Sittings · Document

Draft report (2025/2061(INI)) 2025-09-19

Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime

Committee on Budgets Committee on Budgetary Control

Amendment 1

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Citation -1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– (2025/2061(INL))

Or. en

Amendment 2

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Citation -1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to Article 225 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union,

Or. en

Amendment 3

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Citation 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7(1) thereof,	– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4(2), 4(3) and 7(1) thereof,

Or. en

Amendment 4

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Citation 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7(1) thereof,	– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7 thereof,

Or. en

Amendment 5

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Citation 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe
	Footnote: Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0056

Or. en

Amendment 6

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Citation 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 2 April 2025 entitled ‘The local and regional perspective in the implementation of the Rule of Law in the European Union’14,	deleted
_________________
14 OJ C, C/2025/3169, 20.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3169/oj.

Or. nl

Amendment 7

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Citation 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 30 April 2025 entitled ‘The economic dimension of the Rule of Law’,	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 8

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are reflected in the fundamental rights spelled out in the Charter, such as equality between women and men, non-discrimination, and the right of collective bargaining and action, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas adherence to these shared values constitutes the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU;	A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are reflected in the fundamental rights spelled out in the Charter, such as equality between women and men, non-discrimination, and the right of collective bargaining and action, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas adherence to these shared values constitutes the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU; whereas civil society organisations and other stakeholders play an important role in fostering the rule of law on the ground;

Or. en

Amendment 9

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are reflected in the fundamental rights spelled out in the Charter, such as equality between women and men, non-discrimination, and the right of collective bargaining and action, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas adherence to these shared values constitutes the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU;	(Does not affect the English version.)

Or. nl

Amendment 10

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas any clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by a given Member State can affect the fundamental rights of EU citizens in all of the Member States, trust and solidarity between the Member States, and key EU achievements, such as the functioning of the single market and the independence of the media;	C. whereas a relevant serious breach of the rule of law by a given Member State might affect the fundamental rights of EU citizens in all of the Member States, trust and solidarity between the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 11

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas any clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by a given Member State can affect the fundamental rights of EU citizens in all of the Member States, trust and solidarity between the Member States, and key EU achievements, such as the functioning of the single market and the independence of the media;	C. whereas any clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by a given Member State can affect the fundamental rights of EU citizens in all of the Member States, trust and solidarity and sincere cooperation between the Member States, and key EU achievements, such as free movement of people, the functioning of the single market and the independence of the media;

Or. en

Amendment 12

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	C a. whereas freedom of expression and the right to information lack appropriate levels of protection in the EU; whereas the lack of transparency of media ownership and public funding, the lack of independence of editorials from commercial and political influence, and viability problems due to financial needs constitute a risk to the right to information; whereas the promotion of legal content moderation and fact-checking by non-independent associations constitutes an outright attack on freedom of expression;

Or. en

Amendment 13

Thomas Geisel

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	C a. Whereas the Conditionality Regulation was introduced in order to protect the budget of the European Union which determines the commitments and payments to be observed and executed by the European Commission and which has been authorized by the Union's budgetary authorities which are - on equal terms - the European Council and the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 14

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;	D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate, transparently reasoned and time-appropriate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;

Or. en

Amendment 15

Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;	D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State or EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, including the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;

Or. en

Amendment 16

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E a. whereas the Regulation requires the Commission to monitor the rule of law in all Member States but measures have so far been proposed and adopted only in the case of Hungary; whereas additional information was requested from Poland;

Or. en

Amendment 17

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Recital E b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	E b. whereas it is important to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries of EU funds; whereas Member States concerned by a decision under the Conditionality Regulation are required to report on their compliance with their obligations towards final recipients and beneficiaries;

Or. en

Amendment 18

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	F a. whereas the Commission is legally required to keep Parliament informed about its notifications to a Member State in which it considers that breaches of the principles of the rule of law might exist and about any measures proposed, adopted and lifted pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 19

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	G a. whereast the former Commissioner entrusted with negotiating the anti-corruption framework and the rule of law with Member States is currently the subject of a criminal investigation for alleged money laundering and other corruption-related offences;

Or. en

Amendment 20

Tamás Deutsch, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas in December 2024, for the first time, budgetary commitments that had been suspended due to the application of the Conditionality Regulation were ultimately lost by the affected Member State in line with Article 7(3) of the Regulation, because the Member State had not remedied the deficiencies originally identified;	H. whereas Article 7(3) of the Conditionality Regulation became applicable in relation to Article 2(1) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506, which was based on the concrete weaknesses, risks and shortcomings identified by the Council, while it acknowledged the proper implementation of the majority of the commitments made by Hungary in its remedial measures (in total 17);

Or. en

Amendment 21

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital H

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
H. whereas in December 2024, for the first time, budgetary commitments that had been suspended due to the application of the Conditionality Regulation were ultimately lost by the affected Member State in line with Article 7(3) of the Regulation, because the Member State had not remedied the deficiencies originally identified;	H. whereas in December 2024, for the first time, budgetary commitments that had been suspended due to the application of the Conditionality Regulation were ultimately lost by the affected Member State in line with Article 7(3) of the Regulation, because the Member State had not remedied the deficiencies originally identified within the required deadline;

Or. en

Amendment 22

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital H a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	H a. whereas on 16th July the Commission published its proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework and whereas there is a clear interplay between the rule-of-law aspects included in the National and Regional Plans proposal and the Conditionality mechanism;

Or. en

Amendment 23

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of its application, and by issuing recommendations for its future implementation;	I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 24

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of its application, and by issuing recommendations for its future implementation;	I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation including also the interplay with other union instruments, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of its application, and by issuing recommendations for its future implementation

Or. en

Amendment 25

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is key to the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding;	1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is an essential prerequisite for the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding; recalls at the same time that the Conditionality Regulation does not exhaustively define situations that constitute breaches of the rule of law, in particular addressing the impact of rule of law backsliding on civil society organisations and independent media; calls on the Commission to systematically include restrictions on civic space, harassment of NGOs, and attacks on media pluralism as risk indicators directly relevant to the protection of the EU budget and financial interests;

Or. en

Amendment 26

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is key to the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding;	1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is key to the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding; stresses that this is essential for safeguarding citizens’ trust in the Union and for ensuring that EU funds deliver tangible benefits across all Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 27

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is key to the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding;	1. Recalls that the rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU and that respect for the rule of law is key to the sound financial management and effective use of EU funding; urges the Commission to define more precisely what is meant by 'infringement of the rule of law';

Or. nl

Amendment 28

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1 a. Underlines that the EU institutions themselves are bound by the rule of law and must act strictly within the limits of the Treaties; stresses that the Treaties are the primary source of the Union’s rule-of-law framework, and recalls that existing provisions, such as Article 7 TEU, already provide mechanisms to address serious breaches; underlines concern that the Commission’s continuous tendency to extend and overregulate in this field risks exceeding the competences conferred by the Treaties and undermining institutional balance and breaching the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget;	2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget; notes, however, that its practical implementation remains insufficient and calls for concrete improvements to ensure its full effectiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget;	2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget, stresses, however that its application should respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 31

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget;	2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches as narrowly defined in the regulation or serious risks thereof, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to all current and future financing instruments of the EU budget without any time limitation;

Or. en

Amendment 32

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget;	2. Highlights that the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation in 2020 represents a core pillar for the protection of the EU budget against breaches or serious risks resulting from rule of law breaches, which applies across the whole budget and allows for a cumulative application of various measures; underlines that the Conditionality Regulation does not have a time limit and therefore applies to current and future financing instruments of the EU budget;

