On the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

B100288/2026

European Parliament resolution on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Article 2 and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which affirm the EU’s commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights as foundational principles of its external action,

– having regard to the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), signed on 13 December 2016 and provisionally applied since 2017, which explicitly conditions cooperation on measurable progress in the area of human rights and the rule of law,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolutions of 15 November 2023 and 18 September 2024 on the situation of political prisoners and human rights defenders in Cuba,

– having regard to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report 2026 of February 2026, documenting systematic arbitrary detention, torture, and denial of due process in Cuba,

– having regard to Amnesty International’s report of April 2026 entitled ‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’, documenting 529 arbitrary detentions and 39 deaths in custody in 2025 in Cuba,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Cuba has been governed without interruption since 1959 by a single-party communist regime that has systematically denied its citizens the most fundamental political and civil freedoms; whereas the Cuban Communist Party holds a constitutional monopoly on power, all other political parties are illegal, and political dissent is a criminal offence;

B. whereas communism as a governing system has, wherever applied, has resulted in poverty, repression, and injustice; whereas Cuba further confirms this historical pattern;

C. whereas Cuba possesses significant natural and human potential that could make it one of the most prosperous nations in the Caribbean; whereas neighbouring Caribbean states that operate under free-market democratic systems, such as the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, have achieved substantial prosperity; whereas Cuba’s GDP per capita is among the lowest of the Latin American and Caribbean nations;

D. whereas Cuba is experiencing its deepest economic and humanitarian crisis in decades; whereas the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights estimated that 89 % of the population live in extreme poverty;

E. whereas Cuba’s population has fallen by over 1.4 million people in three years; whereas this demographic collapse is a direct consequence of political repression and economic misery; whereas between 2021 and mid-2024, more than 860 000 Cubans arrived in the United States alone;

F. whereas the current humanitarian crisis is primarily the result of decades of economic mismanagement, central planning, and an absence of private property guarantees; whereas attempts to attribute Cuba’s humanitarian catastrophe exclusively to external factors fail to acknowledge the responsibility of the Cuban authorities for policies that have remained largely unchanged for over six decades;

G. whereas, according to the non-governmental organisation Prisoners Defenders, there are approximately 1 200 political prisoners in Cuba as of mid-2026, including minors, journalists, artists and religious leaders;

H. whereas political repression intensified following the nationwide protests of July 2021 when hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets in over 50 cities; whereas over 1 400 people were arrested, 790 indicted, and many sentenced to up to 22 years in prison;

I. whereas the Cuban regime has survived for over six decades thanks to ideological and material support from fellow authoritarian states; whereas from 1999, Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, became Cuba’s principal patron;

J. whereas since 1988, the EU has provided over EUR 300 million to Cuba through more than 200 development projects; whereas approximately EUR 125 million was allocated for the 2021–2027 period; whereas in 2025 alone, the EU mobilised nearly EUR 6 million, and an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid in April 2026; whereas a substantial portion of these funds flows through regime-controlled institutions, in some cases benefiting Cuban police and military authorities;

K. whereas the EU signed the PDCA with Cuba in December 2016 with an explicit human rights conditionality; whereas despite the continuous and documented deterioration of the human rights situation since 2016, the EU has not suspended the PDCA;

L. whereas left-wing European political forces continue to praise the Cuban regime as a model of social justice, while systematically deflecting responsibility for the humanitarian crisis onto the US embargo; whereas Cuba’s economic collapse is the direct result of over six decades of failed central planning, political repression, and economic mismanagement;

1. Strongly condemns the systematic, ongoing, and worsening political repression perpetrated by the Cuban Communist regime against its own citizens, including arbitrary detention, torture, denial of fair trial, enforced disappearances, and the imprisonment of journalists, artists, religious leaders, minors and peaceful protesters;

2. Calls for the release of all political prisoners in Cuba, currently estimated at between 1 197 and 1 260; demands the release of all those imprisoned in connection with the July 2021 protests, many of whom face sentences of up to 22 years;

3. Condemns the systematic use by the Cuban regime of arbitrary detention, intimidation, censorship, political persecution, and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly;

4. Points out that the humanitarian catastrophe in Cuba, including extreme poverty affecting approximately 89 % of the population, chronic food shortages, systematic electricity blackouts, collapse of healthcare provision, and a demographic crisis unprecedented in Cuban history, is the direct consequence of over 65 years of communist mismanagement and totalitarian governance;

5. Rejects categorically the portrayal that attributes Cuba’s humanitarian crisis primarily to the US trade embargo; recalls that Cuba’s GDP per capita is among the lowest of the countries in the entire Latin American and Caribbean region;

6. Condemns those left-wing European political forces that have consistently praised the Cuban regime as a model of social justice and that have systematically failed to condemn its torture of dissidents, its detention of political prisoners, and its forced displacement of over a million citizens;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the PDCA with Cuba given that the core human rights conditionality clauses of the agreement have been systematically violated by the Cuban authorities since it was signed in 2016;

8. Calls on the Commission to conduct an immediate audit of all EU funds disbursed to Cuba since 2016, totalling over EUR 300 million, to determine what proportion of these funds has directly or indirectly benefited the regime’s security apparatus, police authorities, or military institutions rather than independent Cuban civil society;

9. Insists that all EU funds to Cuba must be immediately frozen for as long as the current criminal regime remains in power; stresses that no EU taxpayer money should continue to flow to a dictatorship that systematically violates human rights and imprisons its citizens for exercising basic freedoms;

10. Deplores the Commission’s unconditional engagement with the Cuban dictatorship; opposes the decision to continue disbursing substantial EU funds and to announce additional humanitarian assistance in April 2026, thereby providing the regime with hard currency and political legitimacy while the repression intensifies and Cuban citizens continue to suffer;

11. Reaffirms that Cuba possesses immense human, cultural and economic potential; affirms that a democratic transition based on political freedom, free elections, private initiative, and the rule of law would allow the country to prosper and offer its citizens the opportunities they have long been denied;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Organization of American States, and the Cuban Government.