Lucia Yar, Diana Riba i Giner, Hannah Neumann, Chloé Ridel, Leoluca Orlando

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, demonstrably abuse the vulnerabilities of each individual user, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, using their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;

Or. en

Amendment 186

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user;

Or. en

Amendment 187

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them significantly more influential than traditional publishers;

Or. en

Amendment 188

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
J. whereas online platforms, when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, use their insights into the preferences and vulnerabilities of each individual user, making them more influential than traditional publishers;	J. whereas online platforms demonstrably abuse the vulnerabilities of each individual user when deciding on whether or not to promote content in a user’s feed, using their insights into the preferences;

Or. en

Amendment 189

Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution

Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	J a. Whereas the digital transformation of the information ecosystem has fragmented and personalised information consumption, increasingly driven by opaque algorithmic systems optimised for engagement rather than accuracy or the public interest; whereas a growing majority of young citizens rely primarily on digital platforms as their main sources of information; whereas artificial intelligence and algorithmic recommender systems are evolving faster than democratic safeguards and regulatory oversight, enabling large online platforms and AI providers to exert structural influence over the visibility and amplification of political discourse and, ultimately, democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 190

Fredis Beleris

Motion for a resolution

Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	J a. whereas, according to the 2024 Youth Survey, 42% of young citizens (aged 16-30) use social media as their primary source of information on political and social issues; whereas there is a need to improve media literacy on a population-level, fostering critical thinking and information integrity, as an essential tool for building societal resilience against FIMI, especially when introduced from an early age;

Or. en

Amendment 191

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	J a. whereas young people, women and older persons constitute particularly vulnerable groups in the online environment; whereas young people increasingly form their political views and electoral opinions online, in particular through social media platforms, where they are more frequently exposed to targeted content, algorithmic amplification and manipulation techniques;

Or. en

Amendment 192

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding online platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains too slow which poses a challenge in protecting democratic processes; whereas at the same time the Commission has proposed multiple Omnibus proposals that dismantle certain safeguards under these laws, notably the AI Act and the GDPR, which puts into question the protection provided to European citizens in order to fight foreign interference;

Or. en

Amendment 193

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas Member States and also the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge; whereas the manner in which certain provisions have been implemented has given rise to serious controversies regarding freedom of expression and transparency;

Or. en

Amendment 194

Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts in an attempt to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas there have been ongoing attempts to weaponize these laws to impose targeted online censorship on free speech;

Or. en

Amendment 195

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts , including , inter alia the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas, at the same time, EU is expected to revise certain regulations in order to ensure erespect for the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 196

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time the scope of their enforcement has remained limited due to geopolitical considerations;

Or. en

Amendment 197

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, the European Media Freedom Act, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains insufficient;

Or. en

Amendment 198

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital K

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;	K. whereas the EU has recently adopted a set of comprehensive legislative acts to establish a safe and transparent online space, including the DSA, the DMA, the regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and the AI Act; whereas these laws represent an important step forward in holding digital platforms accountable and protecting democratic processes, increasing transparency and safeguarding freedom of expression; whereas, at the same time, their enforcement remains a challenge;

Or. en

Amendment 199

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Recital K a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K a. Whereas the Digital Services Act (DSA) does not constitute a censorship instrument, but rather codifies the long-standing European legal principle that content which is illegal offline may also be restricted online, subject to due process, judicial redress and proportionality, as consistently upheld by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union; whereas this approach stands in clear contrast to state-driven censorship mechanisms employed by authoritarian regimes, notably the Russian Federation, where content restrictions are imposed without substantive judicial assessment of legality, falsity or harm; whereas, in its recent judgment concerning extensive Russian fines and politically motivated takedown orders against Google, the European Court of Human Rights found that Russian authorities had failed to examine whether the targeted content was false or harmful, instead presuming that any deviation from official narratives constituted a threat to national interests, without providing concrete evidence of harm; whereas this jurisprudence illustrates the fundamental distinction between the European regulatory model—based on legality, proportionality and fundamental rights—and Russian censorship practices that instrumentalise content control to suppress dissent and political pluralism;

Or. en

Amendment 200

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital K a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K a. whereas the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives presented an Interim Staff Report entitled “The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How It Harms American Speech in the United States”1a, which documents extensive engagement and regulatory pressure by European public authorities, including the Commission, on major online platforms, aimed at influencing content moderation practices within and beyond the territory of the Union; whereas the report raises serious concerns that EU regulatory frameworks, policy instruments and informal enforcement practices have been used to exert extraterritorial pressure on digital service providers, leading to the removal, suppression or downranking of lawful content and political speech, including content originating in third countries; whereas the report further highlights that such practices risk undermining freedom of expression, democratic debate and electoral processes, and may amount to indirect censorship incompatible with fundamental rights and international democratic standards;
	_________________
	1a https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf

Or. en

Amendment 201

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital K a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K a. whereas Commission decisions against US big tech companies such as Google have reportedly been delayed so as to not upset the US government during trade talks; whereas the first fine under the DSA, in a case against the platform X, was only issued on 5 December, two years after the start of the investigation against the US-based social media platform, and was reportedly delayed for months for political reasons; whereas this issue is exacerbated by the alignment between the US government and tech companies;

Or. en

Amendment 202

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital K a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K a. whereas regulatory measures affecting the visibility, reach, ranking or dissemination of lawful content may constitute interferences with freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 11 of the Charter and must therefore be subject to strict legal safeguards, transparency and judicial review;

Or. en

Amendment 203

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital K b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K b. whereas available data on content moderation decisions indicate that a substantial proportion of removal decisions are subsequently overturned through complaint and redress mechanisms, pointing to structural risks of over-removal and the chilling effect this may have on lawful expression;

Or. en

Amendment 204

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital K c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	K c. whereas the organisation and conduct of elections remain the competence and responsibility of the Member States in accordance with their national legislation and constitutional traditions;

