On reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

B100198/2024

European Parliament resolution on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

(2024/2940(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022, in particular those of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine and of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to the establishment of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) to provide exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine,

– having regard to the joint statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Cho Tae-yul on DPRK-Russia Cooperation of 5 November 2024,

– having regard to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the European Parliament on 19 November 2024, marking 1 000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement of the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 8 November 2024,

– having regard to the 2010 EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, continuing what it started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

B. whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, committing significant humanitarian, financial and military support to aid Ukraine’s defence until its victory and recovery;

C. whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine; whereas in the case of the DPRK, this was done in flagrant violation of several UN Security Council resolutions;

D. whereas in 2022, the DPRK was among the few countries that voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas in May 2022, Russia, for the first time, vetoed a US-drafted UN Security Council resolution aiming to strengthen sanctions on the DPRK following its repeated ballistic missile tests in violation of previous UN resolutions; whereas in March 2024, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts; whereas this marked a clear shift in Russia’s sanctions policy towards the DPRK;

E. whereas high-level contacts and official visits between Russia and the DPRK have increased substantially since 2023, culminating with President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024; whereas on that occasion, the two countries announced a comprehensive strategic partnership with a mutual defence provision; whereas on 10 November 2024, President Putin signed the mutual defence agreement between Russia and the DPRK; whereas in September 2024, Russia announced that the denuclearisation of the DPRK was ‘off the table’, undermining the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region;

F. whereas, as a significant escalation, in October 2024 around 10 000 DPRK soldiers were deployed in Russia’s Kursk Oblast alongside Russian forces with the aim of directly engaging the Ukrainian military; whereas the DPRK reportedly receives energy and food and probably also technological assistance from Russia; whereas more DPRK troops could be deployed to assist Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas, despite the evidence, the DPRK has so far denied any involvement in the war;

G. whereas the supply of DPRK arms and ammunition, and now troops, is essential to support Russia’s war in Ukraine and has already expanded and prolonged Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine with the goal of turning it into a protracted war of attrition; whereas the increasing military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK threatens global stability and further undermines the rules-based international order;

H. whereas Russia’s armed forces have recruited hundreds of Houthi mercenaries to fight in the conflict in Ukraine, facilitated by a shadowy trafficking operation which shows the increasing ties between Moscow and the Houthi rebel group;

I. whereas China is today the biggest supplier of dual-use goods and military items sustaining Russia’s military base and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas China is providing Russia with substantial assistance to bolster its military capabilities, extending beyond dual-use technologies; whereas the EU has conclusive evidence that armed drones are being produced for the Russian military in China’s western Xinjiang region;

J. whereas the United States, under President Biden, recently authorised Ukraine’s use of advanced rocket systems on legitimate military targets within Russian territory, in order to bolster Ukraine’s self-defence; whereas several European countries had previously shown openness in that regard;

K. whereas Russia has used new intermediate-range ballistic missiles in its attacks against Ukraine;

L. whereas the EU and the United States both held democratic elections to choose their representatives and leaders in 2024; whereas the newly elected European Parliament and Commission Presidents each immediately pledged to uphold their unwavering support to Ukraine; whereas the President-elect of the United States has yet to do the same; whereas anything but victory for Ukraine would be widely perceived as a strategic defeat for both Europe and the United States and would have far-reaching consequences for their security;

M. whereas since February 2022, the European Union has adopted 14 packages of sanctions aimed in particular at limiting as far as possible the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war it has unleashed; whereas these sanctions are set for a period of six months at a time; whereas a proposal to extend the duration of sanctions to three years has not been adopted; whereas the proposal has been blocked by Hungary’s veto, which hampers longer-term stability and support for this loan structure;

N. whereas the EU’s overall military support to Ukraine – provided through the European Peace Facility and by Member States directly – amounts to around EUR 43.5 billion; whereas in August 2024, the EU mobilised only the first tranche of windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia of EUR 1.4 billion through the European Peace Facility, to support further military assistance for Ukraine;

O. whereas the EU, together with the G7 countries, adopted the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism which uses the windfall profits of the frozen Russian assets to pay back the loans provided by the EU to Ukraine; whereas these frozen assets are not yet being used directly to support Ukraine financially, but only the windfall profits of these frozen assets; whereas the use of frozen assets by the EU Member States and their allies would provide much needed additional funding to Ukraine and would be legally sound in the face of the blatant act of aggression committed by Russia against Ukraine; whereas the European Union will provide up to EUR 35 billion in new macro-financial assistance as part of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism;

