Sittings · Document

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (2026/2772(RSP)) 2026-06-15

On Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

on behalf of The Left Group · Rapporteur: Danilo Della Valle, Merja Kyllönen

B100295/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to the UN Charter, in particular Articles 2(4), 21 and 51 thereof,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the principle enshrined therein of the peaceful settlement of disputes,

– having regard to the 2026 Doomsday Clock statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation’s illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 constitutes a grave violation of the UN Charter, in particular Article 2(4) thereof; whereas deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure violate international humanitarian law and must be condemned, and those responsible must be held fully accountable;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression has already lasted for more than four years, causing immense human suffering, the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, mass displacement, long-term physical and psychological trauma, ecological destruction and the destruction of large parts of Ukraine’s civilian, social and economic infrastructure;

C. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian Geran-2 drone struck a residential building in Galați, Romania, injuring two civilians; whereas Romanian President Dan stated that the drone had been struck by Ukrainian air defence over Reni, deflecting it into Romanian territory; whereas this incident is therefore the combined product of a Russian offensive weapon and Ukrainian defensive action, with responsibility for the original attack resting with Russia;

D. whereas since March 2026, a series of drone incursions have affected all three Baltic states and Finland; whereas on 23 March 2026, a drone crashed in Lithuania; whereas on 25 March 2026, a drone struck the chimney of the Auvere power station in Estonia, less than 50 kilometres from the Russian port of Ust-Luga, which Ukraine had struck that night; whereas on 7 May 2026, two drones crossing from Russian airspace struck an oil storage facility in Rēzekne, Latvia, damaging four empty storage tanks;

E. whereas Finland, as an EU Member State sharing a direct land border with the Russian Federation and with a key position in the Baltic Sea security architecture, is particularly exposed to spillover risks from Russian military operations, drone activity and hybrid threats targeting critical infrastructure and energy systems and affecting aviation safety; whereas on 15 May 2026, Helsinki-Vantaa Airport was shut down for three hours, 1.8 million residents of the Helsinki region were ordered to remain indoors and Finnish Air Force jets were scrambled following drone activity linked to overnight Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets near the Finnish border; whereas this response demonstrates the high readiness and vital importance of national defence and border security capabilities; whereas on 8 June 2026, NATO fighter jets shot down another drone that had entered Latvian airspace;

F. whereas the continuation of the war poses serious risks of regional escalation, and has fuelled fears across Europe of a wider confrontation between nuclear-armed states, with potentially catastrophic consequences; whereas the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the Doomsday Clock at 85 seconds to midnight for 2026, the closest it has ever stood, citing Russia’ s war of aggression as a primary driver, characterised by destabilising military tactics and repeated Russian nuclear threats; whereas the New START Treaty expired in February 2026 with no successor agreement, thus removing the last formal constraint on deployed strategic nuclear arsenals;

G. whereas the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned that the war in Ukraine represents the world’s biggest threat to nuclear safety; whereas on 31 May 2026, a drone struck within the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest – prompting the IAEA Director General to warn that attacks on nuclear sites are ‘like playing with fire’; whereas a drone had previously struck the plant’s external radiation control laboratory on 3 May 2026; whereas the IAEA has confirmed physical impacts on the plant, irrespective of the disputed attribution between the parties;

H. whereas on 7 May 2026, a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle carrying explosives was discovered by a fisher on the Greek island of Lefkada; whereas Greek National Defence Minister Dendias confirmed that the vessel was of Ukrainian origin, describing the incident as a threat to Mediterranean navigation and an ‘extremely serious issue’; whereas the Greek authorities subsequently lodged a formal diplomatic protest with Ukraine, concluding that the vessel was part of a broader operation targeting shipping serving Russian interests; whereas Ukraine has since responded and apologised, stating that it seeks to prevent similar incidents in the future;

I. whereas on 5 June 2026, a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle carrying explosives detonated in the Romanian port of Constanța, in close proximity to commercial berths and an ammonium nitrate storage facility after the area had been secured and isolated by the Romanian Intelligence Service, coastguard and Defence Ministry; whereas the Ukrainian Navy and Romanian President Dan both stated that Ukraine had lost control of the drone in the Black Sea due to electronic warfare interference, with the Ukrainian Navy further stating that they had provided the necessary information to the Romanian Navy in order to prevent civilian casualties; whereas, irrespective of the disputes regarding the impact of electronic warfare or technical failures, this event highlights the imminent risk of European civilian and economic infrastructure being targeted in military sabotage operations;

J. whereas these incidents collectively illustrate that the war’s geographic boundaries have become structurally uncontainable;

K. whereas Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu has explicitly threatened Finland and the Baltic states with retaliatory action, claiming Moscow’s right to self-defence if Ukrainian drones enter its airspace; whereas Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chair ‌of Russia’s Security Council, warned European leaders that drones would continue to stray into their countries and prevent their populations from sleeping ​peacefully; whereas such threats against sovereign EU Member States are illegal under international law and constitute deliberate escalatory intimidation;

L. whereas NATO is conducting ‘Northern Star’ exercises at the Vuosanka training ground in Kajaani, central Finland, approximately 30 kilometres from the Russian border, involving 9 000 personnel from seven allied nations – Finland, the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Hungary – with live-fire artillery, infantry and helicopter drills; whereas the Norwegian-led Cold Response 26 exercise brought 25 000 soldiers from 14 countries to the northern areas of Finland, Norway and Sweden in March 2026 as part of NATO’s enhanced Arctic presence;

