On the need for unwavering support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

B90143/2024

European Parliament resolution on the need for unwavering support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

(2024/2526(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (Budapest Memorandum),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,

– having regard to the 2006 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance,

– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’, of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’ and of 23 February 2023 entitled ‘Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

– having regard to the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 12 December 2023 entitled ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine – 1 August to 30 November 2023’,

– having regard to the report of 14 February 2024 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations entitled ‘Ukraine - Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023’,

– having regard to the report of 9 February 2024 of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War entitled ‘An environmental compact for Ukraine – A Green Future꞉ Recommendations for Accountability and Recovery’,

– having regard to the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas two years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B. whereas since then, Russia’s forces have continued to carry out and have escalated indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting continued throughout 2023; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 10 000 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law;

C. whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression; whereas more than 3.3 million people, including 800 000 children, are living along the front line; whereas homes, schools and hospitals continue to be bombed every day; whereas, according to the International Organization for Migration, Russia’s campaign of destruction in 2023 left nearly 720 000 people in the worst-affected parts of Ukraine with no access to adequate and safe housing; whereas the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian populated areas spiked in December 2023, highlighting the persistent pattern of civilian death, destruction and humanitarian needs throughout 2023;

D. whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 19 546 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and of those only 388 have returned home; whereas many of the abducted children reported having suffered physical and mental abuse to erase their Ukrainian identity;

E. whereas Russia’s war crimes will leave an entire population traumatised as 10 million people are estimated to be at risk of or living with a mental health condition, and 3.9 million people are estimated to be suffering from moderate to severe symptoms requiring treatment for mental distress, depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); whereas in 2023, 227 incidents affecting humanitarian operations in the country were reported, with 50 humanitarian workers killed or injured, including 11 killed in the line of duty;

F. whereas women and girls are particularly at risk during humanitarian and displacement crises, as they continue disproportionately to be the victims of gender-based violence; whereas many women have stayed in Ukraine and are serving in combat roles; whereas there are indications that Ukrainian women soldiers in captivity have been tortured and subjected to sexual violence; whereas the OHCHR has reported that, because men represent the majority of victims of summary executions by Russian forces in occupied territories, surviving family members – many of them women – are left behind to cope, often on their own, with limited family income, increased caregiver burdens, and intense mental trauma and distress;

G. whereas Ukraine’s natural environment has been a specific target in the war, as Russia has been blatantly using massive environmental damage, such as burning fields and forests, illegally logging Ukrainian lumber, and contaminating water and soil with chemical waste, as a tactic aimed at destroying the country’s land, habitability and future generations’ ability to thrive and prosper; whereas the destruction of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023 is a clear example of actions by Russia that will continue to cause ecological devastation in the years to come; whereas there is a proposed international legal definition of ‘ecocide’, which could be added to the Rome Statute of the ICC as a new Article 8 ter.; whereas ecocide is defined as ‘unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts’;

H. whereas Russia continues to knowingly pose threats to the security of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes in Ukraine and their personnel, significantly raising the risk of an international nuclear accident; whereas Russia has seized and militarised the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Europe’s largest nuclear power plant; whereas, after a recent visit to the site, the Director General of the IAEA expressed enormous caution as to the current state of the ZNPP, stressing the need to find a sustainable solution for an alternative source of cooling water after the June 2023 destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam and for staff shortages;

I. whereas, according to reports, Russia has dramatically reoriented its economy towards a ‘war economy’, combined with plans for very high defence spending estimated at well over EUR 100 billion; whereas Russia reportedly produces more than 2 million artillery shells per year domestically, which is significantly more than the quantity EU governments had promised to Ukraine;

J. whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the Commission and the UN estimates that as at 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 452.8 billion over the next decade; whereas the EU is now implementing the Ukraine Facility, a EUR 50 billion package of grants and loans for the period 2024 to 2027; whereas this funding is in addition to the over EUR 85 billion of support, including military aid, which has already been provided to Ukraine; whereas additional resources under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) are expected, in particular for humanitarian aid;

