On Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

B100304/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

– having regard to the statements made by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen on 20 May 2026,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas intrusions into NATO and EU airspace, for which Russia has been blamed, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but have recently increased in frequency and intensity;

B. whereas between May and June 2026, several drone-related incidents were reported in the airspace and territory of EU Member States, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, with three incidents requiring the use of air-to-air missiles to shoot down the drones;

C. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania, causing an explosion that injured two people; whereas this was the first such incident to take place on the territory of an EU and NATO Member State that resulted in injuries requiring medical treatment; whereas more than 500 people had to be evacuated;

D. whereas recent provocations have included violations of airspace and maritime areas, sabotage and espionage targeting critical infrastructure, the jamming of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and navigation spoofing, cyberattacks, arson and assassination plots, the weaponisation of migration, the instrumentalisation of organised crime, economic coercion, acts of political subversion and economic penetration, foreign information manipulation and interference, the spread of disinformation and interference in political and electoral processes, and increasingly aggressive Russian activities in space that threaten European satellite constellations; whereas GNSS jamming and spoofing by Russia affects civilian aviation and maritime navigation, emergency services and other critical civilian sectors; whereas the drone incidents caused by Russian actions force Member State authorities to use counter-measures, which may endanger civilians and property;

E. whereas some European intelligence services have warned about a possible Russian armed aggression against the EU as early as 2027; whereas in the wider context of Russian hybrid attacks against the EU and a possible armed aggression against it, these provocations should be seen as a means of testing the EU’s willingness to engage and its response capabilities, NATO’s air-defence and detection systems, and of seeking to undermine NATO’s cohesion;

F. whereas the Baltic Sea region contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure, including subsea energy and telecommunications networks, transport links and other strategic assets, making it particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks, sabotage and drone-related threats; whereas the protection of critical infrastructure requires both physical hardening and increased redundancy and decentralisation, as demonstrated by the lessons learnt from Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure;

G. whereas Russian activities destabilise the Black Sea region, including through drifting mines, jamming operations and threats to freedom of navigation;

H. whereas Member States and NATO allies have increasingly started shooting down drones over their territories, namely Poland, Latvia and Estonia, marking a stark change in the response to these threats, moving from a passive to an active stance; whereas the use of fighter jets to intercept drones entails costs that are often vastly disproportionate to the value of the drones being neutralised, highlighting the need for more cost-effective counter-drone capabilities;

I. whereas the Arctic and the High North are becoming increasingly important for European security, while limited sensor coverage and a sparse permanent presence create vulnerabilities that hostile actors may seek to exploit through unmanned systems and hybrid operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile drone incursions deep into EU territory;

J. whereas EU Member States have yet to develop a fully coordinated and coherent response to hybrid warfare; whereas such a response would not only require adequate capabilities, but also political will and a common threat assessment;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland;

2. Remains convinced that every Member State has the right to shoot down Russian aircraft as a proportionate and legitimate response to incursions of its airspace and to answer with appropriate means to provocative actions; expresses its solidarity with the Member States facing Russian hybrid threats, and with their citizens who are directly affected by such attacks;

3. Strongly condemns Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, and supports Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence; stresses that drone incursions into EU airspace resulting from Russia’s attacks against Ukraine are a direct consequence of Russia’s war of aggression, for which Russia bears full responsibility; considers that the presence of Ukrainian drones in EU airspace is primarily a consequence of Russia’s attacks; emphasises the need for cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova with regard to operational efficiency, situational awareness, the exchange of information, and industrial synergies;

4. Emphasises the need for deepened cooperation with Ukraine on counter-drone capabilities; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s battlefield experience are systematically collected, analysed and incorporated into EU defence initiatives, capability planning and procurement programmes;

5. Recalls that the security of the EU is indivisible and that a threat or attack against one Member State constitutes a threat or attack against all, and that the current increase in hybrid attacks is aimed at undermining the security, stability and resilience of the EU as a whole;

6. Welcomes the decisive response by Member States’ armed forces through the more frequent shooting down of drones in EU airspace; reiterates its full support for NATO’s efforts to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, including through Forward Land Forces recently established in Sweden and Finland, as well as those established in the Baltics and Romania;

7. Condemns Russia for the jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions and beyond, which pose serious safety risks not only to civilian aviation but also to maritime navigation, emergency services and other civilian sectors; reiterates its call on the Council and the Commission to take measures to exert adequate pressure on Russia to cease these hostile activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen resilience against disruptions to satellite navigation systems, including through alternative positioning, navigation and timing capabilities, enhanced monitoring of interference incidents, and the necessary steps to restore the stability and reliability of navigation systems throughout the EU;

8. Expresses grave concern over the continued dissemination of disinformation by Russia targeting the Baltic states; condemns, in particular, unfounded allegations portraying Latvia as a launching ground for terrorist attacks against Russia by Ukraine; stresses that such narratives form part of a broader hybrid warfare strategy aimed at destabilising the EU and its eastern flank; calls for reinforced EU-level strategic communication, resilience-building and coordinated counter-disinformation efforts, in close cooperation with Member States;

9. Reiterates the need to support the Member States along NATO’s eastern flank and the Black Sea region in developing capabilities for intelligence gathering and the detection and tracking of threats originating beyond the EU’s external borders; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in close cooperation with NATO, to establish a common European situational awareness framework for drone-related threats, enabling real-time information sharing, tracking and attribution capabilities, particularly along the EU’s eastern border regions;

10. Urges the Member States and the Commission to urgently implement the Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Wall initiatives, in close coordination with NATO; stresses that Eastern Flank Watch should become a flagship EU initiative to strengthen surveillance, detection, counter-drone capabilities, information sharing and the resilience of critical infrastructure along the EU’s eastern border;

11. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the next multiannual financial framework and future EU defence funding instruments, including those developed under the Readiness 2030 agenda, give due priority to Member States on the EU’s eastern border that face the most acute and immediate security threats from Russia’s hybrid and military activities;

12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop interoperable and geographically targeted public warning mechanisms capable of rapidly informing citizens about drone-related threats while avoiding unnecessary large-scale alerts, especially in cross-border situations;

13. Stresses that Russia’s hybrid attacks against any Member State must entail tangible political and economic consequences; calls on the Council to expand and strengthen sanctions against individuals, entities and state structures involved in airspace violations, GNSS interference, sabotage, disinformation campaigns and other hostile actions directed against Member States;

14. Calls on the Member States to urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, in particular air and missile defence and drones and counter-drone systems;

15. Calls for threats of a hybrid nature, including drone incursions, to be adequately reflected in the threat assessment of the upcoming security strategy;

16. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union; calls for the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments of the Member States and the Secretary General of NATO.