On continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

B100159/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

(2025/2528(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to the Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the 2006 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance,

– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’, of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’, of 23 February 2023 entitled ‘Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’, and of 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’;

– having regard to the report of 25 February 2025 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations entitled ‘Ukraine – Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4) February 2022 – December 2024’,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B. whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and have escalated indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting continued throughout 2024; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been injured, tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Kremlin regime and the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law;

C. whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced in and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression; whereas homes, schools and hospitals, especially near the frontlines, continue to be bombed every day; whereas around 1.6 million individuals, many of them elderly, have returned to frontline areas since February 2022; whereas, as of 2025, 70 % of households along the frontlines are in need of food and water assistance and 69 % are in need of medicine;

D. whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 19 546 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas many of the abducted children have reported having suffered physical and mental abuse to erase their Ukrainian identity;

E. whereas since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Russian army has committed more than 6 500 crimes against the environment in Ukraine, at an estimated cost of USD 71 billion; whereas ecocide is a tactic to destroy the country’s land and habitability and future generations’ ability to thrive and prosper;

F. whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report estimates that, as of December 2024, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 506 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times the estimated nominal gross domestic product of Ukraine for 2024; whereas a total financing gap of EUR 9.62 billion for recovery and reconstruction needs remains for 2025;

G. whereas the 16th EU sanctions package was adopted on 24 February 2025; whereas EU sanctions continue to be undermined by their lacking enforcement; whereas recent reports indicate that the US may grant Russia sanctions relief in the short term;

H. whereas the Trump administration’s shift in foreign policy was confirmed at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, making it clear that Europe can no longer rely on the US to defend our shared interests and values, including supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the Trump administration brought an end to nearly three years of Russian isolation when President Trump initiated a telephone call with President Putin on 12 February 2025 and commenced negotiations with Russia in Saudi Arabia on 18 February 2025; whereas President Trump already openly conceded to Putin’s demands by ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine and stating that Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia may not be returned in a peace deal; whereas President Trump has instructed his administration to ‘pause’ all military aid to Ukraine;

I. whereas President Trump has repeated falsehoods about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including minimising Russia’s culpability for starting the war and questioning President Zelenskyy’s democratic legitimacy and popularity; whereas recent surveys show that President Zelenskyy enjoys an approval rating of 57 %; whereas Ukraine’s martial laws were drafted in 2015, prior to Zelenskyy’s presidency, in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea;

J. whereas the Trump administration has frozen all foreign funds, including funding for Ukraine from the US Agency for International Development (USAID); whereas this funding addressed a significant proportion of Ukraine’s humanitarian needs as well as many other aspects of critical support, such as bolstering Ukraine’s telecommunications networks against Russian cyberattacks; whereas other US funding, now frozen, had been providing crucial support to Ukrainian non-governmental organisations and funding large-scale investigations into Russian war crimes;

K. whereas the US voted against a UN General Assembly resolution, drafted by Ukraine and the EU, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion, and subsequently successfully presented a resolution to the UN Security Council that did not recognise Russia’s culpability for the conflict;

L. whereas in response to the US’s shift towards Russia, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas proposed a plan for additional military support for Ukraine from Member States, while Commission President von der Leyen presented a proposal entitled ‘ReArm Europe’ to enable Member States to access finance to bolster their defence capabilities and step up support for Ukraine;

1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

3. Stresses the legitimacy of President Zelenskyy as the democratically elected leader and President of Ukraine throughout the justified period of martial law; expresses its confidence in the Ukrainian authorities to hold new elections when the situation allows; states firmly that it is because of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine that martial law is still necessary;

4. Expresses deep concern about the decision of the US Government to throw into disarray its long-standing support for Ukraine, in both words and deeds; reiterates its support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan as the best basis for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for the people of Ukraine and our wider region; takes note of the initiatives taken by the US for negotiations, but underlines that there can be no negotiations about Ukraine without Ukraine, and that any negotiations must lead to a just peace; reiterates that the ultimate goal remains the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe; reiterates that a ceasefire is only effective if it is part of a comprehensive peace agreement, while any peace agreement should be accompanied by security guarantees for Ukraine; calls on US lawmakers who are supportive of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence to push back against the current trend of Russian appeasement and to publicly join demands for Ukraine’s participation in all conversations about its future;