K. whereas EU Member States have so far provided Ukraine with EUR 28 billion in military aid and have preliminarily committed a further amount of around EUR 21.2 billion for 2024; whereas there is a lack of burden-sharing and solidarity between Member States when it comes to military aid provided to Ukraine; whereas several large Member States with substantial defence industry capacity have contributed very little of the military aid Ukraine needs; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission has trained 40 500 Ukrainian soldiers and plans to train an additional 20 000 by the summer of 2024; whereas it has become clear that the EU will only be able to send around half of the promised 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by March 2024 and is only expected to reach this target nine months later; whereas the latest U.S. aid package for Ukraine is blocked in Congress; whereas the leaders of Germany, Czechia, the Netherlands, Estonia and Denmark have called on the European Union to recommit to long-term support for Ukraine, describing this as ‘a joint European responsibility’;

L. whereas on 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine; whereas despite the Russian aggression and precarious socio-economic situation, the Government of Ukraine has managed to achieve success in its continued decentralisation and democratisation reforms;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

3. Strongly condemns the massive and grave violations of human rights and the war crimes committed over the past two years by the Russian armed forces and various occupation authorities in Ukraine, including summary killings, rape and other forms of sexual assault, torture, abductions and the targeted destruction of residential areas; insists that the responsible government officials and military leaders, media propagandists, and other perpetrators and enablers of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including intended genocide, must be held accountable; reiterates its full support for the work of the ICC in helping end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community; encourages Ukraine, to this end, to consider becoming a State Party to the Rome Statute;

4. Stresses that over 14.6 million people in Ukraine are in need of humanitarian aid, while over 6 million Ukrainians have been displaced from Ukraine; notes that the number of affected people is expected to increase significantly if Russia makes further territorial gains; underlines the continued need for the EU to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as to address the needs of the millions of displaced persons from and within Ukraine, in particular those belonging to at-risk groups; notes that the need for humanitarian support will likely continue in the years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds; reiterates its call for the EU to step up its efforts to address the dire situation of those who have been forcibly deported to Russia and of the children who have been forcibly adopted in Russia;

5. Calls on Member States to facilitate the temporary stay of refugees from Ukraine in the EU through targeted programmes and policies that ensure affordable and adequate access to housing, food, healthcare, education and employment opportunities, allow for long-term residency and access to nationality, facilitate movement between their host community and Ukraine, and provide help to Ukrainians, particularly children, in preserving their culture and language while abroad;

6. Welcomes the support provided to Ukrainian culture through the Creative Europe Programme in the form of a dedicated call for proposals and urges that this support be extended and enhanced, given the importance of safeguarding the cultural and linguistic identity of Ukrainians in the EU and in Ukraine; welcomes, in this context, the work of the Commission’s expert sub-group dedicated to the safeguarding of cultural heritage in Ukraine and stresses the importance of implementing the experts’ recommendations;

7. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls on the EU and host countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, including for survivors of rape, and to support the provision of these services in Ukraine;

8. Calls on the Commission and Ukraine to prepare to address the significant (mental) healthcare needs which are expected to arise after the war in regions that were formerly occupied, especially for those who were detained, tortured, raped or otherwise abused by the Russian occupying forces, including in Crimea; demands, in this regard, that Russia immediately release all political prisoners in the occupied territories of Ukraine;

9. Reiterates its condemnation of the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in the Russian-occupied area of southern Ukraine, using a man-made disaster as a weapon of war; stresses that this atrocious act of aggression by Russia constitutes ecocide as it caused massive damage and destroyed ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions of Ukrainians living in the region; emphasises that Russia’s destruction of the dam was a clear attack on critical civilian infrastructure and thus amounts to a war crime; encourages the Prosecutor of the ICC to consider the case of the Kakhovka dam collapse for prosecution under Article 8;

10. Is deeply concerned about the long-term environmental impact of the conflict and condemns all of Russia’s acts of ecocide against Ukraine’s flora and fauna and its poisoning of the atmosphere and water resources through its military actions; calls on the Member States and EU institutions to ensure targeted long-term assistance to mitigate the long-term ecological impact of the war as much as possible; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to do all they can to protect Ukraine from further acts of ecocide by Russia;

