On strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

B100361/2025

European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

(2025/2811(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova and on Eastern Partnership countries,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,

– having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for European Union (EU) membership, submitted on 3 March 2022,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the EU statement of 21 March 2024 at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Permanent Council No 1466 in Vienna on the recent security incidents in the Transnistrian region,

– having regard to the Moldova Growth Facility, aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic resilience and alignment with the EU acquis,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in the Republic of Moldova on 28 September 2025; whereas these elections are expected to represent a pivotal moment in Moldova’s democratic consolidation and its ongoing European integration; whereas the electoral context is marked by heightened geopolitical tensions stemming from Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and by an intensification of hybrid threats directed at Moldova, including coordinated disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, foreign funding of political actors, and destabilisation efforts in regions such as Gagauzia and Transnistria;

B. whereas the Russian Federation has persistently sought to influence, subvert and undermine free, fair and independent elections in the Republic of Moldova, as well as in several EU Member States and most recently in Romania, through a broad spectrum of hybrid warfare tactics, including disinformation campaigns, covert operations, cyberattacks, strategic corruption and the illicit financing of political actors; whereas these efforts aim to destabilise democratic institutions, erode public trust and derail Moldova’s pro-European trajectory; whereas, despite recent legislative improvements to increase transparency and accountability in the electoral process, serious concerns remain regarding campaign financing, particularly the use of illicit Russian funds and opaque foreign-linked financial networks to manipulate electoral outcomes; whereas such interference is expected to intensify ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections, necessitating urgent and sustained countermeasures to safeguard Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic resilience;

C. whereas Moldova’s local elections on 5 November 2023 saw unprecedented Russian interference in the form of disinformation, voter bribery and funding for pro-Russian parties, with investigations revealing over USD 15 million in illicit transfers; whereas these hybrid tactics intensified during the 2024 presidential elections and concurrent EU membership referendum, including vote-buying affecting 138 000 citizens, cyberattacks, intimidation and efforts to sway voter sentiment towards Russian-aligned interests;

D. whereas international observers, including the OSCE and the International Republican Institute (IRI), noted that, while the elections were professionally conducted, campaign conditions were unequal and undermined by foreign interference and misuse of public resources; whereas the incumbent, Maia Sandu, was re-elected on 3 November 2024 and the constitutional referendum passed narrowly, with the decisive diaspora vote preserving Moldova’s pro-European course; whereas, in response, Moldova lodged formal protests and the United States, Canada, the EU and the UK imposed sanctions on entities and individuals, including oligarch Ilan Șor and the pro-Russian Victory bloc, for vote buying and hybrid operations; whereas similar patterns of foreign influence are anticipated ahead of the 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections, placing Moldova’s democratic trajectory at risk; whereas Moldova requires strengthened electoral safeguards, enhanced campaign finance transparency, and sustained EU support to counter foreign interference and uphold democratic resilience;

E. whereas Moldova has taken measures to combat Russian interference, including banning pro-Russian parties, sanctioning oligarchs, suspending disinformation media and tightening customs controls, and needs continued support from the EU for these measures; whereas Russia has broadened its interference to include political actors who falsely present themselves as pro-European in order to fragment the electorate, weaken the ruling party and sow division, reflecting evolving Kremlin strategies; whereas several banned Russian TV channels remain accessible via HaiTV;

F. whereas Russia Today (RT) and its Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan coordinated with the Kremlin to influence Moldova’s October 2024 election via state-funded disinformation; whereas on 18 September 2024, Șor allies Marina Tauber and Bashkan of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul met Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and spread false information about the EU and Moldova’s European prospects; whereas in August 2025, Evghenia Guțul was convicted and sentenced to seven years for channelling Russian funds to a pro-Russian political party; whereas in 2023, the Russian Government expanded the operational scope of RT by embedding within it a cyber-unit with direct ties to the Russian state; whereas this unit has been involved in intelligence and influence operations globally, including in Moldova; whereas the information gathered by this entity, operating under RT’s cover, is reportedly funnelled to Russian intelligence agencies, state-controlled media, mercenary groups and other actors aligned with the Russian Government; whereas RT is also engaged in disinformation campaigns, covert influence operations and military procurement efforts in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine; whereas in the run-up to Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, RT has intensified its propaganda through affiliated outlets such as Sputnik Moldova and RT Balkan, broadcasting fabricated reports that falsely claim the EU is preparing to impose agricultural import bans, raise energy tariffs and strip Moldova of its sovereignty; whereas these outlets simultaneously amplified Kremlin-backed politicians such as Marina Tauber, branding her and her allies as the only ‘defenders of Moldovan identity,’ while smearing pro-European parties; whereas through coordinated television segments, online videos and social media amplification, RT is deliberately inciting distrust in democratic institutions and attempting to destabilise Moldova’s parliamentary process to secure a Kremlin-friendly majority in 2025;

G. whereas since April 2025, when Moldova’s parliament scheduled the parliamentary elections, Russia has intensified its efforts, launching an unprecedented campaign mobilising multiple branches of the Kremlin’s foreign influence apparatus; whereas the Matryoshka operation has published an average of three fabricated stories per week, despite showing little focus on Moldova previously, and these fake narratives circulate via media branded as credible outlets such as the BBC and Euronews, yet are entirely fabricated;

H. whereas Russia is escalating its ‘grey zone’ assaults on Moldova through disinformation, cyberattacks, bomb threats and other forms of manipulation; whereas this campaign forms part of Russia’s steadily evolving ‘hybrid war’ across the region, including Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and other neighbouring countries; whereas Putin’s primary instruments to destabilise Moldova include exploiting corruption via billionaire allies such as Ilan Șor and former ruling party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, propaganda, and influence over Gagauzia, a Șor stronghold, and Transnistria, which is controlled by Russian troops;

I. whereas the Intelligence and Security Service of Moldova reported an unprecedented intensity of Russian actions in 2023 aimed at keeping Moldova within its sphere of influence; whereas these hybrid threats target democratic processes and undermine European integration through the amplification of radical and separatist tendencies in Gagauzia, propaganda and information manipulation, interference in elections, and subversive operations;

J. whereas, following the 30 July 2025 meeting of the Supreme Security Council, President Maia Sandu presented findings from Moldova’s specialised institutions on methods of hybrid warfare, identifying 10 principal instruments of foreign interference in Moldova’s political and electoral processes, posing a direct threat to the integrity of the 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections; whereas the foremost threat is large-scale electoral corruption and illicit external financing, including through the use of cryptocurrencies, courier networks (‘cărăuși’), and sophisticated money-laundering schemes designed to subvert the democratic process; whereas such schemes involve transfers to accounts in Promsvyazbank, subsequently converted through illicit mechanisms to finance electoral campaigns, disinformation operations, destabilisation efforts, and the corruption of individuals within the justice system; whereas estimates indicate that up to EUR 100 million may have been funnelled into Moldova through cryptocurrency channels alone; whereas these hybrid operations further include vote-buying on a massive scale, the organisation of paid protests, cyberattacks against digital electoral infrastructure and other critical systems, as well as the instrumentalisation of the Moscow-controlled Orthodox Church and the manipulation of religious sentiment in service of a foreign power;

K. whereas Moldova faces growing economic and security challenges, including the risk of political reversal if Russian-backed candidates succeed in the upcoming parliamentary election;

L. whereas Ukraine’s decision to close its border with Transnistria, where approximately 1 500 Russian troops are stationed in violation of international law and Moldova’s sovereignty, significantly curtailed trade between Kyiv and Tiraspol, cutting off critical revenue streams for Russian-controlled/backed separatists and reducing Transnistria’s trade volumes with Russia by 22 % in 2022; whereas Moldova now controls most of Transnistria’s access to external trade, representing an unprecedented opportunity to influence the separatist region; whereas Moldova has implemented a pressure strategy that includes criminalising separatism, tightening customs checks and stripping Transnistrian businesses of customs privileges, thus creating significant economic strain; whereas Transnistria has been facing significant energy challenges since mid-2025, following the cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine on 1 January 2025;

