Sittings · Document

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (2025/2900(RSP)) 2025-10-15

On the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections

on behalf of the PPE Group · Rapporteur: Ondřej Kolář, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Tomas Tobé, Željana Zovko, Isabel WiselerLima, Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Jan Farský, MirceaGheorghe Hava, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Andrey Kovatchev, Antonio LópezIstúriz White, Liudas Mažylis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak

B100454/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections

(2025/2900(RSP))

The European Parliament,

having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and Commissioner Kos of 9 August 2025 on the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus, and to the statements by the VP/HR of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, of 26 February 2024 on the parliamentary and local elections, and of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024,

having regard to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 21 and 22 October 2021,

having regard to the Letter of Intent on Cooperation between the European Parliament and the Belarusian Democratic Forces, signed on 3 May 2024,

having regard to the Luxembourg Solutions on addressing the specific challenges faced by the Belarusians in exile, adopted on 6 and 7 June 2024 under the auspices of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,

having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur of 22 April 2025 on human rights developments in Belarus between 1 April and 31 March 2025, and to the report of 25 March 2024 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,

having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas five years after the fraudulent presidential election of 9 August 2020, Belarus remains under the authoritarian rule of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, whose regime continues to systematically target political activists, civil society, human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, artists, religious leaders, trade unionists and other groups in Belarus and abroad, subjecting thousands to arbitrary detention, repression, torture, forced disappearances, and suppression of fundamental freedoms;

B. whereas following the fraudulent 2020 presidential election and the subsequent brutal crackdown, the EU and many of its democratic partners did not recognise the results of the elections or Aliaksandr Lukashenka as legitimate leader and President of Belarus;

C. whereas the mass mobilisation of Belarusian citizens in 2020 represented an unprecedented demand for democracy, justice and human rights; whereas the regime’s response was characterised by systemic human rights violations, widespread arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and the confirmed death of at least a dozen peaceful protesters;

D. whereas since 2020 hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have fled the country, seeking refuge from persecution, arbitrary detention, and repression, and continue to face political intimidation, even abroad;

E. whereas the authoritarian regime in Belarus continues to drift towards totalitarianism, intensifying political repression and persecution, destroying independent media, requiring political loyalty as a precondition for participation in public life, and continuing the widespread use of torture, arbitrary detention and forced exile;

F. whereas on 26 January 2025, a presidential election was held in Belarus, in which Lukashenka was declared the winner with 86.8 % of the vote; whereas these elections, although held without mass protests, failed to meet international standards;

G. whereas despite the pardon of approximately 52 political prisoners in September 2025, more than 1 000 political prisoners remain unjustly detained under inhumane and life-threatening conditions;

H. whereas Lukashenka remains in power largely through the continued loyalty of the Belarusian elite, police and security forces, and with significant political and economic support from the Russian Federation, including in the area of security;

I. whereas Lukashenka’s regime has become complicit in international war crimes, notably through its collaboration with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its role in the deportation and kidnapping of Ukrainian children, and its acceptance of the permanent militarisation of Belarusian territory by Russian forces, thereby undermining NATO’s deterrence posture and undercutting the EU’s security policy;

J. whereas Belarus has become a military foothold for Russia, falling into deep political, economic and informational dependence on the Kremlin, thereby undermining regional stability and European security;

K. whereas the Belarusian regime has further aligned itself with the Russian Federation, providing logistical and military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including by allowing Russian troops and equipment to operate from Belarusian territory when launching the assault on Ukraine in February 2022; whereas joint military exercises such as Zapad 2025 and the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil increase regional instability;

L. whereas the regime has also engaged in hybrid operations against the EU, including orchestrated migration pressure on EU borders and facilitating or tolerating drone incursions from Belarusian territory into neighbouring Member States, notably Poland, in what constitutes deliberate destabilisation efforts;

M. whereas the Belarusian people overwhelmingly oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine, a stance which has helped to limit Belarus’s direct involvement in the conflict and demonstrates the Belarusian nation’s commitment to peace, independence and European values;

N. whereas, despite persecution, physical danger and threats to their lives, democratic Belarusian leaders in exile continue their work with courage and determination, often at huge personal risk, advocating for human rights and representing the aspirations of the Belarusian people for a free, democratic and independent Belarus;