Or. en

Amendment 33

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2 a. Condemns in the strongest terms the instrumentalisation of rule of law conditionality for politically motivated ideological assaults on Member States; emphasises that in these assaults, the Commission has demonstrably utilised and financed NGOs and left-leaning media outlets through Union funds; demands consequently an immediate cessation of these attacks against national sovereignty, which are perpetrated through the misuse of the rule of law conditionality;

Or. en

Amendment 34

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities;	3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities;
	Emphasizes that Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that "The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions [...]”;

Or. en

Amendment 35

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities;	3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation of all Member States and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to enforce applicable legislation fully reflecting the court’s affirmation and to highlight this point in all its relevant communication

Or. en

Amendment 36

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Stresses that these financing instruments must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law;	4. Stresses that these financing instruments must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law; notes that citizens struggle to understand why Member States persistently violating the rule of law continue to enjoy voting rights, thereby risking a loss of trust in the Union’s values and decision-making processes;

Or. en

Amendment 37

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Stresses that these financing instruments must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law;	4. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation or any other available budgetary measure must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 38

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Recalls that the Commission’s ‘rule of law toolbox’ has considerably evolved over the last decade, with the inclusion of multiple instruments to protect the rule of law, including the annual rule of law report covering all 27 Member States, the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation, and the so-called super milestones related to the rule of law under the RRF;	5. Recalls that the Commission’s ‘rule of law toolbox’ has considerably evolved over the last decade, with the inclusion of multiple instruments to protect the rule of law, including the annual rule of law report covering all 27 Member States, the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation, and the so-called super milestones related to the rule of law under the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining and further enhancing synergies between the various rule of law instruments; calls for the establishment of a more robust monitoring and reporting framework, in particular with regard to the implementation status of remedial measures by Member States subject to procedures under the general regime of conditionality;

Or. en

Amendment 39

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5 a. Notes with concern the Commission’s politically biased monitoring of rule of law benchmarks through the rule of law toolbox; calls on the Commission to stop political attacks against right-wing, conservative governments; regrets the fact that the Commission is abusing rule of law conditionality to withhold EU funds from governments on a political basis and is thereby violating the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in the Treaties; calls on the Commission to adhere to the principle of sincere cooperation with the governments of all Member States, irrespective of their political leaning;

Or. en

Amendment 40

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5 a. Stresses that the recently published 2025 Spring Eurobarometer survey1a shows overwhelming public support for linking the provision of EU funds to compliance with the rule of law and democratic principles, with 85 % of European citizens and 82 % of Hungarian citizens in favour of this approach; underlines that, as the direct representative of Union citizens, Parliament must respect this clear demand and stand firmly in defence of the conditionality mechanism as an essential tool to protect the Union budget and safeguard the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;
	_________________
	1a European Parliament: Eurobarometer Spring 2025, EB 103.4. - Invest in what matters

Or. en

Amendment 41

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU;	6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU; stresses that it must be applied in line with the principle of ‘smart conditionality’, ensuring that final recipients and beneficiaries, including local and regional authorities, NGOs and other stakeholders, should not be punished for the violations committed by central governments;

Or. en

Amendment 42

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU;	6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU regardless of any budgetary implication;

Or. en

Amendment 43

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 44

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;	8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;
	emphasises that supremacy of national constitutions remains the absolute principle which governs the relationship between the constitutions of the Members States and the Union law;

Or. en

Amendment 45

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;	8. Notes the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 46

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;	8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States; underlines, however, that these judgments must be interpreted strictly within the limits of the Treaties, so as not to extend Union competences beyond those explicity conferred;

Or. en

Amendment 47

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8 a. Acknowledges that the Conditionality Regulation does not exhaustively define situations that constitute breaches of the rule of law but points to the fact that rules for accessing funds are defined in specific legislation;

Or. en

Amendment 48

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8 b. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation does not include a definition of ‘rule of law’ but points to the finding of the CJEU that the concept has been sufficiently developed in case law and the constitutional traditions of the Member States, which limits the discretion of the Commission in its assessments; rejects, therefore, any claim of legal uncertainty;

Or. en

Amendment 49

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8 c. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation is applicable to every Member State, since the Commission assesses for all Member States whether the conditions for the adoption of measures set out in Article 4 are fulfilled;

Or. en

Amendment 50

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8 d. Notes that the procedure prior to the adoption of measures involves several steps, including a written notification from the Commission to the Member State concerned, an exchange of information, possible commitments from the Member State concerned in the form of remedial measures to address the situation, observations from the Member State and, where necessary, a Commission proposal for measures on which the Council decides by qualified majority within strict deadlines;

Or. en

Amendment 51

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Guidelines were adopted over a year after the entry into force of the Regulation, and that this contributed to a de facto delay in its application;	9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Guidelines were adopted over a year after the entry into force of the Regulation, and that this contributed to a de facto delay in its application; calls for earlier and more transparent engagement with stakeholders to prevent such delays in the future;

Or. en

Amendment 52

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Regrets that, following the entry into force of the Conditionality Regulation on 1 January 2021, the Commission did not immediately trigger Article 6(1) in reaction to ongoing severe violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States, which posed a serious risk to the EU’s financial interests; emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation;	10. Emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation, which action was later on withdrawn; reminds that this action clearly states that the Parliament's political blackmailing led to trigerring the rule of law procedure against some Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 53

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Regrets that, following the entry into force of the Conditionality Regulation on 1 January 2021, the Commission did not immediately trigger Article 6(1) in reaction to ongoing severe violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States, which posed a serious risk to the EU’s financial interests; emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation;	10. Regrets that, following the entry into force of the Conditionality Regulation on 1 January 2021, the Commission did not immediately trigger Article 6(1) in reaction to ongoing severe violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States, which posed a serious risk to the EU’s financial interests; emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation; stresses that timely responses are essential for protecting the EU budget;

Or. en

Amendment 54

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Regrets that, following the entry into force of the Conditionality Regulation on 1 January 2021, the Commission did not immediately trigger Article 6(1) in reaction to ongoing severe violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States, which posed a serious risk to the EU’s financial interests; emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation;	10. Notes that, following the entry into force of the Conditionality Regulation on 1 January 2021, the Commission did not immediately trigger Article 6(1) in reaction to concerns about possible violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States; emphasises that in October 2021, following repeated calls on the Commission to act, Parliament launched an action against the Commission before the CJEU pursuant to Article 265 TFEU over its failure to act and apply the Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 55

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10 a. The Commission shall establish and publish indicative internal timelines for each procedural phase (screening, letter, proposal of measures, review);

Or. en

Amendment 56

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument;	11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument; stresses the importance of providing clear explanations on how such evidence, including that submitted by civil society organisations, is taken into account in the Commission’s decisions;

Or. en

Amendment 57

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument;	11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; stresses that such information should be carefully verified to avoid politically motivated or unsubstantiated claims;

Or. en

Amendment 58

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument;	11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers and from the European Parliament; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 59

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11 a. Notes with concern that, the European Court of Auditors could not always verify the reasons for the Commission’s choice of one enforcement tool over another, and therefore concludes that the Commission cannot transparently demonstrate that the Union’s financial interests are being properly protected across all Member States; stresses that this lack of transparency undermines trust in the even application of the Conditionality Regulation 2a;
	_________________
	2a https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/news/NEWS-SR-2024-03