5. Underlines that Russia’s war economy is not sustainable and that coupling orchestrated economic pressure with accelerated military support for Ukraine would enable Ukrainian forces to improve their positions while simultaneously harming Russia’s economy, in order to ensure that Ukraine has a stronger negotiating position when it agrees to engage in peace talks; calls for the EU and its like-minded partners to increase their efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace; urges, therefore, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine, in as large quantities and as quickly as possible, to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks; welcomes, in this regard, the recent proposal by VP/HR Kallas to provide Ukraine with additional air defence systems, missiles, drones, ammunition and military training; stresses that this initiative is long overdue and considers that the support provided by the Member States in the context of this proposal should be in addition to previously pledged military aid; notes, in this context, that a number of Member States are militarily neutral and urges them to increase their non-military support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

6. Stresses that there is no dichotomy between providing military support to Ukraine and investing in our own defence capacities in the EU, but rather that they are two sides of the same coin, both serving to defend the security of our continent; calls on the Member States to scale up direct investments in the capacity of the Ukrainian defence industry to mass-produce essential defence products (following the Danish model), specifically drones, air defence, artillery and long-range strike capabilities; proposes the allocation of a specific multi-billion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; condemns the veto imposed by the Hungarian Government on the European Peace Facility (EPF), which blocks more than EUR 6 billion and renders the EPF almost useless; stresses, further, the urgent need also to consider the option of creating an alternative ad hoc arrangement for those European countries that wish to support Ukraine militarily and finance that aid jointly; welcomes the recent proposal by Commission President von der Leyen to enable Member States to acquire loans outside of the current EU budget to improve their military capacity and step up support for Ukraine; recalls in this context the effectiveness of the Danish model for investing in Ukraine’s defence capacities;

7. Urges the EU and its Member States to ensure that Europe is involved in any peace negotiations in order to defend the intertwined security interests of Ukraine and our continent as a whole; welcomes efforts by France’s President Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Starmer to host European emergency summits in Paris and London; welcomes the launch of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to enable a European-led enforcement of an eventual peace agreement, but regrets the lack of more actionable, coordinated pledges from Member States and like-minded partners to bolster military and financial support for Ukraine in the wake of the US’s shift towards Russia; calls on a coalition of the willing, comprising European countries and their allies, to discuss options for supporting Ukraine with personnel and the deployment of capabilities;

8. Stresses that history shows us the naivety of appeasement; declares that Europe cannot afford for its security architecture to be undermined or compromised; considers that, if the EU does not respond quickly to the US’s withdrawal from our security calculations and deterrence capabilities, our continent will be left seriously vulnerable to Russia; stresses, in this regard, the need to work closely with the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland and Canada;

9. Emphasises that the EU and its Member States must take immediate action, with NATO and like-minded partners, to invest without delay in more efficient and integrated European security and defence structures; considers that EU-level defence cooperation of both national armed forces and the defence industry has to become the rule and cannot remain an exception; calls for the establishment of an EU defence facility that efficiently pools important parts of rising national spending and ensures greater and smarter public investment in security and defence, as well as Parliament’s oversight of this spending, since wasted resources and undermined citizens’ trust because of a lack of transparency would not be acceptable; stresses that Europe needs close cooperation with Ukraine’s armed forces and its defence technological base; underscores that the unanimity principle stands in the way of courageous decisions and calls for its abolition, except in decisions about military interventions; expresses concern about the increased tensions in the Baltic Sea and actions of hybrid warfare against critical infrastructure and considers closer cooperation between the Nordic states, the Baltic states, Poland and Germany to be crucial;

10. Deplores Russia’s ongoing attacks on Ukraine, relentlessly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures; strongly condemns the massive and grave violations of human rights and war crimes committed over the past three years by the Russian armed forces and various occupation authorities in Ukraine, including summary killings, rape and sexual assault, torture, abductions and the targeted destruction of residential areas;

11. Insists that the government officials and military leaders responsible, as well as other perpetrators and enablers of war crimes and crimes against humanity, be held accountable; reiterates its full support for the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in helping end impunity for the perpetrators; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute; expresses deep concern about the US sanctions on the ICC and calls for the activation of the EU blocking statute to protect the ICC, including the enforcement of the ICC arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova; reiterates its call for the establishment of a special ad hoc tribunal, complementary to the current ICC investigation in Ukraine, in order to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the political and military leadership of Russia and Belarus against Ukraine;

12. Calls on the European External Action Service and the Member States to swiftly increase their engagement with world leaders from other regions with regard to support for Ukraine and to strengthen international pressure on the Russian regime;