Or. en

Amendment 205

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the Treaties do not confer upon the Union a general competence to supervise, guarantee or enforce the “fairness” or “integrity” of elections in the Member States; whereas the Commission has itself confirmed that the organisation and conduct of elections remain the responsibility of the Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 206

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for facilitating election management and oversight, such as through detecting suspicious and unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs ; whereas there is emerging evidence of attempts to influence public opinion by Chinese entities, the so-called Muslim Brotherhood and other actors to influence public opinion and influence democratic decision-making in pursuit of their interests and geopolitical objectives; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large; whereas, given that AI outputs may reflect biases introduced through human design choices and may not always rely on up-to-date or verified information, users should retain appropriate oversight and critical judgement when relying on such outputs;

Or. en

Amendment 207

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as “Pravda”, which deliberately targets information ecosystems, including large language models, with pro-Kremlin narratives; whereas such activities constitute a form of foreign information manipulation and interference aimed at undermining democratic discourse and trust in digital technologies across the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 208

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas the majority of AI development is being conducted outside of the EU and the EU is lagging behind in terms of AI investment and training; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large, increased transparency on LLM training, as well as ongoing and adequate research funding to reveal AI-driven disinformation networks and other threats to information integrity such as better understanding recommender systems and AI-powered online harms;

Or. en

Amendment 209

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas instances of such election-related deepfakes have been witnessed in Slovakia and Hungary among others; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;

Or. en

Amendment 210

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally;

Or. en

Amendment 211

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital L

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
L. whereas the use of AI presents new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;	L. whereas the use of AI may present new opportunities for strengthening election management and oversight, such as through detecting unusual online activity and coordinated manipulative behaviour; whereas the use of AI, including generative models and deepfakes, also presents significant challenges for information integrity and electoral processes; whereas credible reports have exposed the operations of a Moscow-based disinformation network known as ‘Pravda’, which has deliberately targeted and infiltrated large language models (LLMs) with pro-Kremlin narratives designed to mimic neutral and fact-based outputs; whereas such tactics represent a dangerous evolution of FIMI, as they exploit the opacity and scalability of AI systems to subtly disseminate false or misleading geopolitical messaging under the guise of authoritative language; whereas this form of algorithmic manipulation threatens to erode public trust in AI technologies, distort democratic discourse, and exacerbate disinformation risks across the EU and globally; whereas this underlines the need for strengthened AI literacy in education, work and society at large;

Or. en

Amendment 212

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. whereas, according to a report from Europinion51b, people between 16 and 24 spend an average 7 hours online, with 2 to 3 hours on social media; whereas the report highlights that 59 % of 15 to 24 year old people use social media as their primary news source; whereas, however, social media platforms with the highest youth usage like TikTok are considered less trustworthy; whereas their news consumption is characterised by fragmentation, passive and incidental consumption and soft news rather than active political content; whereas this means that media literacy trainings must adapt to their consumption habits;
	_________________
	51b Europinion LTD, Navigating the information disorder: European Youth in the age of digital disinformation, April 2025

Or. en

Amendment 213

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. whereas the business model of online platforms is based on generating high levels of engagement which prioritizes sensational, polarizing, or misleading information; whereas the algorithmic opacity of the online platforms remains a challenge; whereas the DSA has established significant new rules to increase algorithmic transparency and accountability; whereas users can now choose non-personalized feeds, reducing reliance on opaque algorithmic curation;

Or. en

Amendment 214

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. whereas the Commission has committed to proposing a digital fairness act that would tackle unethical techniques and commercial practices related to dark patterns, marketing by social media influencers, the addictive design of digital products and services, and online profiling, especially when consumer vulnerabilities are exploited for commercial purposes for all consumers ;

Or. en

Amendment 215

Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. Whereas transnational repression is a growing form of foreign interference in our Member States that undermines democracies, European sovereignty and security, and fundamentally violates the human rights of individuals targeted by transnational repression as well as their safety and protection from repression in Europe;

Or. en

Amendment 216

Jonas Sjöstedt, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Li Andersson

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. whereas online platforms, as part of their business model, systematically deploy algorithmic systems based on design techniques that prioritise emotive or extreme content can also be exploited for electoral interference and the manipulation of democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 217

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital L a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L a. whereas widespread digital and media literacy, combined with the systematic promotion of critical thinking across all age groups, is one of the most effective defences against foreign information manipulation and the malicious use of artificial intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 218

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital L b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	L b. whereas artificial intelligence services represent a major driver of innovation, competitiveness and societal progress, offering unprecedented opportunities to expand access to knowledge, improve productivity and stimulate the development of new digital services and industries; underlines, however, that the growing capacity of such systems to generate, summarise and disseminate news-like content without clear editorial accountability also requires adaptive market conditions and forward-looking regulatory approaches; stresses that innovation itself must be regarded as a central part of the response, notably through investment in European research, trusted AI ecosystems and technological sovereignty ; emphasises that fostering responsible innovation and a level playing field between AI-driven services and editorial media actors is essential to maintaining public trust, safeguarding access to reliable information and ensuring that technological progress reinforces, rather than undermines, the democratic information environment;

Or. en

Amendment 219

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 220

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas a growing share of citizens, and minors in particular, rely extensively on social networks and video- and content-sharing services as gateways to news and current-affairs information; whereas the prevailing economic and engagement-driven models of such services can incentivise the prominence of misleading, sensational or polarising material; whereas many users experience persistent difficulties in reliably distinguishing verified information from false or manipulated content in these environments; whereas online personalities and influencers have acquired significant capacity to shape public opinion and information flows without always being subject to standards of accountability comparable to those applicable to regulated media actors; whereas regulatory approaches across the Union concerning the status, transparency obligations and editorial responsibilities of online influencers remain uneven; whereas, given their reach and audience trust, influencers also constitute a relevant vector in the contemporary information ecosystem and should be encouraged to assume greater responsibility and to be involved with public-interest initiatives aimed at strengthening media literacy, democratic awareness and the integrity of public debate;