M. whereas the massive increase in EU defence expenditure, reaching an estimated EUR 381 billion in 2025 – a 63 % increase since 2020 – has not been accompanied by any autonomous EU diplomatic strategy capable of containing the conflict or reducing the risk of further escalation into EU territory;

N. whereas the increasing use of drones in border regions and near critical infrastructure highlights the need for the EU Member States to enhance defensive capabilities against unmanned aerial systems, including detection, monitoring and proportionate countermeasures, while ensuring that such measures are transparent, precautionary and do not contribute to unnecessary escalation or public alarm;

O. whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union commits the EU to safeguard peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security through peaceful means;

P. whereas a durable and sustainable peace cannot be achieved through militarisation, bloc confrontation or unilateral security arrangements, but requires a framework of inclusive and cooperative security, inspired by the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter;

1. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, of all violations of international humanitarian law and of all war crimes committed during the conflict; demands full accountability under international law; strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s continued violations of international law, including repeated cross-border drone activity, reckless military operations and hybrid actions that threaten the security of EU Member States and civilian infrastructure;

2. Reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to peace, international law and the primacy of diplomatic solutions to armed conflict, rejecting the normalisation of war as a policy tool;

3. Condemns any deliberate violation of the Member States’ airspace and reaffirms that such actions constitute a breach of international law and a potential threat to European security;

4. Reaffirms the right of the Member States to defend their airspace, borders and critical infrastructure and protect their citizens, using all necessary and proportionate means under international law; strongly warns that disproportionate or hasty reactions could dangerously escalate tensions; stresses that defensive measures must always be proportionate, evidencebased, transparent and coordinated;

5. Opposes the instrumentalisation of such incidents to argue for massive rearmament or unlimited increases in defence spending, at the expense of social, environmental and humanitarian priorities;

6. Stresses that irrespective of whether drone incursions into EU territory are caused by Russian drones, electronic warfare, autonomous targeting failures, or Ukrainian operational decisions, the launching state bears primary responsibility for ensuring that its weapons systems do not enter the territory of third states;

7. Condemns the Russian drone and missile campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure, which is deliberately depriving millions of civilians of electricity, heating and essential services; stresses that such attacks constitute a grave violation of international humanitarian law; calls on Russia to immediately cease all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure;

8. Condemns all attacks on civilian populations, civilian infrastructure and nuclear facilities, irrespective of the perpetrator; recalls that international humanitarian law is binding on all parties to a conflict without exception; recalls, furthermore, that the deployment of armed systems in the territory or waters of third states without their prior knowledge or consent is inadmissible under international law irrespective of the military objective pursued;

9. Highlights, furthermore, that Ukrainian women and girls, particularly those in caregiving roles, have been severely and disproportionately impacted by the war, with the first three months of 2026 marking the deadliest winter for women and girls in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;

10. Expresses the gravest concern at the repeated attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; underlines that a nuclear accident at Europe’s largest power plant would be a catastrophe with consequences that would be transboundary and irreversible; calls on all parties to unconditionally halt any and all military action that could endanger the power plant; calls on the EU Member States to support the deployment of UN peacekeepers to protect Ukraine’s nuclear reactors, in close cooperation with the IAEA; stresses that the UN General Assembly possesses subsidiary decision-making powers under Resolution 377 A in cases where the Security Council is unable to act;

11. Calls for the immediate declaration, under IAEA auspices, of a legally binding exclusion zone around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, prohibiting all military drone and missile activity within a defined perimeter; stresses that the plant’s proximity to active combat operations makes any incident an existential risk for the entire European continent;

12. Calls on all parties to exercise maximum restraint in the conduct of military activities near the territory of non-belligerent states; notes that large-scale military exercises in close proximity to active conflict zones, while legitimate under international law, carry an inherent risk of miscalculation and must be accompanied by enhanced transparency measures and communication channels between the parties;

13. Warns that the risk of nuclear escalation, whether through deliberate decision, miscalculation or accident, is categorically unacceptable in the light of its potential consequences; calls on all nuclear-armed states to immediately resume arms control negotiations; rejects any proposal to expand European nuclear deterrence or to encourage nuclear latency among non-nuclear states;

14. Condemns Russian threats against EU Member States as illegal under international law; stresses that the appropriate response is not unlimited military build-up but the construction of a credible and autonomous European diplomatic alternative;

15. Stresses that the drone incidents affecting Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and Greece are not merely military accidents but also consequences of the absence of any functioning diplomatic framework capable of containing the conflict; recalls that wars without political tracks do not remain geographically or operationally constrained; warns that every week that goes by without a credible negotiation process is a week in which the probability of an uncontrolled escalatory incident increases;

16. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to appoint, without further delay, one or more EU special envoys for peace in Ukraine, with a clear mandate to engage all parties to the conflict, as well as key international actors; stresses that such an appointment must be accompanied by a structured negotiation brief, adequate resources and regular reporting to Parliament;

17. Recalls that effective mediation requires direct engagement with all parties to a conflict, including those whose conduct has been condemned;

18. Reiterates its call for a ceasefire and for structured, inclusive and transparent negotiations under the auspices of the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; calls for the EU to actively support the reconstruction of a pan-European security architecture based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act;

19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.