On Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

B100308/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, on hybrid threats, and on the security of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure, including its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, in particular Article 1 thereof, recognising every state’s complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace, and Article 3(c) thereof, prohibiting state aircraft from flying over the territory of another contracting state without authorisation,

– having regard to Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof, and to the invocation of Article 4 by Poland and Estonia following Russian airspace violations in September 2025,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation constitutes the most significant threat to European security; whereas the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and its continued attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure demonstrate a persistent disregard for a peaceful resolution; whereas the Member States must strengthen their collective defence, resilience and support for Ukraine while maintaining a united response to Russian aggression;

B. whereas the evolving nature, scale and speed of hybrid threats require the EU and its Member States to undertake urgent and comprehensive adjustments at strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to effectively deter, detect and respond to such activities;

C. whereas on 26 February 2026, Romanian and allied fighter jets were scrambled twice within a few hours after Russian drones briefly violated Romanian airspace near Tulcea County and north of Sulina, during Russian strikes on Ukrainian Danube port infrastructure; whereas this incident is consistent with a documented pattern of Russia deliberately routing attack drones along the Danube delta and the Black Sea corridor to strike Ukrainian logistical hubs while operating at the edge of NATO territory, treating NATO’s eastern border as a zone of operational pressure;

D. whereas in the night of 28–29 May 2026, a Russian Geran-2 attack drone struck the roof of an apartment building in Galați, Romania, detonating its full warhead and injuring two civilians, one of whom is a minor; whereas this was the first time in nearly four years of repeated airspace breaches that a Russian drone had caused casualties inside Romania; whereas on 5 June 2026, a marine drone detonated in Romania’s Black Sea port of Constanța, approximately 500 metres from an oil terminal, after Ukraine’s navy reported it had lost control of the vessel due to Russian electronic warfare jamming;

E. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally destabilised the Black Sea as a zone of security for Romania and Bulgaria; whereas the deliberate routing of Russian strike drones along the Danube delta and Black Sea coast, combined with Russia’s continued militarisation of the Black Sea, directly threatens the territorial integrity, civilian safety and critical maritime infrastructure of Romania, including its strategic port of Constanța; whereas the Black Sea handles significant portions of Russia’s oil and food exports, serves as a key node in trade routes linking Asia to Europe, and hosts growing offshore energy reserves, making Russian destabilisation of the region a threat to European energy security and global food security;

F. whereas on 7 May 2026, two Ukrainian drones, jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems, struck a fuel storage depot in Rēzekne, Latvia; whereas the Latvian military’s five-hour delay in communicating its response, the lack of public warnings in Rēzekne and the failure of initial radar detection ignited an intense public backlash, causing a political crisis that led to the collapse of the Latvian Government;

G. whereas in September 2025, Russia carried out a series of unprovoked and escalating airspace violations against EU and NATO Member States on the eastern flank; whereas on 10 September 2025, Russian drones violated Polish airspace on 19 occasions during a heavy air raid on Ukraine, prompting Poland to invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the first such invocation by Poland and the first time a NATO member state had downed hostile aircraft since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas on 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace in the area of Vaindloo Island without permission and remained there for approximately 12 minutes, with no flight plan, transponders switched off, and no radio contact with Estonian air traffic control; whereas the jets penetrated approximately 10 kilometres into Estonian territory, and the Institute for the Study of War assessed the incident as a deliberate attempt by Russia to test NATO’s response capabilities for application in potential future conflicts with the alliance; whereas the incident of 19 September represented the fifth Russian violation of Estonian airspace in 2025 alone; whereas Estonia invoked Article 4 and the North Atlantic Council convened at its request, condemning the violation and noting that it was the second time in two weeks that the Council had met under Article 4; whereas both violations prompted NATO to launch Operation Eastern Sentry on 12 September 2025, a vigilance activity to strengthen air defence across the eastern flank;

H. whereas Russian military aircraft have repeatedly violated Finnish airspace, including reported incidents in February, May and June 2025 and in May 2026 in the Gulf of Finland and near Porkkala, leading Finland to scramble F/A-18 Hornets on Quick Reaction Alert to identify the aircraft, to launch investigations and to summon the Russian ambassador; whereas, in March 2026, due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, at least three Ukrainian drones diverted from their intended course and entered and crashed in Finnish territory; whereas similar diversions of Ukrainian drones were reported in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania due to Russian electronic warfare and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) disruption;

