On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

B90256/2024

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

(2024/2665(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself as a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN,

– having regard to Opinion No 992/2020 of 23 March 2021 of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on constitutional amendments and the procedure for their adoption in the Russian Federation,

– having regard to Resolution 2519 (2023) of 13 October 2023 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on examining the legitimacy and legality of the ad hominem term-limit waiver for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation and to its report No 15827, of 22 September 2023 and of the same title, on which it was based,

– having regard to the statement of 18 March 2024 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Russian presidential elections and their non-applicability on Ukrainian territory, to the statement of 12 December 2023 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the intention to hold presidential elections in the temporarily occupied territories and to the statement of 17 June 2023 by the European External Action Service Spokesperson on intentions to hold ‘elections’ in occupied territories of Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement of 18 March 2024 of the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Theodoros Rousopoulos, on the presidential ‘election’ in Russia,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolutions ES‑11/4 of 12 October 2022 and 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement of 24 September 2020 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the so-called ‘inauguration’ of Aleksandr Lukashenko,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation held so-called presidential elections from 15 to 17 March 2024, including in the territories of Ukraine which Russia is currently illegally occupying, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as in parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions; whereas polling stations were also opened in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, without the consent of the Moldovan and Georgian authorities;

B. whereas Russia’s political system is controlled by an authoritarian regime which uses rigged elections to provide a semblance of democracy and concentrates power in the hands of Vladimir Putin; whereas the Russian regime suppresses dissent with the support of loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition parties;

C. whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities have increased their repression of political opposition, the media and civil society including the LGBTIQ community, curtailing rights and individual liberties even further to stifle domestic dissent; whereas anti-war candidates were prevented from standing in the 2024 so-called presidential elections in Russia; whereas Vladimir Putin has only faced three hand-picked candidates of no stature and the outcome of the ballot left no room for suspense despite living conditions becoming increasingly difficult due to the war economy imposed on the Russian people;

D. whereas the number of political prisoners in Russia exceeds levels seen even during the late Soviet period and there has been a significant increase in individuals detained for criticising Putin’s policies, especially concerning the war in Ukraine, particularly long-time outspoken Kremlin critic Vladimir Kara-Murza, co-chair of the Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre Oleg Orlov, local councillor in the Krasnoselsky district Alexei Gorinov, artist Alexandra Skochilenko and opposition politician Ilya Yashin; whereas several Russian opposition leaders, including, most recently, Alexei Navalny, have been killed; whereas many of the political prisoners are in critical health conditions, most notably Vladimir Kara-Murza, and are being denied access to comprehensive medical care;

E. whereas Putin’s regime has decimated a generation of Russian human rights organisations, including Memorial and the Moscow Helsinki Group, and independent media; whereas according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia is holding at least 22 journalists, including Alsu Kurmasheva and Evan Gershkovich, in prison; whereas an active civil society and a free media are crucial for ensuring democratic and open societies and safeguarding human rights;

F. whereas the Russian regime’s severe curtailment of human rights is in clear contravention of the nation’s own constitution and legal framework, as well as a violation of Russia’s international obligations;

G. whereas a transparent, democratic, free and fair political competition process is not compatible with the acts of political repression, including the assassination and forced exile of opponents and former supporters of the regime, which have been carried out in the Russian Federation for many years;

H. whereas Russia’s 1993 Constitution limited the president to two consecutive terms in office, but Vladimir Putin has continuously been in power since 2000, finding different ways to circumvent this limit, including by ruling as Prime Minister between 2008 and 2012; whereas Golos, an independent NGO that monitors elections in Russia, has recorded unprecedented levels of complaints, including forced voting, which is illegal under Russian law, in relation to the 2020 referendum that reset the number of terms Putin had served in office and allowed him to remain in power;

I. whereas the Venice Commission, in its Opinion No 992/2020, concluded that the speed of the preparation of the 2020 constitutional amendments was clearly inappropriate, that the hastily adopted 2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia have disproportionately strengthened the position of the President of the Russian Federation and that the ad hominem exclusion from the term limits of the current and previous presidents contradicts the very logic of the adopted amendment limiting the president’s mandate to two terms;

