On the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

B100463/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

(2025/2917(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular those of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections, and of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,

– having regard to Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos’s interventions in the European Parliament’s plenary debates on Serbia of 5 February 2025, of 6 May 2025 and of 9 September 2025,

– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

– having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the UN human rights experts’ statement of 4 August 2025 on the student protests in Serbia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Serbia has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2012; whereas accession to the EU is a merit-based process in which each candidate country needs to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those of guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

B. whereas Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) have governed the country since 2012 with a heavy concentration of power, control over the media and a weak system of checks and balances, and have established a highly corrupt and nepotistic state and party apparatus; whereas in recent years, the ruling SNS has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organisations;

C. whereas since 2012, all parliamentary elections in Serbia but one have been early elections; whereas the December 2023 elections were the third parliamentary elections in less than four years; whereas previous elections, marred by pressure on voters, vote buying, and organised busing of voters within Serbia and from abroad, were considered to be not fair, and the decisive involvement of the president and the ruling party’s systemic advantages undermined the overall election process;

D. whereas Serbian society is marked by profound political polarisation and widespread discontent;

E. whereas in recent years, Serbia has seen large and prolonged waves of predominantly peaceful anti-government protests, which have addressed various issues, including political violence, electoral fraud, President Vučić’s slide towards authoritarian governance, corruption, environmental concerns, police violence, and the broader ‘Serbia against Violence’ movement;

E. whereas on 1 November 2024, the canopy of the newly renovated train station in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring several others;

F. whereas following this deadly incident, protests erupted over shoddy construction and suspected corruption, leading to the largest anti-government mobilisation in decades, which continues to this date;

G. whereas the physical attack by members of the ruling party on the students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts commemorating the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy in Belgrade on 22 November 2024 was the starting point of the university blockades;

H. whereas these peaceful and creative protests were initiated by students and have since spread across Serbian society, with teachers, farmers, workers, taxi drivers, artists, cultural figures, veterans, and people of all ages throughout the country taking part, building unifying momentum and overcoming divisions, including across ethnic lines;

I. whereas the protesters’ demands included full respect for the rule of law and the system of checks and balances laid down in the Serbian Constitution, as well as accountability, justice, and transparency, and ultimately led to a call for early elections due to the authorities’ failure to address these demands in good faith; whereas the students’ demands, which remain unmet, are fully consistent with the reforms that Serbia is expected to implement in order to advance in the EU accession process;

J. whereas the Serbian students have been nominated and shortlisted among the final candidates for Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

K. whereas in August 2025, former ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić were arrested for alleged abuse of office and causing at least USD 115 million in damage to the Serbian budget during the reconstruction of the Hungarian-Serbian railway line, including the collapsed Novi Sad station, and were later released;

L. whereas the highest state officials, including President Aleksandar Vučić and Speaker of Parliament Ana Brnabić, are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being a terrorist attack, in a deliberate attempt to confuse the public about responsibility for the deadly incident;

M. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been overwhelmingly peaceful, with only a few isolated violent incidents over the summer, which were preceded by violence by supporters of the ruling party;

N. whereas there are credible reports that during the protests on 15 March 2025, the Serbian authorities used an illegal sonic weapon against peaceful protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

O. whereas the speeches delivered during the protests on the Vidovdan holiday on 28 June 2025, which were marked by nationalistic rhetoric and chauvinistic undertones, have faced significant criticism from abroad, but also from participants in the protests themselves and from supporters of the protests;

P. whereas since the summer, the regime has continued and intensified its violent crackdown against peaceful protesters and citizens supporting the protests, including by deploying thugs linked to the ruling party to escalate violence, destroying the property of innocent citizens, employing police brutality, conducting arbitrary arrests, subjecting detainees to inhumane treatment, threatening individuals with violence, including sexual violence, and publicly humiliating them on government propaganda channels;

Q. whereas Serbia’s media landscape is dominated by government-controlled propaganda outlets, such as Happy TV, Pink TV and Informer, that are spreading hate-speech, promoting violence, using dehumanisation, demonising non-Serb ethnic groups, violating minors’ rights, misleading the public, constantly violating journalistic standards, including disseminating disinformation and manipulative anti-opposition narratives, and spreading pro-Russian propaganda;

R. whereas President Vučić and government propaganda media have continuously tried to portray the protesters as ‘violent’ and ‘terrorists’ and framed the protests as ‘colour revolutions’ organised and financed by foreign secret services of Western states, namely accusing Germany, the UK and Croatia and foreign foundations including the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Heinrich Böll Foundation; whereas President Vučić has described as ‘scum’ democratic parties represented in this House and Members of the European Parliament who expressed their support for the protesters’ demands for the respect for rule of law, transparency, accountability and justice,