Or. en

Amendment 221

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies when they address topics such as political parties, their representatives and candidates, including election programmes; whereas it is therefore necessary that, when addressing such topics, their content contributes to raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate; whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, yet they increasingly shape political opinions by commenting on political parties, their representatives and candidates, including election programmes; whereas given their reach and influence, it is necessary that such content does not undermine democratic procedures, but instead contributes to raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures and to a healthy political debate;

Or. en

Amendment 222

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas citizens, especially minors, are massively engaging with social media, content-sharing platforms, and online aggregators, including for news consumption; whereas the business model of such platforms results very often in giving preference to polarizing content; whereas many users find it however challenging to distinguish between true and false information on these services; whereas personalities and influencers active on these online platforms have gained considerable influence in shaping public discourse, without necessarily respecting the same standards than other regulated actors; whereas there is fragmentation in the EU regarding rules covering the activities of online influencers and their editorial responsibility;

Or. en

Amendment 223

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies especially of young people and first time voters , when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate; however, the growing reliance on paid collaborations and sponsored content creates vulnerabilities, that is why these collaborations should be transparent and should be made public, as such arrangements may be exploited to disseminate harmful, misleading or politically manipulative narratives;

Or. en

Amendment 224

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can be used as relay of foreign interference, as was the case during the Romanian presidential elections; whereas they can however play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate; whereas there are attempts at establishing standards for responsible online influencers, such as France’s Certificat de l’influence responsable delivered by the Autorité de régulation professionnelle de la publicité;

Or. en

Amendment 225

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate; whereas the activity of these influencers should also be scrutinised when they use their digital impact to spread disinformation or are hired by national governments to promoted partisan messages;

Or. en

Amendment 226

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate; whereas incentivising online influencers to promote fact-based, pro-democracy content requires transparent and consistent monetisation strategies from online platforms;

Or. en

Amendment 227

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital M

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in strengthening the digital resilience of our societies, when raising awareness about media literacy, democratic procedures or contributing to a healthy political debate;	M. whereas online influencers can play an important role in democratic processes and the political debate by raising awareness or promoting political content;

Or. en

Amendment 228

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital M a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M a. whereas co-opting and corrupting political elites is an effective tactic used by malicious actors; whereas the publication of some of the documents associated with the convicted paedophile Jeffrey Epstein revealed an incomplete list of high-ranking European politicians associated with him; whereas Jeffrey Epstein was allegedly cooperating with foreign secret services, including the Russian secret service; whereas a significant proportion of the European political elite could be compromised and are thus susceptible to blackmail by Russia and other foreign services; whereas Thorbjørn Jagland, while he was a Secretary General of the Council of Europe, promised to facilitate Jeffrey Epstein’s meeting with Russia’s Sergey Lavrov;

Or. en

Amendment 229

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital M a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M a. whereas multiple independent studies demonstrated that algorithmic recommender systems on major online platforms, including X, TikTok and Instagram, systematically amplified far right, polarising or extremist political content in the run-up to national elections in several Member States, including Germany, Poland and Romania, thereby negatively affecting the visibility of democratic political actors; whereas such practices have a direct or indirect effect on electoral processes and democratic participation in the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 230

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital M a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M a. whereas cooperation frameworks such as voluntary codes, rapid response mechanisms and informal coordination with platforms may generate de facto enforcement effects in Member States even absent national implementation or enforceable national mandates; whereas such effects require transparency, defined limits and effective remedies;

Or. en

Amendment 231

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital M b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M b. whereas conflating robust political contestation with “digital violence” risks chilling legitimate democratic scrutiny of public officials and political actors; whereas counter-interference tools must remain targeted at illegal content and genuinely coercive conduct, not lawful criticism or dissent;

Or. en

Amendment 232

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital M b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M b. whereas French authorities uncovered a coordinated campaign tied to a Russian-linked disinformation network that falsely associated President Emmanuel Macron with the Epstein scandal;

Or. en

Amendment 233

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital M c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	M c. whereas certain projects and tools described as counter-disinformation capabilities aim at pre-emptive monitoring and anticipatory intervention, including ambitions to neutralise narratives before they meaningfully circulate; whereas such approaches risk shifting from countering manipulation to managing lawful democratic discourse;

Or. en

Amendment 234

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital N

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;	N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms; whereas evidence points to two main operational patterns, namely the coordinated manipulation of recommendation algorithms through networks of synchronised accounts generating artificial traffic and trend amplification, and the covert instrumentalisation of content creators - in particular nano- and micro-influencers - through concealed remuneration or partnership methods designed to evade transparency and detection; whereas these practices demonstrate how low-cost, low-visibility actors and technical platform dynamics can be weaponised to influence public opinion and circumvent democratic safeguards;

Or. en

Amendment 235

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital N

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;	N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms; whereas addressing such challenges must not be used as a justification for restricting freedom of expression in any form and for limiting pluralism, or for imposing unjustified limitations on the lawful operation of online platforms;

Or. en

Amendment 236

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital N

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;	N. whereas it is alleged that the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms; whereas the available evidence has remained disputed or incomplete; whereas such situations underline the need for rigorous, transparent and verifiable evidentiary standards before drawing political conclusions;

Or. en

Amendment 237

Eugen Tomac

Motion for a resolution

Recital N

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;	N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives and distort electoral competition; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up, illustrating the scale of coordinated inauthentic behaviour and the inadequacy of reactive platform measures during electoral period; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be deliberately weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of fundamental democratic norms;

