On tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions
B-10-2025-0330
on behalf of the Renew Group · Rapporteur: Bart Groothuis, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, MarieAgnes StrackZimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.
Parliament condemns China's export restrictions on critical raw materials and permanent magnets, which disrupt EU supply chains for defence, green tech, and other sectors.¶ It calls for countermeasures, negotiations on a general licence, a CRM fund, stockpiling targets, expedited permitting, and diversification of imports to reduce dependence on China.¶¶¶ It urges Member States to fund strategic projects and treat CRM sectors as part of the defence industrial base, and calls for public procurement to favour EU and partner materials.¶¶
Key points
- Strongly condemns China's export restrictions on critical raw materials and permanent magnets, which have halted exports and disrupted supply chains vital for automakers, defence, semiconductors, green tech, and healthcare.¶
- Insists that unilateral export controls must be limited to national security necessities with transparent rules, and calls on the Commission to continue dialogue with China.¶
- Warns that EU buyers providing information to Chinese authorities for export licences risks exposing trade and national security secrets.¶
- Expresses concern over China's dominance in CRMs and permanent magnets, noting its 98% share of EU rare earth supply and 60% of CRMs, and calls for incentives to use non-Chinese materials.¶
- Highlights Europe's dependence on China for digital and green transitions, including net-zero technologies and 5G, and warns of remote control risks and lock-in effects.¶
- Considers China's restrictions an unjustified weaponisation that undermines European deterrence and rearmament, and stresses that further restrictions will widen the rearmament gap.¶
- Recalls the CRMA benchmarks and welcomes the selection of 47 strategic projects in the EU and 13 outside, aimed at boosting domestic capacity and diversifying imports.¶¶
- Regrets the lack of a dedicated EU budget for the CRMA and calls for adequate financial resources in the multiannual financial framework to support domestic production.¶
- Calls on the Commission to impose countermeasures, including export restrictions on goods China depends on from the EU and limiting market access for high-risk Chinese vendors.¶
- Calls for negotiations on a general licence for certain industries and countries, and stresses that the EU should not make concessions at the upcoming EU-China summit.¶
- Calls for a CRM fund, expedited permitting, stockpiling targets, and public procurement favouring EU and partner materials, with a G7+ security standard.¶¶¶
- Urges Member States to fund strategic projects, treat CRM sectors as part of the defence industrial base, and pursue a unified China policy, including new trade agreements.¶¶
Who is affected
- EU companies in automotive, defence, semiconductor, green technology, and healthcare sectors face supply chain disruptions.¶
- European buyers of Chinese CRMs must comply with intrusive information demands for export licences.¶
- Member States are urged to fund strategic projects and consider CRM sectors as part of the defence industrial base.¶
- China is condemned for export restrictions and is called upon to engage in negotiations.¶¶
Figures and deadlines
- China controls 90% of the global market for essential raw materials used in downstream products.¶
- EU depends on China for almost 99% of its supply of the 17 rare earths and around 92% of NdFeB magnets.
- China accounts for 98% of EU rare earth supply and 60% of CRMs, including 98% of gallium and 93% of germanium.¶
- China provides 80% of global nitrocellulose used for ammunition-grade propellant.
- CRMA benchmark: no more than 65% of EU annual consumption of any CRM from a single non-EU country.¶
- NATO target of 1.5% of GDP annually for defence spending.¶