On strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

B100355/2025

European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

(2025/2811(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova, in particular its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and the constitutional referendum on EU integration,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part,

– having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022 and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate country status on 23 June 2022,

– having regard to the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova,

– having regard to the 9th EU-Moldova Association Council meeting held on 4 June 2025, which reaffirmed the importance of a strong EU-Moldova partnership, as well as the EU’s support for Moldova’s accession efforts and reforms in key areas such as the rule of law, justice and anti-corruption measures,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Republic of Moldova Summit of 4 July 2025 in Chișinău,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 28 September 2025, the Republic of Moldova is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in a context mired by continued Russian interference and efforts to destabilise the country’s political landscape and democratic electoral processes; whereas the stakes have never been higher for both Moldova and Europe, as the 2025 vote will determine whether Moldova establishes itself as a free, sovereign democracy within the European Union;

B. whereas, given the high geopolitical stakes, Russia’s interference in the upcoming parliamentary elections is expected to surpass that in the 2024 elections in both scale and intensity, as Russia’s overarching objective is to reassert political control over Moldova in order to transform it into a security liability for both Ukraine and the EU, while using the country as a testing ground to hone its hybrid warfare toolkit;

C. whereas Russia continues to disseminate false narratives intended to mislead the Moldovan public, including claims that EU integration compromises Moldova’s sovereignty, that the judiciary is under political control, that the country is undergoing militarisation, that the economy is collapsing, that Moldova is internationally isolated, and that the West is targeting the country’s churches and traditional values;

D. whereas intelligence and security services in Moldova and its partner countries have repeatedly reported intensified Russian hybrid activities aimed at derailing Moldova’s EU integration and destabilising its democracy; whereas the Moldovan authorities have identified at least 10 main tools of interference in the electoral process, including illegal financing amounting to around EUR 100 million through cryptocurrencies, electoral bribery, disinformation and deepfakes, paid protests, cyberattacks, the exploitation of Kremlin-affiliated clergy, the obstruction of diaspora voting, and hybrid destabilisation tactics in the Gagauzian and the Transnistrian regions;

E. whereas during the 2024 presidential elections and the EU referendum, Russia and its proxies engaged in illicitly financing political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

F. whereas in 2025, the EU introduced further sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for supporting and implementing actions that undermine and threaten Moldova’s sovereignty and independence, as well as democracy, the rule of law and stability in the country, on the basis of a recently established sanctions regime targeting those responsible for destabilising actions in the Republic of Moldova;

G. whereas the EU, its Member States and Moldova have stepped up joint efforts to counter hybrid threats through strategic communication, sanctions, the deployment of EU hybrid rapid response teams, and the expansion of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova;

H. whereas the participation of a European Parliament delegation in the international election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) demonstrates the EU’s commitment to supporting the integrity of electoral processes in Moldova and strengthening democratic institutions;

I. whereas the Republic of Moldova has undertaken specific measures to counter Russian interference by strengthening its legal framework and increasing the capacity of its institutions to tackle electoral corruption and vote-buying, including by holding those involved accountable and imposing sanctions on oligarchs; whereas the Moldovan Government has also equipped key bodies, such as the Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation, with greater authority to defend the information space and reduce exposure to foreign influence and manipulation; whereas the Moldovan Government has also reinforced the role of law enforcement in tackling electoral fraud and corruption;

J. whereas the Republic of Moldova has managed to significantly consolidate its democracy, continue its reform trajectory and develop its relations with the EU; whereas the improvements to the country’s democratic system have been reflected in its progress on various international indexes; whereas the Moldovan Government’s enhanced implementation of current agreements demonstrates its commitment to closer cooperation with and integration into the EU;

K. whereas Moldova has made notable progress with regard to judicial reforms, including vetting and restructuring of the judiciary, strengthening its independence and improving anti-corruption regulations;

L. whereas public trust in democratic institutions is essential for Moldova’s stability and resilience against malign interference; whereas Moldovan civil society and independent media play a crucial role in exposing disinformation, strengthening resilience and defending democratic values;

M. whereas Moldova has deepened cooperation with the EU on foreign and security policy through the EU–Moldova Security and Defence Partnership, enhanced participation in EU common security and defence policy missions, and aligned with EU restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

N. whereas on 21 May 2024, Moldova became the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU, which will help strengthen cooperation on security and defence policy between the EU and Moldova;

O. whereas the Council has adopted assistance measures worth EUR 197 million since 2021 for modernising the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova under the European Peace Facility;

P. whereas the EU and Moldova share a commitment to sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and a comprehensive and peaceful reintegration of the country, including the withdrawal of Russian military personnel and ammunition from the Transnistrian region;

Q. whereas the Republic of Moldova hosted the first-ever EU-Moldova Summit on 4 July 2025, a historic milestone in bilateral relations, reaffirming the shared commitment to Moldova’s accession process and common values, amid regional security threats; whereas the sides agreed to a comprehensive list of deliverables to the benefit of the citizens of both Moldova and the EU, while fostering Moldova’s integration into the EU’s single market and opening opportunities for closer accelerated integration;

R. whereas on 27 August 2025 French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, in their joint visit to Moldova, participated in the celebration of Moldova National Independence Day at Chișinău’s National Assembly Square, underlining the importance of Moldovan democracy and the freedom of Moldovans to choose their own future;

1. Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders;

2. Strongly condemns the persistent and intensifying hybrid threats, malign interference, and destabilisation attempts by Russia and its local proxies against the Republic of Moldova; deplores, in particular, the use of disinformation, cyberattacks, false-flag operations, illicit political financing, spoiler parties, energy weaponisation, and the instrumentalisation of separatist movements to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy and European integration;

3. Deplores the staggering scale of Russian-orchestrated hybrid campaigns, whereby, according to the 2024 report by Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service, as many as 33 000 activists, 119 territorial cells and 1 900 primary cells were mobilised to manipulate public opinion ahead of the 2024 presidential elections;

4. Calls on Russia to immediately cease all destabilising actions and withdraw its military personnel and ammunition from the Transnistrian region, in accordance with international law and Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

5. Condemns Russia’s continued weaponisation of energy supplies; welcomes Moldova’s progress, through a strategic action plan, in diversifying its energy sources, reducing reliance on Russian gas, and seeking closer integration with the EU energy market;

6. Calls for stronger EU sanctions targeting individuals and entities involved in financing, organising or coordinating hybrid interference against Moldova; underlines the need for stronger cooperation between EU and Moldovan authorities to dismantle these networks;

7. Reaffirms the EU’s unwavering support for the sovereignty, independence, stability, territorial integrity and European future of the Republic of Moldova; underlines that the future of Moldova must be determined freely and democratically by its citizens, without external interference, pressure or manipulation;

8. Calls for enhanced support for the Republic of Moldova to combat illicit political financing, including through strengthened cooperation and information exchange with Moldovan authorities to detect and trace suspicious financial flows, including those involving cryptocurrencies, and to uncover and dismantle opaque or illegal funding networks used to support Russian political proxies and electoral processes;

9. Welcomes the significant progress made by Moldova on reforms, despite persistent hybrid threats; encourages Moldova to further strengthen the rule of law, counter corruption and oligarchic influence, reform the judiciary and consolidate democratic institutions, ensuring that these reforms result in specific and visible outcomes;

10. Welcomes the recent agreement to review and update the trade provisions of the EU–Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which will provide increased market access for Moldovan agricultural exports that have not yet been liberalised; stresses that Parliament has repeatedly called for such a revision in order to ensure greater predictability and support for Moldovan farmers and for the Moldovan economy, which has been severely affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

11. Reaffirms its commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s future membership of the EU; believes that its membership of the EU would constitute a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the widespread support in the Republic of Moldova for its European integration; stresses that the Republic of Moldova’s European integration represents not only a path towards greater economic prosperity, but also a safeguard for political stability and security in the face of external threats;

12. Recalls that the Republic of Moldova has made substantial progress in the bilateral screening process since its launch, having successfully completed the screening for Cluster 1 (fundamentals), Cluster 2 (internal market), Cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth), Cluster 4 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity) and Cluster 6 (external relations) and is planning to complete the screening process for all clusters by September 2025;