Or. en

Amendment 238

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital N

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed significant vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with credible reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas TikTok, one of the most widely used platforms among young voters, claimed to have blocked over 116 000 spam accounts from being created and removed 59 000 fake accounts in a post-election clean-up; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by foreign actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in breach of democratic norms;	N. whereas the autumn 2024 presidential elections in Romania exposed vulnerabilities in the online information environment, with reports indicating the widespread use of fake accounts, bots and algorithmically amplified content to promote specific political narratives; whereas the use of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, by third-country actors further highlights the fact that low-cost, low-visibility actors can be weaponised to evade detection and influence public opinion, in the interest of the persons and/or entities who pay them (including through payments in kind or other benefits and advantages.) directly or through a chain of entities;

Or. en

Amendment 239

Virginie Joron

Motion for a resolution

Recital N a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Na. whereas, according to the United States House Committee on the Judiciary (which has a Republican majority), new non-public documents are casting doubt on the allegations of Russian interference that led a Romanian court to invalidate the results of the 2024 presidential election;whereas TikTok has declared to the Commission that it has found ‘no proof’ of a coordinated Russian campaign to promote the winning candidate Călin Georgescu – the main accusation of the Romanian authorities – and has informed the Romanian authorities of that conclusion;
	whereas, since then, public information has shown that the alleged Russian campaign on TikTok was actually financed by another Romanian political party1a;
	_________________
	1a https://x.com/JudiciaryGOP/status/2018683758006665352

Or. fr

Amendment 240

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital N a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N a. whereas in Poland parliamentary elections in 2023 and the presidential elections in 2025 were exposed to interference by the Russian Federation, as well as to opaque actions by EU institutions and other entities controlled by states, including foundations supporting specific political forces;

Or. en

Amendment 241

Csaba Dömötör, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Virginie Joron, António Tânger Corrêa

Motion for a resolution

Recital N a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N a. whereas the organisation and supervision of elections are the responsibility of the Member States; whereas any expansion of Union involvement beyond a supportive role risk undermining national democratic sovereignty and the principle of conferral;

Or. en

Amendment 242

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital N a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N a. whereas US-based tech oligarchs and far-right networks are promoting far-right and anti-EU parties; whereas the Heritage Foundation and its allies have discussed strategies to dismantle the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 243

Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital N b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Nb. whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has called for greater caution regarding the cancellation of elections;
	whereas just because a candidate runs a successful online campaign, and just because by using social media they were able to spread their message further than the printed and audiovisual media made possible, that does not mean that they broke the rules on campaign financing or transparency and thereby obtained an undue advantage;

Or. fr

Amendment 244

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital N b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N b. whereas number of high-profile right-wing influencers, including Tim Pool, Dave Rubin and Benny Johnson, have been accused of receiving almost $10 million from Russian state media in exchange for promoting pro-Russian messages, including those relating to the war in Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 245

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital N b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N b. whereas the Russian Federation, through the Telegram platform, recruited and paid sabotage groups tasked with disseminating vulgar slogans online and in the public space targeting the conservative, anti-Russian government, as established by final court judgments;

Or. en

Amendment 246

Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital N c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Nc. whereas, following the unprecedented cancellation of the first round of the presidential elections in Romania on 6 December 2024, the statement by Commissioner Thierry Breton of 9 January 2025 (‘we did it in Romania and it will obviously have to be done, if necessary, in Germany’) legitimately shocked many people in Europe;
	whereas the parliamentary elections in Germany took place on 23 February 2025;

Or. fr

Amendment 247

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital N c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N c. whereas EU institutions also unlawfully abused their competences by withholding funds lawfully due to Poland, only to release them immediately following a change of government to one politically aligned with them, without any change in the applicable legal framework and despite continous actions undermining democratic standards;

Or. en

Amendment 248

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital N c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N c. whereas in 2025, Google removed nearly 11,000 YouTube channels and other accounts tied to state-linked propaganda campaigns from China, Russia, and other malicious actors; whereas such actions should be taken more systematically across all online platforms to uphold the integrity of the online space.

Or. en

Amendment 249

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital N d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N d. whereas non-governmental organisations as well as state-controlled foundations provided financial support in a non-transparent and often unlawful manner to activities openly directed against the democratically elected Polish government; whereas similar actions also took place during the most recent presidential campaign, when foreign entities financed social media campaigns targeting the conservative camp’s candidate; whereas content presented as so-called “pro-turnout campaigns” consisted in the dissemination of vulgar and defamatory materials aimed at discouraging voters from supporting the conservative candidate;

Or. en

Amendment 250

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital N d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	N d. whereas AWS, Microsoft and Google account for around 70 per cent of cloud services revenues generated in Europe; whereas at least one quarter of VLOPs' net income is believed to originate in Europe; whereas Meta alone has a global net income of around €60 billion, yet invests only around €25 million (0.04 per cent) in independent fact-checkers in Europe; whereas Community Notes is a useful tool, but it is no substitute for independent human fact-checkers, particularly on controversial topics where the community is often motivated not by facts, but by strong bias;

Or. en

Amendment 251

Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital N d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Nd. whereas the Commission has expressed a desire to interfere, citing the DSA, in the elections of countries outside Europe, as demonstrated by the letter from Commissioner Thierry Breton of 12 August 2024 threatening the US platform X with regulatory sanctions for a live interview with President Trump on US soil in August 2024; whereas this grotesque situation has been compounded by the link made with riots in another foreign country that is not a member of the EU (the UK);

Or. fr

Amendment 252

Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Recital O

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;	O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has maintained a firm stance against political censorship; whereas the Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov has accused French intelligence services of attempting to interfere with the platform’s operations in the context of elections in Romania and Moldova;

Or. en

Amendment 253

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital O

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;	O. whereas Telegram has become a significant channel for communication and information exchange, due to its encrypted and open nature therefore enabling safe and free flow of information; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;