I. whereas Russia has engaged in a systematic campaign of GPS jamming and GNSS spoofing across the eastern flank; whereas Lithuania’s Communications Regulatory Authority reported that the number of spoofing antennas in the Kaliningrad enclave rose from three in early 2025 to 36 by May 2026, with the effect described as no longer occasional but systemic, and capable of reaching Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, most of Poland, parts of Finland and Sweden, and the Baltic Sea at distances of up to 450 kilometres; whereas Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden and Germany have all officially characterised GNSS interference as a form of Russian hybrid warfare, describing it as a deliberate act intended to disrupt civilian and military navigation systems and undermine international agreements; whereas Estonian authorities have reported that 85 % of flights in the country now experience disruption, and Lithuania recorded a 22-fold increase in jamming incidents compared to the previous year;

J. whereas Russia has weaponised its sanctions-evasion shadow fleet to conduct acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea; whereas on 25 December 2024, a shadow fleet vessel, the Eagle S, was suspected of cutting four subsea data cables and the Estlink-2 submarine power cable, one of only two electricity interconnectors between Finland and Estonia, by dragging its anchor along the seabed; whereas Finnish authorities boarded and detained the Eagle S in Finnish waters following the incident and initiated a criminal investigation, demonstrating a clear and effective response to suspected hybrid operations; whereas in January 2025, an undersea cable between Latvia and Sweden was severed, with both Riga and Stockholm concluding the damage was likely the result of external interference by a vessel travelling from Russia; whereas by 2025, eleven incidents of suspected undersea cable damage had been reported in the Baltic region, and one shadow fleet vessel was found to be carrying sanctioned Russian steel and to have been identified as shipping military goods between Russia and Iran; whereas Russia’s shadow fleet functions not solely as a sanctions-evasion mechanism but as a hybrid warfare platform enabling drone launches over military facilities, airports and critical infrastructure across the Baltic and North Sea region;

K. whereas there is credible evidence linking shadow fleet vessels operating in the Baltic Sea to the launch of drones that have violated the airspace of EU Member States;

L. whereas Russia has systematically deployed propaganda to deny responsibility for drone incursions into EU Member States and to attribute them instead to Ukraine; whereas following the Galați incident of 28–29 May 2026, Russia publicly claimed the drone was of Ukrainian origin, deploying the same narrative Russia has used for prior incursions;

M. whereas addressing drone and other air threats in EU airspace is closely linked to the protection of airspace security over Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, both affected by Russian airspace violations and incidents; whereas an effective EU counter-drone capability depends on broad situational awareness and the exchange of information with those neighbouring partners;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s systematic and escalating pattern of airspace violations, drone incursions, GNSS jamming and spoofing, shadow fleet sabotage, and propaganda operations against EU Member States on the eastern flank, and characterises this pattern as a coordinated campaign of hybrid warfare against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic resilience of the EU and its Member States; underlines that each violation of EU airspace constitutes a violation of international law, including Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, and must be treated as such;

2. Expresses its deepest solidarity with Romania, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland; extends particular solidarity to the two civilians injured in Galați on 28–29 May 2026, the first casualties caused by a Russian drone on NATO soil, and to all residents of eastern flank Member States living under sustained threat from Russian military activity; condemns in the strongest terms Russia’s denial of responsibility and its systematic disinformation campaign attributing its own drone incursions to Ukraine;

3. Reiterates its unwavering support for Ukraine and its right to self-defence, including its use of unmanned aerial systems against the aggressor across the entirety of its territory as an integral component of its response to Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; holds Russia fully responsible for instances in which such systems have strayed into or violated the airspace of Member States due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, thereby posing risks to civilian safety and European security;

4. Underlines the exceptional operational experience Ukraine has gained in its defence against Russia’s aggression, in particular in drone warfare; highlights the need to fully leverage Ukraine’s combat-tested knowledge and rapid innovation in unmanned systems in order to strengthen the defence readiness of Member States;

5. Highlights the opportunity for the Member States to enable the production of defence capabilities through joint procurement and industrial cooperation with Ukrainian companies;

