On strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

B100353/2025

European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

(2025/2811(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova,

– having regard to the European Council decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate country status to Moldova,

– having regard to the interim opinion of the Venice Commission of 13 March 2023 on the draft law on limiting excessive economic and political influence in public life (deoligarchisation),

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Republic of Moldova Report’ reviewing Moldova’s implementation of reforms under the EU-Moldova Association Agreement since October 2021 (SWD(2024)0698),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has further affected living standards in Moldova;

B. whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties and cyberattacks, and has been bribing politicians, judges and voters and using other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova;

C. whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty;

D. whereas Russian oligarchs have an excessive influence and vested interests in economic, political and public life in Moldova;

E. whereas Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, who fled to Russia in 2019 after being sentenced to 15 years in prison for fraud and money laundering, continues to play an active role from abroad; whereas Șor’s party was declared ‘unconstitutional’ by the Moldovan Constitutional Court in June 2023 for attempting to destabilise Moldova in collusion with Russia and remains banned; whereas in June 2025 Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service asked the Constitutional Court to dissolve four additional political parties linked to Șor for acting against the sovereignty and independence of the state; whereas Moldovan authorities have carried out at least 18 investigations into alleged Russian financing of political parties and into attempts to influence elections;

F. whereas in July 2023, the Transnistrian Communist Party leader, Oleg Khorzhan, was found stabbed to death in his home; whereas Oleg Khorzhan was a public critic of the de facto authorities and reported on human rights abuses in prison; whereas there has not been any effective breakthrough in the investigation into his death;

G. whereas in the presidential elections held on 20 October 2024 in conjunction with a referendum on joining the EU, President Maia Sandu was re-elected and a majority of voters supported including EU integration in the constitution despite the interference from Russia; whereas Moldova was officially granted candidate status by the EU in June 2022 and accession negotiations were opened in December 2023;

H. whereas reducing corruption is one of the nine steps Moldova needs to address before joining the EU;

I. whereas President Macron, Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Tusk visited Moldova on 27 August 2025; whereas during their visit to Chișinău they reiterated their support for Moldova’s path towards EU integration and expressed their readiness to assist the country in advancing towards EU membership;

J. whereas in the 2024 presidential election and EU membership referendum, Moldovan citizens abroad were provided with 228 polling stations (although 234 were planned) across 37 countries, yet in the Russian Federation – home to one of the largest Moldovan diasporas – authorities established only two polling stations in Moscow, thereby creating a stark disparity in voting access compared to other diaspora communities;

K. whereas the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has allocated significant funding to the modernisation of Moldovan institutions, such as the Central Electoral Commission, and to the strengthening of the non-governmental sector;

1. Emphasises that the future of Moldova must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Moldova’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Moldova’s democratic institutions;

2. Strongly criticises the increasing interference of foreign actors in the electoral process, including Russian disinformation on social media, and in particular any disinformation from convicted oligarch Ilan Șor, with the aim of misleading voters;

3. Recognises and encourages the efforts of the Moldovan authorities to allow all Moldovans to vote, including those living in the breakaway Republic of Transnistria or residing abroad; calls on the Moldovan authorities to ensure that sufficient polling stations are also opened in the Russian Federation, where a large number of Moldovan citizens reside, so that their voting rights can be exercised on an equal basis with diaspora communities in other countries;

4. Calls on the Moldovan authorities to protect basic democratic values, including freedom of expression, the media and association; calls on the Moldovan authorities not to impose any limits on the possibility of working for a legitimate opposition or to engage in critical scrutiny of the media;

5. Underlines the importance of a stable and democratic Moldova for stability, peace and cooperation throughout the region; calls for the EU to continue to support Moldova’s democratic structures;

6. Takes note of the importance of the nine conditions set by the Commission for the accession procedure; recognises Moldova’s reform efforts; underlines the importance of continued support from the EU, including strengthening the rule of law and the independence and effectiveness of the Moldovan authorities;

7. Underscores that financial support should have strong social conditionalities attached to it; recalls that such support should also encompass strengthening the capacities, independence and plurality of civil society organisations and social partner organisations; recommends establishing a sustainable social dialogue as another key area of social intervention;

8. Notes the significant progress Moldova has made in reducing its direct dependence on Russian gas, while acknowledging its remaining indirect vulnerabilities, particularly through Transnistria; calls for the EU to further support energy conservation, domestic renewable energy production, Moldova’s continued integration into European electricity and gas grids, and resilience against price volatility and infrastructure constraints;

9. Notes that Moldova has extended temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine until 1 March 2026, expanding eligibility to include third-country nationals with Ukrainian permanent residence permits and children born to third-country nationals living with Ukrainians; notes that, despite these efforts, many refugees continue to face significant challenges accessing employment, healthcare, social protection and legal information, particularly vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities and survivors of gender-based violence;

10. Notes with concern Russia’s ongoing attempts to exploit and foment tensions between the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Moldovan authorities; supports and encourages the Moldovan Government’s continued efforts to address these challenges through dialogue, inclusive reforms and the strengthening of democratic institutions;

11. Underlines the fact that the region of Transnistria is under Russian influence and is being used to destabilise the democratic government in Moldova; condemns President Vladimir Putin’s decision to revoke a 2012 decree committing Russia to finding a solution for Transnistria; calls on Russia to immediately dismantle its military presence in Transnistria; reiterates its support for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova with a special status for the region of Transnistria; encourages the implementation of all confidence-building measures designed to avoid destabilisation; believes that a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict is important for Moldova’s EU accession process;

12. Urges the EU and its Member States to further strengthen cooperation with Moldova through targeted measures in order to enhance the country’s resilience to hybrid threats, including by improving strategic communications about the EU, supporting journalists and civil society in countering disinformation, promoting independent Russian-language media content and enhancing public information literacy; calls for additional resources and technical know-how to assist the Moldovan Government’s strategic communications, internal coordination and capacity-building against hybrid attacks and disinformation; commends the efforts of Moldovan civil society in supporting the Moldovan Government’s fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values;

13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue supporting media literacy and media independence, as well as the strengthening of Moldova’s critical digital infrastructure, including through the replacement of Russian-origin information and communications technology systems; calls for the EU and its Member States to expand and intensify their direct engagement with Moldovan citizens by including them in various EU and bilateral programmes and projects, such as citizen consultations, and to foster people-to-people connections;

14. Underlines the importance of advancing the country’s reform process in order to improve living standards, particularly for vulnerable groups, and to provide the younger generations with attractive prospects for life and work in the country, thereby increasing societal resilience to hybrid attacks;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the authorities of the Russian Federation, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.