On Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

B100309/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

– having regard to the NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations launched along the Alliance’s eastern flank, and to ongoing discussions on the establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative,

– having regard to the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and the European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), and to the mandate of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to support the development of common defence capabilities,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, on European security and defence, and on the strengthening of the EU’s eastern flank,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters have become an increasingly frequent and alarming phenomenon, posing a threat beyond Ukraine’s borders;

B. whereas, following previous incidents involving drone fragments and other military debris falling on Romanian territory, on 29 May 2026 a Russian-made Geran-2 drone hit a residential block of flats in the eastern Romanian city of Galați, injuring civilians, including a child, and causing serious material damage, with the Galați incident marking a qualitative escalation from falling drone fragments and military debris to civilian injuries and direct damage to residential infrastructure; whereas on 5 June 2026, a maritime drone exploded in the Black Sea Port of Constanța; whereas these incidents demonstrate that Romania has been directly affected by the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and underline the immediate risks posed to EU citizens, civilian infrastructure, maritime security and critical infrastructure in the Black Sea region;

C. whereas the Black Sea is increasingly a strategic theatre of military operations, hybrid threats, drone warfare, attacks on critical infrastructure and disruptions to maritime transport and trade routes; whereas the EU’s security is increasingly linked to the security and stability of the Black Sea region and its maritime domain awareness capabilities;

D. whereas, on 3 June 2026, Estonia and Latvia issued simultaneous airspace alerts after sensors detected drone activity moving across the region; whereas Estonia’s EE-Alarm system broadcast warnings across six counties (Tartu, Jõgeva, Viljandi, Valga, Võru and Põlva), covering much of the country’s south and east, and Latvia issued a yellow-level warning for Alūksne municipality in the north east; whereas NATO Baltic Air Policing aircraft were scrambled and Lithuania reportedly conducted overnight reinforcement sorties in support of the response;

E. whereas on 8 June 2026, a French military Rafale fighter jet shot down a drone that entered Latvia’s airspace from Russia;

F. whereas, on 8 June 2026 a drone crossed the Moldovan border and its fragments were later found in a field near the village of Lopatna in the Orhei district;

G. whereas Finland has investigated several incidents involving damage to undersea power and telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, alongside cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and other acts of sabotage; whereas Finland continues to combat the instrumentalisation of migration as a form of hybrid threat at its eastern border, the longest external border that both the EU and NATO share with Russia; whereas, on 15 May 2026, Finnish authorities issued an emergency warning after detecting a suspected drone incursion into the country’s airspace, resulting in air traffic at Helsinki Airport being suspended and nearly two million residents in southern Finland being advised to take shelter;

H. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region;

I. whereas on several occasions, unmanned aerial vehicles originating from or entering through Belarusian airspace have crossed into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, including incidents affecting the municipalities and districts of Jonava, Vilnius District, Varėna and other areas bordering Belarus; whereas such incursions have required the deployment of military, police and civil protection resources and have demonstrated the vulnerability of the external borders of NATO and the EU to airborne provocations; whereas Lithuanian authorities have repeatedly warned residents not to approach unidentified aerial objects and to immediately report sightings through the emergency number 112; whereas some incidents have involved suspected military-type drones and explosive devices, creating significant risks for civilian populations and critical infrastructure;

J. whereas drone-related security incidents in Lithuania have led national authorities to activate emergency warning systems and issue public alerts to residents in affected municipalities and districts; whereas residents were instructed to remain vigilant, monitor official communications, report suspicious aerial objects through the emergency number 112 and, where necessary, move to shelters or other safe locations pending the assessment of potential threats; whereas such incidents illustrate the direct impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and associated hybrid threats on the security of EU citizens;

K. whereas in May 2026, Lithuanian authorities issued air-alert warnings affecting Vilnius and surrounding municipalities, urging residents to seek shelter and follow emergency instructions following a drone-related security alert, demonstrating the growing threat posed by hostile aerial incursions on the EU’s eastern border;

