On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

B90128/2024

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

(2024/2548(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties and to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022;

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas an international team of investigative journalists has revealed in an article in The Insider that long-standing Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has for more than a decade served as an agent of the Russian intelligence services; whereas as far back as 2014, Ms Ždanoka was placed under investigation by Latvia’s security authorities, accused of being an agent of influence of Russia;

B. whereas this is not the first case of an MEP spying for Russia, with far-right Jobbik Member Béla Kovács being sentenced on similar grounds by the Hungarian authorities;

C. whereas an analysis of MEPs’ public interventions, voting records, legislative activities and sponsored events indicate that Tatjana Ždanoka’s case may not be isolated and that more Members of the European Parliament may have ties with Russian intelligence, despite Russia’s war of aggression launched against Ukraine; whereas, since 2014, several MEPs have visited the occupied territories of Ukraine and Georgia, and have been hosted in Syria by the bloody dictator Bashar al-Assad, in breach of EU sanctions and national laws, while being used as a tool of regimes’ propaganda;

D. whereas in 2018 and 2019 Elizaveta Peskova, the daughter of Vladimir Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, was working as a trainee with an MEP;

E. whereas other EU institutions are less transparent than the European Parliament, and therefore Russian influence is even harder to expose and counter there; whereas the most obvious example of Russian special operations within the EU was the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines with the silent acquiescence of certain EU officials, which has never been properly investigated;

F. whereas Russia has been creating and spreading disinformation of an unparalleled malice and magnitude with the help of its agents of influence, by forging links with far-left and far-right political parties in the EU, as well as by using traditional media outlets and social media platforms, in order to deceive its citizens at home and the international community; whereas there are numerous ‘Russlandversteher’ politicians within mainstream political parties, in particular former high-level German, Austrian and French leaders, with the most symbolic case being Gerhard Schröder, who, despite being openly paid by the Kremlin, exercise their pro-Russian influence within both the domestic and European political scene;

G. whereas these actions, which are part of a hybrid warfare strategy and constitute a violation of international law, mislead and deceive citizens and affect their voting behaviour, amplify divisive debates, divide, polarise and exploit the vulnerabilities of societies, distort the integrity of democratic elections and referendums, sow distrust in national governments and public authorities and have the goal of destabilising European democracies, and therefore constitute a serious threat to the EU and Member States’ security and sovereignty;

H. whereas Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns also influence indirect opinion-forming in Europe by focusing on the Russian-speaking diaspora, especially in countries with large Russian-speaking populations, such as Germany (over 3 million), Latvia and Estonia;

I. whereas Russia has traditionally been implementing the age-old tactics of ‘divide and rule’ by meddling in the internal affairs of the EU Member States and fuelling divisions inside societies and between nations, using both economic leverage, such as the discontinued Nord Stream project, and hostile propaganda;

J. whereas the EU’s energy dependence on Russia has created enormous difficulties for its energy security since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine and it has highlighted the short-sightedness of certain Member States, despite numerous warnings against strengthening relations with Russia, coming mostly from countries in central and eastern Europe;

K. whereas on the eve of the 2024 European elections increased interference and manipulation of information by Russia is to be expected;

L. whereas Russia has been transporting migrants to the EU’s external border as part of its hybrid foreign interference strategies to provoke the EU and its Member States, such as in the autumn of 2021 to its borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia and in 2023 to its border with Finland; whereas these hybrid interference attempts also take the form of spreading disinformation and thereby polarising the EU’s societies;

M. whereas Russian funding of political activities and politicians inside the European Union before and after 24 February 2022 continues to be revealed by journalists and experts and requires thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable;

N. whereas Russia seeks to make contact with far-left and far-right parties, political figures and movements, in order to use players within the EU institutions to legitimise Russian positions and proxy governments, to lobby for sanctions relief and to mitigate the consequences of international isolation;

O. whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, such as Gerhard Schröder, Wolfgang Schüssel, François Fillon, Karin Kneissl and Paavo Lipponen, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, some of them decided not to step down, continuing to be sponsored with the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties;

