On the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

B100291/2026

European Parliament resolution on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolutions of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island, and of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (PDCA), signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017, and in particular to Articles 1(5) and 85(3)(b) thereof,

– having regard to the joint hearing of its Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights on the current political and human rights situation in Cuba, held on 5 May 2026, and to the testimonies presented by the Rapporteur for Cuba of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, Stuardo Ralón Orellana, and by Cuban opposition leader and former political prisoner José Daniel Ferrer,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba has been a State Party since 1995, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, and to other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the reports of the non-governmental organisation Prisoners Defenders on torture, on the structural violation of due process, on convictions for ‘pre-criminal social dangerousness’, on digital surveillance and on forced malnutrition in Cuban prisons,

– having regard to the new sanctions imposed in June 2026 by the United States against Miguel Díaz-Canel and members of his family, against relatives of Raúl Castro, and against entities of the regime’s military apparatus,

– having regard to the Freedom Accord, signed in Miami on 2 March 2026 by the two largest Cuban opposition coalitions, Pasos de Cambio and the Asamblea de la Resistencia Cubana (ARC),

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025, which, owing to an amendment tabled by the ECR Group, calls for the suspension of privileged cooperation with Cuba,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas more than five decades of political, economic and geopolitical choices made by the Cuban communist regime have led the country into a profound political, economic and social crisis, bringing Cuba increasingly close to having the characteristics of a failed state; whereas this situation is compounded by systematic and persistent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the continuation of a one-party political system, the absence of free, fair and competitive elections, the prohibition of political pluralism and the denial of the right of citizens to freely associate for political purposes;

B. whereas the communist regime in Cuba has grown more repressive and more destabilising in the region, having sustained the Chávez and, later, Maduro regimes in Venezuela and propped up the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship in Nicaragua; whereas the regime in Cuba has become more openly aligned with the enemies of Europe, despite the EU’s sustained political and financial openness and despite the PDCA, which entered into force almost 10 years ago; whereas the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has acknowledged that the agreement has not met its objectives; whereas the agreement is now under review;

C. whereas the Cuban regime co-founded, and remains a leading force within, the São Paulo Forum, a network of parties created to regroup the authoritarian left after the collapse of the Soviet bloc; whereas Cuba has used the São Paulo Forum to coordinate, legitimise and sustain authoritarian movements throughout Latin America;

D. whereas the recent history of central and eastern Europe shows that communist dictatorships do not democratise in exchange for dialogue and subsidies, but yield only to firm pressure and solidarity with those they oppress;

E. whereas Cuba is in the grip of a compounding humanitarian and economic crisis, marked by power cuts of up to 22 hours a day, acute shortages of food, fuel and medicine, and frequent water shortages, thus meeting many of the criteria associated with a failed state; whereas the regime depends on imported fuels, but its traditional suppliers – Russia, Venezuela and Mexico – have halted or curtailed deliveries and US sanctions have further restricted Cuba’s access to resources;

F. whereas this collapse is the consequence of decades of economic mismanagement and of the militarisation of the economy, and not of external pressure; whereas GAESA, the holding company of the Cuban Armed Forces, is estimated to control around 40 % of the Cuban economy, including banking, fuel, food retail and tourism, while ordinary citizens are left without basic goods;

G. whereas the United States has adopted targeted sanctions against senior figures of the regime and against the institutions of its security and military apparatus, citing the regime’s repression of its own people and its hostile activities abroad;

H. whereas a number of European companies have for years benefited from and operated within the economic structures controlled by the regime, thereby contributing directly or indirectly to the prolongation of the totalitarian system; whereas as sanctions tighten and the Cuban communist system appears to be approaching an inevitable collapse, the remaining European companies have begun to terminate or significantly reduce their presence in Cuba; whereas the Spanish hotel groups Meliá and Iberostar have withdrawn their management and branding from numerous resorts, while the French shipping company CMA CGM and the German carrier Hapag-Lloyd, together accounting for around 60 % of Cuba’s maritime traffic, have suspended their services to and from the island;

I. whereas ‘business as usual’ with such a regime legitimises the oppressor and betrays the oppressed;

J. whereas the number of political prisoners documented by independent organisations exceeds one thousand, including persons detained as minors; whereas the case of José Daniel Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba and a prisoner of conscience whose release the European Parliament has repeatedly demanded, is emblematic of the regime’s methods; whereas José Daniel Ferrer was ultimately driven into exile in October 2025;

K. whereas in a statistically representative study by Prisoners Defenders, every political prisoner examined, including minors, had suffered torture and was denied medical care; whereas abuse by state agents is excluded, in law and practice, from ordinary jurisdiction, leaving the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior with effective impunity;

L. whereas no systems are in place in Cuba to address the fact that liberty is currently being deprived; whereas the Cuban Constitution subordinates the judiciary, the prosecution and the legal profession to the President and the Communist Party, in clear breach of the rights to an independent tribunal and an effective defence;

M. whereas vaguely defined offences, such as enemy propaganda, contempt, public disorder, sedition, resistance and disobedience, together with summary proceedings and the trial of civilians before military courts, are systematically used to criminalise the freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion;

N. whereas thousands of Cubans have been punished under the former offence of ‘pre-criminal social dangerousness’, without having committed or attempted a crime; whereas although the 2022 Penal Code formally abolished that category of offence, it preserves similar pre-criminal mechanisms by allowing authorities of the Ministry of the Interior to issue warnings to persons deemed ‘prone to commit crimes or to break the social and constitutional order’, with non-compliance punishable by imprisonment;

