On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union

B90265/2024

European Parliament resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union

(2024/2696(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties and to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the European External Action Service (EEAS) two years after the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the European Council decision of 17 April 2024 to launch a temporary crisis task force to counter Russia’s attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas there is clear evidence of Russian attempts to interfere in electoral processes and policymaking worldwide;

B. whereas there have been numerous attempts by Russia to interfere in the European Parliament’s positions and legislative procedures, including by funding movements and lobbies, and by spreading disinformation and propaganda in social media and traditional news outlets; whereas the Member States’ strategic interests may be at high risk if any of these attempts succeed;

C. whereas investigative journalists exposed a classified addendum to Russia’s official – and public – ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, in which the ministry calls for an ‘offensive information campaign’ and other measures spanning ‘the military-political, economic and trade and informational psychological spheres’ against a ‘coalition of unfriendly countries’ led by the United States;

D. whereas Russia is exploiting erroneous EU policies, such as in the fields of migration, energy and the green transition for its malign purposes; whereas voices critical to certain EU’s policies should be distinguished from Russian propaganda;

E. whereas other EU institutions are not free from either direct or indirect Russian influence as the cases of the Nord Stream pipelines proved; whereas the different transparency rules make it more difficult to expose or scrutinise certain EU officials;

F. whereas there are also Russlandversteher politicians (Russia sympathisers) within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both the domestic and European political scenes;

G. whereas there is evidence that Russia has been creating and spreading disinformation with AI and bots in social media, as well as in traditional media outlets, in order to push its interests in the political agenda, and to whitewash its illegal actions including the war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Czech, Polish and Belgian authorities unveiled a recent pro-Russian propaganda operation carried out by the news outlet ‘Voice of Europe’, involving pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk; whereas ‘Voice of Europe’ interviewed a number of MEPs, some of whom were critical towards Russia;

H. whereas the outlet resumed its activities from Kazakhstan on 11 April 2024;

I. whereas these actions are part of a hybrid warfare strategy that constitutes a violation of international law; whereas this hybrid warfare strategy has many forms that go beyond disinformation and enabling corruption;

J. whereas Russia has been transporting immigrants to the EU’s external border as part of its hybrid foreign interference strategies to provoke the EU and its Member States, such as transporting immigrants to its borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia as in the autumn of 2021 and to its border with Finland in 2023;

K. whereas Russia was actively involved in supporting Catalonia’s separatist campaign, which included spreading disinformation, setting up troll and bot farms, and even offers to send 10 000 troops and funds to clear Catalonia’s debt if independence was declared; whereas according to the testimony of Victor Tarradellas, former member responsible for international relations in Carles Puigdemont’s party, these offers were in exchange for the recognition by Catalonia of Russian sovereignty over the Ukrainian territory of Crimea;

L. whereas on the eve of the 2024 European elections increased interference and manipulation of information by Russia is to be expected;

M. whereas the situation of traditional media outlets keeps worsening in most Member States with poor working conditions, low wages, no transparency of media ownership, no plurality of media providers, little to no editorial independence and no political independence; whereas this situation generates a sense of mistrust that makes most EU citizens vulnerable to disinformation, including from known Russian disinformation campaigns;

N. whereas EU rules promoting the use of fact-checkers and content moderation in social media constitute an attack on freedom of speech and push EU citizens to alternative sources of information thus making them more vulnerable to Russian propaganda and disinformation;

1. Calls for action and effective measures to counter any attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections, including those from the Russian autocratic apparatus;

2. Reiterates that any measure taken to safeguard democracy in the EU and the integrity of the forthcoming European elections must be fully transparent and respect the right to information and freedom of speech;

3. Welcomes the swift reaction to the uncovering of the pro-Russian influence operation spearheaded by the ‘Voice of Europe’; calls for the ‘Voice of Europe’ to be included on the EU sanctions list;

4. Condemns in the strongest possible terms all actions carried out by Russia as part of the hybrid warfare strategy against EU Member States; calls on EU leaders and institutions to develop a coordinated strategy against these threats; welcomes in this regard the agreement announced by the Belgian Presidency to launch a temporary crisis task force to counter Russia’s attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections;

5. Reiterates its concerns over revelations that Russia supported secessionist movements in the EU as part of its attempts to destabilise the West; deplores, in this regard, the case of Spanish secessionist movements that attempted a coup d’état in 2017, which severely disrupted the functioning of public institutions and led to a long period of instability extending to the present day;

6. Condemns Russia’s participation in disinformation campaigns, its support for secessionist movements and parties, and the Kremlin’s conducting cyber operations in the Spanish region of Catalonia, as revealed by several bodies and institutions such as the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and the Commission; condemns, further, that some of these operations included the organisation of riots that resulted in the injuries of hundreds of law enforcement officers and in the death of a French citizen at El Prat Airport;

7. Reiterates its calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of Carles Puigdemont and other Catalan MEPs associated with Russia, and on the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members to carry out an investigation and to take appropriate action;

8. Calls on the Spanish authorities to coordinate with their EU counterparts and NATO allies to counter any possible Russian interference in view of the forthcoming regional elections in Catalonia;

9. Strongly condemns the Russian practice of instrumentalising illegal immigrants by pushing them into EU territory to destabilise neighbouring Member States, in particular Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland;

10. Underlines that countering foreign interference is of the utmost importance in order to ensure free and democratic electoral processes; stresses in this regard that freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and compliance with the law are equally important in all democratic processes;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, NATO and the Russian authorities.