On the critical situation in Cuba

B90151/2024

European Parliament resolution on the critical situation in Cuba

(2024/2584(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (PDCA), signed in December 2016, which has provisionally applied since 1 November 2017,

– having regard to the reports of the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights on repressive actions and arbitrary detentions,

– having regard to the statement by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its Special Rapporteurs on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights and Freedom of Expression of 15 July 2021,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba is a State Party,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Cuban constitution and criminal code,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Cuba is an authoritarian state which has imposed a communist system for decades, ruling out any prospects for democratic change; whereas the Cuban constitution directly establishes, in Article 5 thereof, that the ‘unique, Martí, Fidelista and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Cuba’ is the superior political force and ruler of society and the state, and Articles 4 and 229 thereof establish this as an irreversible system;

B. whereas the Cuban criminal code contains the definition of ‘dangerous state’ and ‘pre-criminal security measures’, for which thousands of people are sentenced to between one and four years of imprisonment every year, without there being any attributable crime, and for which more than 8 000 people have been imprisoned and more than 2 500 have been sentenced to forced labour without internment; whereas, according to the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Prisoners Defenders, more than 1 000 political prisoners were being held in detention in Cuba in December 2023;

C. whereas in October 2020, the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that the arbitrary detentions that have occurred in recent decades in Cuba are not isolated cases, but are rather part of ‘a systematic practice ... in which ... the Cuban authorities have participated for decades’;

D. whereas the Organization of American States has denounced the fact that current attempts to destabilise Iberoamerican political systems have their origin in the strategy of the Bolivarian and Cuban dictatorships, which have financed, supported and promoted political and social conflict in the Latin American region;

E. whereas the Cuban regime has persistently violated human rights for decades, including extrajudicial killings; arbitrary arrests and detentions; torture and inhuman treatment of political dissidents, detainees and prisoners by security forces; life-threatening prison conditions for political prisoners; lack of independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, censorship, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and enforcement or threat to enforce criminal laws to limit expression; transnational repression against individuals in other countries; interference with the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organisation, funding and operation of non-governmental and civil society organisations; and severe restrictions on religious freedom; whereas in 2023 more than 200 incidents of internet restrictions were documented, including hacking into the accounts of journalists in order to silence them and curb free speech;

F. whereas in 2021 the people of Cuba took to the streets to oppose communist rule in the biggest protests since the 1959 communist revolution;

G. whereas many different independent NGOs in Cuba, such as the Council for the Democratic Transition in Cuba, of which the Patriotic Union of Cuba is a part, Cuba Decide, the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights, the Women’s Network of Cuba and Cuban Prisoners Defenders, have denounced the fact that both Decree-Law 35/2021 and Resolution 105 criminalise counter-revolutionary actions that oppose, question, criticise and/or try to modify the model of the dictatorial regime prevailing in the country;

H. whereas in June 2023, the IACHR found the Cuban Government responsible for the deaths of democracy activists Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero in a 2012 car accident; whereas the IACHR concluded that state agents were directly involved in their deaths and that the Cuban regime had violated Oswaldo Payá’s and Harold Cepero’s rights to life, honour and freedom of expression;

I. whereas in May 2022, the Committee against Torture urged Cuba to adopt measures to prevent or stop arbitrary detentions, harassment, intimidation, threats and actions to discredit human rights defenders, as well as to investigate all the deaths that occur during any deprivation of freedom and to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor’s Office and the judiciary;

J. whereas in its resolution of 10 June 2021, Parliament reminded the European External Action Service (EEAS) that the participation of civil society in the political dialogues and cooperation projects under the PDCA is a fundamental element of the agreement; whereas civil society is being excluded from accessing cooperation funds and participating in the PDCA; whereas, meanwhile, only companies that the Cuban state controls or in which it participates are exclusively allowed to participate in the PDCA and access cooperation funds, as has been the case since the agreement’s signing; whereas the EEAS should decisively address this unacceptable situation;

K. whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought on three occasions to Cuban activists: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov Prize winners and their families continue to be systematically persecuted and intimidated and those living on the island are systematically prevented from leaving the country to participate in international events and events organised by the European Parliament; whereas political prisoners suffer from worrying health conditions, for example Félix Navarro Rodríguez (69 years old), Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca (61 years old), Carlos Manuel Pupo Rodríguez (68 years old), Miguel Díaz Bauza (80 years old) and Fredy Beirut Matos (65 years old);

L. whereas despite the fact that Parliament’s resolution of 28 November 2019 on the José Daniel Ferrer case urged ‘the EEAS and the Commission to actively support civil society groups and individuals defending human rights in Cuba, including through arranging prison visits, trial monitoring and public statements’, in no case has there been a visit to any political prisoner in prison or the observation of any trial of opponents, dissidents, human rights activists or independent civil society activists;

M. whereas authoritarian allies of the Cuban regime, such as Russia, Venezuela, China and Belarus, maintain close cooperation with Cuba in military and security matters; whereas this cooperation also involves the Wagner Group;

N. whereas Cuba and Russia maintain very close, not only diplomatic, but also political, economic, strategic and military relations, as demonstrated by the meeting held in Moscow in November 2022 between Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Russian President Vladimir Putin, at which they stated that their bilateral ties were ‘significant’;

O. whereas Cuba defines the Cuban-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for economic-commercial and scientific-technical collaboration as essential; whereas the Cuban regime has always publicly appreciated Moscow’s vote at the UN in favour of a Cuban resolution against the embargo imposed by the United States on the island;

P. whereas in May 2023, the Cuban regime signed an agreement with Belarus to send special forces troops there, as a show of solidarity with one of Russia’s main allies in its war against Ukraine; whereas through this, the Cuban military will receive training, which implies that Cuba and Belarus will be strengthening their ties in terms of military cooperation;

Q. whereas in January 2021, the US Secretary of State denounced the Cuban regime’s support for international terrorism and the subversion of the US justice system;

R. whereas vast regions of Latin America are being held hostage by non-democratic regimes inspired by communism and operating under the umbrella of Cuba and initiatives such as the São Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group, which are hubs of drug production and trafficking;

S. whereas on 5 July 2017, Parliament granted its approval to the PDCA between the EU and Cuba; whereas its approval of the PDCA was based on the clear intention to improve the dire human rights situation in Cuba; whereas monitoring and control of compliance with the PDCA are inconsistent with the current actions of Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell;

T. whereas the PDCA includes a so-called human rights clause, which is a standard, essential element of the EU’s international agreements, allowing it to be suspended in the event of violations of the provisions on human rights;

U. whereas Parliament’s approval of the PDCA was linked to the commitment by the Commission and the EEAS to guarantee the establishment of a regular exchange with Parliament on the application of the agreement and on the fulfilment of the mutual obligations contained therein, especially those relating to the implementation of all provisions on human rights; whereas Parliament has also requested that the EEAS do everything possible to closely monitor the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba when applying the PDCA;

V. whereas, despite years of Parliament insisting on the need to visit the island, the Cuban authorities systematically refuse to allow committees, delegations and political groups from Parliament, international human rights organisations and other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN special rapporteurs, to enter Cuba;

W. whereas on 23 November 2023, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised the sending of an ad hoc delegation to the Republic of Cuba following a letter of invitation from the Ambassador of Cuba to Belgium and the European Union dated 20 September 2023; whereas paragraph 45 of its non-legislative resolution of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, refers to requesting entry to Cuba of an official delegation of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, which is part of the PDCA;

X. whereas the current political system in Cuba is incompatible with the EU’s demands to conclude cooperation agreements; whereas respect for human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights is essential for the EU;

Y. whereas on 16 September 2021, Parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution on the government repression of protests and citizens in Cuba calling for the EU to activate Article 85(3)b of the PDCA to suspend the agreement because of the Cuban regime’s violations of the provisions relating to human rights, which constituted a ‘special urgency case’; whereas Parliament recalled that the PDCA’s human rights clause was an essential element of the agreement; whereas it called on the Council to make use of the human rights provisions in the general EU sanctions regime and to adopt sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Cuba as soon as possible,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic violation of the fundamental rights of the Cuban people during the more than six decades of rule by the Communist Party of Cuba; condemns the systematic and increasing violation of the fundamental rights of political prisoners, human rights defenders and other citizens by authoritarian regimes all around the world, especially following the recent killing of Alexei Navalny by the Russian regime, a like-minded partner of the Cuban regime;

2. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained solely for exercising their human rights, especially of the political prisoners José Daniel Ferrer, who is currently being held in an unknown location, and Roberto Pérez Fonseca, who was sentenced to ten years in prison in July 2021;

3. Demands full transparency in an investigation to bring to justice those responsible for killing Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero;

4. Regrets that, since 2015, when the dialogue on human rights between the EU and Cuba was restarted, the Cuban regime has systematically refused to recognise the monitoring of human rights as a legitimate activity and has denied legal status to local human rights groups;

5. Disapproves of the passive and irresponsible attitude of the EEAS under the direction of VP/HR Josep Borrell, as it has ignored or trivialised the outcry of the Cuban people and the systematic violation of human rights by the regime in Cuba; considers that this attitude has indirectly contributed to a dramatic worsening of the human rights situation, in flagrant violation of the provisions contained in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba that was signed in 2016;

6. Objects to the fact that the EEAS has systematically infringed the terms of the PDCA referring to cooperation projects that establish civil society as an essential part of this cooperation; disapproves of the fact that since the signing of the PDCA, the EEAS has made it possible for the cooperation funds to end up exclusively in the hands of companies owned or controlled by the Cuban state or organisations of the Communist Party of Cuba, leading to the illegitimate conversion of these funds into a means of financing the Cuban dictatorship;

7. Disapproves of the fact that, in May 2022, despite the constant violation of human rights by the Cuban regime, VP/HR Josep Borrell misused his participation in the third bilateral meeting that took place in Cuba under the PDCA, putting his goal of diplomatically approaching the regime above the fate of the people of Cuba, in particular the political prisoners, of whom several were on hunger strike, and ignoring all those oppressed by the communist dictatorship; regrets that the visit contributed to whitewashing President Díaz-Canel and the Cuban dictatorship; regrets that the VP/HR’s statements have avoided mentioning the serious and systematic violations of human rights, have not condemned Cuba’s support for Russia in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and therefore have not reflected the Council’s conclusions and the EU’s positions and policies which he is obliged to represent and implement;

8. Requests that VP/HR Josep Borrell place his position at the disposal of the Council, and tasks the Commission President and the Council with carrying out a thorough assessment of how his actions have seriously harmed the people of Cuba; is of the opinion that implementing such harmful policies, which contravene the EU’s values and founding documents, should be met with proper reactions from the Council, the Commission and Parliament and that VP/HR Josep Borrell should therefore fully bear responsibility for his actions;

9. Deplores the fact that, despite the time that has elapsed since the entry into force of the PDCA, the lack of democracy and freedoms in Cuba has not improved at all; notes that, on the contrary, the human rights situation on the island has been further aggravated and has further deteriorated, in clear and systematic violation of the basic provisions of the PDCA;

10. Reiterates its firm and unconditional support for the Cuban people, for all human rights defenders in Cuba and for their commendable dedication to freedoms and all rights which the Cuban regime has denied for decades;

11. Urges the EU to live up to its values by applying Article 85(3)b and immediately suspending the PDCA between the EU and Cuba;

12. Urges the Council to strongly condemn Cuba’s permanent interference in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries and its clear cooperation with other totalitarian regimes, as well as with drug cartels and terrorist forces, during the past six decades;

13. Urges the Council to make use of the human rights provisions in the general EU sanctions regime and to adopt sanctions, as soon as possible, against those responsible for human rights violations in Cuba and abroad who assist other dictatorships and rogue states in carrying out torture and strategies of social terror, in view of the systematic violation of human rights by the Cuban regime, which constitutes a ‘case of special urgency’;

14. Invites the EU Member States to demand the immediate revocation of Cuba’s place on the UN Human Rights Council;

15. Demands the immediate cessation of all financial aid from the EU to Cuba, which has been consistently maintained without taking into account the continuing serious human rights violations and which fuels the regime instead of providing relief to and serving the people of Cuba;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission, the College of Commissioners, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.