J. whereas, in its Resolution 2519 (2023), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on European governments to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace;

K. whereas, contrary to the OSCE commitments made by the Russian Federation, the Russian Government failed to invite the OSCE and any other credible international organisation to observe and assess the conduct of the so-called presidential election;

L. whereas the voting process was marred by irregularities and violations of international electoral standards, including intimidation of voters, denial of their right to vote, stuffing of ballot boxes and the detention of independent domestic election observers;

M. whereas, in recent years, the EU has refused to recognise the legitimacy of leaders elected through fraudulent elections, such as Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela;

N. whereas on 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in view of his responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas all States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court are legally bound to arrest Vladimir Putin when he enters their jurisdiction;

1. Considers that the so-called presidential elections held in Russia from 15 to 17 March 2024 were neither free nor fair, did not meet the basic international electoral standards and thus lacked democratic legitimacy, as did the 2020 referendum on constitutional amendments, and therefore that Vladimir Putin should not be considered legitimate;

2. Strongly condemns the illegal holding of the so-called elections in the territories of Ukraine that Russia has temporarily occupied; underlines that it does not and will not recognise the holding of these so-called elections in the occupied territories of Ukraine; underscores that the organisation of the so-called elections in the occupied territories of Ukraine represents a clear violation by Russia of international law, including the UN Charter, and of Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

3. Reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders;

4. Condemns the undemocratic practices employed by the Russian authorities to manipulate electoral processes and suppress dissent, including the recent so-called presidential elections characterised by widespread irregularities and a lack of genuine competition;

5. Denounces the escalation of human rights violations by the Putin regime and condemns the ongoing crackdown on government critics, human rights defenders, anti-war activists and independent journalists, as well as the increased suppression of LGBTIQ activists;

6. Continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release and compensation of all political prisoners, including Vladimir Kara-Murza, Oleg Orlov, Alexei Gorinov, Alexandra Skochilenko and Ilya Yashin, unjustly imprisoned journalists, including Alsu Kurmasheva and Evan Gershkovich, and their families, and for the restoration of freedom of expression and association in Russia, and increased international scrutiny and monitoring of human rights abuses in Russia; urges the Russian authorities to provide immediate access to comprehensive medical care for political prisoners in critical health conditions, most notably Vladimir Kara-Murza; reminds Russia to adhere to its international obligations on the rights of prisoners; calls on the Russian authorities to grant consular officials access to prisoners with dual citizenship; calls for the EU and its Member States to work with international partners and organisations to provide support to political prisoners, in particular medical and legal assistance, which is being limited or denied to them, and to seek ways to secure their release; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to raise awareness about the deteriorating human rights situation in Russia and to pressure the Russian Government to uphold its international obligations;

7. Expresses solidarity with the people of Russia who strive for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including with those Russians who expressed their protest by going to the polls on 17 March 2024 at noon, as proposed by Alexei Navalny shortly before his death; reaffirms its support for the Russian independent civil society organisations and independent media;

8. Observes that the reorientation of the economy towards military production has massive and negative consequences for many sectors such as health, social security, roads, civil infrastructure and energy systems, and has a negative impact on the lives of many ordinary Russian citizens, provoking discontent that cannot be expressed given the increased repression exerted by the Kremlin since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, which shows the insecurity of the regime;

9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to actively support independent Russian civil society organisations, independent media outlets and human rights defenders; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively engage with and offer support to the Russian democratic opposition who oppose Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; categorically regrets that the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, chose to break rank with the EU and congratulate Vladimir Putin on his sham re-election;

10. Reiterates its call for the diplomatic representations of the EU and its Member States to continue to closely monitor court proceedings against members of the Russian political opposition and their prison conditions; urges the Member States to provide humanitarian visas and other support to Russian dissidents, including lawyers, at risk of political prosecution;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Russian authorities, and to make it available in the Russian language.