On the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

B100071/2024

European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

(2024/2822(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Georgia, most notably its resolution of 25 April 2024 on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society,

– having regard to the European Council decision of December 2023 to grant Georgia candidate status to the EU,

– having regard to the recommendations of the Commission’s Georgia 2023 Report of 8 November 2023,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, as a result of the achievements of numerous Georgian Governments since the Rose Revolution, as well as the constant support of Georgia’s civil society, in its decision of 15 December 2023 the European Council granted candidate country status to Georgia, on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendations of 8 November 2023 be taken;

B. whereas civil society in Georgia has traditionally been very vibrant and active and played a pivotal role in soliciting and promoting democratic changes in the country, as well as in safeguarding and watching over their implementation;

C. whereas the ruling party Georgian Dream has taken numerous actions that directly undermine the European aspirations of the Georgian people, the most notable example being a law on ‘Transparency of Foreign Influence’ of 28 May 2024 (‘foreign agents law’), which has largely been seen as based on an infamous law that Russia has used extensively to crack down on dissent;

D. whereas the bill requires foreign-funded non-governmental organisations, media and trade unions to register as ‘agents of foreign influence’, while excluding certain types of organisation, such as businesses or NGOs receiving government funding, mirroring similar Russian legislation;

E. whereas the proposed bill has drawn criticism and condemnation from Georgian society and the international community and is seen as an instrument of foreign interference backed by Russia and intended to undermine Georgia’s bid to join the European Union;

F. whereas Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili refused to sign the bill, branding it a ‘Russian law’ that contravenes the Georgian constitution and European standards; whereas her veto was overridden by a simple majority in the parliament;

G. whereas in June 2024, following the adoption of the foreign agents law, the EU effectively froze Georgia’s accession process and suspended financial assistance of EUR 30 million from the European Peace Facility;

H. whereas step 9 of the Commission’s Georgia Report of 8 November 2023 includes a recommendation for Georgia to ensure that civil society can operate freely, while step 1 calls on Georgia to fight disinformation against the EU and its values;

I. whereas on 6 June 2024 the United States imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’, and on two high-ranking police officials for brutality during the crackdown on the demonstrations, as well as on two leaders of Kremlin-linked violent extremist groups;

J. whereas the bill sparked huge street protests which were brutally dispersed by the police, including with the use of tear gas and riot gear against peaceful demonstrators, and with the arrest of hundreds of people;

K. whereas there is still an exceptionally high level of support among the Georgian population for joining the EU, with over 80 % of people in favour;

L. whereas the founder of the Georgian Dream party, dominant oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, openly returned to active politics on 30 December 2023, becoming ‘honorary chairman’ of the party; whereas the updated party statute bestows upon Ivanishvili as honorary chairman a range of prerogatives, thus formalising the concentration of power in his hands, without outlining any accountability mechanisms;

M. whereas Mikheil Saakashvili, who served as President of Georgia from 2004 until 2013 and is a leader of the largest opposition party, has been held in detention since October 2022, has been mistreated in prison and been subjected to humiliating treatment during court hearings, calling into question the integrity of the forthcoming election;

N. whereas an increasing number of incidents indicate that Georgia is experiencing an insecure media environment, which poses a threat to its democracy; whereas Reporters Without Borders’ annual index on press freedom ranks Georgia 103rd out of 180 countries, a drop of 26 places from the previous year;

O. whereas the parliamentary election that will be held in Georgia on 26 October 2024 is seen as a turning point that may determine Georgia’s future for decades to come;

P. whereas Georgia’s recent elections exposed many of the problems that have been hindering the country’s democratisation process over the last few years; whereas during the pre-election period alarming reports suggest that problems such as pressure and even physical attacks on the opposition have intensified;

Q. whereas the foreign agents law has a huge impact on the functioning of an independent civil society, including those NGOs that specialise in election observation; whereas the law has made it very difficult to recruit local short-term observers for the forthcoming vote;

R. whereas Georgian Dream’s narrative is that the West is trying to push Georgia into a renewed war with Russia, which invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy part of its territory; whereas this anti-Western communication strategy was used by the Georgian Dream party to justify its evasion of joining EU statements against Belarus or Iran, and denying support to Moldova and Ukraine;

S. whereas the Russian foreign minister hinted that the Kremlin was ready to reach an agreement with Georgia to resolve the stand-off over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a statement welcomed by some Georgian Dream officials and a sign of ever-improving relations with Russia; whereas, simultaneously, Russia continues the process of ‘borderisation’ and the creeping occupation of Georgian regions and has announced its intention to build a permanent naval base in an occupied region of Georgia;

1. Reiterates its steadfast support for Georgia’s democratic development and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its people;

2. Remains concerned about the Georgian Dream government’s human rights abuses and anti-democratic actions; strongly condemns the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents law and considers it a tool for interfering in the forthcoming parliamentary election; underlines that such attempts to politically control or curb the activities of civil society contravene democratic values and the Commission recommendations;

3. Stands in full solidarity with the Georgian people and Georgia’s vibrant civil society, which has traditionally played a very active and important role in bringing Georgia closer to the West, promoting democratisation and pushing for Euro-Atlantic integration in line with the desires of the Georgian people; in this regard, deplores the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the ruling party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the United States, the European Union and EU officials, and its promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

4. Is alarmed by the continuous and highly disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the opposition, as well as by the threats of further repression voiced by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili to outlaw the democratic pro-Western opposition and silence dissent;

5. Calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure that the 26 October parliamentary election in Georgia is democratic, fair and free, and in line with the democratic standards that Georgia has committed to adhering to; warns against any attempts to interfere with the conduct or the results of this election;

6. Calls on the Georgian authorities and electoral bodies to cooperate closely with both international election observation missions and Georgian observers, who will monitor the conduct of the election in terms of its compliance with Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation;

7. Is alarmed by the decision to open only a limited number of polling stations abroad, despite numerous requests from the Georgian diaspora, thereby depriving the majority of Georgians living abroad of the right to vote;

8. Strongly condemns any physical attacks on politicians and campaigners; is extremely concerned at the climate of impunity for politically-motivated violence, as in the case of Levan Khabeishvili;

9. Calls on the Commission to expand and intensify its support for civil society in Georgia, especially in the light of recent pressure resulting from the foreign agents law;

10. Notes with concern that the Georgian Government has recently intensified its persecution of civil society organisations; is appalled, in particular, by the fact that the government is using the Anti-Corruption Bureau to exert pressure on organisations such as Transparency International Georgia and Choose Europe, in an apparent attempt to obstruct their ability to effectively monitor the forthcoming election;

11. Expresses its concern over the series of brutal beatings of political figures and civil society leaders during and in the aftermath of the demonstrations against the foreign agents law this spring; expresses concern that not a single perpetrator has been detained, charged or even identified, and calls upon the Georgian authorities to bring the perpetrators of such beatings to justice;

12. Regrets that EU approval of Donald Tusk’s proposed model of ‘militant democracy’ does not enhance the credibility of EU institutions in advocating for the rule of law and human rights beyond Member States’ borders;

13. Is deeply concerned about the increasing Russian influence within the country, as well as by the actions of the Georgian Dream government, which has pursued rapprochement with Russia – in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory, and its aggression against Ukraine – by strengthening trade ties despite EU sanctions and refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow;

14. Urges Georgia, as a European Union candidate country, to impose sanctions on Russia in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to enforce effective measures to avoid the circumvention of European sanctions, as it has committed to doing;

15. Reminds the Georgian Government that the large majority of the population strongly supports the country’s pro-Western course and its accession to the EU;

16. Welcomes the personal sanctions imposed by the United States on Georgian Dream officials; calls on the EU to impose comparable travel bans on those involved in the adoption of the foreign agents law, and to extend such bans to other high-ranking members of the ruling party as well as to judges passing politically-motivated sentences;

17. Strongly condemns the destructive personal role played by Georgia’s dominant oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in orchestrating the ongoing political crisis and systematically sabotaging the country’s pro-Western trajectory in favour of alignment with Russia; deplores his continuous efforts to erode Georgia’s democratic institutions and betray the aspirations of its people; strongly reiterates its call for the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his direct involvement in undermining Georgia’s political process and acting against the country’s fundamental interests;

18. Reiterates its call for the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

19. Underlines that suspending the visa liberalisation agreement with Georgia should be considered only after personal sanctions against members of the ruling party and dominant oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili are put in place;

20. Emphasises that the Georgian Government bears full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety, and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him; strongly reiterates its urgent demand for his immediate and unconditional release;

21. Regrets that MEPs have not been allowed to visit President Saakashvili in the past to assess the conditions of his imprisonment; calls on the Georgian authorities to reverse their stance and allow visits by MEPs;

22. Notes that the Georgian Government has imposed further draconian restrictions on access to public information, including Soviet-era archives, and has used the EU General Data Protection Regulation to falsely justify its actions; notes that some of Georgia’s most significant Soviet-era archives (such as the archive of the former KGB and of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party) have been completely closed since last October without any explanation;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.