11. Deplores Russia’s attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied and annexed territories, banning the use of the Ukrainian language and symbols, and the repeated attempts by the Russian President and other officials to rewrite history;

12. Strongly condemns Russia’s eradication, destruction and looting of Ukraine’s cultural artefacts, such as churches, artworks, museums and universities; takes note of the damage, as verified by UNESCO, that has been caused to 341 sites since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 126 religious sites, 150 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 31 museums, 19 monuments, 14 libraries and one archive; reiterates that deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites may amount to war crimes;

13. Welcomes the establishment of the Ukraine Facility while, at the same time, referring to the estimate in the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that Ukraine will need at least EUR 452.8 billion over the next decade for its recovery and reconstruction; stresses therefore, that the funds provided for under the Ukraine Facility will not be sufficient and calls on the EU and the Member States to commit to additional long-term financing for Ukraine, in particular given that the latest US aid package for Ukraine remains blocked in Congress; calls on the Commission to continue to mobilise international partners and funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction, as well as to continue cooperating closely with local self-governments and the central government of Ukraine, while insisting on ambitious democratic and institutional reforms in areas such as media freedom, the rule of law, decentralisation and the fight against corruption; welcomes the decisions of the G7 and the EU which pave the way towards using the profits generated by confiscated Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction; reiterates its call to explore legal avenues for using the frozen assets of Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for Ukraine’s reconstruction, in accordance with international law;

14. Calls on the Member States and the relevant EU institutions to increase and accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine as a matter of the utmost urgency, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs; expresses concern that the target of one million rounds of ammunition will not be met as promised; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to present to Parliament information about the volume and value of past deliveries of military aid to Ukraine, including the audit conducted by the EEAS, and the amount of aid Member States are willing to commit during 2024;

15. Urges in particular the largest Member States with substantial defence industry capacity, such as France, Spain and Italy, to significantly and urgently increase military assistance to Ukraine; stresses that there is a need to link the amount and quality of military aid that a Member State delivers to Ukraine to the level of subsidies its defence companies receive under the European Defence Fund in order to strengthen solidarity and security both within the EU and for Ukraine;

16. Urges the governments of the Member States to immediately enter into dialogue with defence companies in order to guarantee that the production and delivery of, in particular, ammunition, shells and missiles for Ukraine are prioritised over orders from other third countries; stresses the need to make the European Peace Facility (EPF) a tool that focuses more on incentivising the delivery and joint procurement of state-of-the-art military technology for Ukraine, and on medium-term predictability when it comes to a sufficiently high budget for deliveries to Ukraine; supports, in this respect, the proposal by the VP/HR for the creation of a EUR 20 billion Ukraine assistance fund within the EPF over four years;

17. Reiterates its support for the Member States’ decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, in accordance with Article 49 TEU and as the start of a merit-based process; calls on the Member States to muster the political will to re-energise the enlargement process and to deliver on their promises with concrete positive steps in the accession processes of countries that seek to join the Union and deserve to be part of the European family; underlines the crucial need for countries that wish to accede to the EU to implement the necessary reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights;

18. Welcomes the adoption of the 13th package of EU sanctions on Russia, which will target additional individuals as well as entities from Russia, China and other countries deemed to be helping Moscow’s war effort; calls on all partners, in particular EU candidate countries and potential candidates, to align with the sanctions packages; asks the Commission and the Member States to consider measures against third countries that try to help Russia and Belarus to circumvent the sanctions imposed;

19. Reiterates its call for further restrictions on imports of goods from Russia, including raw materials, such as metals, and agricultural and fishery products; stresses the need for an immediate and full embargo on imports of fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, for the price cap on Russian petroleum products to be further decreased in coordination with G7 partners in order to stop the financing of Putin’s war with EU money; calls, in addition, for punitive measures to be imposed against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which transports oil without insurance on precarious vessels through EU and international waters, and for sanctions against companies from China and other countries helping Russia to circumvent sanctions; calls to expand the current military and dual-use licensing regime to include a much larger group of war-relevant goods, including digital components;