P. whereas the deepening relations between Russia and the DPRK pose a threat to the stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region;

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has lasted for more than 1 000 days, not counting the aggression that began in 2014, and the involvement and support of third countries in this war; demands that Russia immediately cease all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, release Ukrainian prisoners of war and unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians, return abducted Ukrainian children and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

2. Further condemns Russia’s continuous escalation in its war of aggression, in particular its bombings of civilians and critical infrastructure, its recourse to the DPRK to provide troops to fight against the Ukrainian military and its testing of new ballistic missiles in Ukraine; considers that these recent escalatory steps represent a new phase in the war and a new risk for Europe’s security as a whole; calls on the Member States and Ukraine’s other partners to react accordingly;

3. Reiterates the EU’s unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and emphasises the need for increased and accelerated EU solidarity in providing political, military, humanitarian, economic and financial support to Ukraine; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supports Ukraine’s Peace Formula as a framework for international engagement;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war, which must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression committed by Russia, and Russian reparations and other payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; insists that no negotiations about Ukraine can take place without Ukraine; calls for active EU engagement in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula and creating the grounds for holding the second Peace Summit; is convinced that the EU and its Member States must participate in establishing Ukraine’s future robust security guarantees;

5. Denounces Iran, Belarus and the DPRK for their military support to Russia, and in particular all the DPRK’s active military support for Russia, which further exacerbates the conflict; reiterates that both Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the DPRK’s participation in the conflict in Ukraine and its nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order; condemns the signing and recent ratification of the Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and Russia; underlines the unprecedented military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, a regime that is under the most comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by the UN; warns of the serious implications of this military partnership in inspiring other autocratic regimes to become actively involved in military conflicts;

6. Condemns, in the strongest terms, China’s supply of dual-use goods and military items to Russia; reminds China of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to stand up in defence of the rules-based international order, and therefore calls on Beijing to end all military or dual-use assistance to Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that a refusal to change course on this matter risks seriously affecting bilateral EU-China relations; expresses deep concern about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and that of the EU as a whole;

7. Calls for strengthened international cooperation to prevent arms shipments from the DPRK to Russia, including enhanced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within the UN framework and through multilateral alliances; urges the EU to take decisive action to sanction individuals and entities in the DPRK who are involved in arms transfers, as well as intermediaries facilitating these transactions; welcomes the efforts of the international community to crack down on the DPRK’s illicit arms trade and emphasises the need for sustained pressure on Pyongyang to cease its destabilising actions;

8. Urges the EU Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against the DPRK and Iran in light of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add to the EU sanctions lists all the main Chinese entities and individuals who directly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s defence and security sector;

9. Highlights the need for a comprehensive EU strategy to address the broader implications of authoritarian alliances, particularly between Russia, the DPRK, Belarus, Iran, China and other states undermining the rules-based international order; calls for active efforts by the EU and its Member States to promote the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and for closer cooperation with international partners to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific region;

10. Calls for accountability for war crimes and violations of international law committed by Russia and its allies, including the DPRK, through strengthened cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other judicial bodies; urges the EU and international partners to intensify efforts to hold all perpetrators accountable;

11. Reiterates the constructive role of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the rules-based international order, including its unwavering commitment to Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with the ROK and seek to shift its position on arming Ukraine, in order to provide significant military resources to aid Ukraine’s defence operations; welcomes the first-ever EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Dialogue held in Seoul on 4 November 2024 and the subsequent Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the ROK; supports the deepening of the EU’s relations with the ROK and enhanced bilateral security and defence cooperation, including cooperation on matters related to economic security, cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation and interference; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with Ukraine and the ROK, to encourage and be prepared for the possible defection of members of the Korean People’s Army;

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to deepen their cooperation with the ROK on Ukraine’s future, focusing on its EU aspirations, security guarantees and the equitable and sustainable reconstruction of the country;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to further strengthen their military support for Ukraine, including the provision of long-range missiles, modern air-defence systems, artillery and training programmes for Ukrainian forces, while calling for accelerated delivery of the equipment pledged to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs;

14. Reiterates its support for the proposal that all EU Member States and NATO allies should support Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;

15. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively contribute towards maintaining unity on sanctions, to swiftly pursue the adoption of the 15th package of sanctions, particularly sanctioning the import of Russian nuclear energy and deepening sanctions against Russian liquefied natural gas and more effectively targeting Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ activities; strongly disagrees with Hungary’s go-it-alone approach and its blocking of the European Peace Facility; regrets the German Chancellor’s uncoordinated and ineffective phone call with Vladimir Putin, which was followed by intensified Russian bombing of Ukraine;