13. Stresses that over 12.7 million people in Ukraine will need humanitarian assistance in 2025, while over 6.8 million Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have been displaced from Ukraine; regrets the funding freeze of USAID and many other US actors that supported Ukraine in a variety of crucial fields; notes that this leaves a massive gap in funding for immediate humanitarian aid as well as for longer-term democracy and recovery support; notes that the need for humanitarian support is likely to continue for years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds to replace the withdrawn US funding;

14. Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; stresses that the funds of the Ukraine Facility and other EU funds will not be sufficient and calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to commit to additional long-term financing for Ukraine, in terms of both direct budget support and the financing of recovery and reconstruction, especially in the light of the US funding freeze; stresses the need to explore legal avenues for fully seizing the frozen assets of Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for use as grants for Ukraine’s expenditure on defence and resilience needs and its reconstruction, in accordance with international law;

15. Reiterates its condemnation of all acts of ecocide committed by Russia in Ukraine, including the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in 2023, which continue to cause mass damage and destruction of ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions of Ukrainians; encourages the ICC Prosecutor to consider the case of the Kakhovka dam collapse for prosecution as a war crime within the scope of Article 8 of the Rome Statute;

16. Deplores the Russian Federation’s attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied territories; reiterates its call for the EU to step up efforts to address the dire situation of those forcibly deported to Russia and of the children who have been forcibly adopted in Russia;

17. Welcomes the 16th package of sanctions on Russia; stresses that the sanctions imposed so far have had limited impact and expresses concern about the EU’s ability to maintain economic pressure on Russia if the US were to delink its sanctions; reiterates, to this end, its demands for stronger sanctions, along with an accelerated effort to close all loopholes and avenues for sanctions evasion; calls for a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU; stresses, further, that the impact of current sanctions, as well as financial and military support for Ukraine, will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; calls for a ban on importing Russian grain, potash and fertilisers, as well as raw materials, including steel products, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and oil and gas; calls for sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, including individual sanctions against Rosatom’s leadership;

18. Calls for the next EU sanctions package to sanction all known shadow fleet tankers and their owners, while also introducing sanctions on any oil tanker breaching the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and enforcing strict implementation by all Member States of the measures prohibiting vessels, irrespective of flag, from sailing in European waters or into any EU Member State port if they have not followed the international rules regarding ship-to-ship transfers at sea or have illegally turned off their automatic identification system; urges the Commission and the Member States to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters;

19. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop broader sanctions on Russian and Belarusian wood, including specifically prohibiting the import or purchase of wood products processed in non-EU countries that incorporate wood, particularly birch plywood, originating in Russia or Belarus, to support the enforcement of current sanctions;

20. Strongly condemns the Hungarian Government for threatening to block the renewal of the EU’s sanctions framework as well to limit an appropriate EU response commensurate with the gravity of the situation; calls upon the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking;

20. Deplores the ongoing lack of compliance culture regarding EU sanctions on Russia; condemns companies, including those in the EU, that deliberately evade sanctions and thereby undermine the EU’s efforts to support Ukraine while yielding massive profits; insists that circumventing an EU restrictive measure, including by transferring goods to a destination where their import, export, sale, purchase, transfer, transit or transport are restricted, should be criminalised at EU level; stresses that it is critical for enforcement that the EU promptly criminalises direct sanctions violations, including when they are committed with serious negligence;

21. Expresses deep concern about reports from the US about plans for Russia sanctions relief and calls on US lawmakers to maintain and enforce sanctions against Russia;

22. Stresses the growing malign role of Russian disinformation spreading false narratives to undermine global support for Ukraine and harm our democracies; deplores the repetition of Russian disinformation by US officials, including Trump; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to combat Russian disinformation about the war, by strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based narratives and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act;

23. Welcomes the start of accession negotiations between the EU and Ukraine in June 2024, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union; calls on the Member States to muster the political will to re-energise the enlargement process and to deliver on their promises with concrete positive steps in the accession processes of those countries that seek to join the EU and deserve to be part of the European family; underscores the importance of continued EU financial assistance, linked to concrete reform conditions, as a key instrument to sustain and accelerate Ukraine’s transformation in line with European standards; underlines that the Copenhagen criteria and the required reforms, in particular concerning the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, are fundamental to the merit-based process of accession; reiterates its call to move immediately to qualified majority voting for the intermediate steps in enlargement policy; proposes, in particular, that Ukraine be integrated already into the EU for promising sectors such as energy and digital services; reiterates its suggestion to grant Ukraine observer status in relevant bodies and institutions, including Parliament, initially through temporary arrangements, if negotiations, in particular on the fundamentals and external relations clusters, are sufficiently advanced, and if all conditions are met and agreed, until the accession treaties have been signed;

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.