Or. en

Amendment 254

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital O

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;	O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements; whereas Telegram often spreads disinformation to its users about the ongoing legal proceedings against its founder as well as EU and national legislation which may have consequences on its accountability and responsibility as a platform, such as the recent disinformation campaign shared via messages to its users in Spain over a social media ban for under-16s;

Or. en

Amendment 255

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital O

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;	O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas credible reports clearly indicate that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements whereas the Commission has been assessing the matter for a considerable time without coming to a conclusion on how to move forward;

Or. en

Amendment 256

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital O

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia and lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;	O. whereas Telegram, a messaging platform with a growing user base in the EU, has increasingly been flagged as a conduit for disinformation, foreign interference and illicit activities, including the spread of extremist content and untraceable political propaganda; whereas its origins in Russia, opaque ownership structures and control over network infrastructure, as well as lack of meaningful content moderation have raised persistent concerns regarding its role in undermining democratic discourse; whereas Telegram has become a primary channel for recruiting ‘disposable agents’ and conducting hybrid operations; whereas malicious state actors have been found to exploit the technological skills, financial needs and naivety of Telegram users, especially young people, to conduct espionage and sabotage operations at minimal cost, while maintaining plausible deniability; whereas reports suggest that Telegram meets the user threshold for it to be classified as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the DSA, making it subject to stricter regulatory obligations and risk-mitigation requirements;

Or. en

Amendment 257

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital O a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	O a. Whereas women political leaders, candidates and elected representatives are increasingly targeted by gender-based disinformation, online abuse and harassment, as well as deepfake campaigns, often coordinated by foreign and domestic malicious actors with the aim of silencing their voices, deterring their participation in political life and undermining the integrity and stability of democratic institutions; whereas recent electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova have illustrated the deployment of such practices to delegitimise pro-democratic women leaders through sexualised manipulation, defamatory content and disinformation; whereas the rapid dissemination and accessibility of generative artificial intelligence tools has further aggravated these risks, as illustrated by the ongoing controversy surrounding the AI chatbot Grok, which has been used to produce non-consensual, sexualised and misleading images of women politicians;

Or. en

Amendment 258

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital O a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	O a. whereas video games, video game communication applications and their forums are increasingly used to spread right-wing terrorist and extremist propaganda and masculinist content[1]; whereas in addition, video games e-shops and other digital objects are used to circumvent sanctions and transfer money illegally, whereas this constitute a gap that needs to be filled in the EU’s ability to track disinformation and hybrid threats51c;
	_________________
	51c https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EUIF%20Technical%20Meeting%20on%20Video%20Gaming%20October%202021%20RAN%20Policy%20Support%20paper_en.pdf

Or. en

Amendment 259

Konstantinos Arvanitis, Danilo Della Valle, Jonas Sjöstedt, Li Andersson

Motion for a resolution

Recital O a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	O a. whereas public dialogue in the digital sphere is increasingly and predominantly shaped by corporate actors, owing both to platform ownership and proximity to executive political power, such as in the case of the United States; whereas the owner of X has publicly and unequivocaly expressed vested interest in the support for far-right political parties in the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 260

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology ; whereas the global technological landscape is being rapidly reshaped by advances in artificial intelligence, creating a new phase of strategic competition in which leadership positions remain open and directly influence economic strength, information security and democratic resilience; whereas the Union has already developed significant capabilities in key enabling technologies, including high-performance computing, advanced research infrastructure and sector-specific AI applications, demonstrating that sustained public investment and coordinated European policies can yield measurable strategic advantages; whereas the increasing adoption of artificial intelligence by European enterprises across multiple industries reflects a positive shift towards greater technological maturity and productivity, supported by a growing ecosystem of innovative start-ups and scale-ups capable of competing at global level; whereas strengthening access to computing power, data infrastructure and large-scale testing facilities, including through public-private partnerships and dedicated innovation hubs, contributes not only to economic competitiveness but also to the Union’s open strategic autonomy in the digital sphere; whereas enhanced digital capacity, sovereign infrastructure and technological self-reliance reduce structural dependencies on external actors and limit the opportunities for hostile interference, information manipulation or economic coercion; whereas, in this context, reinforcing Europe’s technological base constitutes a central pillar of the European Democracy Shield by improving the Union’s ability to safeguard its information space, protect critical digital assets and ensure that innovation serves democratic values, societal resilience and long-term security;

Or. en

Amendment 261

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas the rapid development and deployment of AI systems worldwide, including in third countries where regulatory approaches may be shaped by specific religious or ideological frameworks, including Islamic values, may rise concerns where such frameworks are not fully compatible with the Union´s fundamental rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression, as enshrined in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas building European technical sovereignty, including through the development of European AI capabilities and digital platforms throughout their life cycle, as well as fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Or. en

Amendment 262

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology; whereas strategic connectivity projects such as the East to Med Corridor (EMC), a submarine and terrestrial data transmission system connecting Europe with Asia via Greece and Saudi Arabia, contribute to diversifying data routes and strengthening the Union’s digital independence; whereas reported interference by Türkiye in survey activities related to the EMC project highlights the geopolitical risks to critical digital infrastructure and the need for the EU to protect strategic connectivity initiatives of Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 263

Christophe Gomart

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services, social media platforms, payment solutions and IT software; whereas the Commission’s refusal to reserve certification guaranteeing the highest level of strategic-data protection for European cloud providers highlights the EU’s current limitations when it comes to stepping up its digital sovereignty; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Or. fr

Amendment 264

Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem;

Or. en

Amendment 265

Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas this dependency has yet again been confirmed by the 2026 EU Court of Auditors regarding critical raw material51d; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;
	_________________
	51d European Court of Auditors, special report 04/2026 “Critical raw materials for the energy transition – Not a rock-solid policy”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2026 https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2026-04/SR-2026-04_EN.pdf

Or. en

Amendment 266

Konstantinos Arvanitis, Danilo Della Valle

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology; whereas EU digital sovereignty is especially difficult to achieve when VLOPs and VLOSEs operate in a de facto state of oligopoly;

Or. en

Amendment 267

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups, ensuring fair and competitive markets for digital technologies, enforcing the digital rulebook and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Or. en

Amendment 268

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology, especially given that the technological race is accelerating, and Europe should not lag behind;

Or. en

Amendment 269

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. Whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies — particularly those based in China and other countries outside NATO allies and like-minded partners — has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services, and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups, and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps toward building a competitive, secure, and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology.