Or. en

Amendment 60

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11 a. Condemns the use of CSOs and HRDs to implement the foreign agendas of non-EU state and non-state actors; stresses that the Commission should not rely on foreign-funded organisations when designing new policies, as their objectives do not necessarily align with those of the EU and of its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 61

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11 b. Expresses deep concern about the lack of transparency of CSOs, especially regarding their funding; recalls the special report No 35/2018 by the European Court of Auditors, which highlighted the lack of transparency regarding the implementation of EU funds by CSOs; emphasises the consequent risk of money laundering and terrorist financing through non-profit organisations;

Or. en

Amendment 62

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11 b. Recalls what must be regarded as one of the gravest breaches of the rule of law, transparency, and accountability ever committed by an EU institution—the negotiation of COVID-19 vaccine contracts by the European Commission, conducted in a manner that raises unprecedented concerns about legality, oversight, and respect for democratic standards;

Or. en

Amendment 63

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;	12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls for simplified and multilingual complaint procedures, accessible to civil society organisations, journalists, academics and local authorities; insists that whistle-blowers and complainants must be offered robust protection against retaliation; stresses that such mechanisms must ensure full anonymity in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1937, and provide legal, financial and psychological support where necessary;

Or. en

Amendment 64

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;	12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action; stresses that such tools must be accessible, transparent and trusted by stakeholders, in order to maximise their effectiveness and ensure that evidence received is fully taken into account;

Or. en

Amendment 65

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;	12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential and user friendly reporting portal, guaranteeing whistblower protection against personal data misuse, through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;

Or. en

Amendment 66

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	12 a. Expresses deep concern that, despite the ECA requirement for decisions to be based on technical and legal criteria, political considerations may ultimately prevail; recalls the auditors’ warning that decisions on blocking or releasing funds, which require a qualified majority in Council, are often intertwined with unrelated high-level negotiations that require unanimity1a;
	_________________
	1a https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-03

Or. en

Amendment 67

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;	13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this gap between findings and enforcement undermines the Regulation’s credibility and weakens its preventive function in protecting the EU’s financial interests;

Or. en

Amendment 68

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;	13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF also made public in the Annual reports on the protection of the EU's financial interests ("PIF" Report) and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 69

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;	13. Notes that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 70

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	13 a. Reminds that the ECA’s special report No 03/2024 concluded that the Commission did not systematically assess and document the impact on the EU’s financial interests for all member states in which it identified challenges to the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 71

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided;	14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches or serious risks thereof and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably in a timely manner; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided; reiterates that under no circumstances can the rule of law be even seen as a bargaining chip; emphasises that the tool must not only be used as a measure of last-resort but that the Regulation also allows for early-stage partial suspensions whenever rule of law breaches have been identified that could seriously risk affecting the EU budget; calls on the Commission in this regard to make full and timely use of the instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 72

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided;	14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States and EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies , while respecting all principles set out in that regulation; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and serious risks to the EU budget and the Member State or EU institution concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal political dialogues between the Parliament and the Commission must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided;

Or. en

Amendment 73

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided;	14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing, used for example by the Hungarian government to obstruct Union decision-making, must be firmly rejected;

Or. en

Amendment 74

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided;	14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation should be applied consistently across all Member States; calls on the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act in a timely and transparent manner where a link has been established between rule of law concerns and risks to the EU budget, and where the Member State concerned does not take sufficient measures; notes that informal dialogues should not unduly delay the process; underlines the importance of ensuring that enforcement remains impartial, proportionate and avoids the perceprtion of selectiver treatment of certain Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 75

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Auke Zijlstra, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14 a. Regrets the fact that the Commission assesses the application of the rule of law by the Member States only, and not by the EU institutions themselves; underlines that there are plenty of alleged breaches of the rule of law by the EU institutions, not least by the Commission, that require proper scrutiny;

Or. en

Amendment 76

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Auke Zijlstra, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14 b. Notes with concern recent revelations in the ‘green lobby scandal’ on the use of EU funds by the Commission to interfere with the EU legislative branch in seeking support for the European Green Deal; calls, in this regard, for a thorough investigation of the case, and for the recovery of all the taxpayers’ money that was unduly spent;

Or. en

Amendment 77

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;	15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA; stresses that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries should be shielded from the consequences of institutional disputes;

Or. en

Amendment 78

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;	15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach especially as evidenced by fraudulent activities identified by OLAF, EPPO, or national and regional authorities, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;

Or. en

Amendment 79

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;	15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; calls on the Commission to publish the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;

Or. en

Amendment 80

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15 a. Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in cases where sanctions are imposed on their government; strongly believes that, to date, this provision has been insufficiently enforced and stresses the need for a robust, smart conditionality approach to safeguard beneficiaries from being penalised due to the actions of their government, particularly in cases such as the Hungarian government’s actions, which undermine the rule of law and have resulted in the suspension of EU funds; calls on the Commission to urgently propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society organisations, SMEs and other beneficiaries can continue to access Union funding, even in cases of rule of law violations by national governments, without undermining the effectiveness and enforcement of the regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 81

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15 a. Deplores the double standards exhibited by the Commission when it overtly terminated the Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland after what it deemed to be a politically favourable election outcome in 2023, despite the fact that most elements of the action plan have not even been initiated by the Polish Government yet; underlines the fact that the Article 7 procedure against Hungary has been ongoing for seven years without any outcome; calls on the Council to swiftly terminate the Article 7 procedure against Hungary;

Or. en

Amendment 82

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15 a. Stresses that the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, must act with full impartiality irrespective of the political orientation of national governments, and sanction in all fairness any breach of the rule of law that endangers the EU budget and the Union’s values; recalls that only such impartial enforcement can preserve the credibility and legitimacy of the conditionality regime;

Or. en

Amendment 83

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;	16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism; the opinion of the European anti-fraud body should be taken into account in decisions about the use of the mechanism;

Or. en

Amendment 84

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;	16. While acknowledging that the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget can be difficult insists at the same time that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;

Or. en

Amendment 85

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;	16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; recalls, however, that this requirement is an essential criterion for the application of the conditionality procedure that has to be proven;

Or. en

Amendment 86

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;	16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; however, underlines that this safeguard is important to ensure legal certanty and prevent arbitrary application of the Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 87

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16 a. Notes with concern the absence of clear criteria, which prevents Member States from knowing in advance which actions might trigger sanctions, thereby undermining legal certainty and the principle of predictable governance; underlines that the requirement of establishing a “sufficiently direct link” between rule-of-law deficiencies and the Union budget or its financial interests is neither fixed nor objectively defined, opening the door to disputes over causality, scope, and evidence;

Or. en

Amendment 88

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	deleted
_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. nl

Amendment 89

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	deleted
_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 90

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Rasmus Andresen, Brando Benifei, Eero Heinäluoma, Moritz Körner, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Tineke Strik, Chloé Ridel, Jutta Paulus, Pär Holmgren, Alice Kuhnke, Isabella Lövin

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary as well as a prohibition for the Commission to enter into new legal commitments with public interest trusts and entities maintained by them for EU funding implemented under direct or indirect management.; points to the legal analysis[1] demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a 100% suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that since the adoption of measures in December 2022, the Commission has reassessed the breaches identified and the state of play of remedial measures both in December 2023, a year after the original decision taken, as well as in December 2024, following a notification from Hungary in relation to remedying breaches related to public interest trusts ; stresses that both Commission decisions concluded that the necessary steps have not been fulfilled; notes the decisions do not include any assessment of additional breaches of the rule of law or serious risks thereof affecting or risking affecting the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to urgently re-assess and address rule of law backsliding in particular as regards the independence of the judiciary by proposing additional measures in particular the 100% suspension of payments; [1]
_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 91