O. whereas Parliament and the Belarusian democratic forces remain steadfast in their shared commitment to restoring democracy in Belarus through free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the promotion of Belarus’s European integration as a guarantee of its independence and sovereignty;

P. whereas the EU has mobilised more than EUR 170 million since 2020 to support Belarusian civil society, independent media and victims of repression, and continues to impose sanctions on those responsible for undermining democracy and violating human rights;

Q. whereas sustained and coordinated pressure on the Lukashenka regime, including through the use of targeted and effective sanctions, remains one of the key instruments in compelling it to make meaningful concessions to the forces of democracy, including the release of all political prisoners and the cessation of repression;

R. whereas, during the visit by the US Special Envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, to Minsk on 21 June 2025, the Belarusian authorities released fourteen political prisoners, including former presidential candidate Siarhei Tsikhanouski, after nearly five years of imprisonment; whereas, however, many more political prisoners remain behind bars;

S. whereas Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, was arrested on 18 March 2021, and later sentenced to three years in prison on charges of ‘publicly insulting the President of Belarus’ and ‘inciting ethnic hatred’; whereas on 8 February 2023 the Hrodna Regional Court found him guilty of encouraging actions aimed at harming the national security of the Republic of Belarus and inciting ethnic hostility, and sentenced him to eight years in prison, where he remains to this day;

T. whereas the Lukashenka regime continues to force migrants from non-EU countries across its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as part of a hybrid attack on the EU; whereas migrants in Belarus face torture and other ill treatment by border guards and other officials;

1. Reiterates its non-recognition of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as President of Belarus and considers any elections conducted under his regime as fraudulent and illegitimate; acknowledges the widespread evidence and numerous testimonies indicating that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election, while the Lukashenka regime unlawfully seized power and refused to acknowledge her victory;

2. Continues to express grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Andrzej Poczobut, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Matskevich, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Anastasiya Loika, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha, Mikalai Statkevich, Pavel Sieviarynets and others, many of whom have no access to proper medical care, despite facing severe health issues, isolation, ill-treatment and torture; calls on Member State diplomats and representatives to actively support relevant organisations that advocate for political prisoners and, where appropriate, to seek ways to provide direct political support to prisoners in Belarus;

3. Strongly condemns the ongoing repression of political opponents, journalists, civil society activists and cultural figures in Belarus; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all unjustly imprisoned political prisoners, journalists and media workers, and the full restoration of their civil and political rights; calls for strengthened international efforts to secure the release of all political prisoners, ensuring that no one is subjected to forced deportation from Belarus; commends the efforts of the US administration in this regard and its tangible results;

4. Demands that the Belarusian authorities cease the criminalisation of journalism, end the harassment of journalists both within Belarus and in exile, and halt intimidation of their family members; calls for the protection of independent media and of freedom of expression as essential elements of a democratic society;

5. Strongly condemns the authorities of Belarus for blocking independent media, restricting access to the internet, and arresting journalists and bloggers, which contravenes international standards of press freedom;

6. Deplores the fact that the repressive measures in Belarus have expanded to include attacks on religious freedom, through the adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations, which grossly violates the fundamental right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief; urges the Lukashenka regime to immediately halt the persecution of religious communities and churches;

7. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s unjustified, illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine; considers that the Lukashenka regime has become an accomplice in the crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine; deems, furthermore, that the special international tribunal on the crime of aggression perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine must also have the jurisdiction to investigate the Belarusian leadership;

8. Denounces the illegal transfer of several thousand children, including orphans, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine to so-called recreational camps in Belarus, where they are subjected to Russification and indoctrination; strongly condemns the involvement of the Belarus Red Cross in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children; asks the Commission and other relevant bodies to support the President of Ukraine’s Bring Kids Back UA initiative in every possible way;

9. Supports the establishment of an international accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute the crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenka regime;

10. Calls on the Member States and the international community to prepare the ground for the criminal prosecution of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the Belarusian officials responsible for falsifying the 2020 election results and escalating human rights violations in its aftermath, under the accepted principles of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction; highlights the invaluable work carried out by human rights defenders and civil society representatives on the ground in monitoring, documenting and reporting the grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity that are taking place in Belarus, in order to ensure subsequent accountability and justice for the victims;