Or. en

Amendment 270

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and online platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential and urgent in order to build a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem that is independent on foreign interests; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Or. en

Amendment 271

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;	P. whereas the growing influence of non-European technology companies – particularly those based in the United States and China – has highlighted the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical areas such as data infrastructure, satellite communication, cloud services and social media platforms; whereas fostering home-grown innovation, supporting European start-ups and investing in sovereign digital infrastructure are essential steps towards building a competitive, secure and resilient EU digital ecosystem; whereas aligning digital innovation with democratic values and fundamental rights offers the EU an opportunity to become a global leader in responsible and human-centred technology;

Or. en

Amendment 272

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Sophie Wilmès

Motion for a resolution

Recital P a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P a. Whereas European technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy starts with the substantial reduction of the Union’s defence dependencies; whereas a strong and credible European defence posture underpins the resilience of the Union’s democratic systems and its capacity to enforce its regulatory framework, including the Digital Services Act (DSA); whereas strengthening European defence capabilities is therefore a prerequisite for safeguarding democratic resilience and reducing strategic dependencies across other critical domains;

Or. en

Amendment 273

Jonas Sjöstedt, Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Li Andersson

Motion for a resolution

Recital P a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P a. whereas public statements, political endorsements, and repeated expressions of support by political figures from the United States administration in favour of far-right political parties and leaders in the European Union constitute a form of political interference in the Union’s democratic space, insofar as they seek to influence political discourse, legitimise far-right actors, and shape electoral dynamics within the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 274

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P a. whereas China controls around 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing, giving it a near-monopoly on certain critical elements that are essential for the high-tech, defence and green energy industries; whereas China strategically leverages this position by implementing export controls for political and economic advantage, which leaves the EU’s automotive and green industries highly vulnerable to these restrictions.

Or. en

Amendment 275

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital P a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P a. whereas geo-economic coercion, including tools such as debt-trap practices, targeted export controls and the strategic acquisition of European companies by actors from third countries, can undermine the decision-making sovereignty of the Union and of the Member States and negatively affect democratic resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 276

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital P a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P a. whereas foreign influence may also occur through long-term institutional channels, including state-linked organisations, foundations, religious structures, academic partnerships and corporate network;

Or. en

Amendment 277

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital P b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P b. whereas foreign influence operations are not limited to online disinformation campaigns but may also take the form of long-term structural engagement through funding networks, cultural and religious organisations, academic cooperation, diaspora mobilisation and strategic partnerships; whereas such influence can operate through lawful channels and therefore requires transparency rather than presumption of illegality;

Or. en

Amendment 278

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P b. whereas Chinese companies with strong ties to the Chinese Communist Party now hold stakes in more than 30 European naval port terminals, often in close proximity to European military naval bases; whereas the Commission’s White Paper on European Defence – Readiness 2030 introduced the idea of stricter controls on foreign-owned critical transport infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 279

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P c. whereas renewable energy is a crucial stepping stone for Europe’s energy sovereignty; whereas according to the 2025 Wood Mackenzie analysis, nine of the ten largest global solar inverter suppliers were based in China; whereas hidden communication devices have been discovered in Chinese-made solar power inverters used in Europe and the United States; whereas according to the Czechia’s cybersecurity office, there are risks regarding data protection and, in extreme cases, remote manipulation of solar inverters; whereas solar power plants interconnected through a decentralised dense network are more susceptible to cyberattacks and therefore require more robust regulation and security measures;

Or. en

Amendment 280

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital P c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P c. whereas certain third countries actively maintain structured relationships with diaspora communities in the Union through state-linked institutions, religious administrations and cultural networks; whereas such engagement, while legitimate in many cases, may also serve as a vehicle for influence, information shaping or political mobilisation;

Or. en

Amendment 281

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P d. whereas Spain has awarded Huawei a contract to manage and store judicially authorized wiretaps used by both law enforcement and intelligence services; whereas the Commission has restricted Huawei from 5G networks across the European Union due to security concerns;

Or. en

Amendment 282

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital P d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P d. whereas the attribution of foreign information manipulation operations requires high evidentiary standards and transparent methodologies, given the potential impact such claims may have on political stability, public trust and electoral legitimacy;

Or. en

Amendment 283

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P e. whereas according to the UK’s intelligence services, Russia hacked thousands of video surveillance cameras in Ukraine and the European Union to monitor foreign supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 284

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P f. whereas Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare against Poland and the Baltic states through cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation, portraying Polish defensive actions as provocations to fuel the domestic narrative; whereas anti-Ukrainian sentiment is on the rise in Poland; whereas according to the Polish government, the Russian secret services were behind the 2024 arson attack on a Warsaw shopping centre;

Or. en

Amendment 285

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital P g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	P g. whereas Russia and Putin himself are actively engaging in historical revisionism, denying the identity and sovereignty of nations that were once under Russian rule; whereas these narratives are promoted by Russian propaganda in Russia, EU member states, and the Global South to justify Russia's interference in various countries;

Or. en

Amendment 286

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU information spaces despite regulatory measures;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 287

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU information spaces despite regulatory measures;	Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU information spaces despite regulatory measures; whereas Meta is the only major tech company regularly publishing its monetisation data with sparse details while other online platforms remain fully intransparent;

