On the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

B100585/2025

European Parliament resolution on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

(2025/3025(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and to the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Belarus and Russia,

– having regard to the statement of 29 October 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Belarus’ hybrid actions at the EU external border,

– having regard to the statement of 2 December 2025 by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the violation of Lithuanian airspace by Belarusian balloons,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas in recent years, Belarus, in close coordination with Russia, has intensified its hybrid operations targeting Lithuania, including the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), smuggling balloons, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and the instrumentalisation of migration;

B. whereas Lithuania has recorded hundreds of violations of its airspace by Belarus-launched unmanned objects since 2024, including balloons carrying contraband; whereas none of these incursions were notified to aviation authorities, thereby breaching international safety norms and Lithuanian sovereignty;

C. whereas Belarusian hybrid operations, including in the vicinity of major airports such as Vilnius Airport and Kaunas Airport, are fundamentally undermining security and disrupting civil aviation, and have already caused numerous closures of airports, affected hundreds of flights and tens of thousands of passengers, and caused significant losses to Lithuanian airports and aviation companies;

D. whereas in reaction to the Lithuanian Government’s decision to temporarily close its border with Belarus, the Belarusian de facto authorities have engaged in economic coercion by detaining European road freight vehicles, demanding ransom, threatening confiscation and obstructing legitimate border crossings;

E. whereas on 9 December 2025, the Government of Lithuania declared a national state of emergency following a surge of balloons launched from Belarus;

F. whereas on 13 December 2025, the United States made the decision to lift some sanctions on Belarus without prior coordination with the EU;

G. whereas Lithuanian explosive ordnance disposal units and security agencies have recovered debris and components from Belarus-launched UAVs and balloons that pointed to controlled deployment, onboard electronics and, in one case, the presence of explosive materials;

H. whereas since 2021, Belarus has been conducting instrumentalised migration operations, directing irregular migrants towards the Lithuanian border as a deliberate destabilisation strategy; whereas the combination of UAV incursions, balloon networks, disinformation attacks and border pressure forms a sustained pattern of multi-domain hybrid aggression against Lithuania and the EU;

I. whereas Belarusian state media and officials have denied responsibility for airspace violations while spreading false narratives accusing Lithuania of espionage and fabricating incidents; whereas such disinformation mirrors long-standing Russian information tactics, aims to erode public trust and seeks to divert attention from verifiable hybrid aggression; whereas countering such narratives requires coordinated communication at both EU and NATO level;

J. whereas the Lithuanian authorities have acted proportionately, strengthening airspace monitoring, temporarily closing border crossing points with Belarus and alerting EU and NATO partners to the rising threat;

K. whereas Belarus maintains increasingly close military and intelligence cooperation with and dependence on Russia, including shared air-defence structures, technology transfer in UAV systems and coordinated hybrid operations targeting EU Member States; whereas these dynamics must be interpreted within the broader context of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and its destabilisation strategy against NATO’s eastern flank;

L. whereas NATO has stated repeatedly that UAV incursions into allied airspace are unacceptable, and that hybrid operations by hostile actors must be addressed collectively;

M. whereas the EU has already launched initiatives, such as the Eastern Flank Watch, enhanced air surveillance and the drone wall proposal, to strengthen border security and counter hybrid threats;

N. whereas Lithuania’s experience demonstrates the urgent need for coordinated EU action, effective counter-UAV capabilities, border-protection technologies and rapid information-sharing across Member States;

1. Strongly condemns Belarus’s ongoing hybrid attacks, which amount to state-organised terror operations, against Lithuania and the EU as a whole, including repeated UAV and balloon incursions, instrumentalised migration, systemic smuggling operations, economic coercion, cyber activities and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; considers these activities to be deliberate, coordinated and hostile, aimed at undermining Lithuania’s national security, terrorising its population, destabilising the EU’s external border and testing the resilience and response thresholds of EU and NATO defence systems;

2. Declares that Belarusian hybrid aggression forms part of a broader Russia-led destabilisation strategy targeting EU Member States and NATO;

