On military mobility

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on military mobility

(2025/2090(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Titles VI and XVI thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Title V thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 6 March 2025, 21 and 22 March 2024, 14 and 15 December 2023, 29 and 30 June 2023, 15 December 2022 and 30 and 31 May 2022,

– having regard to the conclusions of the Council, particularly those of 6 December 2024, 18 November 2024, 13 June 2024, 27 May 2024, 24 October 2023, 24 January 2022 and 22 January 2018,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2017 entitled ‘Improving Military Mobility in the European Union’ (JOIN(2017)0041),

– having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual‐use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 September 2021 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from October 2020 to September 2021 (JOIN(2021)0026),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 November 2023 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023 (JOIN(2023)0037),

– having regard to the joint report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 March 2025 on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 (JOIN(2025)0011),

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the revised Annex II to the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the Union as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2025 (ST 6728/25 ADD1),

– having regard to the annual reports from 2022, 2023 and 2024 of the European Defence Agency, as well as its reports on military mobility from March 2018 and 26 January 2024,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 04/2025 of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the tenth progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,

– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communique issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, and the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission as well as the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016, respectively,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE)through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 1 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review (COM(2025)0123),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025, for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on building a comprehensive European port strategy,

– having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the Russian illegal war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU transport and tourism sectors,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence and the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the crisis in the Middle East and tensions at the EU’s external borders require the EU to be ready to respond to potential acts of aggression or different types of crises along all its external borders;

B. whereas Member States that share external borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are under a direct security threat, especially as Western security services warn that Russia could attack the EU in the short term; whereas the military mobility infrastructure in all EU corridors would be essential for deploying and supplying troops and military equipment;

C. whereas military mobility is a priority for EU-NATO cooperation and should aim at enabling the movement of allied forces both in times of peace, and of crisis or war;

D. whereas despite significant progress in recent years to enhance military mobility through the implementation of the actions set out in the Action plan on military mobility 2.0, considerable obstacles remain;

Responding to changing geopolitical realities

1. Stresses that the EU’s strategic need for enhanced military mobility has become more urgent in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, the ambition of Member States to substantially increase their defence capabilities in the framework of the common security and defence policy and in the context of NATO;

2. Insists on systematically drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine including on military mobility;

Tackling financial issues

3. Recalls the Council’s unprecedented cut of 75 % to military mobility funding under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), as compared to the position of Parliament and the Commission, and stresses that such a situation cannot be repeated; insists that the resources allocated to military mobility within the next MFF be drastically increased;

4. Stresses that a centrally managed and dedicated EU transport funding instrument such as the Connecting Europe Facility must be continued in the next MFF as the main source for robust military mobility funding, both for infrastructure and transport assets;

5. Urges Member States to use the maximum funding available under the current MFF, including the recently introduced measures to re-allocate resources in the European Regional Development Fund and in the Cohesion Fund, as well as quickly redirect unused Recovery and Resilience Facility funds towards investments in defence or dual-use infrastructure to foster military mobility;

6. Encourages Member States to ensure that the dedicated budgets under the European defence industrial programme, the European Defence Fund, the SAFE, the measures under the Defence Readiness Omnibus proposal and other defence initiatives can be used to support collaborative acquisition of enabling capabilities for defence, including on military mobility;

Removing obstacles to military mobility and moving towards a ‘military Schengen area’

7. Reiterates calls for a ‘military Schengen area’ and encourages the Commission to provide a roadmap towards it;

8. Calls on the Commission to propose further actions with the urgent aim of integrating and coordinating the EU’s approach to removing all existing military mobility obstacles;

9. Calls on the Member States to implement, as a matter of urgency, the 13 commitments taken under the military mobility pledge 2024, focusing on investments in transport infrastructure, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation;

10. Highlights the need to streamline complex, lengthy and divergent national rules and procedures; insists that the upcoming military mobility package proposes simplified, harmonised, uniform and digitalised procedures, including on customs, transport of dangerous goods, diplomatic clearances and the use of identical permits, such as for cross-border movement bids/credits and EU/NATO form 302 documentation; further calls for the development of a military customs system to digitalise customs formalities and reduce administrative burden and cost, with respect to the existing EU projects such as the Secure Digital Military Mobility System;

11. Stresses that the harmonisation of procedures will strengthen mutual trust among Member States and boost cross-border connectivity;

