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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (2024/2548(RSP))

On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

B-9-2024-0127

on behalf of the Renew Group · Rapporteur: Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, José Ramón Bauzá Díaz, Jordi Cañas, Olivier Chastel, Katalin Cseh, Claudia Gamon, Vlad Gheorghe, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Karin Karlsbro, Karen Melchior, Javier Nart, Maite Pagazaurtundúa, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Ramona Strugariu, Dragoş Tudorache, Hilde Vautmans, Adrián Vázquez Lázara

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Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's resolution on Russiagate sets out its response to allegations of Russian interference in EU democratic processes, including spying allegations involving a non-attached MEP. It denounces Russia's alleged attempts to influence MEPs, commits to cooperate with Latvian and Belgian investigations, and welcomes the referral of the MEP to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct. It calls for an enhanced security culture, mandatory security training and screening of staffers, and for investigating links between MEPs and the Kremlin. It calls on Spain to investigate Catalan MEPs' connections with Russia and on member states to strengthen sanctions against Russia.

Key points

  1. Parliament expresses serious concern about spying allegations involving a non-attached MEP and denounces Russia's alleged attempts to influence Members.
  2. It notes the MEP was excluded from her political group over her positions on Russia and Ukraine and is now unaffiliated, and that a small number of MEPs have sided with Russia.
  3. It commits to support and cooperate with Latvian authorities and calls on Belgian authorities to investigate whether the MEP is liable for prosecution under Belgian criminal law.
  4. It welcomes the referral of the MEP to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct and commits to enforce its internal sanction framework in full.
  5. It calls for an enhanced security culture, including mandatory security training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers.
  6. It instructs its services to investigate whether the conduct of MEPs linked to the MEP concerned constitutes sanctionable behaviour under its Code of Conduct.
  7. It calls for the cases of Catalan MEPs to be referred to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct and on Spain to investigate their connections with the Kremlin.
  8. It recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat and stresses the need for vigilance in the run-up to the European elections.
  9. It denounces Russia's attempts to undermine European democratic processes and calls on member states to further develop sanctions and close loopholes.
  10. It stresses the seriousness of Russia's connections with parties and politicians in the EU and its interference in secessionist movements such as in Catalonia.
  11. It commits EU institutions and member states to conduct thorough investigations into connections between European politicians and the Kremlin.
  12. It stresses that Russia's hybrid tactics generate further momentum for the EU's support to Ukraine.

Who is affected

  • The non-attached MEP concerned, who faces allegations of spying and is referred to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct.
  • Catalan MEPs and secessionists, whose connections with Russia are to be investigated and referred to the Advisory Committee.
  • MEPs and staffers, who would face mandatory security training, clearance and screening.
  • Latvian and Belgian authorities, asked to investigate the MEP concerned.
  • Member states, called on to strengthen sanctions against Russia and investigate Kremlin connections.

Figures and deadlines

  • 29 January 2024, date of media reports on the Latvian MEP's alleged assistance to Russian intelligence.
  • 2004 to 2017, period during which the MEP could have provided assistance to Russian intelligence services.
  • 3 October 2005, date of leaked email conversations between the MEP and FSB case-handlers.
  • 2014, year of a referendum observation visit in Russian-occupied Crimea.
  • 2016, year of a visit to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and of a cooperation agreement between United Russia and FPÖ.