P. whereas Russia was actively involved in supporting Catalonia’s separatist campaign, which included spreading disinformation, setting up troll and bot farms, and even offers to send 10 000 troops and money to clear Catalonia’s debt if independence was declared;

1. Expects the Latvian authorities to open a criminal counterintelligence investigation into Tatiana Ždanoka’s activities based on the evidence published by The Insider;

2. Welcomes the decision of President Metsola to launch an investigation into the case of Ms Ždanoka inside Parliament and to refer the case to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members; considers Ms Ždanoka’s actions to be clearly in breach of the Code of Conduct, especially Article 1(a) and (b), Article 2(a) and Article 3 thereof, and calls on the President to use her powers to impose a reasoned decision suspending Ms Ždanoka from all Parliament activities;

3. Calls for further swift action and more effective measures to be adopted in the European Parliament to target possible infiltration by Russian and other hostile intelligence services;

4. Calls on the Commission to launch an internal investigation into the handling of the Nord Stream case and Russian influence during the process of planning and building the pipelines;

5. Reiterates its concerns over revelations that Russia supported secessionist movements in the EU as part of its attempts to destabilise the West; deplores, in this regard, the case of Spanish secessionist movements that attempted a coup d’état in 2017, which severely disrupted the functioning of public institutions and led to a long period of instability extending to the present day;

6. Notes with concern that according to a report published by the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and the Commission, Russia’s activities to destabilise Spain ranged from supporting secessionist movements to cyber operations and direct investments, with which it attempted to undermine and harm the integrity and functionality of Spain’s democracy; notes, further, that some of these operations included the organisation of riots that resulted in the injuries of hundreds of law enforcement officers and in the death of a French citizen in El Prat Airport;

7. Notes the ongoing criminal proceedings in Spain in which the investigating court claims to have sufficient evidence that Russia offered both economic and military support to associates of Carles Puigdemont, president of the region of Catalonia at that time; notes, further, that the Spanish National High Court has formally requested an investigation into Carles Puigdemont and other members of the secessionist parties on terrorism charges in connection with the attempted coup d’état in 2017, as judges deem that there is sufficient evidence of their participation in the organisation of riots and terrorist acts;

8. Condemns the fact that, according to the testimony of Víctor Tarradellas, former member of Carles Puigdemont’s party responsible for international relations, Russia offered to send 10 000 soldiers, as well as to pay off the Catalan regional debt, if Catalonia recognised the Ukrainian territory of Crimea as a territory of the Russian Federation;

9. Underlines that criminal investigations into spying charges fall under the competence of the Member States; welcomes the fact that several EU countries have set up special investigative committees devoted to countering Russian influence, while others have recently dissolved theirs; regrets the fact that in some cases, those who should be rewarded for dismantling networks of Russian and Belarusian spies and effectively countering their hybrid warfare, are being persecuted on political grounds, instead of being specially protected by national authorities;

10. Strongly condemns former high-level politicians joining the Russian payroll soon after finishing their political career in their country; considers it to be a clear conflict of interest and insists that Member States adopt regulations that would forbid former prime ministers and cabinet members from accepting positions in state-owned companies from Russia, China, Iran and other autocratic states;

11. Is concerned about the Russian policy of weaponising culture for reaching the Kremlin’s goals and of using Russian citizens working in this field as agents of influence and spies;

12. Warns against opening the EU borders for Russian people trying to leave the country to avoid being drafted into the army or escaping economic hardships linked with sanctions; underlines that after relocating into the territory of EU Member States, some of them could start playing an active role in promoting or supporting the propagation of the Russian narrative and propaganda, as has already happened in Georgia and Serbia;

13. Strongly condemns the Russian practice of using illegal migrants as weapons and forcibly pushing them into EU territory in order to sow dissent, division and distrust;

14. Warns that Russian spying activities in Europe are on the rise, which is evidenced by a large number of networks uncovered by counter-intelligence services in the Member States;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, NATO and the Russian authorities.