11. Strongly warns the Commission and the European External Action Service, as well as all other EU institutions, bodies and Member States and their representatives that, for the EU to maintain its international credibility and moral authority, and regain trust, it must commit to serious and tangible efforts on the ground rather than engaging solely in performative symbolic gestures on social media platforms; urges all relevant EU institutions to prioritise real and measurable progress in the protection of human rights in Belarus;

12. Insists on the establishment of an EU Special Representative for Belarus, preferably a former high-ranking political figure, tasked with negotiating with Belarusian authorities and officials and with doing everything possible to secure the release of all political prisoners being held in the country;

13. Remains firmly committed to maintaining and strengthening pressure on the Lukashenka regime through robust, targeted and readily adaptable sanctions that address electoral fraud, human rights abuses, Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its hybrid warfare against neighbouring states;

14. Calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt further coordinated sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for repression and for supporting Russia’s aggression; urges the EU to develop a mechanism for identifying, freezing and confiscating assets owned by Lukashenka, his family, and members of his regime, and to redirect the proceeds to victims of repression and to Belarusian democratic initiatives;

15. Welcomes the unity and solidarity shown by the EU and the Member States in addressing the multifaceted threats which the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka poses to the EU, in particular through the continued and growing state-engineered instrumentalisation of migration, which deliberately causes human suffering at Belarus’s borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and beyond; strongly condemns the Belarusian authorities’ use of migration for political ends and sees this as a purposefully orchestrated reprisal by the Lukashenka regime against the EU Member States for their support for the democratic forces of Belarus, with the aim of destabilising those Member States; supports the determined efforts undertaken by the Member States concerned to protect their borders, including by constructing physical barriers, such as border fences, as deterrents;

16. Calls for increased support to key democratic structures, such as the Office of the Elected President Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, the Coordination Council and democratic political parties, to build their capacity and prepare them – as credible alternative institutions – to assume leadership during a democratic transition;

17. Urges the Member States to allow Belarusian citizens who are long-term EU residents and whose documents have expired to remain within, and travel throughout, the EU, without the obligation to return to Belarus, where they risk persecution;

18. Encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue consultative work with the Belarusian democratic forces to lay the conceptual, legislative and human rights framework for Belarus’s transition to democracy in line with EU standards;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in every possible way;

20. Calls on the EU and international organisations to formalise the representation of the Belarusian democratic forces in international forums such as the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

21. Calls on the EU and individual Member States to further formalise the representation of Belarusian democratic forces by supporting them in opening offices across European capitals and allowing them to issue provisional documents to exiled Belarusian citizens;

22. Calls on all Member States to simplify procedures for visa issuance to Belarusian citizens threatened by the Lukashenka regime;

23. Calls on all Member States to create solid visa programmes for Belarusian students, researchers and representatives of academia;

24. Calls on the Member States to help Lithuania and Poland in their efforts to secure the functioning and funding of the Belarusian government in exile and of free Belarusian media outlets stationed in Lithuania and Poland;

25. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the Belarusian people in their pursuit of democracy, freedom and human rights;

26. Prioritises support for Belarusian diaspora communities as key actors of resilience and advocacy in the sense and spirit of the Luxembourg Solutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, including through improved visa access and residence permit procedures and stronger legal protection within the EU; requests increased funding for educational, cultural and identity-preserving projects that safeguard the Belarusian language, culture and national identity while countering Kremlin narratives abroad;

27. Regards an approach towards Belarus that both empowers Belarus’s democratic transition and constrains Russia’s military use of its neighbour as an integral part of the EU’s long-term values-based security strategy and as essential to maintain the EU’s credibility as defender of a democratic Belarus;

28. Strongly condemns incidents involving violations of airspace and blockades of transport corridors, such as the forced landing of a Ryanair plane in 2021;

29. Commends the continued cooperation between the EU institutions, Member States, Belarusian democratic forces and international partners to support a peaceful transition based on democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the de facto authorities of the Republic of Belarus.