On a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future

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DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION

to the Council, Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future

(2023/2050(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 28 June 2016,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ action plan, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the Council’s Concept on EU Peace Mediation of 7 December 2020,

– having regard to the UN New Agenda for Peace of 20 July 2023,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict and mediation,

– having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (XXXXX),

A. whereas a changing geopolitical context stemming from emerging powers confronting traditional players, attacks on the multilateral system, emerging technologies, climate change, food security issues and migration are among the factors contributing to the spread of conflicts around the world;

B. whereas the multilateral, rules-based order is being reshaped and some former alliances are beginning to re-emerge;

C. whereas although the EU is the biggest international aid donor, it has not achieved the same impact in the public-diplomacy sphere and should therefore improve its visibility in the area of preventive diplomacy around the world;

D. whereas the Council has appointed nine EU special representatives for different conflict regions to act as mediators and peace facilitators, but their initiatives and the effects of their actions are not visible;

E. whereas the EU still does not have the necessary confidence to initiate mediation in areas of strategic importance;

F. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the need for stronger and more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU action on the world stage, and accentuates the necessity of the EU autonomously setting its own strategic objectives and developing and using the capabilities needed to pursue them;

G. whereas security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of this aggression spilling over into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilisation of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU;

H. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, as it presents an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanised the momentum towards achieving a geopolitical redefinition of the EU’s foreign policy, including a reconsideration of its preventive diplomacy toolbox;

I. whereas the main obstacle to the EU’s global leadership in preventive diplomacy is the lack of will on the part of the Member States to step away from their individual interests in external relations in order to build joint capacity together;

J. whereas coordination between the European External Action Service (EEAS), Parliament and the Member States needs to be reassessed in order to deliver results and launch meaningful initiatives in preventive diplomacy;

1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

(a) acknowledge the strong link between EU internal and external security and reflect this when approaching conflict prevention;

(b) adapt the EU’s conflict prevention tools to the changing nature of conflicts, including as a result of climate change, the rise of new technologies and food scarcity;

(c) fully use the means at their disposal to prevent conflict, align the EU’s prevention tools with its political agenda and act as a caretaker during global tragedies;

(d) call on the Member States to step away from their individual interests in external relations and build joint capacity together in conflict prevention and mediation;

(e) ensure complementarity across Parliament’s preventive diplomacy actions;

Understanding the local and cultural context

(f) improve the EU’s understanding of local, historical, political, social and cultural contexts and invest in cultivating the necessary skills among EEAS staff working on conflict prevention;

(g) tailor state-building assistance to the cultural, historical and political context of the relevant country receiving it and continuously update it in response to conditions on the ground through rigorous and detailed political analysis for a common strategic response;

EU conflict Early Warning System

(h) ensure that the EU’s conflict Early Warning System is sufficiently proactive and based on forward-looking and robust analysis of risk factors;

(i) closely involve the EU delegations in countries and regions at risk of conflict or dealing with frozen conflict in monitoring the situation on the ground and contributing to the EU conflict Early Warning System;

(j) assess the results achieved by the EU conflict Early Warning System and propose adjustments to make it more effective;

Role of special representatives and special envoys in preventive diplomacy, their accountability and overview of their results

(k) consider cultural and historical background when appointing special representatives and envoys in order to avoid sparking controversy in conflict regions should the appointment come from a Member State with historical ties to the region concerned;

(l) thoroughly assess what initiatives EU special representatives and envoys have undertaken and how they are contributing to preventive diplomacy;

(m) provide regular and thorough assessments on the accountability of the EU special representatives and envoys and overviewing the initiatives they have undertaken;

(n) improve the transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the work of the EU special representatives and envoys by providing Parliament with regular and detailed reports on their activities and achievements;

(o) ensure that the appointment of EU special representatives, special envoys and ambassadors can only be confirmed after a positive assessment by Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs;

Lessons learnt from EU-mediated conflict resolution and frozen conflicts

(p) draw on the lessons learnt from the EU’s missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy and its achievements in Africa, the Western Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Ukraine;

(q) prevent, in the future, the premature suspension of EU missions in conflict regions, such as the one in Mali, which left a vacuum in the country’s security that was filled by the Wagner Group;

(r) ensure a coordinated approach between the EU and its Member States in conflict prevention, as opposed to what occurred in Afghanistan where they were working in parallel in different regions;

(s) enhance the EU’s ability to rigorously and continuously analyse the political and security situation in crisis regions and adapt the EU’s response to shifting realities on the ground;

(t) assess what was lacking in the EU’s preventive diplomacy efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to avert the increasing tensions due to electoral law issues, recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist acts, which are undermining the Dayton Peace Agreement;

(u) set up a mechanism to verify the implementation of all agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo so far and to report to Parliament periodically in order to ensure that further tensions are averted and to provide more effective mediation between the parties, with the goal of overcoming the current stalemate;

(v) aim to come up with lessons learnt from failed preventive diplomacy efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh in order to avoid future escalations like the one that occurred on 19 September 2023 and situations similar to the one during and after the 2020 war when the EU’s passive stance gave other regional actors, such as Russia, Iran and Türkiye, the opportunity to continue exerting their influence in the region;

Strengthening partnerships and international coordination

(w) strengthen partnerships and coordination with international, regional and sub-regional actors, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;

(x) ensure a coordinated and dynamic approach to early warning, conflict prevention and mediation between the EU and other international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE;

