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DRAFT REPORT (2023/2072(INI))

On the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union

AFET-PR-750176

Committee on Foreign Affairs · Rapporteur: Klemen Grošelj

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This is a draft report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union. It examines China's military-civil fusion strategy and its consequences, and calls for an expanded EU toolkit to respond. The report warns about Chinese involvement in EU strategic assets, undersea cables, and critical raw materials, and calls for screening procedures for all stakeholders in EU critical infrastructure projects. It welcomes the European economic security strategy, the Chips Act, and proposals on dual-use technologies, and calls for a new legislative framework on undersea cable suppliers. It also calls on the Commission and the EEAS to extend resilience measures to the EU's closest partners, including accession countries and neighbourhood countries, and expresses concern about Chinese infrastructure in Africa.

Committee position. The rapporteur proposes that Parliament adopt a resolution warning about China's military-civil fusion strategy and its influence on EU critical infrastructure, and calling for an expanded EU toolkit, including screening procedures, a dual-use technology list, and a new framework for undersea cables.

Key points

  1. Underlines that China's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led programme to strengthen the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
  2. Considers that Chinese companies' international activities help the CCP expand influence and undermine geopolitical rivals, and that MCF aims to make China the world's leading power.
  3. Warns of risks from Chinese companies' involvement with EU strategic assets, including technology transfer to China's military.
  4. Emphasises China's dominance in critical commodities like batteries, aluminium, silicon, lithium, copper, nickel and cobalt, posing risks for Europe's defence and industrial sectors.
  5. Expresses grave concern over undersea data cables operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States and NATO military bases, creating security vulnerabilities.
  6. Warns that the deteriorating security environment requires strengthening EU strategic autonomy and preventing leaks of sensitive technologies and dual-use items to destinations of concern.
  7. Calls for expanding screening procedures to all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects, and for the Commission to map, track and assess China's access.
  8. Welcomes the European economic security strategy and calls for swift adoption of Commission proposals and full implementation by Member States to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF.
  9. Welcomes the proposal to establish a list of dual-use technologies and calls for identifying and implementing protection measures as soon as possible.
  10. Welcomes the European Chips Act and calls for further proposals to secure production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials within the EU.
  11. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate security risks from undersea cable system suppliers and prevent data sharing with intelligence services.
  12. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to extend resilience measures to the EU's closest partners, and expresses concern about Chinese infrastructure in Africa and the 'blue economy cooperation base'.

Who is affected

  • EU Member States, which are responsible for infrastructure protection but have not consistently implemented guidelines or set up investment-screening mechanisms.
  • The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), called on to map China's access to critical infrastructure and extend resilience measures to partners.
  • EU critical infrastructure sectors, including energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, water and food, which face risks from Chinese influence.
  • The EU's closest partners, including accession countries and neighbourhood countries, whose resilience should be strengthened against Chinese influence.
  • African countries, where Chinese state-owned enterprises have financed and constructed infrastructure and where China builds a 'blue economy cooperation base'.

Figures and deadlines

  • 70 % of the world's batteries produced by China
  • 60 % of global aluminium production
  • 75 % of silicon production
  • 60 % of lithium refining
  • 70 % of copper processing
  • 84 % of the world's nickel production
  • 85 % of the world's cobalt production
  • One third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises

Legal basis: Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy