On a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU engagement in the Horn of Africa – challenges and strategic priorities

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION

to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on EU engagement in the Horn of Africa – challenges and strategic priorities

(2026/2045(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’, and to other relevant Council conclusions,

– having regard to its recommendation of 5 October 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa, and to its previous resolutions on Africa and on the countries of the Horn of Africa,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),

– having regard to the final joint statement of the sixth European Union-African Union Summit, entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, of 18 February 2022, and to the final joint declaration of the seventh European Union-African Union Summit, of 25 November 2025,

– having regard to its annual reports on the implementation of the EU’s common foreign and security policy and to its annual reports on the implementation of the EU’s common security and defence policy,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan, of 24 October 2023,

– having regard to the updated mandates of EU naval operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA of 30 March 2026,

– having regard to the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 29 January 2009 concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, as amended by the Jeddah Amendment of 12 January 2017,

– having regard to the African Union’s framework document of September 2015 entitled ‘Agenda 2063 – the Africa We Want’, and to its strategy document of 2012 entitled ‘2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy)’,

– having regard to the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process), established in 2014,

– having regard to the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), of 2 November 2022 (Pretoria Agreement),

– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and of the UN General Assembly,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A100000/2026),

A. whereas, in its widest definition, the ‘Horn of Africa’ refers to the eight member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); whereas this recommendation focuses only on Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia;

B. whereas the region has long-standing ties with, and is strategically important for, the EU; whereas the Horn of Africa has tremendous potential, but is facing significant hurdles;

C. whereas the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 and Parliament’s recommendation of 5 October 2022 predate major shifts that have reshaped the strategic environment in the Horn of Africa; whereas these developments, together with the increasingly interconnected nature of the region’s challenges and intensifying geopolitical competition, call for the EU’s engagement with the Horn of Africa to be updated;

D. whereas Djibouti’s geographic position and its role as a major maritime and security hub make it an important contributor to regional stability, while exposing it to growing geopolitical competition in the wider region;

E. whereas the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement has stalled; whereas intra- and inter-state tensions have increased the risk of a new war in Ethiopia;

F. whereas the situation in Eritrea has not improved since 2022, with severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms; whereas tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia have increased significantly and Eritrea’s relations with Djibouti remain fragile;

G. whereas Somalia faces a severe constitutional crisis, with deepening rifts between its federal government and its member states; whereas the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) faces a critical funding gap;

H. whereas the strategic importance of maritime security has grown considerably in recent years;

I. whereas well over half of the population of the four countries is under the age of 25, with limited access to education and employment;

J. whereas resource constraints necessitate greater strategic prioritisation and financial efficiency to address the multiple and interconnected challenges facing the Horn of Africa;

1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

General principles

(a) urgently carry out a comprehensive review of previous EU strategies in light of recent developments and adopt a new strategic framework for the Horn of Africa to update the 2021 conclusions; focus the new framework on a specific set of priorities, including: (i) the peaceful resolution of disputes, regional stability and increased cooperation on maritime security, (ii) democracy, the rule of law and human rights dialogues, and (iii) youth and youth-led initiatives that drive sustainable development, and accompany this framework with an adequately resourced action plan;

(b) develop tailored EU programmes on a country-by-country basis;

(c) scale up bilateral ties based on comprehensive partnerships focused on common interests;

(d) strengthen EU strategic communication and public diplomacy, including by raising awareness of EU funding and actions in the region;

(e) make the region’s predominantly young population a cornerstone of EU engagement;

(f) commit to more regular reporting to Parliament on the implementation of EU commitments in the Horn of Africa;

Regional context

(g) recognise the need for the EU to cooperate with other actors that have influence in the region;

(h) address, as a matter of urgency, the risk of spillover effects of the war in Sudan;

(i) engage with the Gulf states, as influential external actors in the region, while openly addressing actions that run counter to EU objectives;

Peace, stability and maritime security

(j) foster regional dialogue by providing support to intra-regional, African Union and IGAD-led initiatives on conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding;

(k) develop a sustained EU conflict prevention strategy for the four countries referred to above;

(l) continue to strongly oppose the use or threat of force to resolve disputes, and support efforts to address the underlying drivers of conflict in the region, particularly drought and famine;

(m) make the prevention of further escalation and regional spillover of the conflict within Ethiopia, as well as the prevention of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a political priority of EU engagement in the region;

(n) maintain structured engagement with Eritrea, encouraging its constructive participation in regional dialogue, and support measures that reduce the risk of regional conflicts;

(o) support Somalia’s efforts to combat the al-Shabaab militant group and other armed groups while strengthening legitimate and inclusive state institutions; further step up EU support to AUSSOM and maintain and enhance the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) and the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia);

(p) recognise that the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula increasingly form a single strategic and security space;

(q) urgently adopt an EU strategy for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, treating the two shores as a single strategic theatre;

(r) strengthen coordination across EU maritime security efforts by assessing options for closer coordination between and a potentially joint command of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUNAVFOR ASPIDES;

(s) strengthen cooperation on maritime security, in line with the Djibouti Code of Conduct, as updated by the Jeddah Amendment;

(t) strengthen EU support for locally owned reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives, including those involving civil society, traditional and community leaders, and women’s and youth organisations;

Democracy, human rights and the rule of law

(u) maximise the use of political dialogue, development cooperation, technical support and other appropriate instruments to encourage measurable improvements in democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights, and in civil society protection and participation;

(v) support initiatives to protect and expand civic space by safeguarding freedom of expression and media freedom, in particular by protecting journalists and human rights defenders;

(w) promote transitional justice, and support nationally and locally owned accountability and reconciliation processes;

(x) maintain and enforce accountability for the crimes committed during the 2020-2022 war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region;

(y) advocate for full and effective cooperation with relevant UN bodies and mechanisms;

Sustainable development, regional integration and youth

(z) ensure that EU development cooperation addresses the specific vulnerabilities of communities affected by climate change, food insecurity, displacement, conflict and migration flows, while strengthening local ownership and the participation of women and young people;

(aa) support sustainable and inclusive development by investing in climate-resilient infrastructure, renewable energy, water management, and sustainable agriculture and fisheries, while strengthening access to education, healthcare and employment;

(ab) promote regional integration focusing on factors that can unify the region, including cross-border investment and trade, as well as an interconnected transport, energy and digital infrastructure;

(ac) support all four countries in strengthening institutional capacity, and banking and financial systems, and in improving the business environment to create favourable conditions for strategic investment, while ensuring compliance with international labour standards and supporting social dialogue;

(ad) make youth employment a central pillar of EU development cooperation; provide targeted support to empower young people through youth-led initiatives, vocational education and training, skills development, job centres and improved access to finance;

Country-specific issues

(ae) develop a strategic partnership with Djibouti on maritime security; support efforts to tackle the growing challenge of refugees arriving there from Yemen;

(af) call on the Ethiopian Government to fulfil its role as a central actor in regional stabilisation by reducing tensions over sea access and control of the Nile waters; ensure that EU budget support remains conditional on measurable progress in democratic governance and respect for fundamental rights; express concern over renewed fighting in the Tigray, Afar and Amhara regions;

(ag) increase engagement with the Eritrean Government on human rights and encourage the national authorities to cooperate with the UN, including by facilitating access and cooperation with the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea;

(ah) reaffirm the EU’s position on Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while supporting Somali-owned dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa;

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2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.