(y) pursue structured information exchanges, joint horizon scanning, strategic foresight and gender-responsive conflict analyses to ensure alignment between the EU and its partners;

(z) empower national actors to serve as key players in effective prevention;

(aa) use diplomatic means and multilateral platforms for peace to strengthen anticipatory relationships before conflicts arise;

(ab) ensure that the EU takes leading positions at the UN, in proportion to the size of its contributions to the organisation, which cover 30 % of the its costs and 33 % of the expenses for UN peace-keeping missions;

From strategic autonomy to preventive diplomacy

(ac) enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy in order to increase its standing and geopolitical leverage in conflict prevention;

(ad) strengthen the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and to act as a truly global player in response to crises;

(ae) work towards ensuring that the EU takes up a prominent leadership position in peacemaking and mediation around the world;

(af) adopt an integrated approach to conflict prevention that combines humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and security assistance and diplomatic engagement, fully addressing all aspects of the conflict, including in partnership with local and international partners if necessary;

(ag) step up communication efforts in order to ensure that the EU is seen as a key stakeholder in preventive diplomacy and that its actions and success stories are not undermined by false narratives spread or claimed by other global powers present in conflict regions;

(ah) build on existing well-functioning cooperation mechanisms in the EU, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, in order to make use of the Member States’ expertise and avoid the duplication of efforts and resources;

2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The global order is changing swiftly, emerging powers are confronting traditional players, new technologies are posing new challenges to global governance, power dynamics are more and more fragmented and the rules-based international order is more frequently being challenged. With Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, a war is directly threatening European and global security. We are also witnessing the highest level of geopolitical tensions and major power competition since the Cold War era.

This geopolitical instability, the increase of the number of conflicts and the strong link between external and internal security demand from the EU to step up its preventive diplomacy efforts and adapt its toolbox to the changing nature of conflicts. Thanks to new technology, conflicts are becoming more complex, deadly and harder to resolve. Thus, what we need is to prevent conflicts before they arise and focus on sustaining hard won peace gains in areas where conflict previously existed.

Based on EU’s missed opportunities and success stories, the Rapporteur presents a number of recommendations to the Council, the Commission, and the HRVP, which would amplify EU’s preventive diplomacy toolbox and make it the global actor in preventive diplomacy it can and should be.

The recommendations focus on six main areas where improvements in EU’s preventive diplomacy arsenal should be achieved:

1. Understanding the local and cultural context

2. EU Conflict Early Warning System

3. The role of EU Special Representatives and Envoys in preventive diplomacy, their accountability and overview of their results

4. Lessons learned from EU mediated conflict resolution and frozen conflicts

5. Strengthening partnerships and international coordination

6. From strategic autonomy to preventive diplomacy

Concerning the local and cultural context, the EU should develop preventive diplomacy tools and state-building assistance tailored to the cultural, historical and political context of the country. It should carefully select its envoys and representatives in conflict and post-conflict regions in order to avoid sparking controversy linked to appointments from Member States with historical past in these countries or regions.

When it comes to EU Conflict Early Warning System, the Rapporteur recommends to ensure that it is sufficiently proactive and based on continuous, forward-looking and robust analysis of risk factors. She also calls for regular assessment of the results of this system in order to make it more effective in the future.

EU special representatives and envoys should play a key role in EU’s preventive diplomacy efforts. While they are appointed to promote EU’s policies and interests and to act as mediators in troubled regions and countries, the effects of their work and the initiatives they undertake are not visible and not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. When it comes to their appointment, the Council and the EEAS should reflect on the possibility to appoint more recognizable politicians for these positions, in order to match the heavy-weight figures often appointed by other global players to similar troubled regions.

Looking at the lessons learned from EU mediated conflict resolution and frozen conflicts, in particular in Africa, the Western Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Ukraine, the Rapporteur recommends that future EU preventive diplomacy actions consider the missed opportunities and avoid similar situations in the future. In particular, the EU should assess and analyse carefully and continuously the risk factors and adapt its actions in conflict regions in order to prevent the creation of political vacuum that could be filled by actors that might not be acting in the best interest of the country or region in question, or the spread of false narratives.

Partnerships and international coordination are key to successful preventive diplomacy and the EU should continue strengthening its partnerships with international, regional and sub-regional actors, such as the UN, OSCE, the African Union and ASEAN, including what concerns early warning, conflict prevention and mediation. An integrated approach, combining humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, security assistance and diplomatic engagement, in coordination with partners, would be more comprehensive and deliver more favourable results in preventive diplomacy.

Last but not least, the EU should step up its strategic autonomy in order to be seen as a strong actor in preventive diplomacy. This can be achieved if the EU speaks with one voice and action on the ground is aligned between the EU and its Member States, moving away from individual interests. Building on past experience with joint EU mechanisms, like the EU civil protection mechanism or EU peace keeping missions, the EU can adopt similar approach when developing an integrated and pan-European approach to preventive diplomacy missions. It also remains important to communicate EU’s achievements and success stories better. While being the biggest development aid donor in the world, the output from this significant investment in the public diplomacy scene is insignificant and often even overridden by false narratives presented by other major powers present in developing countries.

All these recommendations should bring the EU one-step closer to becoming a leading actor in conflict prevention and resolution worldwide. By joining forces, the EU and its Member States would be able to overcome the pitfalls they have encountered in some of the previous EU mediated actions and would generate a more successful interventionist approach.