On the situation in Northeast Syria, the violence against civilians and the need to maintain a sustainable ceasefire

B100137/2026

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Northeast Syria, the violence against civilians and the need to maintain a sustainable ceasefire

(2026/2602(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2025 on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church,

– having regard to the visit of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa to Damascus on 9 January 2026,

– having regard to the joint statement of 27 January 2026 by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the situation in north-east Syria,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the regime of Bashar Al-Assad fell in December 2024, bringing an end to 50 years of Baathist rule; whereas opposition forces comprised an array of different groups, with the most prominent being Sunni Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani, also known as Ahmed al-Sharaa; whereas al-Sharaa is the de facto leader of the transitional interim government of Syria; whereas al-Sharaa has never expressed regret for being associated with Al-Qaeda in the past;

B. whereas between 25 and 35 million Kurds inhabit a mountainous region straddling the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Armenia; whereas the Kurdish people have never recognised what they consider the artificial boundaries that divide them across four nation-states – Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey – and have struggled to form an independent state; whereas during the 13-year civil war, the United States became involved with Syrian Kurds and the Kurdish-led coalition Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), allying with them to combat the extremist terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); whereas Syrian Kurds also expanded the terrain under their control, including Arab-majority areas such as Raqqa and Deir al-Zour;

C. whereas the transitional interim government began a targeted military offensive in Aleppo and other SDF-controlled areas after the expiry of the 31 December 2025 deadline stipulated in the 10 March 2025 agreement between the interim Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF; whereas the agreement sought to integrate both civilian and military wings of the SDF into the state; whereas a ceasefire agreement between the Syrian transitional authorities and the Kurdish-led SDF was reached on 30 January 2026; whereas the agreement does not have an appropriate and reliable mechanism for monitoring adherence to the ceasefire by all parties, which constitutes a major weakness; whereas the previous agreement, dated 10 March 2025, between SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and the Syrian transitional authorities already suffered from this shortcoming;

D. whereas neighbourhoods such as Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah in Aleppo have been besieged and bombed, with youth abductions and tens of thousands fleeing, while Kurdish sources claim that the ‘new Syrian army’ consists largely of former ISIS, Al-Qaeda and affiliated fighters now operating under the HTS; whereas in north-east Syria, Kurdish groups describe the situation as a ‘war for survival’ as regime forces advance on Kurdish-majority towns such as Hasakah, Qamishli and Kobani, which, reminiscent of the fight against ISIS, were fully encircled by these jihadist-linked units in January 2026;

E. whereas the transfer of control over prisons holding jihadists and former ISIS fighters such as the al-Hol Camp was grossly mismanaged and chaotic; whereas a significant number of jihadists managed to escape these prisons; whereas many of these fighters still regrettably hold EU citizenship, thus posing a direct security threat to EU Member States;

F. whereas the situation for minorities in Syria remains extremely worrying, with thousands of people belonging to minorities having been displaced and vulnerable groups such as Yazidis, Kurds, Christians, Druze, and Alawites remaining at serious risk; whereas sectarian violence remains a particular problem, with a particularly grave example being the suicide bombing at the Mar Elias (Greek Orthodox) Church in Damascus in June 2025, which killed at least 25 and injured over 60, marking the deadliest attack against Christians in years; whereas this attack reinforced religious and ethnic minorities’ concerns about protection and the persistent threat of extremist networks; whereas during 2025 widespread violence occurred against Alawite and Druze communities, resulting in thousands of casualties and feeding a cycle of reprisals and fear;

G. whereas the rapid centralisation of power in Syria carries a significant risk of erosion of pluralistic local governance, intimidation of civil society and ever-shrinking space for the participation of minorities and women in public life; whereas the pressure to dismantle or forcibly ‘integrate’ the Kurdish-led autonomous structures in north-east Syria risks becoming a revenge campaign against democratic regional governance, including local councils, women’s institutions and minority protection arrangements;

H. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa visited Damascus on 9 January 2026 and pledged a financial support package of around EUR 620 million for 2026 and 2027, which includes humanitarian aid, early recovery support and bilateral support; whereas this support must be conditional on adherence to international standards of human rights protection;

1. Calls for the comprehensive cessation of hostilities between the Damascus forces and the SDF;

2. Strongly condemns all attacks targeting religious and ethnic communities in Syria;

3. Takes note of the agreement signed between the Syrian transitional authorities and the SDF on 30 January 2026; calls on all parties to respect and implement the agreement in good faith and a spirit of compromise; welcomes the establishment of humanitarian corridors to ensure the safe transport of humanitarian aid; reiterates that the ceasefire must become permanent;

4. Reiterates that stability in north-east Syria is key to the success of a comprehensive, inclusive and just political transition in Syria; recalls that this transition must respect the life, rights and dignity of all Syrian people, regardless of their ethnic, religious or cultural background;

5. Deplores the fact that many HTS members with grave human rights violation records have assumed roles within the transitional administration, with potentially serious implications for religious freedom, as evidenced by the recurrence of sectarian violence; calls on the transitional authorities to rein in all violent factions and ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus;

6. Recognises the involvement of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the agreement between the Syrian transitional authorities and the SDF; recalls that without any security guarantees and credible monitoring mechanisms, this agreement remains fragile;

7. Underlines the fact that the gradual deployment of regime forces in the Kurdish autonomous areas has been accompanied by considerable uncertainty, with escapes having taken place at a number of prisons taken over by the regime forces, particularly those holding ISIS fighters and their families; considers that ISIS fighters are a major threat to Syria, its neighbours and Europe;

8. Reiterates the importance of jointly continuing and enhancing the fight against ISIS in the Middle East, especially given the current transitional period in Syria; recalls that sustained collective efforts in the fight against ISIS are imperative in order to avoid a security vacuum in and around detention centres where ISIS members are being held; welcomes the parallel lifting of sectoral sanctions against Syria by the United States and the EU and the ongoing work on updating UN sanctions;

9. Reiterates the sovereign right of Member States to refuse the return of jihadist fighters and their families to their territory and to revoke their citizenship;

10. Calls on the EU, the Member States and international partners to shed full light on the number of ISIS fighters or supporters who have escaped or been released from Kurdish prisons, particularly those with European nationality, and to step up their cooperation in order to address the immediate security threat posed by these fighters and supporters;

11. Emphasises the urgent need to protect all religious minorities in Syria, including Christians, Kurds, Druze and Alawite communities, and to guarantee their security, their right to remain in their territories of origin and their religious freedom; calls for clear accountability for all sectarian violence in the country; calls on the Commission to ensure that any EU financial support for the transitional interim government in Damascus is made conditional on adherence to the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities in Syria;

12. Regrets the transitional interim government in Syria’s lack of democratic legitimacy; recalls that free and fair elections must be organised as soon as the situation in the country returns to normal;

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the transitional interim government of Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and to have it translated into, and published in, Arabic and Kurdish.