Or. en

Amendment 288

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU information spaces despite regulatory measures;	Q. whereas research shows a concerning trend in the revenue redistribution programmes of online platforms, revealing that media outlets that are subject to sanctions, for example such as Sputnik and Russia Today, remained listed as ‘partner-publishers’ on Facebook months after the launch of EU sanctions against Russia – raising questions about whether they have continued to benefit financially; whereas such opaque monetisation mechanisms enable foreign state-affiliated actors to profit from sharing disinformation, and continue to destabilise EU and its Member States information spaces despite regulatory measures;

Or. en

Amendment 289

Danilo Della Valle, Jonas Sjöstedt, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Li Andersson

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Q a. whereas Israel has become a significant player in the provision of surveillance and digital security infrastructure to several EU Member States, despite persistent concerns about limited transparency and oversight; whereas the growing technological dependence on Israel risks compromising European strategic sovereignty and reducing Member States' ability to maintain full and autonomous control over their cybersecurity tools;

Or. en

Amendment 290

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Q a. Whereas the complex chain of providers of online advertising channels billions of euros annually from legitimate brands to websites known for publishing misinformation and disinformation; whereas this revenue stream is essential for the financial survival of websites masquerading as local news, polarising communities and eroding trust in high-quality journalism;

Or. en

Amendment 291

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Q a. whereas the electoral process is a core element of the sovereignty of each Member State and must remain primarily within the competence of national authorities, in accordance with their constitutional traditions and legal frameworks;

Or. en

Amendment 292

Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis

Motion for a resolution

Recital Q b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Q b. whereas Israel classifies spyware and other digital intrusion technologies as cyber defence equipment subject to export licences issued by its Ministry of Defence, thereby establishing a close link between the country’s defence industry, intelligence services and diplomatic apparatus; whereas companies such as NSO Group, Candiru, Paragon and Cognyte - founded or staffed by former members of Israeli intelligence - play a central role in this ecosystem and export surveillance and intrusion tools to governments worldwide, including several within the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 293

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital R

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape;	R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape; whereas this underlines the crucial role of education, media literacy and critical digital skills in enabling citizens, in particular young people and first-time voters, to identify bias, manipulation and propaganda and to make informed democratic choices;

Or. en

Amendment 294

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers

Motion for a resolution

Recital R

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape;	R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape, which may be considered indicative of the lack transparency and potential unreliability of such systems, particularly given that the use of AI is on the rise and people increasingly turn to AI for advice on high-impact decisions;

Or. en

Amendment 295

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital R

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape;	R. whereas in a survey held in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, 1 in 10 respondents declared that they would be likely to ask AI for voting advice, while another 13 % declared they would maybe use it; whereas in the Netherlands, the combined ratio for the youngest voters amounts to more than one third of the voters; whereas this trend is consistent with findings across the Member States and globally; whereas a recent study by the Dutch data protection authority demonstrates that voting recommendations generated by AI chatbots often present a highly distorted and polarised view of the political landscape; whereas investing in development of open-source LLMs like France’s Mistral is one way to reduce concerns about hidden biases, backdoors, or data misuse in AI chatbots;

Or. en

Amendment 296

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital R a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	R a. whereas very large online platforms and search engines have become de facto gatekeepers of the public space and primary intermediaries for access to information, thereby exercising a significant influence over what information citizens encounter, how it is prioritised, and under what conditions it circulates; whereas algorithmic ranking systems, recommender systems, opaque content moderation practices and monetisation models based on engagement can, intentionally or unintentionally, distort the information environment, fragment the public sphere, and undermine citizens’ effective right to receive accurate and pluralistic information; whereas ensuring transparency, accountability and risk mitigation by platforms, in line with the Digital Services Act, is essential to protect the integrity of the public sphere and the effective exercise of the right to information by all citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 297

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital R a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	R a. Stresses that AI-generated voting recommendations and advertisements should be transparent, not funded or influenced to promote specific political interests, and fully respect the EU Digital Services Act, in order to prevent manipulation and protect the integrity of citizens’ democratic choices.

Or. en

Amendment 298

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital R a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	R a. whereas according to an investigation by Investigace.cz, Russia actively interfered in the 2025 German federal elections by targeting pro-European political parties, namely the CDU, the SPD, and the Greens, while excluding the AfD, the BSW and Die Linke;

Or. en

Amendment 299

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation; whereas the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report includes a dedicated pillar on media freedom and media pluralism, thereby recognising the intrinsic link between the state of the rule of law, the protection of independent journalism and the resilience of the information environment; whereas strengthening the interaction between rule-of-law monitoring mechanisms and policies aimed at countering disinformation would enhance the Union’s capacity to detect early warning signals, address structural vulnerabilities and reinforce democratic safeguards across the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 300

Stefano Cavedagna

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy and, in order to be fully exercised, it must include the utmost freedom to express positions openly contrary to those commonly accepted (mainstream); whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents an essential instrument for the democratic vitality of the Union and for a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Or. en

Amendment 301

Fredis Beleris

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas lack of pluralism and press freedom in certain candidate countries is harmful not only to local populations but also to the Union, given the frequent manipulation of media to disseminate disinformation; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Or. en

Amendment 302

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled freedom of speech without fear of being punished for their published opinions, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation; whereas this also includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information without interference;

Or. en

Amendment 303

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Or. en

Amendment 304

Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital S

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-FIMI strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;	S. whereas the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a cornerstone of democracy; whereas the EU’s commitment to freedom of expression represents a coherent and principled counter-manipulation strategy, in clear contrast with the restrictions that authoritarian actors systematically impose on their populations; whereas the freedom and pluralism of the media, and the existence of a vibrant civic space, empower societies to detect, expose and reject manipulative narratives through democratic deliberation;