20. Calls for sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, including individual sanctions against Rosatom’s leadership, in order to reduce and phase out Russia’s presence in Europe’s nuclear energy sector, to prevent technology transfers to Rosatom, to prevent vessels from Atomflot, a Rosatom subsidiary, from entering EU ports and to increase international pressure to end the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and more broadly ensure the safety of conflict-affected nuclear power plants;

21. Expresses its deep concern regarding ongoing trade in sanctioned war-critical goods between EU countries and Russia; deplores the serious lack of compliance culture regarding EU sanctions against Russia; condemns the practice in which sanctioned goods from the EU are sold to companies or individuals from third countries, while the goods are still in the EU, and then shipped directly to Russia; condemns companies, including those in the EU, that deliberately evade sanctions, yielding massive profits, and thereby undermine the EU’s efforts to support Ukraine; insists that circumventing an EU restrictive measure, including by transferring goods to a destination where their import, export, sale, purchase, transfer, transit or transport are restricted, should be criminalised at EU level; stresses that it is critical for enforcement that the EU quickly criminalises direct sanctions violations, including when committed with serious negligence, as well as indirect sanctions violations through the circumvention of EU restrictive measures;

22. Calls for continued EU-wide solidarity with Ukraine, including by supporting its ability to trade its agricultural products as a vital way to boost its resources; deeply regrets the repeated border blockades by farmers and truckers along the Polish-Ukrainian border and other sections of the EU-Ukrainian border, causing serious damage to Ukraine’s economy at a critical time in its struggle against Russia as well as complicating or even impeding border crossings for civilians; urges the Commission and Member States to resolve such disputes and animosity while ensuring that Ukraine is able to make full use of Solidarity Lanes; calls on the Commission to consider launching infringement procedures against those Member States that are still maintaining illegal import bans against Ukrainian agricultural products; calls for investigations into the alleged involvement of the Russian Government and their proxies in creating obstacles for the export of goods from Ukraine;

23. Highlights the excellent work of Ukrainian diplomats and individual members of the Verkhovna Rada in consolidating the support of democratic countries for Ukraine; stresses that in the face of Russian hybrid warfare, it is essential to further enhance relations with international partners, including by removing obstacles for representatives of the Ukrainian Government and the opposition to travel abroad for such purposes;

24. Urges the EU and the Member States to combat disinformation and other forms of hybrid warfare employed by Russia, its allies and sympathisers in the EU, its neighbourhood, and the Global South, by strengthening the resilience of local communities, building fact-based narratives, strengthening digital and democratic infrastructure, and holding online platforms accountable for spreading harmful content;

25. Reiterates that it is in the vital interest of the EU and its Member States to ensure Ukraine’s victory as, according to Russia’s leadership, its allies and EU military intelligence, Russia might plan to invade other EU candidate countries and Member States in the event of military success in Ukraine;

26. Urges Member States to urgently shift towards European cooperation as a rule for the armed forces and industry, in order to increase the efficiency of European military production and defence spending, guarantee interoperability, standardisation and better transfer of expertise, with the aim of building the military capabilities that would enable the EU to achieve effective defence readiness and reliable aid, and solidarity with like-minded partners, while remaining ready to act autonomously in deterring external threats;

27. Reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and Belarus against Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to provide political and financial support for the establishment of such a tribunal, and ensure the coordination and complementarity of all ongoing efforts to hold to account the perpetrators of internationally recognised crimes against Ukraine and its people; believes that the EU must show leadership in this fight against impunity and for peace;

28. Calls on the UN General Assembly to keep Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine on its agenda and calls on the EU’s partners around the world to continue to provide political and humanitarian support for Ukraine as it defends its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls on the EEAS and EU Member States to increase their engagement with world leaders from other regions with regard to support for Ukraine and to strengthen international pressure on the Russian regime;

29. Expresses its utmost appreciation for the continued and tireless work of the local staff of the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine in circumstances that remain very difficult for them and their relatives; urges the EEAS and the Commission to adopt contingency plans and interim solutions for the local staff of the EU Delegation, including teleworking and flexible working arrangements and temporary relocation solutions, which are tailored to meeting the actual needs and challenges of the staff; stresses, in addition, the importance of taking adequate care of the mental health of the EU Delegation’s staff;

30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and the Parliament of the Russian Federation.