12. Welcomes the objective of simplifying the legal and administrative frameworks as proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus and the upcoming joint communication on military mobility 2025;

13. Calls on the Commission to present a legal framework addressing ‘crisis situations’, clearly distinguishing ‘peacetime’, ‘in-between’ and ‘wartime’ phases, and including rules for each phase in order to ensure interoperability and priority access for armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets, with streamlined movement for military personnel throughout and across military corridors;

14. Expects that the forthcoming framework will establish an efficient and clear communication system between military and public authorities, on a need-to-know basis, to exchange necessary information with infrastructure managers and foster resilience across entire networks for each phase;

15. Calls for the establishment of a decision-making mechanism to allow heads of state and government to take immediate action in ‘crisis’ and ‘wartime’ phases;

16. Calls for improvement of coordination at the EU institutional level by appointing, for instance, a single point of contact for military mobility matters;

Improving infrastructure

17. Welcomes the adoption by the Council of the four priority military mobility corridors for short-notice and large-scale movements, created in cooperation with NATO, and the ongoing identification of 500 hotspots; highlights that more than 94 % of these corridors are a part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T);

18. Highlights the importance of creating logistics hubs along the military mobility corridors;

19. Considers it important to extend military mobility corridors into Ukraine in order to enhance interoperability and to deter against future aggression;

20. Highlights that given Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the eastern flank of the EU is particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks and hybrid threats, which requires prioritisation of critical infrastructure protection and the resolution of ongoing network issues; notes that, in the event of a Russian attack, eastern EU regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine would be under direct threat and would depend on the functionality of the military mobility corridors in other regions, particularly in the south and west;

21. Notes that Poland’s military mobility is essential for the security of the entire eastern flank;

22. Welcomes the Eastern Regions Pact initiative, recently announced by the Commission, which aims to provide tailored support for Member States along the EU’s eastern border to improve infrastructure and boost resilience in the border regions;

23. Recalls that all EU military mobility corridors play a crucial role in the EU’s security and defence;

24. Reiterates that the resilience of critical infrastructure requires a more harmonised screening of foreign direct investment in the EU;

25. Asks the Commission to urgently establish exemptions from the current public procurement rules for military mobility infrastructure and assets having a significant military or dual-use component;

26. Notes the importance of public-private partnerships for military mobility;

27. Underlines the importance of removing the administrative obstacles and infrastructural barriers faced by private companies that operate abnormal transport for military equipment and cranes for critical infrastructure projects;

Enhancing capabilities

28. Notes that surface transport systems are the main transport modes for the movement of military assets, which are usually heavy and oversized; highlights the need to have a steady supply of dual-use rolling stock, specialised wagons and dual-mode diesel-electric locomotives; stresses the importance of registering all these transport assets in a ‘solidarity pool’ so they can be used whenever and wherever necessary in the most efficient manner;

29. Stresses that over the next decade, despite transport decarbonisation efforts, the use of fossil fuels in military mobility will remain critical, such as the use of locomotives with internal combustion engines, which is the only operational solution in the event of a wide-scale shortage of electric power;

30. Notes the current shortage of certain military mobility equipment such as flatbed wagons, and their decline in production since the Cold War period;

Enhancing EU-NATO cooperation

31. Believes that enhanced military mobility reinforces the transatlantic alliance; stresses that NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States to move troops and equipment; notes with approval that, thanks to progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility, the EU’s relevant military requirements are consistent with NATO’s technical and geographical requirements to a level of around 95 %;

32. Regrets the persistence of political and procedural obstacles to sharing classified information on logistical networks between the two organisations and urges shared understanding in this regard to achieve synergies; calls for the consideration of establishing of a permanent EU-NATO information sharing platform to support the work of NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling Command;

33. Notes that NATO’s operational-level planning timeline is three days; therefore, insists on complying with commitments to meet the maximum five-day objective for completing relevant border crossing procedures and reducing the time to three days for rapid reaction units in ‘peacetime’;

34. Calls on the Member States to develop the necessary defence capabilities for military transport, including strategic lift capabilities, based on the coordinated annual review on defence findings and the 2023 EU capability development priorities; considers it important to meet, in consultation with NATO as appropriate, the military requirements and to mitigate the technical and geographical gaps;

35. Stresses the added value of the exceptional participation of the US, the UK and Norway in the military mobility project of the Permanent Structured Cooperation;

36. Underlines the need for interoperability with key regional partners, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans;

°

° °

37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Increasing commitment for military mobility

The EU faces evolving security challenges that necessitate a robust and responsive military mobility framework. The SEDE and TRAN Rapporteurs outline in their draft report the critical aspects of enhancing military mobility within the EU, focusing on the need for regulatory improvements, financial considerations and strengthened cooperation with NATO and other partners.