L. whereas drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters are either deliberate tests of the Alliance’s resolve or stray drones affected by Russian GPS jamming and spoofing, either way blurring the line between accident and provocation; whereas they expose serious gaps in Europe’s air and maritime defence along its eastern flank;

M. whereas Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and other Member States on the EU’s eastern flank play a key role in safeguarding European security, stability and resilience; whereas past incidents in these Member States, and particularly the one in Romania, constitute a serious warning for the EU, demonstrating that the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are no longer limited to falling drone fragments or military debris, but have resulted in injuries to EU citizens on the territory of a Member State; whereas these incidents underscore the growing vulnerability of the EU’s citizens, territory and critical infrastructure to airborne and maritime threats, urgently requiring a stronger common European response to protect civilians, residential areas and critical infrastructure throughout the EU, and in particular along the EU’s eastern border;

N. whereas the protection of the EU’s airspace, territory and citizens against all threats constitutes a core European public good that should be financed from the EU budget; whereas meeting rising security and defence needs primarily through the redeployment of funds from existing programmes risks weakening cohesion, social, research and other policies that are equally essential to the EU’s resilience and to the regions and citizens most exposed to these threats;

O. whereas the border regions most exposed to drone incursions and hybrid threats suffer not only heightened security risks but also tangible economic and social harm, including loss of tourism, declining investment, business closures and depopulation; whereas, for example, the Latgale region in eastern Latvia has experienced a severe downturn in its tourism sector as a direct consequence of repeated airspace alerts and the perception of insecurity along the EU’s eastern border;

P. whereas the Commission and the High Representative’s strategic approach for the Black Sea region identifies the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub as a flagship initiative under the Black Sea maritime security pillar; whereas Parliament has already called, through its resolutions concerning the general budget of the EU for the financial years 2026 and 2027, for the creation and operationalisation of this hub;

Q. whereas recent incidents have demonstrated the need for a permanent and integrated European presence and a common European monitoring, early warning and rapid response system for the detection, interception and neutralisation of unmanned aerial and maritime threats along the EU’s eastern border and in the Black Sea basin; whereas enhanced military mobility, interoperability, early warning capabilities and forward deployment of assets are essential for effective deterrence and rapid response;

R. whereas the development of sovereign European drone and counter-drone production capabilities, including through regional industrial hubs located in front line Member States, is essential to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), reduce strategic dependencies and ensure rapid operational readiness;

1. Condemns, in the strongest terms, Russia’s sustained and escalating military and hybrid provocations against the EU and its Member States, in particular Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland; further condemns the use of drones and other airborne incursions, as well as other acts of hybrid warfare aimed at targeting and disrupting critical infrastructure, thereby posing a serious threat to the safety, security and well-being of citizens;

2. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions that have taken place, which are escalatory, prone to risk miscalculation and endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic, and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States will not be deterred by these or further hostile acts by the Russian Federation from their enduring commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s war of aggression; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole, and stresses Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence against Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond;

4. Reaffirms that the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union is a fundamental principle of the EU; stresses that any violation thereof constitutes a serious threat to the EU’s security, resilience and democratic foundations, and underlines the need for an immediate, firm, united and proportionate response to protect citizens and critical infrastructure and to detect, deter and counter such hostile activities; urges, in this regard, the Member States to employ, in full compliance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend the EU, its citizens and territory against threats from all directions;

5. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently increase investments in security and defence in order to close all capability gaps, establish a strong common deterrence, and provide adequate support to Ukraine, ensuring that the EU and its Member States are equipped to address all threats, from hybrid and cyber to conventional military challenges; stresses the importance of using these investments to stimulate joint action, including with Ukraine, in order to improve the efficiency of public spending and interoperability, as well as the EU’s strategic autonomy; stresses that European funding must support European industry, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, secure resilient supply chains and generate technological leadership and high-quality jobs;

6. Recommends strengthening strategic enablers as a fundamental component of European defence integration, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, space assets, and integrated command-and-control systems; stresses that these capabilities are critical for effective coordination and timely responses in modern security environments and recommends they should be developed jointly at the European level to ensure efficiency, resilience, and collective operational readiness;

