On Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

B100307/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, in particular those adopted since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania,

– having regard to the Commission’s Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, which was published on 11 February 2026,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2022 updating guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, and on providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders (C(2022)7111),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and its own international commitments; whereas Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas Region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have continued and escalated indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2026;

B. whereas in recent weeks, several drones have entered Romanian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian airspace; whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas these recent airspace violations present a reckless and ongoing escalation that threatens regional security;

C. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the decisive role of unmanned and autonomous systems, low-cost attrition warfare and electronic warfare in modern combat, with drones now reshaping the battlefield and the nature of the threats facing the EU; whereas the EU’s ability to deter and counter these threats depends on its capacity to develop, test and field its own innovative drone and counter-drone solutions at speed;

D. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and struck a residential building in the city of Galați, forcing approximately 70 civilians to evacuate and injuring two; whereas this incident was not isolated, as multiple prior violations of Romanian airspace have been documented;

E. whereas since March 2026, Russia has started electronically hijacking Ukrainian military drones to make incursions into the sovereign territory of EU Member States; whereas a similar incursion into Finland occurred on 15 May 2026 when a Ukrainian drone was redirected by Russia into Finnish airspace, leading to a shelter in place warning for a large part of the population and a three-hour closure of Helsinki Airport; whereas on 18 May 2026 a drone was redirected into Estonia’s airspace, after which it was shot down by a Romanian NATO fighter jet; whereas on 20 May 2026 a drone alert caused the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to come to a standstill, forcing citizens to seek shelter underground; whereas such alerts have become increasingly common in recent months; whereas on 5 June 2026 a Ukrainian naval drone that had been electronically hijacked by Russia exploded near an oil terminal in the Romanian port of Constanța; whereas on 8 June 2026 a French fighter jet had to shoot down a drone entering Latvian airspace, which marks the first time a drone has been shot down over Latvia’s territory;

F. whereas Russia is waging a disinformation campaign in the Baltic states, falsely claiming that Ukraine is launching drone attacks on Russia from their territory; whereas on 19 May 2026 Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Ukrainian drone units were stationed at Latvian military bases, a claim firmly rejected as disinformation by the Latvian authorities and disproved by NATO’s interception of stray drones over Baltic territory; whereas such fabrications seek to intimidate front line Member States and to manufacture pretexts for retaliation;

G. whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, on 12 September 2025 NATO announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s position along the eastern flank; whereas this was followed by the introduction on 16 October 2025 of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as flagship projects under the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; whereas on 11 February 2026 the Commission published the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security;

H. whereas on 9 June 2026 the Commission published its 21st sanctions package against Russia, which includes export restrictions for metals and alloys used in Russian drones and sanctions against entities involved in drone production; whereas, despite calls from several Member States and Members of this Parliament, exports of alumina to Russia were not included in the 21st sanctions package;

I. whereas, in its communication of 30 September 2022, the Commission called for heightened scrutiny of short-stay visa applications by Russian nationals and stated that a very strict approach is justified for Russian citizens travelling for tourism, including refusal where reasonable doubts exist regarding the purpose of travel, security risks or the applicant’s intention to leave the Schengen area;

J. whereas trade data exposed by reporters and information released by the Ukrainian military show that dual-use goods produced in Europe are still found in large quantities in Russian Geran-2 drones; whereas without Western technologies, Russia would not be able to produce the Geran-2 drones it uses to hit civilian targets in Ukraine;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated deliberate violations of the sovereign airspace and territory of EU Member States; expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and hijacked drone incursions, and stresses the importance for EU Member States to stand united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

2. Highlights that these clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare designed to destabilise, divide and undermine the EU, its Member States and NATO; stresses the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the Niinistö report, which presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects;

3. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

5. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility that would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model;

6. Stresses that countering drones and other emerging threats requires the EU to develop and field innovative defence solutions at speed; supports, in this context, the proposed programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) and calls for its contract-based model to be scaled up substantially; underlines the importance of EU action to foster innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises, start-ups and new defence actors, in particular on the eastern flank, so that they can scale up and help meet the EU’s capability needs, especially in drone and counter-drone warfare; calls for increased and dedicated support to this end under the next multiannual financial framework;

7. Expresses its gratitude to Ukraine for volunteering assistance and cooperation to the affected Member States in the wake of the airspace incursions by redirected drones; is obliged to Ukraine for sending air defence experts to Lithuania to assist that country with its protection against stray drones; notes the recently announced cooperation between Ukraine and Latvia to promote joint drone production with Ukrainian companies;

8. Welcomes the Commission’s 21st sanctions package as announced on 9 June 2026, including the sanctions against more than 30 entities involved in drone production and the new export bans on ground support equipment, and jamming and launch systems; expresses serious concern about the fact that European dual-use goods, the export of some of which is already sanctioned, are currently ending up in Russian drones; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement the new and existing sanctions, to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains, and for additional sanctions to be imposed as needed, in particular concerning legal entities in non-EU country re-export hubs, to ensure that European dual-use goods and technology are no longer contributing to the production of Russian drones;

9. Regrets that the 21st sanctions package failed to include any restriction on exports of alumina to Russia, a strategic raw material that ultimately feeds Russia’s military-industrial complex; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include alumina in the next sanctions package without delay, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest;

10. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas (C(2025)7552), and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

11. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure; expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation.