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DRAFT REPORT (2026/2046(INI))

On a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the foreign policy response to external interference in the EU’s neighbourhood

AFET-PR-792076

Committee on Foreign Affairs · Rapporteur: Geadis Geadi

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A draft report from Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes a recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the High Representative on the foreign policy response to external interference in the EU's neighbourhood. It asks them to treat hybrid threats as strategic security threats, detect combined operations, and protect elections and democratic institutions through transparency and attribution rules. It calls for addressing economic coercion, strategic dependencies and the weaponisation of migratory flows, and for cooperation on disinformation, artificial intelligence and independent journalism. It also asks for education and social resilience measures, coordinated deterrence including sanctions, and stronger EU and neighbourhood resilience with measurable indicators.

Committee position. The rapporteur proposes that Parliament recommend to the Council, Commission and High Representative a set of measures against foreign interference, from detection and election protection to economic coercion, disinformation, deterrence and resilience.

Key points

  1. Recommends that the Council, Commission and High Representative recognise hybrid threats in the EU's neighbourhood as strategic security threats and build capabilities to detect combined operations rather than isolated incidents.
  2. Asks them to recognise that frozen or ongoing crises and conflicts shape hybrid threats, and to strengthen the EU's role in building peace and stability.
  3. Calls for cooperation with electoral authorities in the neighbourhood to document foreign interference in elections and for transparency rules on external financing of parties, candidates and campaigns.
  4. Promotes common principles for documenting and attributing interference based on credible evidence, to avoid unsubstantiated accusations that foreign actors could exploit.
  5. Asks that economic coercion be built into interference assessments, that projects of common European interest and critical infrastructure be protected, and that screening of foreign investments be coordinated.
  6. Calls for recognising the deliberate weaponisation of migratory flows by state actors as hybrid interference and examining suspension of EU funding where there is credible documented evidence of state authorities orchestrating it.
  7. Asks for cooperation with digital platforms on coordinated information manipulation, international cooperation against misleading artificial intelligence content, and support for independent journalism, while ensuring counter-disinformation does not restrict legitimate political views.
  8. Calls for education on critical thinking and digital literacy, transparency with strict controls for funding civil society organisations, research centres and think tanks, and attention to distortion of history and instrumentalisation of religious institutions while respecting religious freedom.
  9. Asks that deterrence go beyond statements of condemnation to concrete diplomatic initiatives and substantive sanctions, and that rapid evidence-based communication respond to FIMI campaigns through the EEAS, EU delegations and national authorities.
  10. Calls for strategic communication based on accuracy and verifiable information, and for clearer coordination and division of competences between the Council, Commission, EEAS and member states without parallel mechanisms.
  11. Asks them to consider targeted restrictive measures against natural and legal persons in cases of serious documented interference under the CFSP, with implementing measures under the TFEU.
  12. Calls for strengthening democratic, institutional, economic, energy and digital resilience in the EU and its neighbourhood, diversifying energy sources, developing measurable indicators, and combining sovereignty protection with respect for international law and fundamental rights.

Who is affected

  • The Council, Commission and High Representative, who are asked to take the recommended actions.
  • EU member states and countries in the EU's neighbourhood, whose democratic institutions, elections and resilience the measures aim to protect.
  • Political parties, candidates, campaigns and entities exercising political influence, for whom transparency on external financing is encouraged.
  • Digital platforms, communication services and media, asked to cooperate on identifying manipulation and to support independent journalism.
  • Civil society organisations, research centres and think tanks, for which transparency mechanisms with strict controls on funding are encouraged.