On renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit

B100473/2025

European Parliament resolution on renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit

(2025/2933(RSP))

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), of the other part, also known as the Samoa Agreement, signed on 15 November 2023 and provisionally applied since 1 January 2024, which replaces the Cotonou Agreement and provides the overarching framework for EU-Africa relations through its dedicated Africa-EU regional protocol,

– having regard to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon on 9 December 2007, which laid the foundation for a continent-to-continent partnership between the African Union (AU) and the EU, and to the lessons learned from its implementation,

– having regard to Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, adopted by the AU Assembly on 31 January 2015,

– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to the outcomes of the sixth EU-AU Summit held from 17 to 18 February 2022 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Global Gateway and its Africa-Europe Investment Package worth EUR 150 billion announced by the EU to support shared ambitions for 2030 through investment in sustainable infrastructure, the green transition, digital transformation and human development, and to the EU’s external financing instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument [NDICI] – Global Europe), which provides the financial architecture for development cooperation with African countries,

– having regard to the Global Gateway Forum held from 9 to 10 October 2025,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, and its successor instrument for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework,

– having regard to its latest resolution on Africa-EU relations of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development,

– having regard to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, which entered into force in 2019,

– having regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change and the joint commitments of the EU and African states under it, as well as to the outcomes of recent UN climate change conferences (COPs) relevant to Africa, underlining the importance of cooperation in combating climate change,

– having regard to the Constitutive Act of the African Union and to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Africa and Europe are neighbouring continents whose futures are closely interlinked; whereas the EU remains Africa’s leading partner in trade, investment, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, peace and security, energy and digital transformation; whereas African countries together constitute the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner, while the EU Member States collectively represent Africa’s largest export market;

B. whereas the Samoa Agreement provides a renewed and modernised foundation for relations between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, aiming to strengthen their capacity to address global challenges together and to move decisively towards a partnership of equals grounded in mutual respect and shared interests;

C. whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are core values of both the EU and the AU, and women and young people are key agents of change for Africa’s democratic and economic future;

D. whereas the EU’s rhetoric towards Africa is that of a partnership on an equal footing, especially since the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, which clearly aims for equitable cooperation through the three pillars of development, trade and political cooperation;

E. whereas the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs constitute the universal roadmap for fostering sustainable global prosperity for people and the planet; whereas the EU and Africa share the responsibility of accelerating progress towards these goals through a partnership grounded in solidarity, mutual respect, accountability and tangible results;

F. whereas Africa’s population exceeded 1.5 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050; whereas this demographic dynamism presents both opportunities and challenges, requiring massive investment in education, employment, healthcare and infrastructure;

G. whereas the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance emphasises the importance of free and fair elections as well as the rights of political parties and the opposition; whereas despite progress over the past decades, recent developments, in particular in the Sahel region, the Gulf of Guinea and Tanzania, show a worrying trend of democratic backsliding, with increased persecution of the opposition, the disqualification of candidates standing in elections, and the imprisonment of opposition leaders;

H. whereas recent shifts and volatility in international development financing by various global partners have affected funding predictability for key sectors in parts of Africa; whereas this underscores the need for the EU and its Member States to ensure continuity, complementarity and coordination of support with like-minded partners, and to show continuous solidarity, while reinforcing African ownership and reducing aid dependency over time; whereas external actors have expanded their footprint in Africa, often through opaque or coercive means, underscoring the need for principled, transparent and sustainable European engagement;

I. whereas humanitarian aid plays a crucial role in EU-Africa relations by addressing all kinds of crises; whereas the EU is the leading humanitarian aid donor in Africa; whereas the global humanitarian system is facing an unprecedented funding crisis, with only 43 % of the USD 50 billion UN humanitarian appeal being met in 2024; whereas African countries must not be caught in endless cycles of humanitarian aid, but should instead be able to transition towards self-sustaining, sustainable developed economies;

J. whereas the dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and reductions in foreign support from other key donors, including certain EU Member States, have further aggravated the shortfall, increasing hunger and jeopardising humanitarian, health, gender equality and climate initiatives; whereas China and other actors are trying to fill this vacuum and increase their presence, without, however, coming close to providing the kind of support that the EU is offering;