6. Encourages joint drone experimentation between the EUMS and UAF that permits a streamlined pathway for European-level integration that accommodates scalability, interoperability, and utilises Ukraine’s strengths in modular, low-cost solutions, digital-native C2 and field-driven innovation;

7. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

8. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrine to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

9. Calls for the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes through rotational staff exchanges with Ukrainian military personnel and through the expansion of joint training programmes under the EUMS and its EU Cell at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; recommends the establishment of a permanent, jointly-funded EU-NATO-Ukraine training and logistics hub in a front-line state to streamline operational planning, logistics and maintenance, with a focus on real-world drone survivability and innovation lessons;

10. Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine’s battlefield experience by integrating doctrinal and technological innovations in modern combat conditions, in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College and the EUMS;

11. Invites the Member States to consider engaging in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces;

12. Calls for annual joint drone doctrine integration exercises across CSDP operations and EU Battlegroups, coordinated through the Military Planning and Conduct Capability and evaluated in partnership with NATO’s Joint Force Command and Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, to ensure doctrinal compatibility and operational realism;

13. Recommends launching joint EU-NATO exercises on drone swarm defence, electronic warfare resilience, low-cost kinetic effectors and directed-energy systems at multinational test ranges, with structured EU observer status and reciprocal access for EU-led initiatives;

14. Calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO drone coordination cell to bridge doctrinal and operational gaps between EU and NATO operations, with a permanent joint coordination cell within the EUMS tasked with synchronising drone doctrine, prioritising capability integration and facilitating real-time information sharing between EU CSDP missions and NATO operations;

15. Urges the EU and its Member States to partner with Ukraine for all its drone-related initiatives, both as a way to accelerate drone development in the EU and to increase support to Ukraine; invites, in particular, the Member States to consider their engagement in training missions in Ukraine on drone and counter-drone warfare in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces;

16. Calls for the establishment of a lessons learnt and coordination database with Ukrainian participation to collect battlefield data, publish validated tactics and update doctrines rapidly;

17. Encourages Ukraine to deploy more drone flight operators to EU and NATO training schools and programmes to expand the number of Member States Ukraine can collaborate with;

18. Recognises that Ukraine’s output of drones is severely hampered by a lack of capital investment and insists on the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine’s drone development;

19. Urges the Commission, the Member States and their defence industries to support, invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry to make full use of the potential of production capacities in Ukraine in the most efficient way, in line with the ‘Danish model’;

20. Calls for the EU to further integrate both Ukraine and Moldova into European defence initiatives and invites the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission to present proposals in this regard;

21. Welcomes the launch of NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry in September 2025, the invocation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland and Estonia in September 2025, and Romania’s formal diplomatic steps following the Galați incident; welcomes the deployment of allied air assets, including Italian F-35s and Swedish and Finnish jets, under NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission; calls on the Council and the VP/HR to ensure that the EU’s political response is fully coordinated with and complementary to NATO’s operational posture;

22. Welcomes the swift response of French Rafale fighter jets, deployed under NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, which intercepted and destroyed a drone that had entered Latvian airspace in the context of intensifying Russian electronic warfare activity; commends France’s commitment to European security and the collective defence of NATO’s Eastern Flank;

23. Welcomes the launch of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as priority flagships under the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, with initial operational capabilities expected by the end of 2026 and full functionality by the end of 2028; calls on the Commission to ensure that the implementation timelines are not delayed and that frontline Member States, in particular Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland, are prioritised in capability deployment; calls on all Member States to participate fully in these initiatives and to treat them as matters of collective urgency rather than optional coordination frameworks; welcomes the Commission’s investment through the European Defence Fund in projects supporting the four defence flagship initiatives, covering AI, cyber defence, drones and counter-drone systems;

24. Calls on the Member States to strengthen enforcement powers over vessels operating in their exclusive economic zones and territorial waters whose flag state registration is absent, suspended or manifestly inadequate; calls on the Commission to propose a legal instrument enabling Member States to detain, board and prosecute shadow fleet vessels involved in acts of sabotage or hybrid warfare as a matter of EU law, without relying solely on national criminal jurisdiction, which has proven insufficient given the cross-border nature of these operations;

25. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to counter Russia’s drone attribution disinformation campaign actively and in real time, including through the European External Action Service East StratCom Task Force; calls on the Member States to ensure that official attribution of drone incursions is communicated rapidly, clearly and consistently to the public, so as to deny Russia the narrative vacuum it exploits; calls for ensuring that AI-generated disinformation content, deepfakes and coordinated inauthentic behaviour by state-sponsored networks are treated as acts of foreign interference;

26. Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to develop a dedicated Black Sea security strategy in coordination with Romania and Bulgaria, addressing the convergence of drone threats, Russian electronic warfare, shadow fleet activity, and the disruption of maritime trade routes; notes that the Black Sea carries critical energy and food supply routes and that sustained Russian destabilisation of this region has consequences beyond the eastern flank, including for food security in North Africa and the Middle East; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funds for such a strategy;

27. Stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance in the Baltic, North Sea and Black Sea regions, where Russian drone activities pose particular threats; stresses the importance of tackling the Russian shadow fleet given its suspected involvement in drone incursions into European airspace; believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) strategies; welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations such as Baltic Sentry;

28. Calls for a common EU framework for rapid detection, attribution and neutralisation of unmanned systems, encompassing cross-border data sharing, interoperable situational awareness and joint targeting protocols; stresses that cooperation must include common sensor and C2 standards, coordinated procurement where appropriate, and secure real-time exchange of telemetry and incident reports; calls for EU-wide interoperability standards mandating open modular C-UAS architectures under European Defence Fund-funded programmes to ensure plug-and-play compatibility, reduce vendor lock-in and standardise operational requirements for Class I–III drones, integrating electronic warfare and AI-assisted threat detection;

29. Highlights the need for Member States on the eastern flank to be treated as a priority in defence and security-related EU investments, given the clear and persistent security threat posed by Russia;

30. Calls on the frontline Member States to adopt strategic development plans covering the full drone and C-UAS capability cycle, from research and development, testing and certification to production, deployment and training, supported through EU instruments including the European Defence Fund, the European Defence Industry Programme and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, to ensure an adequate, coordinated and timely response to hybrid and conventional threats along the eastern and southern flanks;

31. Supports a drone surveillance and defence system (‘drone wall’) with a robust, end-to-end system encompassing advanced detection, resilient C2, and cost-effective interception capabilities and calls for a technical roadmap to be developed in close cooperation with Ukraine;

32. Calls for immediate funding and rapid implementation of combat drone units organically embedded within the armed forces of NATO and EU Member States at company, battalion and brigade level, complemented by counter-UAS systems, electronic protection measures and GNSS resilience to minimise vulnerability to jamming; urges the Commission and the VP/HR to devise a two-year accelerated programme for procurement, training, sustainment and certification, with Ukraine included as a full operational and doctrinal partner;

33. Calls on the Member States to prioritise the onshoring of critical drone components, including brushless DC motors, lithium-ion batteries, semiconductors and electro-optical sensors, through co-financed public-private partnerships, EU-coordinated subsidies and tax incentives for firms localising production within the EU, and by leveraging the European Chips Act to prioritise defence applications in strategic semiconductor funding allocation;

34. Calls on the Member States, in their capacity as NATO allies, to ensure that the Ankara Summit of 7 and 8 July 2026 produces concrete and binding decisions on the hybrid threat campaign Russia is conducting against the eastern flank, rather than political reaffirmations of existing commitments; considers that a summit convening four weeks after the first Russian drone casualties on NATO soil must go beyond declaratory language and deliver operational outcomes;

35. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the VP/HR to substantially strengthen the EU’s Hybrid Toolbox and to ensure that it is swiftly and effectively brought into operation, including by streamlining decision-making procedures so as to enable faster activation of the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and the solidarity clause under Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in response to hybrid attacks of sufficient gravity, including coordinated drone incursions; calls, in this context, for the establishment of clear pre-agreed thresholds and trigger mechanisms for the activation of these clauses with a view to avoiding delays caused by case-by-case political deliberation in moments of crisis; further calls for regular joint exercises between the Member States, the EU institutions and NATO to test and improve the readiness of these rapid response mechanisms;

36. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the government of the Russian Federation.