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DRAFT REPORT (2025/2212(INI))

Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union

CJ70-PR-790810

Committee on Security and Defence Committee on Constitutional Affairs · Rapporteur: Niclas Herbst, Salvatore De Meo

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

(2025/2212(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 21, 24, 31, 42 to 46 and 49 thereof,

– having regard to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty1,

– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties2,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence3,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20254,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2026),

A. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its hostile actions against Member States show that peace, democracy and territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted in Europe;

B. whereas the EU faces conventional military and nuclear threats and hybrid attacks, including cyberattacks, sabotage and the spread of disinformation;

C. whereas the EU is a peace project committed to protecting its citizens and defending its values; whereas it is increasingly necessary for the EU to assume greater responsibility for European security, while preserving the transatlantic partnership and strengthening NATO’s European pillar;

D. whereas the EU is committed to progressively establishing a Common European Defence Union (CEDU) to strengthen deterrence and defence capabilities, prevent conflict and promote peace, in accordance with Articles 3(5) and 42(2) TEU;

E. whereas the founders of European integration envisaged that political and economic integration would ultimately be complemented by common defence;

F. whereas the Lisbon Treaty already provides the legal foundations for a CEDU, including Articles 42(7) and 44 TEU, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Agency (EDA);

G. whereas these instruments remain fragmented and lack a coherent institutional framework for rapid decision-making, strategic direction and democratic accountability;

H. whereas Article 42(7) TEU should trigger a permanent EU mechanism rather than ad hoc intergovernmental arrangements, while complementing Article 222 TFEU through a coherent institutional architecture;

I. whereas the CEDU should reinforce NATO’s European pillar through closer strategic coordination, capability development, military mobility and crisis management, while respecting the autonomy of both organisations;

J. whereas its resolution of 22 November 2023 on its proposals for the amendment of the Treaties puts forward important proposals for developing a CEDU;

K. whereas a credible CEDU requires the full use of existing Treaties and, if required, targeted Treaty changes;

Establishing a Common European Defence Union

1. Believes that the time has come to establish a genuine CEDU to protect EU citizens and ensure peace and stability in Europe; calls on the European Council to urgently advance towards a CEDU under full democratic oversight, establishing a dedicated framework covering common defence, governance, financing and decision-making;

2. Underlines that the CEDU should complement NATO by strengthening its European pillar and the EU’s capacity to act; considers that, under the ‘separable but not separate’ principle, the EU should be able to act under Article 42(7) TEU, complementing NATO and being able to provide an EU response where NATO consensus cannot be reached, while respecting the autonomy and legal orders of both organisations;

3. Recalls that some Member States are not NATO members; stresses that, for these countries, Article 42(7) TEU constitutes the primary basis for collective defence;

4. Considers that the CEDU should provide a permanent framework for strategic planning, capability development, crisis management, mutual assistance and defence industrial cooperation based on solidarity, shared responsibility and democratic legitimacy; stresses that, in order to create a coherent constitutional framework, the CEDU should build on the existing Treaties, subject to targeted Treaty amendments, if necessary;

5. Calls on the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to fulfil the mandate assigned to them by the Commission President in their mission letters to complete their work in support of ‘a true European Defence Union’;

6. Calls on the Member States to fulfil the constitutional requirements under Article 42(2) TEU necessary for their participation in the CEDU;

Making full use of the existing Treaties

7. Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty provides significant but underused opportunities for defence integration;

8. Calls on the Member States to generate continued political will, making full use of Articles 42 to 46 TEU, in particular PESCO, the EDA, Article 42(7) TEU, Article 44 TEU and Article 222 TFEU;

9. Calls for greater use of Treaty flexibility to accelerate capability development, military readiness, interoperability and the deployment of EU missions;

10. Calls on the Council to make use of qualified majority voting in the area of defence, as provided for by the Treaties; encourages the wider use of constructive abstention under Article 31 TEU;

11. Regrets that PESCO has fallen short of its potential; calls for stricter commitments for willing and capable participants; calls for a genuine suspension mechanism under Article 46(4) TEU and an explicit command-and-control mandate;