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; stresses that any suspension of funds must remain proportionate, based on objective evidence, and should avoid unintended consequences for citizens, local communities and beneficiaries;
_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 92

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones Special and to introduce an automatic escalation mechanism whereby persistent non-compliance over two consecutive reassessments results in the suspension of 100 % of the concerned commitments.
_________________	_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.	17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 93

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law by the Hungarian government should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the measures by the Hungarian government both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones, including provisions on systematic reporting, assessment, control and monitoring;
_________________	_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.	17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 94

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary, including the severe restriction of media freedom, should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;
_________________	_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.	17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 95

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 96

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications;	18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety and globally, fully taking into account all developments between the original decision on the measures and the situation on the ground at the moment a decision is taken; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications and report on this, before it makes any proposals to reverse measures;

Or. en

Amendment 97

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications;	18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications; underlines that this must also respect the principle of ‘smart conditionality’, ensuring that final recipients and beneficiaries are not sanctioned for central government failures;

Or. en

Amendment 98

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications;	18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications; Verification of remediation shall include on-site checks and random ex-post audits within 24 months;

Or. en

Amendment 99

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective benchmarks and on-site verifications;	18. Stresses that EU funds that have been suspended under the Conditionality Regulation must only be released when the situation that had led to the adoption of measures has been remedied in its entirety; calls on the Commission to confirm that rule of law compliance is verifiably achieved in practice, with objective, independent benchmarks and on-site verifications;

Or. nl

Amendment 100

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18 a. Emphasizes that once rule of law concerns have been remedied, the Commission should act swiftly and flexibly in resuming the disbursement of funds; stresses the importance of working closely with national authorities to prevent further losses due to backlogs; calls on the Commission, once it has positively reassessed the remedial measures, to immediately prepare for the restarting of programme implementation on the ground, so that funds can flow without delay following the Council’s decision;

Or. en

Amendment 101

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18 a. Echoes the ECA’s warning that the Conditionality regime must not turn into a ‘box-ticking exercise’, whereby a Member State purely satisfies formal requirements, but must be matched by genuine improvements on the ground;

Or. en

Amendment 102

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
19. Recalls that, as early as June 2023, Parliament18 warned against the risks of reversals of remedial measures once financial sanctions are lifted, a contingency not expressly covered by either the Conditionality Regulation or the 2022 Guidelines; highlights that the ECA has also identified this risk; calls on the Commission to swiftly re-suspend, and, where appropriate, recover, EU funds, if remedial actions are subsequently reversed;	deleted
_________________
18 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds (OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 103

Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
19. Recalls that, as early as June 2023, Parliament18 warned against the risks of reversals of remedial measures once financial sanctions are lifted, a contingency not expressly covered by either the Conditionality Regulation or the 2022 Guidelines; highlights that the ECA has also identified this risk; calls on the Commission to swiftly re-suspend, and, where appropriate, recover, EU funds, if remedial actions are subsequently reversed;	19. Recalls that, as early as June 2023, Parliament18 warned against the risks of reversals of remedial measures once financial sanctions are lifted, a contingency not expressly covered by either the Conditionality Regulation or the 2022 Guidelines; highlights that the ECA has also identified this risk; calls on the Commission to swiftly re-suspend, and, where appropriate, recover, EU funds, if remedial actions are subsequently reversed; in this case, notification to the Parliament should be delivered immediately;
_________________	_________________
18 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds (OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj).	18 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds (OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 104

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
19. Recalls that, as early as June 2023, Parliament18 warned against the risks of reversals of remedial measures once financial sanctions are lifted, a contingency not expressly covered by either the Conditionality Regulation or the 2022 Guidelines; highlights that the ECA has also identified this risk; calls on the Commission to swiftly re-suspend, and, where appropriate, recover, EU funds, if remedial actions are subsequently reversed;	19. Recalls that, as early as June 2023, Parliament18 warned against the risks of reversals of remedial measures once financial sanctions are lifted, a contingency not expressly covered by either the Conditionality Regulation or the 2022 Guidelines; highlights that the ECA has also identified this risk; notes the risk of reversal of remedial measures, and invites the Commission to ensure that any follow up remains evidence based and proportionate;
_________________	_________________
18 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds (OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj).	18 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds (OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 105

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action; calls, therefore, for the consolidation of the units responsible for rule of law matters into a more transparent and efficient structure, in order to ensure coherence, consistency, transparency and timely enforcement;

Or. en

Amendment 106

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action; stresses the need for clear coordination and information-sharing among services to ensure timely, transparent, and impartial application of the conditionality regime;

Or. en

Amendment 107

Tamás Deutsch, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;

Or. en

Amendment 108

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; and recalls with grave concern that the other measures available have not been systematically used in the past; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;

Or. en

Amendment 109

Thomas Geisel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; acknowledges that the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort, as the programs and legal acts that are being financed by the budget of the European Union usually exhaustively state the conditions and circumstances under which these funds can be disbursed, withheld or reclaimed;

Or. en

Amendment 110

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;	21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application; reminds that Parliament took a legal action against the Commission before the CJEU in March 2024 in order to review the legality of the said Commission decision, as well as to bring legal certainty to the implementation of the Rule of Law mechanisms, and that the CJEU ruling is still pending;

Or. en

Amendment 111

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;	21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; deeply regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that the Hungarian government had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application; urges the European Commission to ensure that EU funds effectively reach the Hungarian population, particularly through direct or indirect funding for local and regional authorities, civil society organisations and SMEs independent from the Hungarian government;

Or. en

Amendment 112

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;	21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;

Or. en

Amendment 113

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;	21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; notes that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;

Or. en

Amendment 114

Tamás Deutsch, Ondřej Knotek

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, and that no payments should be made, even if progress is made in one or more areas, if deficiencies still persist in another;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 115

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, and that no payments should be made, even if progress is made in one or more areas, if deficiencies still persist in another;	22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, and that no payments should be made, even if progress is made in one or more areas, if deficiencies still persist in another and insists that any backsliding compared to the situation in which these measures were identified should also be factored in;

Or. en

Amendment 116

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, and that no payments should be made, even if progress is made in one or more areas, if deficiencies still persist in another;	22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated separate instruments, and once progress is made in one area, funds linked to that should be released ;

Or. en

Amendment 117

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, and that no payments should be made, even if progress is made in one or more areas, if deficiencies still persist in another;	22. Stresses that the rule of law-related measures required for the release of EU funding, as defined by the relevant decisions taken under the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, must be treated as a single, integral package, but should be evaluated on a case by case basis, to reflect progess achieved without undermining accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 118

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Ondřej Knotek

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 119

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;	23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of measures under the Conditionality Regulation but also the Common Provisions Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision; calls, moreover, for an amendment to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (Common Provisions Regulation) to close this loophole definitively, clarifying that commitments suspended pursuant to measures adopted under the Conditionality Regulation, or amounts suspended following non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions under the Common Provisions Regulation, shall not be eligible for programme amendments or transfers under that Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 120

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;	23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to governments non-compliant with Union values and with their obligations to protect the Union’s financial interests that losses can be offset elsewhere; insists that the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; believes that the spirit of the Conditionality Regulation precludes any transfer requests from governments subject to measures under the Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;

