On military mobility

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

(2025/2090(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Titles VI and XVI thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Title V thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 6 March 2025, 21 and 22 March 2024, 14 and 15 December 2023, 29 and 30 June 2023, 15 December 2022 and 30 and 31 May 2022,

– having regard to the conclusions of the Council, particularly those of 6 December 2024, 18 November 2024, 13 June 2024, 27 May 2024, 24 October 2023, 24 January 2022 and 22 January 2018,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2017 entitled ‘Improving Military Mobility in the European Union’ (JOIN(2017)0041),

– having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual‐use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 September 2021 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from October 2020 to September 2021 (JOIN(2021)0026),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 November 2023 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023 (JOIN(2023)0037),

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 March 2025 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 (JOIN(2025)0011),

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the revised Annex II to the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the Union as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2025 (ST 6728/25 ADD1),

– having regard to the annual reports from 2022, 2023 and 2024 of the European Defence Agency, as well as its reports on military mobility from March 2018 and 26 January 2024,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 04/2025 of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the tenth progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,

– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communique issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, and the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission as well as the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016, respectively,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE)through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 1 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review (COM(2025)0123),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025, for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on building a comprehensive European port strategy,

– having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the Russian illegal war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU transport and tourism sectors,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the crisis in the Middle East and tensions at the EU’s external borders require the EU to be ready to respond to potential acts of aggression or different types of crises along all its external borders;

B. whereas Member States that share external borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are under a direct security threat, especially as Western security services warn that Russia could attack the EU in the short term; whereas the military mobility infrastructure in all EU corridors would be essential for deploying and supplying troops and military equipment;

C. whereas military mobility is a priority for EU-NATO cooperation and should aim at enabling the movement of allied forces both in times of peace, and of crisis or war;

D. whereas despite significant progress in recent years to enhance military mobility through the implementation of the actions set out in the Action plan on military mobility 2.0, considerable obstacles remain;

Responding to changing geopolitical realities

1. Stresses that the EU’s strategic need for enhanced military mobility has become more urgent in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, the ambition of Member States to substantially increase their defence capabilities in the framework of the common security and defence policy and in the context of NATO;

2. Insists on systematically drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine including on military mobility;

Tackling financial issues

3. Recalls the Council’s unprecedented cut of 75 % to military mobility funding under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), as compared to the position of Parliament and the Commission, and stresses that such a situation cannot be repeated; insists that the resources allocated to military mobility within the next MFF be drastically increased;

4. Stresses that a centrally managed and dedicated EU transport funding instrument such as the Connecting Europe Facility must be continued in the next MFF as the main source for robust military mobility funding, both for infrastructure and transport assets;

5. Urges Member States to use the maximum funding available under the current MFF, including the recently introduced measures to re-allocate resources in the European Regional Development Fund and in the Cohesion Fund, as well as quickly redirect unused Recovery and Resilience Facility funds towards investments in defence or dual-use infrastructure to foster military mobility;

6. Encourages Member States to ensure that the dedicated budgets under the European defence industrial programme, the European Defence Fund, the SAFE, the measures under the Defence Readiness Omnibus proposal and other defence initiatives can be used to support collaborative acquisition of enabling capabilities for defence, including on military mobility;

Removing obstacles to military mobility and moving towards a ‘military Schengen area’

7. Reiterates calls for a ‘military Schengen area’ and encourages the Commission to provide a roadmap towards it;

8. Calls on the Commission to propose further actions with the urgent aim of integrating and coordinating the EU’s approach to removing all existing military mobility obstacles;

9. Calls on the Member States to implement, as a matter of urgency, the 13 commitments taken under the military mobility pledge 2024, focusing on investments in transport infrastructure, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation;

10. Highlights the need to streamline complex, lengthy and divergent national rules and procedures; insists that the upcoming military mobility package proposes simplified, harmonised, uniform and digitalised procedures, including on customs, transport of dangerous goods, diplomatic clearances and the use of identical permits, such as for cross-border movement bids/credits and EU/NATO form 302 documentation; further calls for the development of a military customs system to digitalise customs formalities and reduce administrative burden and cost, with respect to the existing EU projects such as the Secure Digital Military Mobility System;

11. Stresses that the harmonisation of procedures will strengthen mutual trust among Member States and boost cross-border connectivity;

12. Welcomes the objective of simplifying the legal and administrative frameworks as proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus and the upcoming joint communication on military mobility 2025;