S. whereas Serbia is the only country in the region that has not aligned with the EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus linked to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Serbia continues to nurture close and friendly relations with Russia and China, including on the level of military and security cooperation; whereas President Vučić attended the Military parade in Moscow on 9 May 2025 and the Shanghai Cooperation Summit on 1 September 2025;

1. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024;

2. Expresses its full solidarity with the peaceful protesters in Serbia and warmly welcomes the shortlisting of the Serbian students as finalists for the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

3. Strongly condemns all forms of violence, including physical attacks, smear campaigns, police brutality, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, legal harassment, and the misuse of personal data to retaliate against peaceful protesters and their supporters;

4. Urges the Serbian authorities to immediately end the crackdown and all forms of violence against peaceful protesters, to release all those detained and to end all legal proceedings against them; strongly urges the immediate release of the PSG (Movement of Free Citizens) activists who have been detained for more than seven months in Novi Sad; calls on the authorities to prosecute all individuals, including members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other pro-regime thugs, who are responsible for violence or incitement to violence against participants in peaceful demonstrations and against any detainees;

5. Urges the EU and Member State diplomatic missions to closely monitor all ongoing legal proceedings related to the protests;

6. Is concerned by the arbitrary and politically motivated use of presidential pardons for individuals convicted or prosecuted for violence against students and other citizens participating in peaceful protests;

7. Calls for targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations against protesters, notably within the ranks of the SNS party, the security services, the police, pro-regime thugs and the judiciary;

8. Expresses deep concern about the systemic failings highlighted by the student protests in Serbia, notably issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, institutional and financial transparency, especially when it comes to infrastructure projects, and accountability;

9. Expresses serious concern that corruption is prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that even after several years, Serbian authorities have failed to deliver convincing results in many corruption cases of high public interest, such as the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica and Savamala;

10. Considers that there is still a need for a thorough investigation into the deadly infrastructure collapse in Novi Sad and for the necessary full and transparent legal proceedings to bring all those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to the collapse, including out of concern for the safety standards of other infrastructure projects; calls, therefore, on the Serbian authorities to conduct a comprehensive, technical, safety-related and fully transparent inspection of all infrastructure facilities along the railway line from Belgrade, through Novi Sad, to the border with Hungary, in order to ensure their structural integrity, safety and compliance with international standards; calls on the Serbian authorities not to put into operation any infrastructure facilities that lack the necessary permits and certificates for safe and uninterrupted use, particularly those located on international and regionally important transport corridors; calls, in that respect, for thorough investigation and monitoring of all EXPO 2027-related investments and projects as it lacks proper procedures and permits;

11. Expresses serious concern about the deep societal polarisation in Serbia, which is a direct result of hate-speech, promotion of violence, smear campaigns against opponents, anti-EU/pro-Russian propaganda widely spread via government-controlled media and also by government officials, and of a gross failure on the official side to face and come to terms with Serbia’s past; underlines that primary responsibility for disseminating Russian narratives in the country lies with the ruling party and state authorities that spread them;

12. Is deeply alarmed by reports about the government trying to take control over Serbia’s few remaining critical media outlets, which respect journalistic ethical standards, namely N1 and Nova;

13. Calls on the Serbian authorities to refrain from using the majority state-owned Telekom Srbija and its subsidiaries to undermine media pluralism or distort the media market in Serbia; condemns the actions of Telekom Srbija’s subsidiaries for dismissing journalists who refused to follow mandated pro-government editorial policies;

14. Is equally concerned by the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Law on Juvenile Offenders, which have been introduced without meaningful public debate, as they risk further restricting and criminalising public protest and lowering human rights standards in Serbia; calls on the Serbian authorities to withdraw the proposed amendments until an inclusive and transparent consultation process is ensured and future proposals reflect Serbia’s commitments under international human rights standards;

15. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely follow these developments and use their leverage and power to ensure that these structural problems will not further deteriorate;

16. Condemns the Serbian Government’s retaliation against teachers, professors and academics for supporting protests, including dismissals, salary cuts and funding withdrawals from universities, and condemns the vilification and smear campaigns against them in pro-government media; urges the authorities to restore full university financing and ensure free academic participation in EU projects;

17. Recalls that Serbia has temporarily closed Chapters 25 and 26 of the EU accession negotiations, and calls on the Commission and the Council to consider reopening these chapters in the light of the recent developments affecting academic freedom and labour rights;