Or. en

Amendment 121

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 122

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information;

Or. en

Amendment 123

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; stresses that this imbalance must be corrected, and calls for a revision of the Regulation to grant Parliament co-decision powers in the adoption, amendment, suspension or lifting of measures under the conditionality mechanism; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;

Or. en

Amendment 124

Thomas Geisel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	24. Regrets that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget;

Or. en

Amendment 125

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, to reflect at least to a certain extent the principle of proportionality ;

Or. en

Amendment 126

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;	24. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council – acting by qualified majority – to amend the Commission proposal before the adoption of measures, whereas Parliament’s role is limited to ex post information, thus depriving one arm of the EU’s budgetary and discharge authority of a meaningful say in decisions that are key to the protection of the EU budget; notes that in the single case that Council had to decide upon, it chose to modify the Commission’s proposal by lowering the amounts to be suspended, without any justification;

Or. en

Amendment 127

Thomas Geisel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24 a. Calls on the Commission to amend Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 in such a way, that any proposal in which the Commission withholds funds authorized by the Union's budget by invoking the Conditionality Regulation shall require the approval of both the European Council – by qualified majority – and the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 128

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
25. Reiterates that Parliament takes its scrutiny role concerning the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation very seriously; acknowledges that the Commission has complied with its legal obligation to inform Parliament immediatelyof any measures proposed, adopted or lifted; regrets that the Commission only provided the bare minimum information, without key details, and, even upon Parliament’s request, did not share the full documentation; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information-sharing is essential for Parliament to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively;	25. Reiterates that Parliament takes its scrutiny role concerning the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation very seriously; acknowledges that the Commission has complied with its legal obligation to inform Parliament immediatelyof any measures proposed, adopted or lifted; regrets that the Commission only provided the bare minimum information, without key details, and, even upon Parliament’s request, did not share the full documentation; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information-sharing is essential for Parliament to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively and for citizens to maintain trust in EU institutions and the Union’s credibility as a whole;

Or. en

Amendment 129

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25 a. Takes note of the conclusion of the negotiations on the revision of the Framework Agreement and that Commission commits to further strengthening interinstitutional cooperation on budgetary matters; recalls that Parliament should be treated on an equal footing with the Council in all matters of information sharing, through the systematic provision to Parliament and its committees of timely, structured, and comprehensive access to all relevant documents and information;

Or. en

Amendment 130

Tamás Deutsch, Ondřej Knotek

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU; deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with delays;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 131

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU; deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with delays;	26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question;

Or. en

Amendment 132

Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU; deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with delays;	26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU;deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with delays;
	Welcomes the Commission to enhance full transparency on procedural information and access public openness , thus contributing to foster and enforce trust inside and outside the EU institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 133

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU; deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with delays;	26. Regrets, in addition, that Parliament has no access to the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission services and the Member State in question; stresses that withholding such evidence undermines Parliament’s Treaty-based budgetary control prerogatives under Article 14(1) TEU and Article 319 TFEU; deplores, furthermore, that it had to repeatedly resort to letters or resolutions to obtain basic procedural information from the Commission, and that many documents were transmitted with very significant delays;

Or. en

Amendment 134

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 26 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	26 a. Insists on systematic, secure access to all the information and documentation required for Parliament to fulfil its scrutiny role, including the correspondence exchanged between the Commission services and the Member State concerned and the reports provided under Article 5(2) of the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 135

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
27. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel to ensure access to such information for the Parliament bodies responsible, while safeguarding its confidentiality;	27. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel to ensure access by the competent bodies of Parliament to all relevant information, including the written notification, any request for additional information and the correspondence between the Commission and the Member State concerned by a potential suspension of funds, to such information, while safeguarding its confidentiality;

Or. en

Amendment 136

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; notes that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures;	28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; notes that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures; emphasises that proactive communication is essential to counter disinformation and reinforce trust in the EU institutions and their processes;

Or. en

Amendment 137

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; notes that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures;	28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus;

Or. en

Amendment 138

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; notes that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures;	28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; stresses also that transparency must be exercised with care to avoid stigmatisation of Member States and politicisation of ongoing procedures;

Or. en

Amendment 139

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; notes that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures;	28. Regrets that the information made public by the Commission concerning its findings in specific cases under the Conditionality Regulation omits the concrete rule of law breaches detected, the risk analysis methodology and the proportionality calculus; warns that this lack of information has been exploited by extremist actors to spread disinformation about the EU’s motives and procedures;

Or. en

Amendment 140

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	28 a. Stresses the importance of guaranteeing adequate EU funding to civil society organisations, as they play a crucial role in safeguarding rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights; in this regard calls on the Commission to go beyond project funding and to provide multiannual funding cycles to ensure the long-term sustainability of civil society;

Or. en

Amendment 141

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	28 a. Calls on the Commission to consider establishing a structured and systematic public consultation mechanism with non-state stakeholders for the definition of remedial measures under the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 142

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 143

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;	29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls the Commission’s duties to consider the potential impact on final recipients when adopting measures; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;

Or. en

Amendment 144

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;	29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; stresses that this principle lies at the core of ‘smart conditionality’; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;

Or. en

Amendment 145

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;	29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments, respecting the principle of subsidiarity; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries;

Or. en

Amendment 146

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 30

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 147

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 30

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;	30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; emphasises that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding; urges the Commission to set out a concrete proposal on how final beneficiaries who have been adversely affected by the Conditionality Regulation could still have access to EU funds (for example through a new agency with direct management mandate); regrets that despite the call of the Parliament’s call in its Opinion on General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2026 to find ways for redirecting EU funds directly to final beneficiaries, no progress has been made by the Commission so far; as a last resort asks the Commission to consider cash transfers to citizens whose access to EU funds has been blocked by their government’s action in order to ensure non-discrimination among EU citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 148

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 30

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;	30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to potential final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;

Or. en

Amendment 149

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;	31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms; invites the Commission to establish a specific mechanism for monitoring corruption risks in the management of EU funds, including clear integrity criteria for managing authorities and main beneficiaries, the obligation to fully publish contracts financed from EU funds and their beneficial owners, as well as proportionate financial penalties for Member States that fail to effectively enforce anti-corruption legislation.

Or. en

Amendment 150

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;	31. Underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 151

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;	31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as media, telecommunications, banking, retail, agriculture, food, health-care, pharmacy, construction, tourism and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 152

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;	31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, agro-food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 153

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	31 a. Stresses the importance of systematically integrating European and international standards and recommendations on the prevention and combating of money laundering (AML) into the assessments carried out under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to develop clear AML risk indicators for projects financed from the EU budget, to strengthen the exchange of information with national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and to make access to funding conditional on compliance with these standards

Or. en

Amendment 154

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	31 a. Regrets that, despite Parliament’s requests in its 2026 budget opinion and in its Own Initiative Report ‘A revamped long-term budget for the Union in the changing world’ to explore ways of redirecting EU funds directly to final beneficiaries, the new budget proposal presented by the Commission contains no such concrete measures;

Or. en

Amendment 155

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	31 a. Stresses that in some Member States, intimidation and reprisals against whistle-blowers and investigative journalists contribute to systemic corruption risks; calls on the Commission to treat any such reprisals as aggravating factors when assessing budgetary risks under the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 156

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	31 a. The rule of law in the EU Invites the Commission to explore solid coercive measures against any Member State that does not continue the payments for final recipients and beneficiaries, the after the suspension of EU funds

Or. en

Amendment 157

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 31 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	31 b. Stresses that the scope of the Conditionality Regulation must not apply to funding for security, food security and health, as these constitute essential public services for all EU citizens and no citizen should face discrimination in their access to these public goods.