M. whereas Russia has a substantial military presence in the Black Sea, including through undisclosed numbers and capabilities of its submarines, and considerable potential to dominate adjacent maritime transport routes; whereas the volatile situation in Transnistria poses a strategic risk, as Russia could seize control of the region and escalate the conflict;

N. whereas the Moldovan Orthodox Church, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate and known as the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, is the most significant instrument of Russian propaganda in Moldova; whereas its hierarchy has repeatedly interfered in elections, supporting pro-Russian parties and opposing pro-Western candidates, such as in 2016, when then Bishop Marchel of Balti and Falesti urged followers to vote for Socialist Party candidate Igor Dodon and denounced Maia Sandu as a ‘threat to the Orthodox Church’; whereas in October 2021, following the Party of Action and Solidarity’s rise to power, some clergy under Archbishop Marchel publicly asked to be relieved from praying for the country’s rulers;

O. whereas journalistic and security investigations confirmed that dozens of priests from the Metropolitan Church of Moldova participated in organised ‘pilgrimages’ to Moscow in 2024 and early 2025, receiving Promsvyazbank payment cards and promised monthly transfers up to EUR 1 000 as clerical aid; whereas these trips, reportedly organised by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor in coordination with the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, appear intended to mobilise clergy in support of pro-Russian political objectives during both the 2024 presidential election and upcoming September 2025 parliamentary elections;

P. whereas on 15 July 2025, at the ‘Nativity of the Mother of God’ church in Grinăuți, Rîșcani, priest Constantin Turtureanu, his wife, and their son were violently assaulted and expelled from their parish after joining the Metropolis of Bessarabia, in an incident witnessed by priests and police officers who failed to intervene, with parishioners alleging the attack was orchestrated by the pro-Russian Șor group, represented by Victoria Furtună, leader of the ‘Victory’ movement;

Q. whereas in April 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of Kremlin propaganda, and in August 2024 the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople denounced its militaristic ethno-nationalist turn as heretical;

R. whereas on 22 April 2025, the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS), in collaboration with the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), convened a hearing on the topic of ‘Russia’s Hybrid Threats and Attacks in Europe, Including Best Practices to Counter Them,’ addressing also the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in malign influence operations;

S. whereas on 3 March 2022, the Republic of Moldova applied for EU membership; whereas Moldova was granted the status of candidate country on 23 June 2022 by unanimous agreement of the 27 Member States;

T. whereas the EU has stepped up its financial and technical support to Moldova, including through the Moldova Growth Facility, to accelerate socio-economic development and alignment with the acquis; whereas Moldova is set to join the EU’s free roaming area on 1 January 2026, enhancing connectivity for its citizens; whereas on 4 July 2025, a bilateral EU-Moldova summit marked a milestone in Moldova’s over two-decade path towards EU membership;

1. Reiterates its solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and unwavering support for the country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; stresses Moldova’s role in the safety and stability of the EU’s eastern border and the Black Sea region, amid the humanitarian and energy crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

2. Commends Moldova for successfully completing the bilateral screening of Clusters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6; urges the Commission and the Member States to support the Moldovan Government’s ambition to open negotiations on all clusters by the end of 2025, with the opening of Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) scheduled for September; underscores that the rapid progress reflects Moldova’s strong commitment to EU integration, adherence to reform priorities and readiness to align with European standards;

3. Reiterates its support for the establishment of an Eastern Partnership office in Moldova which, in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions and renewed momentum for EU enlargement, will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society, and local partners across the Eastern Partnership region;

4. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated attempts to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, its institutions and society; calls on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country, and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhasia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine;

5. Reaffirms its full commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s EU membership; welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ ongoing efforts to advance reforms and implement the milestones outlined in the Commission’s latest progress reports, despite continued pressure from Russia and the broader challenges caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

6. Stresses that, based on the 2023-2024 elections, the Russian Federation is likely to use ‘filler’ parties in the 2025 parliamentary elections, exploit pseudo-sovereigntist movements, illegally back Șor populists who engage in vote-buying and violent protests, and covertly support ‘independent’ candidates to spread pro-Russian propaganda and undermine Moldova’s democratic institutions and its European path;