K. whereas China has been increasing its economic footprint in Africa by providing easy loans and advancing quick investments in infrastructure projects; whereas after an initially positive reception, several countries have now realised that the Chinese investments come with a significant cost and are trying to rebalance their partnerships;

L. whereas Russia has been pursuing an aggressive anti-European campaign throughout many parts of Africa, in particular in the Sahel region, focusing on spreading false and manipulated information (FIMI) with the aim of stirring anti-European sentiment; whereas such campaigns take place especially in countries with a strong European presence or hosting common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions;

M. whereas the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has exploited certain political vacuums, often to the detriment of the EU’s interests, and has significantly expanded its economic and strategic presence in Africa; whereas the UAE has increased its involvement in Africa’s security landscape, often in competition with the EU’s security interests; whereas the UAE is actively intervening in conflicts, often without meaningful cooperation with the EU, through the provision of weapons and logistical support, which has prolonged a number of crises, notably in Sudan;

N. whereas Türkiye, often to the detriment of the EU’s interests and without meaningful cooperation with the EU, has increased its influence in Africa over the past two decades, as reflected in rising trade volumes, as well as increased security, religious, cultural and diplomatic cooperation;

O. whereas the Russian Federation makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as Africa Corps and the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox, while exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; whereas Africa Corps and the Wagner Group have reportedly committed atrocities in various parts of Africa;

P. whereas Africa has demonstrated strong economic growth over the past two decades – averaging 4.8 % annually between 2000 and 2010 and maintaining 3.1 % between 2011 and 2020, above the global average; whereas much of this growth has been linked to commodity exports; whereas 61 % of regional exports now comprise processed and semi-processed goods, highlighting potential for supply chain diversification; whereas the AfCFTA offers a transformative framework to reduce dependence on volatile global markets, increase intra-African trade, and build a more resilient, integrated and value-added economy across the continent;

Q. whereas peace, security and good governance are prerequisites for prosperity, yet several African regions continue to face instability, terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and humanitarian crises; whereas African security challenges, from the Sahel region to the Horn of Africa, necessitate Africa-led, Europe-enabled responses grounded in accountability and respect for human rights;

R. whereas the EU will allocate EUR 1.5 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at national and regional level in sub-Saharan Africa; whereas additional support is also provided in Africa under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which enables the EU to provide all kinds of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners;

S. whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on minority communities;

T. whereas migration and mobility between Africa and Europe are long-standing realities, and the majority of the estimated 40 million Africans living outside their country of origin have migrated within Africa, rather than to Europe or other continents; whereas there is a need for the EU and Africa to establish a mutually beneficial migration partnership focused on economic development in Africa and addressing labour shortages in Europe; whereas the urgent and efficient implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum is needed in order to better manage migration and combat irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking; whereas migration is driven by complex factors including disinformation, armed conflict, political instability, economic hardship, food insecurity and environmental degradation; whereas development cooperation plays a key role in tackling the root causes of irregular migration through support for the rule of law, law enforcement, sustainable economic opportunities, governance, peace and stability across Africa;

U. whereas climate change and environmental degradation threaten lives and livelihoods across Africa, despite the continent’s minimal contribution to global emissions, and joint EU-AU leadership is essential to achieve a just and green transition; whereas EU sustainability laws, including the Deforestation Regulation and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, must not penalise African small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or serve as a pretext to restrict market entry;

V. whereas in the current crisis of multilateralism, strengthening the EU-Africa partnership offers a vital chance to revitalise cooperation by centring African agency and promoting inclusive, people-focused and future-oriented models; whereas by shifting from division to genuine partnership, the EU and Africa can tackle shared challenges – economic development, climate change, peace and social cohesion – showing that collective action based on mutual respect is key to global stability and prosperity;

New strategic partnership of equals

1. Affirms that the EU and the AU stand at a historic crossroads as both face shared challenges that demand shared solutions; believes that the time has come to elevate the partnership into a truly strategic alliance founded on equality, shared responsibility, mutual trust, the rule of law and common purpose; stresses that this renewed relationship must move beyond assistance towards joint investment, innovation and governance and must be built on strong, sustainable and transparent foundations; recognises that a resilient bridge between Africa and Europe, anchored in solidarity, human dignity and respect for common values, will be essential to safeguard prosperity, peace and global stability;

2. Notes that in an era of shifting geopolitical allegiances, rising extremism and increasing global insecurity, the EU-Africa partnership is more essential than ever; underlines that genuine cooperation between the two continents is indispensable to address shared challenges and that joint multilateral action remains the most effective path to advancing common priorities in peace, prosperity, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, sustainable trade and human development;

3. Welcomes the Samoa Agreement as the updated overarching framework for EU-Africa relations through its dedicated regional protocol; calls on all EU Member States and African partners to complete its ratification without delay so as to move from provisional application to full entry into force;

4. Reaffirms that the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda and the SDGs must serve as the common compass of the renewed EU-Africa partnership, which should align all political, financial and investment frameworks, including NDICI – Global Europe and the Global Gateway strategy, with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement, ensuring social, environmental and economic impact across both continents;

5. Calls for the establishment of a genuine new strategic partnership of equals between the EU and the AU, building on the Joint Vision for 2030 adopted at the sixth EU-AU Summit in Brussels, and guided by shared priorities in prosperity, peace and governance, human development and environmental stewardship; stresses that this partnership must convert common aspirations into measurable commitments, promoting sustainable trade and investment, advancing democracy and the rule of law, empowering people through education, health and mobility, and driving joint action within a rules-based multilateral order; emphasises that only through sustained political dialogue, transparency and joint ownership can the two continents turn this vision into lasting progress for their citizens;

6. Calls for a new EU communication strategy to better inform both European and African citizens about the EU’s engagements with Africa and about the magnitude and importance of not only the EU-AU partnership, but also of the various significant projects that the EU is financing on the African continent; deplores the fact that, in the absence of such a clear strategy, other malign actors have found it easy in the past to discredit the EU or diminish its significant involvement due to the lack of clear information about the EU’s involvement in partner countries;

Sustainable growth, trade and investment

7. Highlights the fact that the EU is Africa’s largest trading and investment partner and stresses the need to strengthen trade relations in favour of resilience, value addition and diversification; supports the full implementation of the AfCFTA as a driver of continental integration and calls for the EU to provide capacity building and technical and financial assistance for its institutions, customs harmonisation and private-sector readiness;

8. Encourages the EU to align its trade and development policies in Africa, supporting and complementing African-led regional integration efforts, including the establishment of the AfCFTA; recognises the EU’s significant financial and political support for the AU’s Agenda 2063 – focused on inclusive socio-economic development and regional integration – and recalls the importance of ensuring that trade frameworks, such as economic partnership agreements (EPAs), fully reinforce these goals; reiterates that EPAs promote diversification, industrialisation and increased intra-African trade, thereby strengthening African economic development, value addition and sustainable development in line with Agenda 2063’s vision; stresses that a reinforced EU-Africa trade partnership can play a pivotal role in fostering Africa’s long-term growth and resilience;

9. Welcomes the ambition to make EU external action more coherent and effective through the Global Europe instrument and to scale up investment under the Global Gateway strategy; stresses that flexibility must go hand in hand with accountability, transparency and parliamentary oversight; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework safeguards funding to realise our priorities and guarantees that EU external financing remains a driver of trust and genuine partnership with African countries;

10. Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to scale up the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package as the flagship of the new partnership, ensuring that projects are co-designed with African stakeholders, aligned with national and regional priorities, and implemented transparently; stresses the importance of strong private-sector involvement and better access for SMEs in the design of Global Gateway projects; calls for the Global Gateway to channel investment into renewable energy, sustainable transport corridors, green and digital infrastructure, water and sanitation, and resilient agriculture, while preventing unsustainable debt accumulation; stresses that improving the visibility and communication of EU-funded Global Gateway projects is essential for demonstrating the EU’s added value, ensuring accountability to citizens in Europe and partner countries, and highlighting the tangible benefits of the Africa-Europe partnership on the ground; underlines the crucial role of EU delegations in this process and the need to strengthen their capacities, rather than reducing them, to ensure effective coordination and implementation of Global Gateway initiatives; calls for Global Gateway projects to support the further integration of the AfCFTA by addressing logistical bottlenecks between African countries;

