On the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

B100461/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

(2025/2917(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a concrete and glass canopy collapsed in the main railway station in Novi Sad, leading to the deaths of 16 people; whereas the railway station underwent renovations from 2021 to mid-2024; whereas this tragedy triggered large-scale student and citizen protests across Serbia; whereas protesters initially demanded a transparent investigation into the collapse, criticising government corruption, with their calls soon escalating into demands for early elections;

B. whereas the December 2023 parliamentary elections brought the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) a very large victory; whereas the SNS won 46.7 % of the vote, far ahead of the newly formed opposition coalition Serbia Against Violence (SPN), which gained only 23.6 % of the vote;

C. whereas supporters of the SPN opposition coalition, among them the Green-Left Front’s co-leader Radomir Lazović, engaged in violent demonstrations against the result of the parliamentary elections of December 2023, in an attempt to storm the Belgrade city hall; whereas more than 30 people were arrested during this demonstration and eight police officers were injured;

D. whereas the mass street protests in 2024, following the Novi Sad tragedy, led to the resignation of Serbia’s Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, along with the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric; whereas the demonstrators nevertheless continued their street protests, calling for snap elections;

E. whereas in the summer of 2025, anti-government protests intensified and violence re-emerged; whereas anti-government protestors and supporters of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić are holding parallel rallies across Serbia;

F. whereas on 16 September 2025, the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad filed an updated indictment, charging Serbia’s former Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić and 12 others, including another former minister, Tomislav Momirović, who headed the Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Ministry before Vesić; whereas those indicted face charges of serious crimes against public safety;

G. whereas Serbia ranked 105th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index;

H. whereas in November 2023, the Commission announced a growth plan for the Western Balkans, to accelerate the region’s socio-economic development and EU integration; whereas a EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans is to provide key support for the implementation of the growth plan; whereas in October 2024, the Commission approved the Reform Agenda for Serbia, anticipating EUR 1.586 billion in non-repayable grants and highly concessional loans;

I. whereas between 2021 and 2024 the EU allocated over EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance to Serbia under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

J. whereas under the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans, since 2020, the EU has mobilised EUR 6.2 billion in investments, including support for railways and healthcare;

K. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade in goods in 2023; whereas total EU foreign direct investment reached EUR 1.39 billion in 2022;

L. whereas in Serbia, support for EU accession has plummeted to an historic low point; whereas according to a Eurobarometer survey, published in September 2025, only 33 % of Serbian citizens support EU accession, reflecting general distrust towards the EU;

M. whereas Serbia is deepening its energy ties with Russia while purchasing Chinese surveillance systems; whereas on 29 September 2025, an international parliamentary conference entitled ‘BRICS – Serbia among friends’ was held in the Serbian National Assembly, joined by diplomats from BRICS countries along with officials of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the ‘We, the People’s Power’ movement; whereas according to a 2025 survey by the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade and the Lidington Research agency, more than 60 % of Serbian citizens support joining BRICS;

N. whereas on 25 June 2024, the EU and Serbia signed an agreement on operational cooperation in border management with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), allowing Frontex to carry out joint operations and deploying its standing corps at Serbia’s borders with neighbouring non-EU countries;

O. whereas in October 2024, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Vučić issued a joint statement, calling for a united front against illegal migration;

P. whereas Serbia actively participates in EU crisis management missions and operations under the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

Q. whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has condemned the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Serbia has supported various UN resolutions, including the UN General Assembly resolution of 12 October 2022 condemning Russia’s annexation of four eastern regions of Ukraine; whereas Serbia has provided considerable humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Ukraine since the start of the war;

1. Notes the updated indictment by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad against former Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić and 12 others; notes that the indictment proposes detention for all the defendants, due to the risk of a ‘significant public disturbance, which could jeopardise the smooth and fair conduct of the criminal proceedings’; calls on all the actors to respect the principle of separation of powers;

2. Is deeply concerned by the persistent street violence and deep polarisation within Serbian society;

3. Affirms that the SNS won the parliamentary elections of December 2023 by a very large margin and that the Serbian people made a clear choice regarding the composition of their government;

4. Welcomes the pluralistic composition of the Serbian National Assembly, with its broad representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities;

5. Recalls that in a democracy, people have the freedom to assemble and to protest against government measures; recalls, however, that in a democracy, power is transferred through elections and that political parties must respect the outcomes of elections and not incite violent street protests;

6. Calls on the EU to respect the democratic choice of the Serbian people and to avoid drawing stark contrasts between the different parties; warns the EU that by supporting efforts to overturn a legitimate election result because of dissatisfaction with its outcome, it is undermining democracy in Serbia and fuelling polarisation and instability;

7. Notes the serious decline in Serbia of public support for EU accession; notes that, at the same time, the topic of Serbia’s potential membership of the BRICS countries is steadily gaining traction;

8. Is concerned that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, also related to work designated by the EU as ‘projects of interest for the Republic of Serbia’; notes the adoption by the Serbian Government of an anti-corruption strategy for the 2024-2028 period; deplores, however, that only limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption; encourages Serbia to step up the fight against corruption and to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions;

9. Notes that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has launched a separate investigation into the possible misuse of EU funds for the Novi Sad railway station’s 2021-2024 renovation; expresses concern that EU funds pose a corruption risk and that the provision of massive EU funds to Serbia is fostering corruption on a grand scale;

10. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the security and stability of the EU as a whole;

11. Emphasises the importance of Serbia as a partner in the fight against illegal migration; welcomes the operational cooperation agreement on border control and security between Serbia and Frontex; notes that Serbia has proven to be a good partner in fighting crime, migrant smuggling and illegal migration;

12. Emphasises that the Western Balkans are a crucial energy and security corridor, linking Europe to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus;

13. Encourages Serbia to deepen cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially in the field of cross-border road infrastructure;

14. Notes that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia are detached from reality and have created frustration, pushing Serbia toward alternative partners, including Russia and China; notes that the massive (pre-accession and other) EU funds to Serbia have not led to a growth in EU influence;

15. Is of the opinion that the most effective response to instability in Serbia and the Western Balkans in general is not top-down management by the Commission, but engagement from trusted regional actors who are much better positioned to drive economic development and political stability;

16. Is of the opinion that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia have failed; is of the opinion that a privileged partnership between the EU and Serbia, enabling trade and economic integration, while respecting Serbia’s wish for sovereignty and political independence, should be established, as this is in the interests of both the EU and Serbia;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.