Operationalising Article 42(7) TEU

12. Recalls that Article 42(7) TEU remains institutionally and operationally underdeveloped;

13. Stresses that credible mutual defence requires sustained political will, permanent institutions, common planning, interoperable capabilities and predictable decision-making; calls on the Council, with the Commission’s support, to establish permanent procedures for contingency planning, political consultation, operational planning, intelligence-sharing and logistical coordination;

14. Calls for an EU operational readiness review based on existing mechanisms, identifying strengths, capability gaps, dependencies and strategic enablers, while respecting confidentiality;

15. Calls for an Article 42(7) TEU playbook that defines activation procedures, assistance modalities and coordination mechanisms for scenarios including hybrid, cyber, critical infrastructure, space and subsea attacks;

16. Calls for a more frequent execution of annual EU-wide security and defence exercises for multiple scenarios involving relevant actors and, where appropriate, NATO allies;

17. Calls on the Commission to propose a defence-readiness omnibus enabling the coordinated use of EU legislation upon activation of Article 42(7) TEU, including in the areas of communications, transport, energy, raw materials, defence production, budgets and currencies;

18. Calls on the EU institutions to provide clear guidance on the implementation of Article 42(7) TEU as a cornerstone of a genuine CEDU;

Institutional architecture of the CEDU

19. Considers that the credibility of the CEDU requires a permanent institutional architecture that ensures political direction, coordination, command and democratic accountability;

20. Calls for the establishment of a European Security Council, composed of Heads of State or Government and chaired by the President of the European Council, as the CEDU’s permanent strategic body, which would be responsible for coordinating Article 42(7) TEU responses and ensuring coherence between EU external, security and defence policies; considers that participation of other European countries, in particular the strategic security and defence partners of the EU, including Ukraine, should be envisaged;

21. Calls for the establishment of a permanent defence council, bringing together ministers of defence and chaired by the VP/HR, to coordinate capability planning, military readiness, common procurement, defence industrial initiatives and the implementation of CEDU decisions;

22. Calls for a stronger coordinating role for the VP/HR in EU foreign, security and defence policy; calls for clarification of the respective roles of the VP/HR and the Commissioner for Defence and Space in order to avoid institutional overlap;

23. Supports the gradual development of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, including the capability for strategic planning, operational coordination, intelligence fusion, logistics and command support;

Treaty changes and decision-making under the CEDU

24. Considers that CEDU decision-making must balance national sovereignty with the EU’s need for timely action;

25. Recalls its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, while recognising that Treaty revision faces exceptional political challenges under the current circumstances; calls, nevertheless, on the European Council to initiate a structured reflection on the establishment of a CEDU as an objective of the EU, with a view to defining at Treaty level its governance, financing arrangements, command structures and framework for democratic accountability;

26. Calls for greater use of qualified majority voting in capability development, defence industry, procurement and financing, while exploring decision-making mechanisms for military deployments that preserve national sovereignty without allowing blockage;

Enlargement and the future of the CEDU

27. Underlines that the CEDU should be designed for a Union of more than thirty Member States;

28. Considers that Ukraine’s future EU accession would strengthen the CEDU through its military capabilities, operational experience, defence industry and expertise in conventional, hybrid and cyber warfare;

29. Calls for accession negotiations to include structured dialogue on participation in the common security and defence policy, PESCO, the EDA, capability planning and future CEDU institutions;

30. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to assess the institutional, financial and operational implications of enlargement for the CEDU;

Democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight

31. Stresses that deeper defence integration must be matched by stronger democratic legitimacy, transparency, accountability and parliamentary scrutiny;

32. Considers that all CEDU actions should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny; calls for an annual debate within Parliament on the state of the CEDU, based on a report by the European Council and the Commission;

33. Considers that Article 36 TEU, in its current form, reflects a framework primarily conceived for the EU’s external crisis-management role and is no longer sufficient in the light of the EU’s evolving responsibilities in the field of security and defence; considers, therefore, that Parliament must be able to exercise full democratic scrutiny over EU defence commitments and decisions with significant security and defence implications, including in connection with the activation and implementation of the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU;

34. Calls for Parliament to be informed whenever Article 42(7) TEU is invoked and to receive regular implementation reports, subject to confidentiality requirements;

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35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the parliaments of the Member States and candidate countries, and the Secretary General of NATO.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

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ANNEX: DECLARATIONS OF INPUT

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