On the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report

(2024/0000(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources,

– having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, and 27 June 2024,

– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March, 22 April, 24 May, 24 June, and 22 July,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A100000/2024),

A. whereas the pace of geopolitical change is dramatic, with autocratic actors working individually and in concerted action to undermine the rules-based international order and its multilateral organisations; whereas conflicts are proliferating and the use of force is increasingly normalised as a means to pursue political objectives by both states and non-state actors;

B. whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible and unified EU action on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to redefine the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) into a fully fledged EU policy; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3 (5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas the EU should correspondingly stand up for freedom and democratic standards worldwide, as well as the universality of human rights;

C. whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF;

D. whereas in the area of the CFSP, the European Parliament exercises the functions of political control and consultation; whereas it exercises the budgetary function for this policy area jointly with the Council, except in cases when the Council decides unanimously that the expenditure is charged to the Member States; whereas the European Parliament needs to exercise all its competences to the full extent in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the CFSP; whereas the other institutions need to adjust their cooperation with the European Parliament accordingly;

I. The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report

1. Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;

2. Welcomes in particular:

- the successful finalisation of the screening process for Albania at the end of 2023; reiterates the call for entering into the next phase of negotiations without further delay; highlights the need to further intensify reforms to address deficiencies that persist regarding the ‘fundamentals’;

- the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; encourages the authorities to take all of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022; deplores the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the entity ‘Republika Srpska’ and recalls in this context the importance of EUFOR Althea being visibly present;

- the progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, especially in the areas of freedom of movement and energy; regrets the lack of progress in the implementation of the path to normalisation and calls for efforts to be made and capacity to be put into normalising relations and developing the EU-facilitated dialogue;

- the progress made by Montenegro in meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis; encourages the country to continue to make progress on and implement EU-related reforms swiftly;

- the successful finalisation of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; calls for entering into the next phase of negotiations without further delay; calls on the North Macedonia Government to work constructively with neighbouring countries to remove remaining obstacles to move forward with accession negotiations;

- the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment, which requires commitment from both the EU and the enlargement countries on their pathways to accession; recalls in this context the continued need for reforms regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and public administration, and for alignment with the CFSP, including on sanctions;

- the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; commends the fact that the CFSP alignment rate of Moldova has substantially increased from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024; calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences;

- the ongoing attempts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to normalise their relations; encourages them to sign a comprehensive peace agreement without delay;

3. Condemns in particular:

- the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing Russian attacks against civilian targets and civilian infrastructure within Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian leadership immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine and any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies;

- the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in effectively surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus;

- the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies in undermining and subverting the democratic stability and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova;

- the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks committed by Hamas across Israel on 7 October 2023, which triggered a conflict in Gaza that has a disproportionate effect on civilians and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation;

- Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification;

- the wrongful detention of European citizens in Iran; urges the VP/HR to do the utmost to free these citizens and to put an end to the practice of Iranian hostage diplomacy;

- the recent adoption of the law on the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Afghanistan, as well as the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the extreme interpretation of sharia which erases women from public life, bars them from working, hinders their access to healthcare without being chaperoned by a male relative and to education beyond the sixth grade; demands from the de facto authorities of Afghanistan that all gender-based restrictions on women be lifted and stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; insists on maintaining strict, conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council for engaging with the de facto authorities and by holding the perpetrators of these grave violations of girls’ and women’s rights accountable, including through restrictive measures;

- the increasing breadth and intensity of operations of Chinese Government vessels and aircraft intimidating China’s neighbours; denounces the government-led system of forced labour and China’s crimes against humanity in Xinjiang;

- the decision of the central Sahel military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus plunging ECOWAS into a deep political crisis; takes note of the de facto closure of the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the non-renewal of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM);

- the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba; condemns, in the strongest terms, the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime; strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela and demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

4. Concurs with:

- the need to improve relations with Türkiye; welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the east Mediterranean and the Aegean; reiterates its concern that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP;

- the urgency for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward toward a mutual reflection process which leads to a mutually beneficial, more dynamic and strategic partnership, considering the key role played by Türkiye in the region and its significance as a NATO ally;

- the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP, including on sanctions and the anti-circumvention of sanctions, as well as with the need for Türkiye to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy; deplores the unacceptable nature of the solidarity and support that the President of Türkiye has publicly provided to the terrorist organisation Hamas;

- the call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive nor aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood;

- the fact that the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’, the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code in Georgia, are incompatible with EU values and democratic principles; recalls that Georgia’s bid for accession to the EU will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of the country’s success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership;

- the concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in Central Asia in response; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus;

- the fact that the Arctic is of geostrategic importance as regards the expansion of possible maritime routes, access to natural resources, climate conservation, territorial claims, inter alia due to Russian military expansion in the High North, and the freedom and safety of navigation;

II. CFSP objectives in 2025

5. Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;

Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

6. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage;

7. Calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof;

8. Calls for the EU and its Member States to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine’s victory in order to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control within its internationally recognised borders; underlines in particular the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure ahead of the forthcoming winter, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory;

9. Calls for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness of its 14 sanction packages adopted so far and adopt new ones as soon as the need arises; calls for effective cooperation with like-minded partners across the globe to increase the pressure on Russia;

10. Unwaveringly supports the 10-point peace plan put forward by Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy and recalls that any initiative aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression needs to be based on input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people;

11. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression;

12. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies;

13. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, worth an estimated EUR 35 billion, which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets;

14. Recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine and deems the Republic of Moldova the second line of defence of the European way of life; believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; encourages the VP/HR to enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova through concrete measures and, in particular, through measures ensuring the inviolability of the state borders of and between both countries;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

15. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and a subsequently imminent and permeant ceasefire to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of a health epidemic in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law;

16. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian land, which constitutes a violation of international law; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; expresses support for US President Biden’s three-phase Peace Plan and regrets the lack of will on both sides to ensure its implementation; regrets, further, that the latest rounds of peace talks did not bring any tangible results;

17. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; urges all parties to show maximum restraint, commit to de-escalation and refrain from any further escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; calls upon the VP/HR and the Member States to continue and step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue;

18. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’; recalls that the European Parliament has called for Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

19. Highlights the strong links between Iran and the IRGC, its proxies such as the Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian militias, and organisations on the EU terrorist list, namely Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing; calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations; deplores Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which have resulted in an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon; is deeply concerned about the situation in Lebanon and recalls the need for a cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner;

20. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and, at the same time, increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran;

21. Underlines that the EU needs to increase its effective presence in the region, by all means at its disposal, and calls on the VP/HR to make this a priority for his office and the forthcoming MFF;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

22. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the United Nations and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, which balances the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while prioritising cooperation with selected, like-minded partners at the same time;

23. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world;

24. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; welcomes the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer foreign policy and security cooperation, which would be of added value for both the EU and the UK; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;

25. Recalls that the transatlantic relationship remains the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States, which has been emphasised by the unity and strength of the partnership demonstrated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; underlines that a strong transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity;

26. Welcomes the close relationship with non-EU western European countries and, in particular, the excellent cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; urges the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of fostering even stronger relations with Norway; calls for a swift signature of the Association Agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

27. Reiterates that a peaceful, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is of vital European interest; encourages, to this end, closer foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and effect of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan;

28. Recalls, in this context, the deep and comprehensive partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; acknowledges the fundamental role of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in their relationship at a time of geopolitical upheaval; encourages both sides to demonstrate the required political will to ratify the SPA, in particular the remaining EU Member States that have not yet done so;

29. Considers that the rise of China remains one of the primary geopolitical challenges of the 21st century and requires a multi-dimensional response through which the EU maintains its engagement with China on a number of key issues; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement while increasing the EU’s assertiveness towards China in order for it to assume its responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council;

30. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

31. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and working towards a comprehensive strategic partnership;

32. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda;

33. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with like-minded partners in Africa, among others Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a key and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges;

34. Emphasises the need to continue stepping up the EU’s engagement with like-minded countries in Latin America, particularly given the growing influence of China and Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean; calls on the Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights;

35. Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of his term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources;

36. Believes simultaneously in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the ‘Global South’, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships;

Fostering EU action abroad

37. Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation;

38. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action;

39. Calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide;

40. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts;

41. Calls for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy, including peace mediation and dialogue, as a proactive foreign policy tool; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises;

42. Reaffirms the role of the EU Special Representatives, who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies;

43. Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:

- to work with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, NATO and the other partners concerned, to enable robust constabulary forces to assume all key tasks of internal security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as from 2026, and to prepare the proposals for the necessary CFSP missions to be launched in 2025, using the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as preventive military reinforcement; recalls that the expenditure for these measures, including the RDC’s standby expenditure, should be charged to the EU budget;

- to work with Cyprus, Türkiye, the UK and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone on Cyprus, and to improve security on the island, both of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community;

- to reiterate his support for the ongoing work by the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the occupied Palestinian territory (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM) in Rafah in assisting with the Palestinian authorities’ security and justice sector reform and integrated border management;

44. Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad;

III. The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight

45. Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information;

46. Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that it also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

47. Recalls that all CFSP and CSDP expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, unless the Council decides otherwise on a case-by-case basis, or when the expenditure concerns operations with military or defence implications; recognises that it falls to the Council to determine whether an EU action abroad is an operation with military or defence implications; underlines that in all other cases of CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure, the Council should consider charging the expenditure to the EU budget;

48. Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for these policies; calls on the VP/HR to consult the European Parliament before he makes any such proposals for CFSP or CSDP decisions;

49. Recalls that the European Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise these functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in that regard;

50. Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature both in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

51. Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action as an integral player of ‘Team Europe’, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;

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52. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Every year, the Committee on Foreign Affairs drafts a resolution on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as a response to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This resolution assesses the implementation of the CFSP and is a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU external action, most notably with regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon.

The 2024 report is the first resolution on the implementation of the CFSP in this legislature. As such, it should also act as a guide for the priorities of a new Commission and High Representative. The report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025. Here, the Rapporteur has chosen to focus on the strategic trends that define the overall orientation of the EU’s common foreign and security policy and which have exacerbated the necessity for the EU to define its interests and deploy the capabilities to pursue them. These include:

1. the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine,

2. conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East,

3. cooperation with like-minded partners, and

4. the visibility of the EU’s action abroad

The report develops each of these points in more detail, providing guidance for the future EU executives when defining the CFSP. Parliament’s forward looking CFSP posture is finally underlined by key demands concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework and the parliamentary oversight thereof.