3. Deplores the lack of coordination surrounding the United States’ partial lifting of sanctions on Belarus on 13 December 2025, which undermines solidarity and collective support for EU and NATO members targeted by Belarusian hybrid attacks;

4. Demands that Belarus immediately cease all hybrid operations against Lithuania, including the launch of unmanned devices, smuggling activities, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion and manipulation of migration flows, and that it immediately release all European hauliers’ freight vehicles and goods held on Belarusian territory;

5. Rejects the false narratives and accusations propagated by the Belarusian regime alleging espionage flights or fabricated airspace incidents; stresses that such disinformation aims to obscure responsibility, create diplomatic tension, force the EU to change its stance in regard to isolating Belarus for its involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and for its violations of democratic principles and human rights, and undermine public trust;

6. Reiterates its non-recognition of the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president following the sham elections of 26 January 2025; stresses that any review of the EU’s sanctions policy or engagement in political dialogue with Belarus must be strictly conditional on sustained, verifiable and irreversible systemic changes, as expressed in previous resolutions by Parliament;

7. Stresses that statements by the US special envoy to Belarus giving assurances that the balloon launches will be stopped indicate an acknowledgement of responsibility and are relevant for the establishment of state responsibility under international law;

8. Expresses full solidarity with Lithuania and other Member States affected by Belarusian actions and provocations; reiterates that an attack on the security of one Member State affects the EU as a whole; calls on all EU Member States to closely follow this policy line towards Belarus;

9. Calls for strengthened EU-NATO cooperation on Lithuanian airspace surveillance, including unified incident-classification protocols, enhanced air-policing rotations and coordinated responses to balloon or UAV intrusions; underlines the need for regular joint exercises simulating hybrid aerial threats; stresses that close cooperation will reduce response times, increase attribution accuracy and minimise risks of escalation;

10. Calls on the Commission and Frontex to expand Lithuania’s border-surveillance capacity with additional sensors, patrol aircraft, mobile counter-UAV kits and real-time threat analysis support; notes that Belarus’s hybrid tactics expose structural vulnerabilities that must be addressed collectively;

11. Calls for the Commission to enhance strategic communication, counter disinformation and publicly attribute hostile activities; underlines that coordinated communication increases societal resilience and reduces the effectiveness of foreign manipulation; stresses the need to expose coordinated Belarusian and Russian attempts to influence public opinion;

12. Calls on the Council to adopt additional targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials, intelligence services, state enterprises, private entities and individuals involved in UAV production, deployment and all other hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure, economic activities and democratic institutions;

13. Calls on the Council to take further sectoral measures against Belarus, including the expansion of restrictions regarding the aviation sector, the prohibition of transactions with additional financial institutions, further import restrictions, the prohibition of investment in certain Belarusian preferential economic zones, the expansion of service prohibitions, the prohibition of Belarusian citizens from holding any posts in the governing bodies of European critical infrastructure, and the prohibition of accepting donations from the Belarusian de facto authorities and publicly owned entities;

14. Calls on European businesses, particularly hauliers, to reassess the security risks associated with doing business in Belarus and take appropriate measures to protect their employees and property;

15. Encourages the Member States to raise Belarus’s actions before the UN, and to seek international condemnation of hybrid aggression targeting the EU; stresses that Belarusian hybrid attacks cannot be separated from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

16. Calls for closer EU-Ukraine cooperation on drone technology, counter-UAV systems, cyber protection and hybrid-threat resilience; recognises Ukraine’s extensive battlefield experience and innovation in unmanned systems as invaluable for strengthening the EU’s defence posture;

17. Urges the Council to incorporate eastern-border security priorities into the next multiannual financial framework, ensuring sustained EU investment in counter-hybrid infrastructure, military mobility and defence technologies;

18. Calls on the Member States to ensure the rapid cross-border movement of military and security assets in support of Lithuania, including counter-UAV equipment, air-defence systems and specialised personnel;

19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the United Nations and the Belarusian de facto authorities.