16. Urges the Council and the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU states and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, ensuring that no loopholes are exploited to channel arms or resources to Russia; calls to urgently intensify the review of EU Member States’ trade with Central Asian countries, as well as Türkiye and Azerbaijan among others, as they are clearly used in EU sanctions evasion;

17. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to revise the current duration of the sanctions imposed on Russia, extending the validity period from the existing six months to a more robust and strategic three years; notes that such a measure would enhance the consistency and predictability of the EU’s foreign policy stance and shield it from abusive instrumentalisation of unanimity requirements, strengthen the impact of the sanctions and send a clear message of commitment to upholding international law and European security, while also reducing the administrative burden of frequent renewals;

18. Welcomes US President Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use advanced rocket systems on military targets within Russian territory, highlighting that this authorisation respects Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt similar measures, removing restrictions on the use of Western-supplied military systems for legitimate defensive operations beyond Ukraine’s borders to deter further Russian aggression;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with G7 and G20 partners, to develop and promote the swift adoption of an alternative mechanism to the UN Panel of Experts in order to ensure efficient monitoring and enforcement of sanctions on the DPRK;

20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with the incoming administration in Washington to strengthen mutually beneficial transatlantic cooperation, emphasising the shared strategic interest of supporting Ukraine, and to highlight that Russia and its allies pose not only a threat to European stability, but also a significant danger to global security and the rules-based international order;

21. Expects the incoming Trump administration to maintain support for Ukraine and remain steadfast in its commitment to NATO, and meanwhile urges the EU and its Member States to put words into action and establish a genuine Defence Union, starting with strengthening its defence capabilities;

22. Calls on the Commission to propose additional measures to support the Ukrainian economy by providing further financial support and facilitating investment opportunities;

23. Calls for a significant increase in EU humanitarian aid to address the dire situation caused by Russia’s systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure, in particular energy infrastructure, which have left millions of Ukrainians without essential services;

24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise making the European IRIS2 space communication capabilities fully operational and to grant access to Ukraine (and to Taiwan) as soon as possible;

25. Stresses the importance of the Ukraine Facility as a mechanism for long-term financial support, reconstruction and recovery efforts, and urges its swift and efficient implementation;

26. Welcomes the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, providing up to EUR 35 billion backed by revenues originating from immobilised Russian sovereign assets; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to take more substantive steps towards establishing creative solutions under a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU, and for their use to address the various implications of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the prevention of further destruction and loss of life, reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression; stresses that any future claim by Russia to these assets may only be settled after an overall consideration of the outstanding reparations due to Ukraine;

27. Stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to take further initiatives to mobilise resources for the provision of additional financial assistance to Ukraine;

28. Emphasises the need to create a more stable and predictable framework for EU-Ukraine trade relations through permanent and reciprocal tariff liberalisation; in this regard, calls on the Commission to accelerate consultations with Ukraine under Article 29 of the Association Agreement and urges both sides to agree on the most ambitious level of liberalisation possible; calls on the Commission to closely involve Parliament in the review of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA);

29. Notes the restrictions on imports of agri-food products from Ukraine imposed unilaterally by several Member States, which touch on the EU’s exclusive competence for trade under the common commercial policy and the EU’s obligations under the DCFTA with Ukraine; calls on the Commission to find European solutions to potential market distortions caused by increased inflows of Ukrainian agri-food products, in consultation with Ukraine and the relevant Member States;

30. Acknowledges the work of many Ukrainian and other civil society organisations in assisting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians and their tireless efforts to bring their loved ones home; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to support their activities and to use all available international forums to pressure Russia to return abducted Ukrainian children, Ukrainian prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians;

31. Deplores the deliberate killing and mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia and calls on Russia to comply with its international obligations, in particular the Geneva Convention, and to allow international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisoners of war and to assess their state of health; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community, in particular the United Nations, to review and adapt international conventions and the work of the relevant international organisations to today’s realities and to make them more responsive to the needs of prisoners of war;

32. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue providing support to the Russian opposition, to ensure their protection and to encourage them to fight against the Putin regime, in particular the militarist, chauvinist and imperialist sentiments in Russian society, and to strongly express and actively seek support for Ukraine;

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Commissioner for Defence and Space, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian Government, the Governments of the ROK and the DPRK and the other governments concerned, and the United Nations.