Or. en

Amendment 158

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Lessons learnt and recommendations for future improvements	Lessons learnt

Or. en

Amendment 159

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 160

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 161

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 162

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;	32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law or serious risks thereof; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;

Or. en

Amendment 163

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	32 a. Welcomes national initiatives to simplify access to Union programmes through digital single-entry points and standardised applications; stresses that reducing unnecessary administrative burdens supports SMEs, municipalities and civil society while maintaining strict financial controls;

Or. en

Amendment 164

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	32 a. Criticizes the poor and inconsistent implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, which has so far failed to ensure effective enforcement, particularly in the cases of Hungary and Poland, where systemic breaches of the rule of law persist;

Or. en

Amendment 165

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	32 b. Regrets that the European Parliament plays only a marginal role in the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, despite being the direct representative of EU citizens. Believes that the Parliament must be placed on an equal footing with the Council and the Commission in all key decisions concerning the freezing, maintenance and restoration of EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 166

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 167

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox;	33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox; emphasis that consistent consideration of media freedom and independent civil society is essential for assessing systemic breaches in Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 168

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox;	33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox in particular ex-ante tools and their joint application if needed;

Or. en

Amendment 169

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 33

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
33. Underlines that, although there is no need to revise the Conditionality Regulation at this stage, some aspects of its application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, and its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox;	33. Underlines that, some aspects of Conditionality Regulation application should be improved, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, transparency, subsidiarity and objectivity in its application to Member States, as well as its coordination and consistency with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox;

Or. en

Amendment 170

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality is calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches; and provide clear solutions and practical steps for when reversals occur;	34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality is calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk, providing detailed criteria for assessing and establishing the existence of such a link, as recommended in ECA special report from 2024, The rule of law in the EU - An improved framework to protect the EU’s financial interests, but risks remain ; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches; and provide clear solutions and practical steps for when reversals occur;

Or. en

Amendment 171

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality is calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches; and provide clear solutions and practical steps for when reversals occur;	34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality is calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches and how to handle backsliding should it occur linked to the breaches identified already;

Or. en

Amendment 172

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 34 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	34 a. Stresses that the Commission should document that link in every case file and publish, together with each decision, a succinct explanation of how the ‘sufficiently direct link’ test was met, using the indicators listed in the revised Guidelines;

Or. en

Amendment 173

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 174

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;	35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality; regrets that the new MFF Communication seems to confirm this approach with the Conditionality Regulation being used as a “last line of defence”;

Or. en

Amendment 175

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;	35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in general in its use of the toolbox it has in its use also when warranted for, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 176

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;	35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument, while respecting the principle of proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 177

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	35 a. Reiterates that all Member States must be subject to permanent and equal scrutiny, regardless of the political affiliation of their governments;

Or. en

Amendment 178

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation;	36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this assessment should ensure that any sanctions imposed on central authorities do not inadvertently restrict access to funding for these stakeholders;

Or. en

Amendment 179

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation;	36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the adverse consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, many of which have been excluded from the ERASMUS Programme as a result of the Conditionality Regulation, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 180

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation;	36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries and/or potential final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 181

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	36 a. Condemns the fact that in December 2022 the Commission decided to exclude Hungarian universities from the Horizon Europe program, which is inexplicable and devastating, causing Hungarian students and researchers suffer a competitive disadvantage compared to others; highlights in that regard, that the use and accountability of Union funds has been transparent for decades at Hungarian universities; regrets that Hungarian universities have suffered enormous loss both in reputation and financially due to the inability to contract for tenders already won or submitted; calls on the Commission to immediately withdraw its discriminative decision;

Or. en

Amendment 182

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	36 b. Condemns the fact that in December 2022 the Commission decided to exclude Hungarian universities, students, teachers and researchers from Erasmus+; calls on the Commission to immediately withdraw its discriminative decision;

Or. en

Amendment 183

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 184

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 185

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments and use the funds in a non-discriminatory way; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;

Or. en

Amendment 186

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries respecting the principle of subsidiarity, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;

Or. en

Amendment 187

Csaba Molnár, Marit Maij, Eero Heinäluoma

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects that the Parliament will be fully involved in this process;

Or. en

Amendment 188

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	37 a. Requests the Commission not to extend the scope of the Conditionality Regulation to certain expenditures such as but not limited to the direct income support paid to farmers and the support for other essential services like healthcare and education;

Or. en

Amendment 189

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 38

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
38. Calls on the Commission to make systematic cross-references between infringement proceedings and measures adopted pursuant to Article 6 of the Financial Regulation and pending conditionality screenings, so that the Member States cannot exploit procedural silos and that the EU’s financial interests are protected, regardless of the legal instrument used;	38. Calls on the Commission to make systematic cross-references between infringement proceedings and measures adopted pursuant to Article 6 of the Financial Regulation and pending conditionality screenings as well as any other relevant tool, including Article 9 of the Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509e and is of the opinion that the relevant decision should be taken by Commission Delegated decisions also Article 8 of the same proposal, so that the Member States cannot exploit procedural silos and that the EU’s financial interests are protected, regardless of the legal instrument used;

Or. en

Amendment 190

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 39

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations in the future;	39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations or further backsliding in the future;

Or. en

Amendment 191

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 39

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations in the future;	39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by improved safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations in the future;

Or. en

Amendment 192

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
40. Expects the Commission to take concrete action to strengthen the links between the recommendations of its annual rule of law reports and financial support from the EU budget, as outlined in the 2024 mission letters to the Commissioners responsible for Budget and for the Rule of Law; invites the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual rule of law reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 193

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
40. Expects the Commission to take concrete action to strengthen the links between the recommendations of its annual rule of law reports and financial support from the EU budget, as outlined in the 2024 mission letters to the Commissioners responsible for Budget and for the Rule of Law; invites the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual rule of law reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation;	40. Expects the Commission to take concrete action to strengthen the links between the recommendations of its annual rule of law reports and financial support from the EU budget, as outlined in the 2024 mission letters to the Commissioners responsible for Budget and for the Rule of Law; deplores the lack of detail on how this link is made in the 2025 annual rule of law report and notably in its recommendations; invites the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual rule of law reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 194

Chloé Ridel, Pierre Jouvet, Daniel Freund, Olivier Chastel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	40 a. Recommends that the Commission suspend the disbursement of funds until all grave and systemic Rule of law violations have been remedied; calls on the Commission to further develop the link between preventive and reactive instruments and, on the basis of the findings of the annual Rule of Law Report, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures; calls on the Commission to assess and report, in the annual Rule of Law Report, on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in the rule of law regimes;

Or. en

Amendment 195

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 40 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	40 a. Notes that the Commission’s annual rule of law report has shown clear political bias in recent years; regrets the fact that the report does not present an objective and substantiated picture of the rule of law situation in the Member States; highlights the fact that this report cannot serve as a basis for any further EU mechanisms or procedures; regrets that the Commission includes inputs from NGOs funded by the EU itself and, more worryingly, in some cases by non-EU governments when drafting its annual rule of law report;

