Sittings · Document
Draft report (2025/2042(INI)) 2025-06-05
Application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process
Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Amendment 1
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences and subsidiarity, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy and Article 12 on the role of national parliaments, | – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences, subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy and Article 12 on the role of national parliaments, |
Or. en
Amendment 2
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular the proposed amendments related to the subsidiarity principle and Protocol No 2; |
Or. en
Amendment 3
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and relations with national Parliaments, |
Or. en
Amendment 4
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – - having regard to Article 122 TFEU, |
Or. en
Amendment 5
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the final report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More Efficiently”; |
Or. en
Amendment 6
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to recommendation 40 of the final report on the outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe; |
Or. en
Amendment 7
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’7 (the Draghi report), | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 7 Draghi, M., ‘The future of European Competitiveness’, European Commission, 9 September 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059. |
Or. en
Amendment 8
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the report by the Task force on subsidiarity, proportionality and doing less more efficiently of 10 July 2018, |
Or. en
Amendment 9
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the Communication from the Commission “The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU's policymaking” of 23 October 2018, |
Or. en
Amendment 10
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| A. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that decisions are made as close to citizens as possible and that the EU only acts when the Member States cannot achieve the relevant objectives alone; whereas this principle safeguards the balance of power in the EU; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties; | A. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level; whereas this principle safeguards the balance of power in the EU; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties; |
Or. en
Amendment 11
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| A. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that decisions are made as close to citizens as possible and that the EU only acts when the Member States cannot achieve the relevant objectives alone; whereas this principle safeguards the balance of power in the EU; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties; | A. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that decisions are made as close to citizens as possible and that the EU only acts if the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties; |
Or. en
Amendment 12
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachment on Member State competences; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 13
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachment on Member State competences; | B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring the regulatory impact and efficiency of the EU; whereas it is essential that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary regulatory burden on Member States and legal subjects; |
Or. en
Amendment 14
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachment on Member State competences; | B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring unnecessary intervention by the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 15
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachment on Member State competences; | B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU’s legislative activity is both legitimate and effective by promoting a balance between EU and national decision-making; |
Or. en
Amendment 16
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachment on Member State competences; | B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the EU legislative process while ensuring that Member States remain ‘united in diversity’; |
Or. en
Amendment 17
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| C. whereas Articles 2-6 TFEU clearly delineate the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU; | C. whereas Articles 2-6 TFEU delineate only broadly the areas of exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU; allowing for a wide understanding and progressive accumulation of competences by the EU through the initiatives of the European Commission (EC) as well as the “judicial activism” in the interpretations of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); |
Or. en
Amendment 18
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| C. whereas Articles 2-6 TFEU clearly delineate the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU; | C. whereas Articles 2-6 TFEU define the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 19
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address concerns among the Member States about potential overreach by the EU; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); | D. whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); |
Or. en
Amendment 20
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address concerns among the Member States about potential overreach by the EU; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); | D. whereas the principle of subsidiarity was mentioned explicitly for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS) and the recognition of the role of the European Committee of the Regions in this respect by giving it the right to take action on subsidiarity before the European Court of Justice; |
Or. en
Amendment 21
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address concerns among the Member States about potential overreach by the EU; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); | D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); |
Or. en
Amendment 22
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address concerns among the Member States about potential overreach by the EU; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); | D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address the proper distribution and implementation of shared competences by the EU and Member States; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); |
Or. en
Amendment 23
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to address concerns among the Member States about potential overreach by the EU; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); | D. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to to balance the growing powers of the European Union with the sovereignty of its Member States; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS); |
Or. en
Amendment 24
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D a. whereas interference by the European institutions in the internal affairs of Member States undermines citizens' confidence in our institutions; |
Or. en
Amendment 25
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D b. whereas the rise of supranational agencies and organisations is undermining the autonomy of state governance and this situation is contributing to the rise of Euroscepticism within the European Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 26
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| E a. Whereas, in line with the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the entire EU institutional framework must make consistent and sustained efforts to ensure the active involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process; whereas the “yellow” and “orange card” mechanisms, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, should be strengthened, and consideration should be given to further enhancing their effectiveness; |
Or. en
Amendment 27
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| E b. whereas reinforcing the role of national parliaments and ensuring the meaningful participation of Member States are essential to safeguarding subsidiarity and proportionality within the Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 28
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| F. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures has led to the withdrawal of a proposal8 , the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation9 , and the third had no effect, despite a record number of 14 reasoned opinions submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States10 ; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 8 Proposal for a Council Regulation of 2012 on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, COM(2012)0130. | |
| 9 The creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): the yellow card was triggered in 2013, and enhanced cooperation adopted under Article 86 TFEU in 2017. | |
| 10 Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 173, 9.7.2018, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/957/oj. |
Or. en
Amendment 29