13. Calls on the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure the timely opening of accession negotiations on Cluster 1 prior to the upcoming parliamentary elections, as a crucial measure to strengthen the credibility and irreversibility of the country’s European integration path, as well as the opening of all the clusters by the end of 2025;

14. Underlines that delivering tangible and visible benefits to citizens in the pre-accession phase is a key instrument in countering Russian anti-EU narratives and disinformation; emphasises that demonstrating the specific advantages of EU integration can significantly boost public support for the European path, increase trust in institutions and build societal resilience against foreign manipulation; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue supporting Moldova in joining relevant EU programmes and agencies, as a means of enhancing and accelerating alignment with EU policies prior to accession; calls for more consistent support for the Republic of Moldova in its EU accession process, including increased technical assistance for the Moldovan authorities as a contribution to strengthening capacity-building;

15. Welcomes the smooth adoption of the EUR 1.9 billion Moldova Growth Plan, which represents an unprecedented level of support aimed at boosting the Moldovan economy and advancing the country’s path toward EU membership by accelerating key reforms in sectors such as energy, the environment, the digital sector, transport and others; welcomes the disbursement of the prefinancing tranche of EUR 270 million from the EUR 1.9 billion EU Growth Plan for Moldova and calls for the swift release of the first ordinary tranche to support key reforms in infrastructure, human capital, business development and the digital and green transitions;

16. Welcomes the finalisation of the procedures enabling Moldova to join the EU ‘roam like at home’ area from 1 January 2026; notes that this will be one of the most tangible deliverables, showcasing the benefits of European integration, and will be welcome progress both in Moldova and among the large Moldovan diaspora in Europe, thereby further contributing to increased unfettered exchanges and to the freedom of movement; notes, furthermore, that Moldova’s association with the EU’s roam like at home area will allow Moldovan citizens traveling to the EU, and from the EU to Moldova, to use their mobile telephones without incurring additional roaming charges; highlights the fact that, according to the requirements of the EU roaming area association process, substantial tariff reductions will already be in place from 2026, with the gradual and total elimination of tariffs in the medium term;

17. Welcomes the participation of a European Parliament delegation in the OSCE/ODIHR international election observation mission to closely monitor the integrity of the electoral process;

18. Calls on the Commission to assist the Moldovan Government in exerting additional pressure on social media platforms to effectively tackle disinformation;

19. Commends the establishment of the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANC) and the National Institute of Innovations in Cybersecurity (Cybercor) as vital instruments for countering foreign information manipulation and hybrid threats; calls for sustained EU support, including through hybrid rapid response teams and access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve;

20. Applauds the creation of a EUPM-supported strategic communication centre relying on EU-standard methodologies, extensive training and strategic communication tools, significantly boosting national resilience to disinformation and hybrid threats;

21. Welcomes the adoption of Moldova’s new national defence strategy for 2024-2034 on 26 December 2024, which aims to enhance military capabilities, including integrated airspace surveillance, cyber defence, critical infrastructure protection and closer alignment with EU standards;

22. Supports Moldova’s consistent alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy; welcomes the first year of implementation of the EU–Moldova Security and Defence Partnership and calls for deeper cooperation, including in defence capabilities, cyber defence and resilience;

23. Condemns the repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles, which pose a direct threat to the country’s security and territorial integrity; calls on the EU Member States to substantially increase funding for the Republic of Moldova through the European Peace Facility, in order to strengthen its defence capabilities, particularly for the protection and surveillance of its airspace;

24. Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities; highlights the important decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chișinău to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region and the Republic of Moldova in particular; underlines Parliament’s commitment to have a fully functional liaison office in Chișinău as soon as possible;

25. Welcomes the recent joint trip of French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to Moldova to celebrate Moldova National Independence Day and supports the message they conveyed of supporting the efforts of the current Moldovan Government towards peace and security in Europe and confirming Moldova’s clear path towards EU membership on the basis of a process involving merit-based and democratic principles;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Russian authorities.