11. Calls for the EU and its financial institutions to expand the use of blended finance and guarantees under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus to mobilise private capital for sustainable projects, particularly in job-creating sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness and technology; insists that investments comply with high social and environmental standards and contribute to local value chains;

12. Underlines that official development assistance (ODA) remains indispensable, especially in fragile contexts; calls on the EU Member States to sustain and step up progress towards the long-standing UN target of allocating 0.7 % of gross national income to ODA and to increase the share directed to least-developed countries, in line with EU and international commitments;

13. Recognises that large-scale investment initiatives alone cannot adequately address the complex realities of fragile and conflict-affected settings, nor the vulnerabilities of least-developed and heavily indebted countries; calls therefore for a dedicated EU strategy for engagement in fragile contexts under the future Global Europe instrument, ensuring that political dialogue, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and state-building support are coherently integrated with development and investment actions; emphasises that this approach must preserve the EU’s values-based principles, prevent the accumulation of unsustainable debt, and guarantee that the most fragile partners are not forgotten or left behind by broader investment-oriented policies;

14. Notes the changing landscape of international development assistance, where evolving priorities among major global donor countries, including the recent shutdown of USAID programmes, have created significant financing gaps in essential services; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to realign NDICI – Global Europe and Team Europe programming with their officially agreed objectives and minimum spending targets for sub-Saharan Africa and thematic programmes, and to use these instruments to bridge such gaps swiftly where appropriate, prioritising health, education, food security and climate adaptation in the most vulnerable African countries;

15. Calls for enhanced donor coordination with like-minded partners, the G7, multilateral development banks and the UN system to avoid duplication, sustain life-saving programmes and ensure alignment with African priorities; encourages stronger cooperation with complementary local and regional initiatives that pursue sustainable development, transparency and accountability in partnership with the EU;

Peace, security and good governance

16. Reiterates that peace and prosperity are inseparable; supports African-led peace operations and mediation efforts under the African Peace and Security Architecture and commends EU financial and technical assistance through the EPF; calls for predictable, long-term financing of AU-mandated peace operations, including through UN-assessed contributions;

17. Condemns the resurgence of military coups and unconstitutional changes of government in Africa and supports the AU’s zero-tolerance policy in this regard; calls for the EU to coordinate with the AU and regional bodies to restore constitutional order, apply targeted sanctions where necessary and assist transitions back to democratic governance; regrets the democratic backsliding, notably in the Sahel region, and strongly condemns increased measures to suppress and persecute opposition parties; Emphasises that banning opposition candidates from running in elections, as well as imprisoning opposition leaders, are obstacles to further deepening EU-AU relations; points, in particular, to the case of the Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu who has been imprisoned for calling for electoral reforms; calls for his immediate release;

18. Expresses deep concern over the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in parts of Africa and calls for a comprehensive approach that combines security measures, prevention, deradicalisation and socio-economic development; underlines the need for closer EU-AU cooperation to counter terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); emphasises that counterterrorism operations must fully respect international humanitarian and human rights law; supports EU programmes for community resilience, women and youth engagement and post-conflict reconstruction; recalls that despite challenges, the EU has a good track record in addressing terrorism in Africa; underlines, however, that Russian efforts to combat terrorism have often failed to improve the security situation and have led to a significant deterioration in domestic human rights situations at a massive cost to local populations;

19. Condemns any form of religiously motivated violence against individuals of any faith and calls for increased efforts at EU-AU level to prevent future violence and bring the perpetrators to justice; expresses its solidarity with, and condolences to, all victims of violence;

20. Emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel region, following the series of coups in the region; strongly deplores the forced departure of French troops and UN peacekeeping forces from the region and condemns the presence instead of PMCs and state-sponsored proxies such as Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group); underscores that these PMCs have played a destabilising role in the Sahel region and have supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to further Russia’s influence in Africa; urges the EU Special Representative for the Sahel and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement and continue supporting civil society and investing in development and humanitarian aid;