Military mobility is an essential enabler for European security and defence and for the EU’s support to Ukraine. It enhances the ability of Member States and allies’ armed forces to swiftly move military personnel, materiel and assets across the EU in case of conflict or intensified hybrid warfare.

Legally, territorial defence is a competence of the 27 Member States, 23 of which are also members of NATO. In terms of EU-NATO cooperation, military mobility has been included in the common set of proposals to implement the three EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016, 2018 and 2023, and is currently a flagship project of cooperation between the two organisations, with an ongoing structured dialogue to ensure coordination.

Military mobility first gained attention at the EU level in 2017-18 through the launch of the first EU Action Plan and the various commitments undertaken by the Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of June 2018, which included developing national plans for military mobility and ensuring permissions for cross-border movement within five working days. A Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project to enhance cooperation on military mobility was launched in 2018.

The EU’s strategic need for military mobility became even more urgent in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the problems encountered by armed forces in the EU. This proves that more steps need to be taken to improve military mobility.

In that context, the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence of March 2022 confirmed that substantially enhancing military mobility is paramount for European security and defence. In line with the Strategic Compass, the Action Plan 2.0 was adopted in November 2022, for the period 2022-2026. It provides the current framework to develop a well-connected military mobility network, with shorter reaction times and capable, secure, sustainable and resilient transport infrastructure and capabilities.

Military mobility was designated a strategic priority at EU political level and identified as a priority focus area in EU defence capabilities and defence readiness by the Granada declaration adopted by the European Council on 6 October 2023.

In March 2024, the Commission published the European Defence Industrial Strategy, which indicates the need to address the remaining bottlenecks of military mobility.

In May 2024, Member States adopted an updated Military Mobility Pledge that complements and reinforces the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0. Member States committed to implement 13 concrete commitments before the end of 2026. These include, among others, prioritising investments in transport infrastructure benefitting military movements, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.

In February 2025, the European Court of Auditors published an audit of military mobility, which considered that progress has so far been variable. It makes recommendations in different areas to strengthen the EU’s impact on military mobility, including governance, funding predictability and the selection of dual use infrastructure projects under the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

In March 2025, the Commission and the HR presented a White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. It sets out the necessary steps to rebuild European defence, to support Ukraine, address critical capability shortfalls and establish a strong and competitive defence industrial base. Based on the defence capability gaps already identified by Member States, the White Paper identifies military mobility as one of the seven priority areas that are critical to build a robust European defence.

The White Paper acknowledges that considerable obstacles remain to moving troops and equipment unhindered across the EU, and identifies areas where urgent action is needed:

· Red tape, often requiring both diplomatic clearance specific to military transports and compliance with regular administrative rules and processes.

· Non-harmonised procedures, including customs, often cause severe delays in the issuance of cross-border permissions.

· The EU and Member States need to immediately simplify and streamline regulations and procedures and ensure priority access for the armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets. For their movements, the armed forces need access to critical transport infrastructure that is fit for a dual-use purpose.

· Armed forces need both the availability of all transport modes and multiple routings across the EU and connections to partner countries.

· The EU and Member States need to identify possible immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular NATO.

· There is a need for increased availability of specialised and dual use transport assets in all transport modes. Strengthened cooperation with EU industries would allow to increase supply of such critical assets and maintain lead market position of European companies offering dual use technologies.

Dual use transport infrastructure

In December 2021, the Commission presented its proposal to revise the TEN-T Regulation, with an amended proposal presented in July 2022 to reflect the changed geopolitical situation. The revised Regulation entered into force in July 2024. It contains four key elements to support military mobility within and beyond the EU:

1. It anchors within EU law the notion of a military mobility transport network;

2. Through its new Article 48 on military mobility, it mandates the Commission to identify priority military mobility corridors;

3. It sets the TEN-T on the path of becoming a largely dual-use transport infrastructure network, notably by requiring the Member States to consider military mobility needs when constructing or upgrading infrastructure on the TEN-T; and

4. It strengthens and aligns several transport infrastructure requirements with military requirements, especially for rail; in some instances the updated maps also reflect the military needs, most notably with extensions into neighbouring countries Ukraine and Moldova.

