On the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

B100578/2025

European Parliament resolution on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

(2025/3025(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 29 October 2025 on Belarus’ hybrid attacks at the EU external border,

– having regard to recent public declarations by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, especially her statement of 1 December 2025 that the hybrid attack by the Lukashenko regime was completely unacceptable,

– having regard to the statement by Council President António Costa in which he expressed full solidarity with Lithuania and called on Belarus to cease its hybrid activities,

– having regard to the statement by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola underlining Parliament’s commitment to the security of Europe’s borders,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to the State Party referral submitted by the Republic of Lithuania to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 30 September 2024 concerning the situation in Belarus,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and to the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 222, 83, 170 and 77(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine since 24 February 2022,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Belarus has repeatedly launched unmanned objects into Lithuanian airspace, disrupting aviation, endangering safety and forcing airports and borders to close;

B. whereas Belarus is a platform for Russia’s hybrid operations against Europe,, which include the smuggling of tobacco products, violating trade regulations, harming consumers and posing a risk of facilitating more serious forms of contraband in the future;

C. whereas these incursions reflect broader hybrid aggression, such as migrant smuggling, airspace violations and economic coercion, all aimed at destabilising the EU Member States; whereas more than 180 migrants crossed into Poland on 12 December 2025 through a tunnel hidden on the Belarus-Poland border; whereas Belarussian and Russian hybrid threats are aimed at critical infrastructure and challenge EU sovereignty; whereas investigations show that Belarusian security structures organise these operations, while state-owned tobacco and cigarette smuggling networks operate with the security services’ involvement; whereas these incidents prove that Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime is not genuinely de-escalating the situation, and is instead continuing hostile operations against its neighbours and the EU, independently and with Russia;

D. whereas the Lithuanian authorities have reported a drastic escalation of hybrid activities from Belarus, having detected three contraband balloons in 2023, 226 in 2024 and 623 in 2025 up until 8 December; whereas more than 600 balloon and 200 drone intrusions into Lithuanian airspace have been registered;

E. whereas the use of aircraft has escalated recently, including the use of weather balloons for smuggling on 4 October 2025, which seriously interfered with operations at Vilnius International Airport; whereas between 4 October and 7 December 2025, airspace restrictions were imposed owing to Belarusian hybrid activities 15 times over Vilnius Airport and once over Kaunas Airport;

F. whereas hybrid activities have disrupted over 350 flights, affecting approximately 51 000 passengers, and have led to losses amounting to over EUR 750 000 for Lithuanian airports and operational partners;

G. whereas Lithuania declared a nationwide state of emergency on 9 December 2025 following the surge in contraband balloons entering the country from Belarus, citing security concerns; whereas Lithuania has authorised the shooting down of these unmanned flying objects and temporarily closed its border with Belarus;

H. whereas Belarus has engaged in economic coercion through taking hostage Lithuanian freight vehicles, threatening their confiscation and obstructing access to the border, contributing to destabilisation and hybrid pressure;

I. whereas on 9 December 2025, the State Security Department of Lithuania publicly warned about a new provocation consisting of individuals impersonating Lithuanian intelligence officers on the Telegram messaging platform attempting to recruit Lithuanian citizens;

J. whereas the EU summoned the Belarusian Chargé d’Affaires to deliver a formal diplomatic note regarding the hybrid attacks from Belarusian territory;

K. whereas intelligence and security assessments across the EU indicate that Belarussian hybrid tactics closely align with and contribute to Russia’s broader strategy of hostility against the EU and its Member States; whereas these hybrid attacks serve the strategic interests of the Kremlin, provide opportunities to test NATO’s air-defence and detection systems, probe responses to airspace violations and undermine NATO’s cohesion;

L. whereas repeated hybrid tactics and undercover operations signal a desire to sow instability and ambiguity; whereas Russia’s sabre-rattling rhetoric and subversive activities at EU borders could amount to the precursor of a military attack;

M. whereas the war of aggression which Russia has been waging since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Belarus as its accomplice, goes against international law and jeopardises international order; whereas an armed attack justifies self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter;

