On the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

B100286/2026

European Parliament resolution on political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other, provisionally applied since 1 November 2017,

– having regard to the speeches delivered by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, at Parliament’s plenary, in particular the ones on the applicability of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement of 6 May 2025 and the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba of 19 May 2026,

– having regard to the EU-Cuba human rights dialogues,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Cuba is a state party,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights statements of 25 March 2026 on Cuba,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas human rights organisations continue to document the Cuban regimes’ ongoing repression against all dissenting voices, a crackdown that has intensified in the last months; whereas according to Prisoners Defenders, the number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Cuba rose to 1 260 in April 2026; whereas political prisoners in Cuba include minors, athletes, artists, independent journalists, dissidents and peaceful activists;

B. whereas Cuban political repression is characterised by recurring patterns of arbitrary detention, pretrial detention without judicial oversight, temporary disappearances, violence during arrests, incommunicado detention, constant surveillance, harassment of family members and the criminalisation of critical speech through prosecutions;

C. whereas political prisoners suffer from illnesses caused or aggravated by prison conditions, which include torture, sexual violence and the systematic denial of medical care;

D. whereas many Cubans have fled the country or been forced to leave; whereas they have not been allowed to return and will remain in exile for the foreseeable future;

E. whereas the state and the military control a majority of the Cuban economy; whereas the origin of the economic problems and energy crisis in Cuba are the result of decades of poor policies, structural problems and a heavy reliance on imported fuels, which have led to the total failure of the country’s economic and productive systems;

F. whereas the humanitarian crisis that the Cuban people are experiencing cannot be separated from the decades of state repression aimed at intimidating and systematically silencing dissenting voices; whereas further instability will only risk greater humanitarian, migratory and security consequences;

G. whereas, according to the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights’ 2025 Report, 89 % of Cuban families suffer from extreme poverty, 78 % of Cubans want to leave the country or know someone who does, 70 % must forgo some of their daily meals, and only 3 % are able to purchase medication at pharmacies;

H. whereas for decades, millions of Cubans have suffered from food crises, the high cost of living, poor wages, ineffective public health care and constant blackouts that can last 22 hours or more; whereas in July 2021, the Cuban regime violently repressed the large peaceful demonstration denouncing shortages and restrictions on freedoms;

I. whereas Cuban hospitals are unable to function normally, the health care system has been thrown into chaos, the tourism industry has been devastated, and schools and government offices forced to close;

J. whereas according to the UN, health systems are facing a backlog of over 96 000 patients waiting for surgery, including 11 000 for children, while the National Immunization Program has been delayed for thousands of infants; whereas roughly one million people are currently dependent on water trucking, a service that is severely constrained by the lack of diesel;

K. whereas in January 2026, US President Donald Trump issued an oil blockade against Cuba and signed an executive order threatening tariffs against any country shipping fuel to the communist-run nation, which has aggravated the existing fuel shortages; whereas Cuba have recognised negotiations with the United States to overcome the oil blockade;

L. whereas the Cuban regime has deepened its relationship with the Putin regime since the start of Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas at the end of March 2026, a Russian-owned tanker carrying an estimated 730 000 barrels of crude oil was allowed to dock on the northern coast of Cuba;

M. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for reforms in Cuba, which, in the current context of the economic, humanitarian, social and human rights crisis, are more necessary than ever;

N. whereas in April 2026, the EU allocated an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid, funding which is added to the EUR 4 million already approved earlier this year as a regional allocation for the Caribbean; whereas the funding aims to provide logistics support to humanitarian partners delivering urgent relief to the most vulnerable, in the light of the current energy crisis and related difficulties in distributing food and drinking water;

O. whereas the updated UN Action Plan on Cuba, which aims to support around two million people, includes the installation of solar power for irrigation systems, hospitals and schools and the reinforcement of water pumping infrastructure, in order to reduce reliance on the fragile national grid; whereas while the UN has already mobilised USD 26.2 million, a significant funding gap of USD 68 million remains;

P. whereas there has not been concrete progress in Cuba vis-à-vis the general principles and objectives pursued by the PDCA to improve the situation of human rights, and, on the contrary, the Cuban regime has intensified its repression and labour and human rights violations, including an increase in the number of political prisoners; whereas the PDCA has failed in its core aim to improve fundamental freedoms in Cuba;

1. Urges the Cuban regime to immediately end political repression; condemns in the strongest terms the systematic violation of human rights and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime against protesters, political dissidents, students, religious leaders and human rights activists, among others;

2. Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release all those politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

3. Condemns the torture and the inhuman and degrading treatment perpetrated by the Cuban regime against political prisoners, and calls for them to be given immediate access to medical care;

4. Reiterates its demand for fair trials, for the independence of the judiciary, and for persons deprived of their liberty to have access to an independent lawyer;

5. Underlines its unconditional support for the Cuban people, for all those fighting for the freedoms and rights that the regime has denied for decades, for the leaders of the historical and emerging democratic opposition, and for independent civic movements; highlights the need for full respect for human rights and for ensuring that all citizens, including those with dissenting views, can freely exercise their fundamental freedoms;

6. Calls on the regime to listen to its citizens and to engage in an inclusive national dialogue, with no restrictions, on fundamental changes, modernisation and a transition towards a robust democratic and pluralistic society;

7. Calls on the VP/HR to promote a roadmap for democracy in Cuba; urges the establishment of a framework of verifiable minimum conditions such as the release of prisoners and legal reforms, linked to concrete diplomatic incentives and clear consequences in the event of repressive setbacks;

8. Stresses its deep concern over the humanitarian situation in Cuba and calls on all donors to step up their aid in order to meet the needs of the Cuban people; stresses that humanitarian support must remain protected and free from state intermediation under all circumstances;

9. Urges the Cuban regime to put forward sustainable and meaningful economic reforms that ensure legal certainty and support independent economic actors, private initiatives, investments and freedoms, as essential ways to avoid collapse;

10. Recalls that any dialogue between the EU and Cuban civil society, as well as any funding opportunities, must be held only with independent civil society organisations, making sure that any funding or humanitarian aid does not contribute to financing the Cuban regime, but is directed to improving the standard of living of the Cuban people; stresses, furthermore, that these initiatives must be channelled in the most direct and effective way possible towards Cuban citizens, with the aim of maximising their impact on improving the living conditions of the population;

11. Echoes its call on the Council to apply the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (the EU Magnitsky Act) and adopt targeted and individual sanctions against those responsible for the persistent human rights violations in Cuba;

12. Reiterates its previous positions regarding the activation of the PDCA’s suspension clause, given that the core human rights clauses of the agreement have been continuously breached by the Cuban regime;

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the rotating Presidency of the EU, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the United Nations, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and the Cuban regime.