13. Calls on the Commission to present a legal framework addressing ‘crisis situations’, clearly distinguishing ‘peacetime’, ‘in-between’ and ‘wartime’ phases, and including rules for each phase in order to ensure interoperability and priority access for armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets, with streamlined movement for military personnel throughout and across military corridors;

14. Expects that the forthcoming framework will establish an efficient and clear communication system between military and public authorities, on a need-to-know basis, to exchange necessary information with infrastructure managers and foster resilience across entire networks for each phase;

15. Calls for the establishment of a decision-making mechanism to allow heads of state and government to take immediate action in ‘crisis’ and ‘wartime’ phases;

16. Calls for improvement of coordination at the EU institutional level by appointing, for instance, a single point of contact for military mobility matters;

Improving infrastructure

17. Welcomes the adoption by the Council of the four priority military mobility corridors for short-notice and large-scale movements, created in cooperation with NATO, and the ongoing identification of 500 hotspots; highlights that more than 94 % of these corridors are a part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T);

18. Highlights the importance of creating logistics hubs along the military mobility corridors;

19. Considers it important to extend military mobility corridors into Ukraine in order to enhance interoperability and to deter against future aggression;

20. Highlights that given Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the eastern flank of the EU is particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks and hybrid threats, which requires prioritisation of critical infrastructure protection and the resolution of ongoing network issues; notes that, in the event of a Russian attack, eastern EU regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine would be under direct threat and would depend on the functionality of the military mobility corridors in other regions, particularly in the south and west;

21. Notes that Poland’s military mobility is essential for the security of the entire eastern flank;

22. Welcomes the Eastern Regions Pact initiative, recently announced by the Commission, which aims to provide tailored support for Member States along the EU’s eastern border to improve infrastructure and boost resilience in the border regions;

23. Recalls that all EU military mobility corridors play a crucial role in the EU’s security and defence;

24. Reiterates that the resilience of critical infrastructure requires a more harmonised screening of foreign direct investment in the EU;

25. Asks the Commission to urgently establish exemptions from the current public procurement rules for military mobility infrastructure and assets having a significant military or dual-use component;

26. Notes the importance of public-private partnerships for military mobility;

27. Underlines the importance of removing the administrative obstacles and infrastructural barriers faced by private companies that operate abnormal transport for military equipment and cranes for critical infrastructure projects;

Enhancing capabilities

28. Notes that surface transport systems are the main transport modes for the movement of military assets, which are usually heavy and oversized; highlights the need to have a steady supply of dual-use rolling stock, specialised wagons and dual-mode diesel-electric locomotives; stresses the importance of registering all these transport assets in a ‘solidarity pool’ so they can be used whenever and wherever necessary in the most efficient manner;

29. Stresses that over the next decade, despite transport decarbonisation efforts, the use of fossil fuels in military mobility will remain critical, such as the use of locomotives with internal combustion engines, which is the only operational solution in the event of a wide-scale shortage of electric power;

30. Notes the current shortage of certain military mobility equipment such as flatbed wagons, and their decline in production since the Cold War period;

Enhancing EU-NATO cooperation

31. Believes that enhanced military mobility reinforces the transatlantic alliance; stresses that NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States to move troops and equipment; notes with approval that, thanks to progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility, the EU’s relevant military requirements are consistent with NATO’s technical and geographical requirements to a level of around 95 %;

32. Regrets the persistence of political and procedural obstacles to sharing classified information on logistical networks between the two organisations and urges shared understanding in this regard to achieve synergies; calls for the consideration of establishing of a permanent EU-NATO information sharing platform to support the work of NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling Command;

33. Notes that NATO’s operational-level planning timeline is three days; therefore, insists on complying with commitments to meet the maximum five-day objective for completing relevant border crossing procedures and reducing the time to three days for rapid reaction units in ‘peacetime’;

34. Calls on the Member States to develop the necessary defence capabilities for military transport, including strategic lift capabilities, based on the coordinated annual review on defence findings and the 2023 EU capability development priorities; considers it important to meet, in consultation with NATO as appropriate, the military requirements and to mitigate the technical and geographical gaps;

35. Stresses the added value of the exceptional participation of the US, the UK and Norway in the military mobility project of the Permanent Structured Cooperation;

36. Underlines the need for interoperability with key regional partners, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans;

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37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.