O. whereas reports indicate that tens of thousands of inmates endure forced malnutrition on rations providing barely a 10th of minimum daily energy needs, compounded by insanitary conditions and the denial of medical care; whereas the July 2021 protester Alexander Díaz Rodríguez, released in April 2026 with extreme malnutrition, anaemia and advanced thyroid cancer, is proof of the life-threatening conditions imposed on political prisoners;

P. whereas the regime runs a pervasive system of digital surveillance through the state telecommunications monopoly, with selective internet outages, blockages of services, interception of private communications and reprisals against dissenters’ families, generating fear and leading to self-censorship at home and in the diaspora;

Q. whereas these systematic and widespread practices, directed against the civilian population as a deliberate instrument of state policy, may amount to crimes against humanity;

R. whereas the Cuban democratic opposition and resistance, on the island and in exile, have united to an unprecedented degree behind a single Freedom Accord and a common transition plan, despite decades of dispersion; whereas this rare unity offers the EU a credible partner and structured roadmap for a free and democratic Cuba;

S. whereas the regime has aligned itself with the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and has become a source of recruits fighting on Russia’s behalf, thereby directly threatening European security; whereas, according to Ukrainian sources, Cuban nationals constitute the largest group of foreign recruits fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

T. whereas the regime persistently refuses entry to delegations of the European Parliament, to UN special rapporteurs and to independent monitors, and insists on excluding the democratic opposition and independent civil society from any political dialogue;

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic and widespread repression carried out by the Cuban communist regime against its own people, including torture, arbitrary detention, forced malnutrition, mass surveillance, forced labour and judicial persecution;

2. Recalls that independent investigations have concluded that the Cuban regime’s security apparatus has been responsible for assassinations of political opponents, including the deaths of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero; further recalls that the United States has charged former Cuban Defence Minister Raúl Castro and other senior regime officials in relation to the 1996 destruction of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft in international airspace, resulting in the deaths of four civilians;

3. Demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and of all persons arbitrarily detained for exercising their fundamental rights, and calls for full reparation to be made to the victims of torture and ill treatment;

4. Concludes that the PDCA has failed in its core purpose and that the regime’s conduct constitutes persistent and substantial violations of the agreement’s essential human rights provisions; calls, therefore, for Article 86(4) PDCA to be triggered without further delay, for the agreement to be suspended and for the procedure for its termination to begin;

5. Reiterates its call on the Council to adopt targeted measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against those responsible, beginning with Miguel Díaz-Canel and the senior chain of command of the security, judicial and penitentiary apparatus;

6. Welcomes the targeted measures adopted by the United States against named members of the regime’s leadership and against the entities of its security, military and surveillance apparatus; considers that sustained and coordinated international pressure on the dictatorship is the most effective means of advancing democratic change and is consistent with Parliament’s own calls for sanctions;

7. Notes that, since February 2026, the United States has authorised exports of fuel and other essential goods to Cuba’s private businesses and households while excluding the regime, its armed forces and GAESA-controlled entities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop adequate humanitarian channels through which energy, food and medicine can be delivered directly to the Cuban people and to independent enterprises, bypassing the criminal Cuban state;

8. Calls on European companies to refrain from commercial dealings with Cuban state and military-controlled entities, in particular GAESA and its subsidiaries, as such revenues underwrite the regime’s apparatus rather than benefit the Cuban people;

9. Affirms that EU policy should add to, not offset, pressure on the regime’s economic power base, and that the EU’s priority must be solidarity with the Cuban people rather than the protection of arrangements that benefit their oppressors;

10. Calls for the immediate suspension of all EU funds channelled to or through Cuban state entities, and for any future cooperation to be redirected exclusively to independent civil society, the democratic opposition or the Cuban people;

11. Recalls that engagement without conditionality has never reformed a dictatorship and serves only to prolong it; affirms that solidarity with Cuban democratic activists, not accommodation with their jailers, must guide EU policy;

12. Maintains that no political dialogue with Havana is acceptable if it excludes the democratic opposition and independent civil society, whose inclusion the PCDA itself requires;

13. Expresses its full support for the Freedom Accord and for the united Cuban opposition and resistance behind it; recognises Pasos de Cambio, the ARC and their partner organisations as legitimate voices of the Cuban people’s democratic aspirations; calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to engage with them directly and to treat their transition plan for the liberation, stabilisation, reconstruction and democratisation of the country as a reference framework for the EU’s policy towards a free Cuba;

14. Calls on the regime to abolish, in all its forms, the pre-criminal mechanisms that allow the state to silence and arbitrarily imprison citizens, and to release those convicted under it without having committed any crime;

15. Demands an end to all forms of state-imposed forced labour, including within the medical brigades, the earnings of which are largely appropriated by the state;

16. Calls for an independent international investigation into prison conditions, the regime of forced malnutrition and deaths in custody;

17. Condemns Cuba’s material support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the recruitment of Cuban nationals to fight against Ukraine, and insists that this be treated as a matter of European security across all dimensions of relations with Havana; condemns the Cuban regime’s alignment with the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, which extends beyond political and economic cooperation to include close military and security ties; stresses that such cooperation undermines European security;

18. Demands that the regime grant immediate and unconditional access to delegations of the European Parliament, to UN special rapporteurs and to independent observers, and deplores its repeated refusal to do so;

19. Calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to raise these violations of human rights consistently in all relevant forums and to support accountability and a peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba, led by citizens, in line with the principles and objectives set out in the Freedom Accord;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and the authorities of the Republic of Cuba.