21. Is concerned about the limited role played by the EU in the Horn of Africa, while the involvement of other foreign actors, notably China, the UAE and Türkiye, continues to grow; calls for a review of the EU strategy in the region, with a view to achieving the EU’s goals of promoting peace, stability and inclusive and sustainable economic development in the region;

22. Underlines that the EU has been actively supporting stability and security throughout Africa via diplomatic efforts, notably by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, as well as various CSDP missions; takes note that the mandates of the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger and the ground mission of personnel from the EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Niger ended in 2024, while the EU Capacity Mission Sahel Mali and the EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel are still ongoing; takes note of the creation of a new type of hybrid civilian-military EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea, established in August 2023, aiming to empower the security and defence forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin to improve the stability and resilience of their northern border areas;

23. Insists that good governance, transparency and accountability are the backbone of sustainable development; encourages support for civil service reform, anti-corruption mechanisms, free and independent media, and strong civil society participation; calls for enhanced cooperation on electoral observation and democracy-building, in partnership with the AU and regional organisations;

24. Recalls that China’s approach to Africa reflects hegemonic ambitions as it establishes one-sided dependencies with African countries, including in trade, critical raw materials and certain tech areas, and has leveraged these for political means vis-à-vis individual countries as well as in international organisations; underlines that China seeks to establish economic dependencies for political purposes; recalls that China and Russia have broadened their influence in the media sphere by acquiring local and regional media platforms, and use social media platforms, such as TikTok, to spread disinformation, including pro-Chinese or pro-Russian and anti-Western propaganda; believes that Europe should collaborate with African partners to counter Chinese- and Russian-led disinformation efforts, to jointly expose foreign adversaries’ manipulation attempts and to promote EU-African media partnerships to strengthen shared resilience; calls for stronger AU-EU cooperation in combating AI-generated disinformation;

25. Recalls that the UAE has significantly increased its economic and strategic presence in Africa, often to the detriment of the EU’s interests; notes that it has established itself as a security actor, including through the establishment of military outposts and the provision of weapons and logistical support to armed groups such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, thereby exacerbating ongoing conflicts; expresses concern that the UAE’s ‘no strings attached’ approach frequently neglects the human rights and environmental impacts of large infrastructure projects; underlines the need for the EU to respond proactively by promoting responsible investment and development practices that reinforce African ownership, peace and sustainability;

26. Reaffirms the essential role of women and young people in peacebuilding and governance; urges both the EU and the AU to implement the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda and the UN Youth, Peace and Security agenda, ensuring equal participation in decision-making; calls for dedicated funding to female mediators, and young peacebuilders and community leaders;

27. Underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework in order to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the EU-AU partnership;

28. Supports efforts to revitalise the Joint Parliamentary Assembly between the European Parliament and the regional Assembly of Africa, as well as the cooperation between the Pan-African Parliament and the European Parliament to ensure a forum for democratic dialogue and oversight; encourages regular thematic meetings between parliamentary committees from both continents to ensure accountability within the partnership;

Investing in human development, youth and mobility

29. Affirms that people-centred cooperation is the core of the EU-Africa partnership; welcomes the EU Youth Action Plan for 2022-2027 and the Youth Mobility for Africa initiative; calls for the Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and Intra-Africa Academic Mobility schemes to be scaled up to reach far more students and researchers, and for increased support to be provided to African universities and vocational institutes;

30. Emphasises that health security is a shared global public good; welcomes EU support for the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, for vaccine manufacturing hubs in Africa and for the African Medicines Agency; calls for continued cooperation on pandemic preparedness, local pharmaceutical production and universal health coverage;

31. Calls for a balanced, humane and forward-looking approach to migration and mobility; calls for the EU and the AU to address the root causes of irregular migration through sustainable job creation, governance and climate resilience by systematically integrating migratory considerations into development policies and programmes;

32. Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen cooperation with the member states of the AU on asylum and migration, with a view to swiftly implementing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, fighting disinformation, preventing irregular migration, combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and enhancing effective and dignified return, readmission and reintegration; underlines the added value of EU support for capacity building for border management in partner countries, including through the deployment of Frontex personnel to countries such as Mauritania and Senegal; highlights the ongoing debate about making development cooperation conditional on progress related to migration cooperation; calls for the establishment of tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships with those countries, addressing the root causes and drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement; calls for increased support for partner countries hosting large numbers of migrants and refugees in need of protection; stresses that all migration cooperation must respect international law and human rights;

33. Acknowledges the vital role of diaspora communities in deepening ties between Africa and Europe; encourages structured dialogue with diaspora networks and support for initiatives that link remittances and entrepreneurship to sustainable development in countries of origin;

34. Reiterates that gender equality and women’s empowerment are prerequisites for inclusive growth; urges both continents to uphold women’s rights, ensure access to education and sexual and reproductive health services, and combat gender-based violence and harmful practices;

35. Supports joint programmes on social protection, digital inclusion and youth employment; calls for a dedicated Africa-Europe youth innovation fund under the Global Gateway strategy to finance start-ups and community projects led by young entrepreneurs;

Climate, the environment and multilateral cooperation

36. Recognises climate change as a defining common challenge and an opportunity for EU-Africa collaboration; stresses the importance of critical raw materials for the energy transition on both continents; welcomes the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative, which aims to generate 50 GW of renewable energy capacity in Africa by 2030 and provide electricity access to 100 million people; calls for joint implementation of the African single electricity market and cross-border interconnections to enable continental energy integration;

37. Calls for the EU to deliver its fair share of climate financing for African adaptation and mitigation efforts, prioritising early warning systems, sustainable agriculture and biodiversity protection; supports African initiatives such as the Great Green Wall and NaturAfrica, which link environmental protection to job creation and rural development;

38. Encourages joint AU-EU advocacy and concrete actions, including at COP conferences, for stepping up equitable climate finance to reach the targets of the new global quantified goal adopted at COP29, and for technology transfer; calls for sufficient funding for the global Loss and Damage Fund to assist climate-vulnerable countries;

39. Underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters, including emerging economies and G20 countries, to take the lead and show leadership in global climate action to meet the targets set in the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to spearhead a coalition of high ambition and work collaboratively with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP30;

40. Highlights the need for cooperation on sustainable urbanisation, waste management and water security; encourages city-to-city partnerships between African and European municipalities to share experiences in green planning, mobility and resilience;

41. Welcomes the AU’s admission as a permanent member of the G20 and supports greater African representation in global governance, such as a permanent seat for Africa on the UN Security Council; supports regional integration organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); reiterates its readiness to provide further assistance and support, if desired; urges the AU and the EU to coordinate closely in multilateral forums to defend democracy, the rule of law and the multilateral system against authoritarian and unilateral trends;

42. Proposes that the AU and the EU establish an annual high-level dialogue on climate and sustainability in order to monitor progress and align policies on energy, biodiversity and environmental protection;

43. Underlines the great potential for cooperation in the field of natural resource exploration and recalls that cooperation on critical raw materials must ensure local processing, environmental protection and transparent and traceable supply chains;

Way forward

44. Welcomes the holding of the seventh EU-AU Summit in Luanda as a significant opportunity for African and European leaders to reaffirm their commitment to the EU-AU partnership and to build on the progress made under the Joint Vision for 2030, adopted in Brussels in 2022; calls on participants to seize this occasion to announce measurable commitments for the next five years, notably through the adoption of a joint action plan for 2025-2030, the implementation of the Joint Vision for 2030, a roadmap to double Africa-EU trade and investment by 2030, an agreement on mutual mobility and visa facilitation for students and researchers, and a renewed joint framework on digital transformation and green energy partnerships;

45. Urges the Commission and the European External Action Service to establish annual high-level dialogues with the AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities in four priority areas: peace and security, trade and economic cooperation, migration and mobility, and sustainability and climate action, in order to evaluate partnership priorities, monitor implementation and feed into both the AU-EU summit process and the EU’s multiannual financial framework; proposes that AU-EU consultations be institutionalised at ministerial and senior official level each year, ensuring continuous coordination, accountability and adaptive policy design;

46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the African Union Commission, the Pan-African Parliament, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and African Union member states, and to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States.