7. Regrets that the EU and the Member States have not invested sufficiently in drone technologies and production capacities in recent years, creating capability gaps and strategic dependencies; stresses that the evolving security environment and the lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine demonstrate the urgent need to accelerate investments and strengthen the EDTIB;

8. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of borders and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction for affected communities in these particularly exposed regions;

9. Stresses that a common defence against airborne, maritime and hybrid threats, in particular along the EU’s eastern border, must be adequately financed by the EU budget; calls on the Commission and the Council to adapt relevant EU funding instruments in order to ensure that expenditure related to the consequences of Russia’s provocations and hybrid attacks on the territory of Member States may be eligible for EU financial support and rapid reimbursement procedures, where compatible with the legal bases of the respective instruments; insists that the next multiannual financial framework provide dedicated funding for a common defence; underlines that such financing must be ensured through a genuine reinforcement of the budget and not through the redeployment of resources away from cohesion, social, research and other EU programmes, on which the resilience of citizens and regions also depends;

10. Calls on the Member States to urgently accelerate European drone and counter-drone development and production, ensuring that capability plans and procurement strategies are fit for purpose, with increased investment in large-scale production and joint procurement of affordable systems to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and deliver scalable, cost-effective capabilities;

11. Calls for the rapid establishment of joint, layered counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure; underlines that these capabilities are essential for protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, ensuring effective deterrence, and safeguarding the EU’s role as a global actor committed to peace, human rights and the rule of law; urges the Commission and the EDA to make full use of their mandates, including through the EDIP and EDPCI frameworks, to coordinate national efforts effectively;

12. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate with Ukraine, particularly in the areas of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, and thus strengthening both European and Ukrainian defence capabilities; calls, in particular, on Member States to integrate their threat-detection system with that of Ukraine; recommends, in particular, establishing structured mechanisms to facilitate ongoing knowledge-sharing on drone and counter-drone technologies; invites the Member States to consider engagement in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces; welcomes bilateral and regional initiatives in that direction, such as the one set up between Romania and Ukraine;

13. Calls on the Commission to establish and rapidly operationalise a European Black Sea Maritime Security Hub serving as a regional centre for real-time maritime domain awareness, satellite-based and seabed monitoring, early warning, intelligence-sharing, protection of critical underwater, energy, transport and port infrastructure, counter-drone and counter-hybrid operations, responses to naval mines, hostile unmanned maritime systems and the activities of Russia’s shadow fleet, coordination with Black Sea littoral Member States and partner countries, and direct cooperation with relevant EU and NATO structures, in support of EU and NATO maritime security initiatives in the Black Sea basin; notes that locating this hub in affected Member States, such as Romania, could be beneficial and enhance maritime security in the Black Sea region;

14. Welcomes the ongoing NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations; welcomes discussions on the potential establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative to strengthen maritime security, improve regional situational awareness, safeguard critical infrastructure, and support freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region in accordance with international law;

15. Calls for the establishment of a defensive, European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone over uncontested territory of Ukraine, designed to strengthen civilian protection and critical infrastructure resilience against missile and drone attacks; stresses that such an initiative should form part of a broader European air and missile defence architecture, based on integrated capabilities and close coordination with Ukraine, while ensuring compliance with international law and avoiding escalation risks; underlines that this approach would contribute to enhanced regional security and the protection of European airspace;

16. Calls on the EU and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to defence, recognising that security extends beyond military assets and encompasses defending against acts of hybrid warfare; underscores the importance of developing a robust EU‑level toolbox for safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s external borders and for supporting Member States facing pressure from hostile third countries, which should include legal, financial and operational measures to allow it to defend itself against hybrid attacks; stresses that unless the vulnerabilities undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democracy are addressed, the EU risks instability and weakness despite military strength; urges the development of defence investment plans in a way that also strengthens social cohesion within and among regions and Member States;

17. Urges the EU and the Member States to develop clearer procedures and common assessment criteria for the potential activation of Article 42(7) TEU in the context of hybrid threats; calls, furthermore, for enhanced intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated preparedness measures to ensure a swift and effective collective response to evolving security challenges;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.