18. Is concerned that the violent activities of persons allegedly connected to the ruling party increased the risk of ethnic tensions in the Bosniak-majority city of Novi Pazar and Slovak-majority municipality of Bački Petrovac over the summer; notes that during the July protest in Novi Pazar, pro-government media used ethnic slurs to target the protesters;

19. Strongly condemns the unfounded accusations by state officials, politicians and government propaganda channels portraying civil society organisations as traitors or state enemies, as well as the unlawful pressure and warrantless police raids against organisations such as the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability, Civic Initiatives, the Trag Foundation, and the Center for Practical Politics; underlines the essential role of a vibrant and independent civil society and independent cultural actors in promoting democracy, pluralism, good governance, and Serbia’s EU integration process; regrets the lack of an enabling environment allowing civil society organisations to operate freely and participate meaningfully in policymaking;

20. Is deeply alarmed by reports from Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation of the use by the Serbian authorities of illegal spyware surveillance, such as Pegasus, Cellebrite and Novi Spy, against activists, journalists and members of civil society organisations; urges the Serbian Government to immediately end such practices, investigate all cases, and hold those responsible accountable; calls on the Commission to follow up and press the Serbian authorities for a thorough investigation;

21. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in this context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of EU citizens’ personal data, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s borders;

22. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the verbal attacks on the Members of the European Parliament by the highest Serbian officials, the most prominent example of which includes President Vučić’s attack on the MEPs from the Green/EFA Group on 5 September 2025;

23. Tasks its Committee on Foreign Affairs with sending a fact-finding mission to Serbia in order to assess, on the ground, the state of democracy, the ongoing protests, attacks on demonstrators, and repression targeting students, academics, educators and public-sector employees;

24. Supports genuine attempts at dialogue about how the government can meet students’ demands; notes, however, that students and protesters remain convinced that the recent calls for dialogue by the ruling party were not genuine;

25. Supports the call for early elections as a viable way out of the deep political and societal crisis in Serbia;

26. Underlines the critical importance of implementing all outstanding and recent recommendations on electoral reform issued by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe bodies, as part of a transparent and inclusive process, and ahead of the needed new elections; highlights the importance of reforming and depoliticising the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media with a view to guaranteeing its political independence and ensuring its proper functioning, including during the election campaign, as well as of reforming the Law on the Electoral Roll to enable full and independent oversight of voter registration;

27. Urges the Commission and the Member States to focus, in their engagement with the Serbian authorities, including on the highest level, on ending the violent crackdown on the protest, on supporting free, fair and early elections as a viable solution to the current crisis and of making any cooperation and financial support to the government conditional on respect for rule of law, fundamental rights, including media freedom, and democratic values, which are at the core of the EU accession process, thus supporting citizens and the country on its way forward;

28. Calls on the Commission to apply strict and fair conditionality in accordance with the enlargement methodology, ensuring that no funds are disbursed under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance or the Growth Plan until the Serbian authorities fully implement crucial reforms in the rule of law, democracy and the media, in particular regarding the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media and voter registration; reiterates its call for relevant EU funding, including funds from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect funds towards supporting judicial reforms, anti-corruption measures, independent media, civil society organisations and the independent cultural sector, in order to support their critical work;

29. Considers that Serbia no longer complies with the conditions set out in Article 2(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2024/823 which grants Serbia almost full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market, as a result of the persistent and serious erosion of the rule of law and fundamental democratic principles, including free and fair elections; calls, therefore, on the Commission to activate the suspension mechanism;

30. Calls on the President of the Commission to refrain from making unfounded or premature statements praising the reform processes in Serbia; calls on the Commission, including at the highest political level, to adopt clearer and more consistent language in its public communication towards Serbia, explicitly addressing the country’s significant shortcomings, lack of progress, and continued backsliding on the rule of law, thereby upholding the Union’s fundamental values and safeguarding public support for pro-European and pro-democratic forces;

31. Urges the Commission and the Member States to finally put an end to their appeasement politics towards Serbia, given the country’s years-long roll-back in the areas of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, its deeply destabilising influence on the wider region, its continuing friendly and close relations with Russia, and its strategic engagement with Russia and China on military and security matters;

32. Reiterates that Serbia’s progress in its accession process depends on tangible advances in the rule of law, commitment to European values, constructive engagement in the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue leading to a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, and full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy; stresses that negotiations should advance only once Serbia aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes substantial progress on key EU-related reforms, especially in the area of fundamental values;

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.