On the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

B100468/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

(2025/2917(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Serbia 2023 report’ (SWD(2023)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy’ (COM(2023)(0690),

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD)(2024)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, to the Council conclusions of 25 March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia EU candidate status and the European Council decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas 16 people lost their lives following the collapse of the concrete canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024;

B. whereas renovation work on the station had begun in 2021, and was officially unveiled during an election campaign in 2022; whereas further reconstruction work was done by two Chinese companies, namely China Railway International (CRI) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), both of which are predominantly state-owned, publicly traded Chinese companies;

C. whereas, citing corruption as the main cause of the accident, protesters across Serbia have been demanding snap elections to remove Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), from power; whereas the increase in internal political tensions demonstrates the growing public discontent in Serbia with government corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

D. whereas the Serbian Government has resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas according to the Serbian Constitution, the president has no formal authority over policing;

E. whereas the Novi Sad tragedy has unveiled further structural weaknesses in Serbia’s public administration, transparency and rule of law, which remain essential areas of reform for any country aspiring to EU membership;

F. whereas concerns have also been raised regarding the activities of certain foreign contractors, particularly Chinese state-owned companies, operating in Serbia; whereas the 2018 sale of the Serbian mining and smelting complex RTB Bor to the Chinese company Zijin has led to uncontrolled exploitation of copper and gold ore in the municipalities of Bor and Majdanpek, affecting local communities and the environment; whereas reports indicate that the local population, which is almost entirely comprised of people belonging to Serbia’s Romanian minority, are at risk of being displaced, which would threaten the local ethnic composition, thereby breaching the Serbian Constitution;

G. whereas Serbian President Aleksander Vučić has claimed that EU Member States are involved in organising a ‘colour revolution in Serbia’;

1. Expresses its profound sorrow following the tragic Novi Sad railway station collapse on 1 November 2024, which led to the deaths of 16 people, and offers its heartfelt condolences to the victims and their families;

2. Expresses concern about the main issue raised by the student protests, namely corruption related to large-scale infrastructure projects in Serbia; notes the that the criminal justice system in Serbia fails to investigate and prosecute cases of high-level corruption;

3. Condemns the use of unlawful surveillance on protesters and the deployment of unidentified or plainclothes officers, including individuals employed by private security companies, against demonstrators;

4. Condemns in the strongest terms the conduct of members of the Unit for the Security of Certain Persons and Facilities (JZO) and its commanding officer, Marko Kričak, which has included illegal detention, the beating of restrained detainees, spitting, verbal degradation including threats of sexual violence and death; reiterates that these actions amount to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by international law and policing protocols;

5. Reminds the Serbian authorities that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are fundamental human rights and basic democratic freedoms; reiterates that these rights form a central part of the Copenhagen criteria and are to be upheld by EU candidate countries;

6. Deplores the unfounded allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in any way with the organisation of student protests; reiterates that the protest movement began as a genuine and authentic grassroots effort by the Serbian student community to demand action against systemic corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

7. Reiterates that Serbia must ensure the consistent and effective implementation of the legislative and institutional frameworks for the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of assembly, and furthermore, the equal respect of the rights of people belonging to national minorities, in line with the Copenhagen criteria and Serbia’s commitments under the EU accession process;

8. Calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure full transparency and due diligence in public procurement and concession processes involving foreign state-owned companies, including Chinese contractors; stresses that Serbia must safeguard its constitutional order, environmental standards, and the rights of local and national minority communities when approving such projects;

9. Condemns the visits and attendance of President Vučić at the military parades held in Moscow in May 2025 and Beijing in September 2025 in the midst of Serbia’s biggest political and societal crisis since he came to power; reiterates that China remains a strategic rival and that the Russian Federation is an enemy, which continues to wage an illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine – a candidate country for EU membership;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.