7. Calls on NATO and its members to consider enhancing NATO’s military presence and readiness in the Black Sea region;

8. Reiterates its call on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country and undermine its constitutional order and democratic institutions; reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and to destroy any remaining ammunition stored there; calls on the international community to strengthen support to settle the Transnistrian issue based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and without affecting the country’s European integration; underlines that on the occasion of Moldova’s 34th National Day, the United States underscored its commitment to uphold Moldova’s national sovereignty;

9. Calls for EU support in the form of financial and technical assistance for Moldova’s efforts to achieve economic stabilisation, the energy diversification of Transnistria through Moldova’s neighbouring states, and social cohesion initiatives, ensuring that Moldova’s progress towards EU accession is not undermined by the continued occupation of Transnistria;

10. Expresses deep concern over Russia’s National Security Strategy, approved by President Putin on 31 December 2015, building on the Military Doctrine of 25 December 2014; emphasises its explicit prioritisation of defending so-called ‘traditional Russian spiritual and moral values’ against perceived Western influence, thereby demonstrating Russia’s instrumentalisation of these values and their institutions for strategic purposes; stresses that the primary channel for Russian propaganda in Moldova is the Russian Orthodox Church, specifically the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova;

11. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes that after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia was not officially recognised until 2002, following a decision by the European Court of Human Rights;

12. Emphasises the importance of strategic communication, including outreach to the Russian-speaking population in Moldova, to highlight the benefits of EU integration and effectively counter foreign information manipulation and interference;

13. Commends the Council’s decision of 25 July 2025 to integrate Moldova into the ‘roam like at home’ area as of 1 January 2026, following a similar decision for Ukraine adopted on 14 July 2025; notes that, as a result, Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens in the EU, as well as EU citizens in Moldova and Ukraine, will be able to make calls, send text messages, and use mobile data under the same conditions as in their home country, without incurring additional charges;

14. Calls on the Commission to move beyond the temporary autonomous trade measures and work towards establishing a more stable and predictable long-term trade framework with the Republic of Moldova, such as extending and modernising the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with binding commitments for a minimum period of 10 years; welcomes the July 2025 update to the DCFTA, which expands tariff-rate quotas for key Moldovan agricultural exports and provides for a 2027 review aligned with Moldova’s reform progress; underlines that a long-term, secure trade arrangement would support Moldova’s economic resilience, attract sustainable investment, and further anchor the country within the EU single market;

15. Welcomes continued support under the European Peace Facility, including EUR 60 million in 2025 and nearly EUR 200 million since 2021, as well as the EUR 20 million April 2025 package for shortrange airdefence systems, contributing to the modernisation of Moldova’s defence; calls for ongoing support and Moldova’s inclusion in the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) for joint defence procurement; commends the establishment and 2025 extension of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) under the common security and defence policy (CSDP) until 31 May 2027 with a EUR 19.8 million budget to strengthen resilience against hybrid threats; underscores Moldova’s May 2024 Security and Defence Partnership, the EU’s first with a nonEU country, laying the groundwork for deeper CSDP cooperation on crisis management, border security, counterhybrid threats, and defence reform;

16. Welcomes Moldova’s decision to invite the OSCE, through the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), to observe the upcoming parliamentary elections, as observation is vital for transparency, equal opportunities, and public trust; underlines EU support for OSCE’s neutrality and professional monitoring of all election phases, from voter registration, the campaign environment, media coverage, and finance, to vote counting and dispute resolution, and stands ready to cooperate with the OSCE and other partners to ensure elections are free, fair, and in line with international standards;

17. Calls on the Commission and the Council, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and other like-minded countries to continue to apply and expand sanctions against individuals, media outlets, and entities involved in Kremlin-sponsored activities to subvert Moldova’s and all other EU countries and partners’ democratic processes and electoral integrity;

18. Urges the Moldovan Government to increase vigilance over potential electoral irregularities, enhance public communication on election security, and prepare to address Russian attempts to incite protests following the election results;

19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.