N. whereas Lithuania is the first State Party to the Rome Statute to formally refer the situation in Belarus to the ICC, requesting an investigation of alleged crimes against humanity by Lukashenka’s regime during the 2020 and 2021 crackdown on protesters and government opponents; whereas ongoing hybrid attacks by Belarus against Lithuania constitute blackmail to deter EU Member States from maintaining and strengthening sanctions, pursuing international accountability and supporting democratic opposition;

O. whereas Belarus freed 123 prisoners on 14 December 2025, while more than 1 000 political prisoners are still imprisoned;

1. Strongly condemns Belarus’s hybrid attacks against Lithuania and the EU, using unmanned objects, economic coercion and confiscation threats, as deliberate hostile acts undermining international law and security; stresses that Lukashenka’s regime serves as a staging ground for Russia’s hybrid warfare against the EU;

2. Expresses solidarity with Lithuania and other Member States facing Belarusian hybrid threats; reaffirms that attacks on one Member State are attacks on the whole EU, requiring a united response; acknowledges that Lithuania’s situation and contraband balloon intrusions pose geostrategic risks affecting consumers, public health and international trade;

3. Calls on Belarus to take responsibility for its airspace violations and discrimination against Lithuanian carriers, immediately cease hybrid activities, and ensure border and airspace safety;

4. Fully supports Lithuania in defending its sovereignty, airspace and public safety by neutralising threatening unmanned objects from Belarus; supports Lithuania’s decision of 9 December 2025 to declare a nationwide state of emergency and shoot down any airborne threats violating its airspace;

5. Calls on the Member States to take appropriate steps, such as the immediate neutralisation of any drones or unidentified objects entering their airspace;

6. Calls for solidarity in addressing the threats posed by the Lukashenka regime, particularly through its state-engineered weaponisation of migration; strongly condemns the Belarusian authorities’ use of migration for political ends;

7. Calls for tougher sanctions against Belarus, similar to those targeting Russia, given Belarus’s status as an enabling state;

8. Reiterates its call for a new approach towards Belarus, empowering and supporting its democratic opposition forces, and for constraining Russia’s military use of Belarus, as an integral part of the EU’s long-term values-based security strategy, essential to maintaining the EU’s credibility as defender of a democratic Belarus;

9. Calls for supporting the Belarusian democratic forces and developing mechanisms for assisting Belarusian citizens;

10. Calls for hybrid attacks (such as unmanned aerial vehicle incursions, contraband balloons, and coercive recruitment and manipulation of EU citizens) to be added to Belarus’s new sanctions criteria; calls for additional measures targeting organisers, perpetrators and supporting networks, following Lithuania’s request;

11. Supports the statement by NATO Chair of the Military Committee Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone and calls for a proactive, non-reactive approach to battling Russian and Belarusian hybrid threats; stresses the need for a thorough and bold hybrid warfare strategy;

12. Calls for support for NATO member states in the eastern flank and the Black Sea region to develop intelligence and tracking capabilities against threats from beyond the EU’s borders;

13. Reiterates its calls for enhanced EU preparedness and coordination, unity and solidarity between the Member States, the EU institutions and NATO; calls for the swift implementation of the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Air Shield;

14. Requests that the Commission prepare measures to protect the Trans-European Transport Network infrastructure and safeguard the continuity of trans-European transport services against future hybrid attacks;

15. Calls on the Member States and the NATO allies to review the rules of engagement for all types of threats, ensuring that they adequately respond to the most innovative hybrid threats; stresses that the EU and the Member States must signal that non-EU countries violating their airspace or sovereignty will face immediate retaliation; calls for a transition from reactive containment to a proactive defence approach against hybrid threats, recognising their persistent and systemic nature; underlines the need for integrated cross-sector capabilities to anticipate, prevent, attribute and respond effectively to such threats;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Council to prepare an EU response plan, including an ‘escalation ladder’ for hybrid warfare from Russia, Belarus or other non-EU countries, providing for retaliatory measures matching the severity of hostile activities against the EU; calls urgently for the creation of a robust and effective air defence system along the EU’s eastern border and highlights the need to invest in research and innovation programmes to produce cheap and effective anti-drone defence systems; emphasises that the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including transport and aviation infrastructure, must be structurally embedded and adequately financed in the next multiannual financial framework;

17. Calls for more military aid for Ukraine, particularly air defence ammunition; warns that if Ukraine is defeated in the war with Russia, the risk of attacks on EU territory will increase;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments of the Member States and the Belarusian authorities.