To further align standards of the TEN-T and the EU military transport network, the Council adopted in October 2023 the revised military requirements including Annex II on “Multi-Modal Transport Corridors”. The revision process included consultations with NATO. The enlarged scope of military requirements encompasses: (i) logistics hubs; (ii) the supply-chain infrastructure for fuel; (iii) lessons identified from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and (iv) military criteria for the evaluation of dual-use infrastructural project proposals.

In March 2025, the Council adopted the revised Annex II of the military requirements, which includes four priority multi-modal corridors (rail, road, sea and air) for military mobility for short-notice and large-scale movements of troops and equipment. These corridors were identified by the Commission together with the EU Military Staff representing the EEAS, and Member States, followed by consultations with NATO. The corridors can better guide and prioritise future investments in the military mobility network at both EU and national level.

Within these four priority corridors, 500 hot-spot projects have already been identified as being in need of urgent upgrade. Their security, maintenance and repair also need to be assured.

Your Rapporteurs believe that improving the capacity of transport infrastructure to handle military assets requires new measures, including streamlining and harmonizing complex national rules and procedures.

The military mobility package

The Commission has announced the presentation by the end of 2025 of a Military Mobility package, consisting of a joint communication, a regulation and amendments to existing EU laws. It will address existing infrastructure bottlenecks, procedural obstacles and capability gaps, and it is expected to present strategic objectives, harmonise national procedures and enhance infrastructure resilience. If ambitious enough, these measures will streamline military movements across the EU while integrating military needs with broader policies, such as transport, energy and taxation.

Your Rapporteurs encourage the Commission to consider the revision of all necessary pieces of EU legislation and look forward to this very much needed Military mobility package. The EU must simplify, harmonize, and digitalize military mobility procedures to accelerate the granting of permissions and ensure priority access for armed forces to transport facilities and networks. This includes customs formalities for military operations, the transport of dangerous goods, and diplomatic clearances.

Funding

The main funding instrument for military mobility is the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).

Under the MFF 2021-2027, a budget of approximately EUR 1.7 billion was allocated to co-fund dual-use transport infrastructure through the CEF. This figure represents 75% less than the EUR 6.5 billion proposed initially by the Commission and supported by Parliament. The dedicated military mobility envelope under the CEF has been exhausted after three calls (2021, 2022, and 2023).

In the current MFF period, transport infrastructure projects can receive funding through the CEF ‘General and Cohesion’ envelope.

With EUR 14.5 billion, the MFF’s overall Security and Defence heading – created for the first time in 2019 –remains modest. The current level of funds does not match the scale of additional investment needed to meet the demands of better preparedness for our own deterrence, as well as to support Ukraine in the long term.

To address this funding gap, the Commission presented, as part of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, a defence package providing financial levers to EU Member States to drive an investment surge in defence capabilities, including the allocation of resources to CEF for military mobility projects. The Commission also adopted a Communication on Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact.

Your Rapporteurs call on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to address the funding gap for military mobility to bolster European security. A more ambitious and forward-looking approach in the next MFF is needed to ensure adequate funding and flexibility for Member States to implement key infrastructure projects.

Relations with NATO

The Rapporteurs believe that enhanced military mobility reinforces the transatlantic alliance since NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States for moving Allied forces and military equipment. The progress in EU-NATO cooperation has ensured that the EU's military requirements are consistent with NATO's technical and geographical requirements. The EU must intensify its essential partnership with NATO, focusing on areas such as military requirements, transport infrastructure, customs, and cross-border movement permissions. Avoiding duplication of efforts and improving information sharing between the EU and NATO is crucial for achieving synergies and enhancing overall defence capabilities.

Interoperability with key regional partners such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans is essential for enhancing military mobility and strengthening dual-use infrastructure leading to the Union's Eastern and South-Eastern borders.

Conclusions

Your Rapporteurs strongly believe that enhancing military mobility within the EU is a multifaceted endeavour that requires concerted efforts at the EU and national levels. By urgently and efficiently addressing financial, regulatory, and institutional issues, and by strengthening cooperation with NATO and other partners, the EU can ensure a robust and responsive defence framework capable of meeting current and future security challenges in order to protect EU citizens and defend the Union's interests and shared values.

ANNEX: DECLARATIONS OF INPUT

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM PETRAS AUŠTREVIČIUS

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM ROBERTS ZĪLE

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.