Or. en

Amendment 196

Chloé Ridel, Pierre Jouvet, Daniel Freund, Olivier Chastel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;	41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, including preventive measures concerning the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, addressing revolving doors situations, transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties, rules for illicit political financing, a strong role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union as well as an expansion of its mandate, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law; reiterates the European Parliament's call and position that the Rule of Law Report should cover the full scope of values in article 2 TEU as these can not be seen in isolation;

Or. en

Amendment 197

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;	41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media freedom and media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law; calls on the Commission to highlight systemic breaches in media freedom as a specific risk to the EU budget and democratic accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 198

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;	41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; welcomes that, after Parliament's repeated requests, a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address various severe and systemic breaches to the rule of law affecting companies and workers across multiple Member States; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 199

Chloé Ridel, Pierre Jouvet, Daniel Freund, Olivier Chastel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	41 a. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to rule of law, the European budget, democracy and fundamental rights; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68% of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country and 65% of Europeans believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41% believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers it a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

Or. en

Amendment 200

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	41 a. Highlights the importance of linking national audit and control systems with EU-level databases, while ensuring cybersecurity and privacy safeguards; stresses that data interoperability strengthens the Union’s capacity to detect cross-border fraud and corruption;

Or. en

Amendment 201

Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Olivier Chastel, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Michal Wiezik, Moritz Körner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;	42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds; calls on the Commission to ensure that independent civil society organisations and local authorities can provide input on such breaches, reinforcing transparency and accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 202

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;	42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably as regards the functioning of the judiciary system and in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 203

Marit Maij

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;	42. Believes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 204

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;	42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget could lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 205

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	42 a. Insists that the Commission should justify its decisions not to propose measures under the Conditionality Regulation where country-specific recommendations with links to the EU budget remain unaddressed for a long time;

Or. en

Amendment 206

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 44

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
44. Insists that Parliament’s scrutiny prerogatives be safeguarded by empowering it to monitor consistency in the (non-)application of the conditionality regime, thereby preventing political instrumentalisation or opacity; invites the Commission to transmit to Parliament a consolidated annual inventory of all conditionality-related decisions across budget headings in the context of the annual budgetary procedure;	44. Insists that Parliament’s scrutiny prerogatives be safeguarded by empowering it to monitor consistency in the (non-)application of the conditionality regime as well as Art 9 of the Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509e, thereby preventing political instrumentalisation or opacity; invites the Commission to transmit to Parliament a consolidated annual inventory of all related decisions across budget headings in the context of the annual budgetary procedure;

Or. en

Amendment 207

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip;	46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and therefore to assess the Commission's proposals only after establishing a more precise definition of 'infringement of the rule of law'; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip;

Or. nl

Amendment 208

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip;	46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip;

Or. en

Amendment 209

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;	47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation;

Or. nl

Amendment 210

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;	47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public; also calls for the creation of a single public register, accessible online, in which all relevant decisions and assessments under the conditionality mechanism shall be published transparently, including aggregated statistical data on investigations, amounts suspended, Member States concerned and the procedural stage, while ensuring compliance with confidentiality rules and data protection.

Or. en

Amendment 211

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;	47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; underlines that clear, accessible information is essential to counter disinformation and to demonstrate to citizens that the EU acts consistently and fairly when addressing rule of law breaches; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public; underlines that clear and proactive communication is key to strengthening trust in EU institutions and countering populist narratives;

Or. en

Amendment 212

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;	47. Recalls that the Conditionality regulation imposes to the Commission the need to provide information and guidance to final recipients or beneficiaries via a website or internet portal; stresses that such a platform should enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;

Or. en

Amendment 213

Kinga Kollár

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 47

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public;	47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public; further asks the Commission to actively counter disinformation related to the application of the Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 214

Tamás Deutsch, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments in cases of serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 215

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments in cases of serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;	48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications is of the opinion that Art 6 of the Financial Regulation creates the legal bases of immediate action and that in the next MFF Art 8 of of the Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 is a starting point for strengthening this link;

Or. en

Amendment 216

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments in cases of serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;	48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, respecting the principles of the European Union law, such as the transparency principle and the proportionality principle in the reporting requirements ; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments, in full respect of the subsidiarity principle, in cases of serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;

Or. en

Amendment 217

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
48. Considers that, while the Conditionality Regulation is primarily designed to protect the EU budget from breaches of the rule of law, there is merit in exploring ways of strengthening the protection of the EU budget against violations of the other values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the EU budget is not neutral to breaches of democracy, equality and fundamental rights, which can have tangible financial implications; invites the Commission to assess the extension of conditionality instruments in cases of serious and systemic violations of other Article 2 TEU values affect the EU budget;	(Does not affect the English version.)

Or. nl

Amendment 218

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 48 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	48 a. Considers that the EU budget should be protected in its entirety and therefore calls for identifying and implementing similar protective tools for all EU financial programmes

Or. en

Amendment 219

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 49

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
49. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received;	deleted

Or. nl

Amendment 220

Ruggero Razza

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 49

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
49. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 221

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 49

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
49. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received;	49. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received; calls on the Commission and the Council to strengthen the competences of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) by allocating additional financial and human resources, extending its mandate to cover serious offences against the Union’s financial interests, including in public procurement financed from EU funds, and facilitating the direct exchange of information between the EPPO, OLAF, the ECA and the competent national authorities, in order to ensure coordinated and effective action.

Or. en

Amendment 222

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 50 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	50 a. Takes note of the rule of law related aspects of the Commission proposal of 16 July for the next MFF 2028-2034, and in particular the introduction of a horizontal condition on the respect for the principles of the rule of law within the proposal of the Commission for a Regulation establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034; expresses its concern that i) the Commission proposal does not substantially simplify the rule of law toolbox nor lays out the coordination among the different rule of law instruments, but rather introduces overlap and contradictions, ii) measures for breaches of the horizontal rule of law condition are triggered by a Council implementing decision and Parliament has no decision-making role in the procedure; iii) Commission maintains that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is a last-resort instrument; iv) the condition does not require for a sufficiently direct link between a breach to the rule of law and the protection of the EU budget, as is the case for the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism; points to the decision of the CJEU from February 16, 2022;

Or. en

Amendment 223

Victor Negrescu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 50 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	50 a. Calls on the Commission to set up a permanent coordination framework between the EPPO, OLAF, relevant EU agencies and national authorities in the fields of AML and anti-corruption, to ensure early detection and effective investigation of fraud, money laundering and acts of corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests; requests that the results of these actions be reported periodically to the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 224

Jean-Marc Germain, Monika Hohlmeier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 50 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	50 b. Acknowledges that the Commission puts forward a proposal to ensure that funding de-committed because of a lack of remedial measures in response to an identified breach to the rule of law under this provision may be made available again to programmes in direct or indirect management;; demands clarification as to how such decommitted amounts could be channelled to other programmes after being transferred to the flexibility instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 225

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
51. Calls on the Member States to ensure respect for the rule of law and to swiftly address any identified breaches, so as to protect the EU’s financial interests and prevent the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation; calls, furthermore, for the allocation of adequate resources to national authorities, whose work is essential to ensure the upholding of the rule of law;	51. Calls on the Member States and all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to ensure respect for the rule of law and to swiftly address any identified breaches, so as to protect the EU’s financial interests and prevent the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation; calls, furthermore, for the allocation of adequate resources to national authorities, whose work is essential to ensure the upholding of the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 226

