On the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT…………………...……………………………………….11

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024

(XXXX(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092,

– having regard to the annual financing decision, constituting the first part of the annual work programme for the implementation of the European Defence Fund for 2024, adopted by the Commission on 15 March 2024 (C(2024)1702),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises and of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

– having regard to the Granada Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 6 October 2023,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on EU security and defence,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships respectively signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, and on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, 1889 (2009) of 5 October 2009, 2122 (2013) of 18 October 2013, 2242 (2015) of 13 October 2015 and 2493 (2019) of 29 October 2019 on Women, Peace and Security, and Resolutions 2250 (2015) of 9 December 2015, 2419 (2018) of 6 June 2018 and 2535 (2020) of 14 July 2020 on Youth, Peace and Security,

– having regard to the Pact for the Future and Chapter Two thereof on international peace and security, adopted on 23 September 2024 by the heads of state or government of the UN member states,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2023,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-xxxxx/2024),

A. whereas this past year has been marked by a decline in global peace and security, resulting, inter alia, from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation and hybrid threats, as assessed by the Normandy Index 2024;

The consequences of a changing geopolitical paradigm for European security

1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain states and non-state actors to promote their political objectives and interests or to resolve disputes; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules-based international order and multilateralism;

The EU’s response: a new era of European security and defence

2. Emphasises the absolute need for the EU to meet the challenges posed by the multiple and constantly evolving threats to its security, and for this purpose, to engage in new policies and actions that enable the EU and its Member States to collectively and coherently strengthen their defence in Europe and their ability to act at the global level;

3. Welcomes, in this regard, the objective of the Commission President to usher in a new era for European defence and security, by building a true European defence union; welcomes the designation on 17 September 2024 of the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, tasked with working jointly with the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on a white paper on the future of European defence within the first hundred days of their mandate;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration, adopted on 11 March 2022, to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence; stresses the need for EU Member States to step up their efforts by increasing their spending and procuring more joint capabilities, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes;

5. Concurs with the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO and stresses that the development of a European defence union can go hand-in-hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation;

Enhancing European security: supporting Ukraine by providing military capabilities without restrictions on their use in order to end Russia’s war of aggression

6. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide it with the necessary military means to defend itself, end the conflict and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; reiterates its call for Member States to accelerate their delivery of weapons, air defence systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles; calls for Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against military targets within Russia, as allowed by international law;

7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support Ukraine in expanding the international coalition in support of its Victory Plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only viable route to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of international law, thereby holding Russia to account for its war crimes, including the crime of aggression, and ensuring Russian reparations and other payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine;

8. Stresses the importance of the European Peace Facility (EPF), which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while providing coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism hosted by the EU Military Staff ; welcomes the setting up of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine to be increased through this instrument; urges Hungary to lift its veto on EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursements to Member States that delivered military aid to Ukraine;

Joining forces to increase defence capabilities

9. Welcomes the vision set out in the European Defence Industrial Strategy accompanied by the Commission’s proposal for establishing the European defence industry programme; supports the objective of strengthening EU defence industrial preparedness to further enable Member States to identify and discuss joint defence programming and procurement, as well as European defence projects of common interest;

10. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, as it leads to unnecessary duplications and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence spending; calls on the Commission to present proposals to complete the EU internal market for defence, based, in particular, on an assessment of EU rules for defence procurement and transfer of defence-related products, and on the identification and analysis of limitations and loopholes in the current legal framework;

11. Stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced effort between strengthening existing EU armament industrial capabilities in the short and medium-term, and supporting research and development for new and innovative military equipment and armament tailored to the needs of the armed forces of the Member States;

A new Strategic Compass: promoting a common strategic vision and coherence, and improving EU decision-making on defence issues within the EU institutional framework

Strategic Compass

12. Stresses that geopolitical developments have evolved rapidly since the Strategic Compass was adopted by Member States in March 2022; calls, therefore, for a review of the Strategic Compass based on a comprehensive joint threat assessment; calls, furthermore, for the Commission and the VP/HR to present an updated version of the Strategic Compass, following this review exercise and for this to inform the preparation of the white paper on the future of European defence;

Defence governance: consolidating the EU institutional framework and decision-making process in defence and security fields

13. Suggests that the Council review the institutional settings of its decision-making bodies competent for defence and security, and consider setting up a new permanent decision-making body made up of ministers of defence from Member States;

14. Reiterates its call to strengthen the EU military planning and conduct capability and to achieve full operational capability, including through the provision of adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its full support for the Rapid Deployment Capacity to achieve full operational capability in 2025, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions;

Increasing resources dedicated to the EU common security and defence policy

15. Welcomes the increased budgets and investment in defence by Member States and the increase, albeit modest, in the EU budget for CSDP in 2024; calls on the Member States that have not yet reached the minimum threshold of 2 % of their GDP devoted to defence expenditure to resolutely commit to gradually increasing their military budgets; recommends that, on the basis of continuous analysis of capability needs, Member States further increase this threshold, in particular for joint procurement of defence capabilities;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate an open discussion based on the recommendations presented in Mr Draghi’s report on the future of European competiveness, including increasing the resources allocated to security and defence in the next multiannual financial framework and exploring all funding options to this end; further calls on Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners and allies, while also aligning with CSDP missions and operations;

Contributing more effectively to world peace through EU common security and defence policy and strengthening the role of the EU as a security actor

De-escalation, preventing wars and supporting conflict resolution

17. Expresses deep and increasing concern over China’s support to Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia, and the ongoing involvement of China-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention; is also deeply concerned over the increasing number of hostile acts being conducted by China against Taiwan, including cyberattacks, influence campaigns, Chinese warplanes entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and the severing of subsea cables;

18. Calls on the Chinese authorities to put an end to all aggressive actions, in particular air and maritime operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, that endanger the stability in the Indo-Pacific region and thereby undermine international security, the sovereignty of regional countries, the safety of life at sea and freedom of navigation;

19. Condemns Iran, in the strongest terms, for its destabilising activities in the Middle East region and for its continued support for terrorist groups, which pose a direct threat to regional and global security; expresses, however, full support for and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces;

20. Reiterates its condemnation of the despicable terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which contributed to further destabilisation in the Middle East, intensified by aggressions against Israel by Iranian proxies (such as terrorist organisations including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) and the Iranian regime itself;

CSDP missions and operations

21. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue to innovate CSDP missions and operations, including with robust, flexible and modular mandates, in order to adapt to the changing security context and needs of host countries, and to build on the synergies and complementarities of the civilian and military dimensions of the CSDP;

Improving the EU’s ability to address security challenges

Intelligence capacity

22. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of actions under the CSDP, particularly in the area of crisis management;

Defence against hybrid attacks and disinformation

23. Expresses serious concern over the growing security challenges posed by cyber and hybrid attacks, and foreign information manipulation and interference, which are aimed, inter alia, at undermining the stability of democratic societies, especially in the run-up to elections; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to strengthen their capabilities to address these challenges and increase resilience against disinformation;

Space

24. Welcomes the findings and recommendations proposed by Mr Draghi in his report on the future of European competitiveness, which encourage Member States to update governance and investment rules in the space domain, in particular for defence-related areas;

Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament

25. Regrets, during these unstable geopolitical times, the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes, and calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend;

Defence and society

26. Highlights the need for EU citizens to have a broader understanding of security threats and risks in order for a consciousness on European defence to emerge; calls for the EU and its Member States to develop awareness-raising and educational programmes aimed at improving knowledge on defence among citizens, especially young people, and at strengthening the resilience and preparedness of societies to face security challenges;

Strengthening defence cooperation and partnerships

27. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its allies and partners around the world in order to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and its partners, and destabilising the rules-based international order;

EU-NATO cooperation

28. Stresses the importance of NATO and the EU playing complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international security and thus avoiding the duplication of defence efforts; welcomes the accession of Sweden to NATO in 2024, following Finland in 2023, representing a historic step forward in strengthening security in Europe;

Partnership with the United States

29. Considers it essential to further develop the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law; values the United States’ commitment to and involvement in the territorial defence of Europe, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

Partnership with the United Kingdom

30. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

Partnership with Western Balkan countries

31. Underlines that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of its immediate neighbours in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, and in the Western Balkans;

Greater involvement of the European Parliament in the CSDP

32. Stresses that the strengthening of the CSDP as a political priority under the tenth legislative term and the increase in spending on defence policies and programmes at EU level and among the Member States requires full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability;

°

° °

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

* * *

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

During the last years, and particularly since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has had to face multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its close geographical environment, including the consequences of the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel in October, 2023.

The EU has reacted to these negative developments by involving more deeply in European security and defence, exploring new directions and launching new initiatives to strengthen and develop its defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner.

This first annual report on the implementation of the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) under the tenth parliamentary term aims to present the assessment of the European Parliament on CSDP progress in the current geopolitical and security context and thus responds to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy, published on 20 June 2024 and entitled “Common Foreign and Security Policy Report - Our Priorities in 2024”. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the means of financing them.