Or. en

Amendment 305

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital S a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	S a. having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 December 1976 in Handy side v. the United Kingdom which established that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population;

Or. en

Amendment 306

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital S a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	S a. whereas the DSA’s out-of-court dispute settlement framework covers a wide set of platform decisions, and the allocation of procedural costs may create incentives for platforms to avoid disputes by complying with removal/restriction demands even where content is contested, thereby potentially producing de facto restrictions on lawful speech through cost-risk asymmetries rather than judicial determinations;

Or. en

Amendment 307

Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose

Motion for a resolution

Recital S a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	S a. whereas the European Commission published preliminary findings on 24 October 2025 showing that Meta platforms may have breached certain transparency and user-protection obligations under the Digital Services Act, in particular as regards providing adequate access to public data for researchers, and ensuring mechanisms to notify illegal content and to challenge content moderation decisions;

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Amendment 308

Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI; whereas the European Union remains firmly and unequivocally committed to the protection of freedom of expression as a core democratic value and a pillar of its constitutional order; whereas this commitment must be accompanied by a clear regulatory framework ensuring that the exercise of this freedom does not serve as a pretext for the dissemination of illegal content, coordinated manipulation or other unlawful activities, and that appropriate safeguards and proportionate oversight mechanisms are in place to protect fundamental rights, public order and the integrity of democratic discourse;

Or. en

Amendment 309

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect individuals, not machines, bots or to her automated systems, including AI; whereas this is one of core fundamental rights and values on which the EU is founded and which also underpin the constitutional traditions of the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 310

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI; any effort to regulate AI should ensure that such measures do not limit the human right of expression while fully respecting human dignity

Or. en

Amendment 311

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI and must not be restricted in a non-transparent or unlawful manner, nor without proper democratic scrutiny and accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 312

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, including for machines, bots and AI directed by human action;

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Amendment 313

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital T

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, bots and AI;	T. whereas freedom of expression and information is a fundamental right designed to protect humans, not machines, recommender systems bots and AI;

Or. en

Amendment 314

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital T a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	T a. whereas the determination of ‘truth’ is inherently subjective and historical experience show that minority opinions or information initially labelled as false, dangerous or ‘disinformation’ by authorities often prove to be factually correct over time; whereas legitimate reporting has, in certain cases, been unjustifiably restricted or removed by online platforms, including as a result of external pressure, , only to be later verified as authentic; whereas this highlights the inherent danger of granting public authorities or publicly funded bodies the role of arbiters of truth, which may lead to censorship and undermine freedom of expression and democratic pluralism;

Or. en

Amendment 315

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital T a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	T a. whereas automated and semi-automated systems are increasingly used in legitimate journalistic production, including for data-driven reporting such as financial updates, weather reports and sports coverage, and may therefore fall within the scope of media freedom and freedom of expression where they reflect human editorial intent and design;

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Amendment 316

Ana Miguel Pedro

Motion for a resolution

Recital T a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	T a. whereas open democratic information spaces are structurally more vulnerable to manipulation than closed authoritarian systems, which can restrict and filter external content while exploiting the openness of Western platforms, creating an asymmetry that must be addressed through reinforced and coordinated EU action in the information domain;

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Amendment 317

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital T b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	T b. whereas freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as protected by Articles 10 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including the freedom to manifest religion or belief in public discourse, constitutes a core component of democratic pluralism and resilience, and must not be indirectly constrained by measures aimed at countering disinformation or foreign information manipulation;

Or. en

Amendment 318

Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis

Motion for a resolution

Recital U

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;	U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content; whereas unregulated inauthentic content and disinformation disincentivizes genuine human interaction and leads to the “dead internet”; whereas the 2024 Imperva Threat Research report revealed that almost 50% of internet traffic comes from non-human sources, while Bad Bots comprise nearly one-third of all traffic;

Or. en

Amendment 319

Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin

Motion for a resolution

Recital U

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;	U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated disinformation campaigns;

Or. en

Amendment 320

Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Motion for a resolution

Recital U

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;	U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content; whereas competent national authorities, as well as the technology platforms themselves, are taking measures to prevent such interference;

Or. en

Amendment 321

Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri

Motion for a resolution

Recital U

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the expressions of real persons with inauthentic content;	U. whereas FIMI actors exploit technologies to orchestrate coordinated inauthentic behaviour and misinformation or disinformation campaigns; whereas these technologies, notably bots and AI-based software programmes, are capable of exhibiting autonomous behaviour, and subsequently distort and destroy genuine public discourse, flooding the online space and the communication channels of real persons with inauthentic content or by creating false targeted accounts in the online environment;

Or. en

Amendment 322

Saskia Bricmont, Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Lucia Yar, Diana Riba i Giner, Hannah Neumann, Chloé Ridel, Leoluca Orlando

Motion for a resolution

Recital U a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	U a. whereas malicious foreign actors abuse open vulnerabilities in devices in order to infiltrate personal or professional communications, whereas multiple cases in the past years have shown that the EU is not equipped against infiltration of devices with spyware; whereas spyware has been used by foreign actors to monitor dissidents and public officials alike; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of transnational repression or “surveillance enabled coercion”; whereas the trading of vulnerabilities on the dark net remains and has not been tackled effectively, exposing digital communication, systems and devices to foreign interference without resort

Or. en

Amendment 323

Kim Van Sparrentak

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital U a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	U a. whereas malicious foreign actors abuse open vulnerabilities in devices in order to infiltrate personal or professional communications, whereas multiple cases in the past years have shown that the EU is not equipped against infiltration of devices with spyware; whereas spyware has been used by foreign actors to monitor dissidents and public officials alike; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of transnational repression or “surveillance enabled coercion”; whereas the trading of vulnerabilities on the dark net remains and has not been tackled effectively, exposing digital communication, systems and devices to foreign interference without resort;

Or. en