Auke Zijlstra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
51. Calls on the Member States to ensure respect for the rule of law and to swiftly address any identified breaches, so as to protect the EU’s financial interests and prevent the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation; calls, furthermore, for the allocation of adequate resources to national authorities, whose work is essential to ensure the upholding of the rule of law;	51. Calls on the Member States to ensure respect for the rule of law and to swiftly address any identified breaches, so as to protect the EU’s financial interests and prevent the adoption of measures under the Conditionality Regulation; calls, furthermore, for the allocation of adequate resources to independent national authorities, whose work is essential to ensure the upholding of the rule of law;

Or. nl

Amendment 227

Tamás Deutsch, Julien Sanchez, Angéline Furet, Auke Zijlstra, Ondřej Knotek, Jana Nagyová

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Reminds that the rule of law applies equally to the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union, in order to ensure that they themselves are bound by the same principles of transparency, accountability, and legality which are demanded of the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 228

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Invites the ECA to produce a Special Report assessing the cost-effectiveness of the Conditionality Regulation, including administrative burden, deterrence impact and protection of final recipients and beneficiaries;

Or. en

Amendment 229

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. The Conditionality Regulation and the next MFF

Or. en

Amendment 230

Rasmus Nordqvist, Daniel Freund

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Takes note of Art 15 (4) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and stresses that in its view an obligation must be created here;

Or. en

Amendment 231

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 b. Takes note that different units within the Directorate-General for Budgets of the Commission are responsible to assess and monitor the different parts of the conditionality instruments within the regulation for the general regime of the conditionality for the protection of the Union budget and the proposal of the Commission for the new MFF for national and regional plans; criticises the fragmentation and separation of responsibilities in the Commission causing intransparency and complex coordination structures and the consequent risks; urges the Commission to streamline competences and responsibilities to guarantee improved transparency as well as enhanced communication to Parliament and Member states;

Or. en

Amendment 232

Monika Hohlmeier, Jean-Marc Germain

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 c. Raises serious concerns about the general approach of the Commission in the proposal for the next MFF 2028-2034 that no institution or responsible body is expected to verify the underlying costs of the operations of the national plans based on the principle of financing not linked to costs; strongly criticises that the Commission proposal undermines the Treaty-based democratic scrutiny of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary and discharge authority as well as the important role of the Court of Auditors; urges the Commission to guarantee the cost effectiveness, the traceability and transparency of the financial flows from the payments up to the real beneficiaries including subcontractors by the interoperable IT-System as the sole possibility to establish or quantify the budgetary impact of rule of law breaches; stresses that the Commission has to improve the accuracy and precision of the information to be shared with Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 233

Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Expresses deep concern about the application of the Conditionality Regulation in the context of MFF-related proposals where financing not linked to actual costs is proposed to become the primary method of budget implementation; warns that this approach could severely hinder the ability to determine or measure the financial consequences of rule of law breaches. esses deep concern about the application of the Conditionality Regulation in the context of MFF-related proposals where financing not linked to actual costs is proposed to become the primary method of budget implementation; warns that this approach could severely hinder the ability to determine or measure the financial consequences of rule of law breaches;

Or. en

Amendment 234

Tamás Deutsch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 b. Expresses its firm opposition to the perpetuation of the current ‘rule of law conditionality system’ and, furthermore, to any proposals aimed at its reinforcement or expansion; recalls that any initiative seeking to strengthen or extend such conditionalities undermines the crucial objectives of simplification and enhanced competitiveness by imposing greater complexities and protracted delays on Member States seeking access to vital funding;

Or. en

Amendment 235

Fidias Panayiotou

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Calls on the Commission, when preparing the next multi-annual financial framework to asses the results and shortcomings of the rule of law framework and to propose un up-dated toolbox that would increase EU budgets` protection

Or. en

Amendment 236

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 b. Welcomes the inclusion of conditionality for the rule of law and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights under the 2025 MFF proposal, and acknowledges the importance of strong safeguards for the respect of EU values throughout the implementation of Union funds. Notes, however, that the Commission proposal remains insufficient, as it risks creating a fragmented system of parallel instruments;

Or. en

Amendment 237

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 c. Believes that the Conditionality Regulation must serve as a general line of defence for the Union budget and the rule of law, rather than a last resort instrument. Opposes the coexistence of a separate horizontal enabling condition system alongside the Conditionality Regulation. Calls in the framework of the next MFF for a unified and comprehensive system under the umbrella of the Conditionality Regulation, covering both enabling conditions that must be fulfilled in order to access EU funding, and measures to freeze or withhold funds when relevant conditions are no longer met. Therefore, requests the Commission to propose a revision of the Conditionality Regulation that consolidates all rule of law safeguards into a single instrument.

Or. en

Amendment 238

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 d. Stresses that this revised conditionality system must apply to the entire Union budget, not only to national or regional partnership programmes, in order to guarantee consistency and ensure the full protection of the financial interests of Union citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 239

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 e. Commits to amending all MFF files accordingly, including through the introduction of dedicated annexes in all MFF files specifying the share of funds to be withheld from each Member State due to non-fulfilment of conditions. Proposes that the Commission may amend these figures through delegated acts, thereby guaranteeing the equal right of Parliament and Council to block or amend the Commission’s proposals to freeze or end the freezing of EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 240

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 f. Believes that the revised Conditionality Regulation with its unified and comprehensive system must be strongly linked to the annual Rule of Law Report. Believes that Member States should, as part of the funding validation process, provide assurances on compliance with horizontal conditions. Insists that such assessments must be based on objective evidence, in particular drawing on the annual Rule of Law Report, the European Semester, ongoing infringement proceedings and judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Calls on Member States to review their National Reform Plans biennially to address new deficiencies identified in the most recent Rule of Law Report. Requests the Commission to clearly distinguish between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in its annual reports.

Or. en

Amendment 241

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 g. Stresses that systematic non-compliance with Union law must lead to tangible and deterrent financial penalties. Emphasizes that all decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding must be based on clear, objective and transparent criteria, must not be subject to political bargaining, and must not result from opaque negotiations. Demands that Union funds be withheld where essential requirements are not fulfilled and that frozen funds only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and compliance with the rule of law has been verifiably achieved in practice;

Or. en

Amendment 242

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 h. Asks the Commission to include in the revised Conditionality Regulation a mechanism to recover funds that have been illegally spent;

Or. en

Amendment 243

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Olivier Chastel, Sophie Wilmès, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 i (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 i. Believes that the Conditionality Regulation should form an integral part of a dedicated Rule of Law Semester, thereby embedding rule of law scrutiny into the Union’s overall economic and budgetary governance framework;

Or. en

Amendment 244

Moritz Körner, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Nikola Minchev, Hilde Vautmans, Jan-Christoph Oetjen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 j (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 j. Expresses concern that the suspension of Union funds could be misused by sanctioned governments to punish civil society and regional or local authorities. Stresses the obligation of Member States to maintain appropriate arrangements for ensuring uninterrupted payments to final beneficiaries, including local and regional authorities, civil society organisations and private actors, in cases where Union funds are suspended. Supports a smart conditionality approach whereby decommitted funds may be redirected towards other programmes through the annual budget procedure. Calls on the Commission to adopt additional measures to safeguard beneficiaries from being penalised for the failures of their national governments, including the reallocation of decommitted funds to financing schemes directly managed by the Commission. Underlines that in order to avoid an excessive administrative burden on the Commission, the role of managing authorities should be entrusted to competent regional and local authorities, semi-independent bodies such as JASPERS or the European Investment Bank, or independent professional fund operators with proven capacity, selected through transparent and competitive public tenders;

Or. en