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| F. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures has led to the withdrawal of a proposal8 , the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation9 , and the third had no effect, despite a record number of 14 reasoned opinions submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States10 ; | F. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures has led to the withdrawal of a proposal8 , the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation9 , and the third had no effect, while 14 reasoned opinions were submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States10 ; |
| _________________ | _________________ |
| 10 Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 173, 9.7.2018, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/957/oj. | 10 Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 173, 9.7.2018, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/957/oj. |
| 8 Proposal for a Council Regulation of 2012 on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, COM(2012)0130. | 8 Proposal for a Council Regulation of 2012 on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, COM(2012)0130. |
| 9 The creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): the yellow card was triggered in 2013, and enhanced cooperation adopted under Article 86 TFEU in 2017. | 9 The creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): the yellow card was triggered in 2013, and enhanced cooperation adopted under Article 86 TFEU in 2017. |
Or. en
Amendment 30
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| G. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; | G. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of these principles; whereas the effective oversight and control of the European Commission, as the executive arm of the Union, must be exercised not only by the European Parliament but also by national parliaments; whereas in cases of serious disagreement or potential overreach regarding competences, the CJEU should be seized to rule on legal conflicts of a constitutional nature between EU institutions and between the central powers of the Union and the Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 31
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| G. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; | G. whereas the EWS has led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 32
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| G. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; | G. whereas the EWS has led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 33
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately lead to better lawmaking; | H. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are necessary to ensure better lawmaking; |
Or. en
Amendment 34
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately lead to better lawmaking; | H. whereas a strict adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission and the co-legislators, the Council in particular, can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately lead to better lawmaking; |
Or. en
Amendment 35
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately lead to better lawmaking; | H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately contribute to a more efficient law making process; |
Or. en
Amendment 36
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and will ultimately lead to better lawmaking; | H. whereas a stricter adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and can lead to better lawmaking; |
Or. en
Amendment 37
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H a. whereas national parliaments are included in the EU legislative process both by the specific provisions of Protocol 2 of TFEU, as well as by exercising democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of Member States in the Council; |
Or. en
Amendment 38
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H a. whereas the principle of subsidiarity should be interpreted as allowing the first step in regulating a certain area to be taken by national authorities and only when it is mutually convened that a central EU initiative would be more efficient to proceed in the latter way; |
Or. en
Amendment 39
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H b. whereas there is an established practice of parliamentary dimension of each rotational presidency of the Council of the European Union, with national parliaments participating jointly with the European parliament in numerous inter-parliamentary conferences on a variety of topics; |
Or. en
Amendment 40
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H b. whereas Article 122 TFEU is designed to be used only in exceptional and crisis situations and should not be misused as a way of circumventing other procedures laid down by the Treaties, especially as this excludes the EP’s participation and, thus, may weaken public trust; |
Or. en
Amendment 41
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital H c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H c. whereas scrutiny over the EC, as executive body of the EU, should be exercised both by the EP and national parliaments; [PG1] [PG1]aici s-ar intelege ca si parlamentele nationale can do scrutiny over EC, adica rol de supraveghere si control asupra comisiei- sa audieze comisari, sa depuna motiuni de cenzura, sa aprobe bugetul Comisiei- ori nu se poate. eu as modifica cu ce am pus mai jos, sa permitem parlamentelor nationale doar sa supravegheze activitatea comisiei, sa transmita sesizari catre Parlament si Parlamentul sa faca demersuri mai departe indreptate catre Comisie |
Or. en
Amendment 42
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Recital H d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| H d. Calls for strengthening the role of national parliaments in the European Union by enhancing transparency, dialogue, and cooperation mechanisms between national parliaments and the European Commission; stresses that while national parliaments do not hold formal direct powers over the Commission akin to those of the European Parliament, their political influence should be reinforced to ensure more effective oversight and accountability of the Commission’s actions; underlines the need to develop structured and regular channels of communication and consultation to promote mutual understanding and democratic legitimacy within the EU institutional framework; calls on the European Commission to establish formal procedures allowing national parliaments to send written requests or letters to the Commission to seek explanations regarding potential irregularities in the application or enforcement of EU legislation.[PG1] [PG1]il punem pe acesta paragraful 3 nou care intareste si e mai explicit al ideii de mai sus |
Or. en
Amendment 43
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty and competences of the Member States; | 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be essential elements of the Commission’s approach to better regulation which is built on the three fundamental processes of evaluation, impact assessment and stakeholder consultation |
Or. en
Amendment 44
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty and competences of the Member States; | 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential; |
Or. en
Amendment 45
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty and competences of the Member States; | 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the division of powers and ensuring that EU actions are necessary and appropriate; |
Or. en
Amendment 46
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty and competences of the Member States; | 1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the proper functioning of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 47
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, and that actions should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing an issue; | 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, and that actions should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing an issue; highlights the increasing relevancy of transnational and global issues, giving rise to a renewed discussion of which issues should be tackled on the European Union level; emphasises in this regard that the final proposals of the Conference of the future of Europe recommend to extend EU competences on climate and to introduce shared competences in the fields of health, healthcare and education, based on the recommendations of citizens; |
Or. en
Amendment 48
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, and that actions should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing an issue; | 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, safeguarding the ability of the Member States to take decisions and action and authorises intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, ‘by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action’; |
Or. en
Amendment 49
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, and that actions should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing an issue; | 2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is to ensure that decisions are made at the most appropriate level, with the primary goal of maximising effectiveness and ensuring closer proximity to the citizens; |
Or. en
Amendment 50
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Recalls that the principles of subsidiarity and of proportionality, require that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation. Highlight that measures must be suitable to reach the goal defined it must be necessary fot this and the measure adopted must not impose too high a bunden on the individual in relation to the defined goal. |
Or. en
Amendment 51
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Underlines that the concept of 'active subsidiarity' as developed by the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and "Doing Less More Efficiently"' (hereinafter the Task Force) is based on the constructive cooperation between all levels of governance during all stages of the life-cycle of EU legislation for the benefit of EU citizens. |
Or. en
Amendment 52
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 53
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; underlines that the entire EU institutional framework must make consistent and sustained efforts to ensure the active involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process; calls for the strengthening of the “yellow”, “orange” and “red card” mechanisms under Protocol No 2; and highlights the importance of reinforcing the role of national parliaments and the participation of EU Member States in safeguarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. |
Or. en
Amendment 54
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Calls on the Commission to apply more thoroughly the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, including when defining the legal basis for EU legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 55
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Calls on the Commission to exercise due diligence and discretion when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to clearly and thoroughly define the legal basis for EU action, ensuring full respect for Member State competences and the appropriate use of legal foundations; |
Or. en
Amendment 56
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 57
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Calls on the Commission to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls within the competence of the Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusive competence of the Member States if such proposals would go beyond coordination or supporting the Member States; considers that the Commission should only propose legislation on these matters at the explicit request of the Member States; | 3. Welcomes the work carried out by the Commission in recent years to cast additional clarity on the institutional implementation of the proportionality and subsidiarity principles, including through the Task Force on Subsidiarity and the introduction of the subsidiarity grid; calls on the Commission to continue to show restraint when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to more thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to withdraw the legislative process from the co-decision procedure and to reserve them for the sole adoption by the Member States; points out that the increased and consistent use of the “intergovernmental method” is at odds with the democratic guarantees of the Treaties and slowly erodes citizens’ trust in the functioning of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 58
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Notes with concern the Commission’s choice of Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis for the deployment of €800 billion for the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 instrument; calls on the Commission to revise the legal basis of such initiative; urges the Commission to read Article 122 TFEU in the light of its initial design, as an extraordinary and crisis management solution, and in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity in any future proposals; |
Or. en
Amendment 59
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; | 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating the justification that lies behind and the foreseeable effects in a quantified and reasoned manner; |
Or. en
Amendment 60
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; | 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value; |
Or. en
Amendment 61
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; | 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating the impossibility of effective action at the national levelas well as that the proposed legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the use of legal bases under Article 352 and 122 TFEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 62
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; | 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the need for action and the choice of instruments; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value; recalls the Commission’s intention, expressed in its communication in 2018, to integrate an assessment grid into its better regulation guidance and to use it as part of the impact assessments, evaluations and explanatory memoranda that accompany its legislative proposals; regrets that so far this has not been fulfilled in practice; welcomes in this regard the subsidiarity grid developed by the European Committee of the Regions and encourages the European Commission to use it as the basis for its subsidiarity assessments; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the use of Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis. |
Or. en
Amendment 63
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; | 4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 122 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence; calls for a strengthened prior consultation of the national and regional parliaments before proposing legislation on the EU level; |
Or. en
Amendment 64
Salvatore De Meo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. it
Amendment 65
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 66
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 67
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 68
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 69
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | 5. Expresses its cautiousness regarding the tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; |
| _________________ | |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 70
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; | 5. Notes the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee11 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts; |
| _________________ | _________________ |
| 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. | 11 Le Sénat, Commission des affaires européenes, ‘Dérive normative de l’Union européenne – Rapport d’information n° 190 (2024-2025), 4 December 2024. |
Or. en
Amendment 71
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; | 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission, jointly with the European Parliament, to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; |
Or. en
Amendment 72
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; | 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity and proportionality checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; |
Or. en
Amendment 73
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; | 6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to continue to consistently apply the subsidiarity grid in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for continued transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives; |
Or. en
Amendment 74
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes that this risks overlooking the specific situation in individual Member States in favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which does not take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 75
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes that this risks overlooking the specific situation in individual Member States in favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which does not take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; | 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; |
Or. en
Amendment 76
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes that this risks overlooking the specific situation in individual Member States in favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which does not take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; | 7. Notes that the Commission has committed to reply with an aggregated response to reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments representing at least seven votes; calls on the Commission to provide such responses even when the reasoned opinions do not reach this threshold so that its responses are not perceived as dismissive and in order to ensure that they take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 77
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes that this risks overlooking the specific situation in individual Member States in favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which does not take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; | 7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions should be carefully considered especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes in fact the need to always pay attention for the specific situation in individual Member States taking into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments; |
Or. en
Amendment 78
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 a. Points out that implementing new EU legislation can entail very high costs for municipalities, particularly in remote or scarcely populated areas; considers that municipalities must be equipped with sufficient financial resources to implement EU law, so as to enable them to comply with the new EU legislative norms; points out that these financial resources should correspond to the implementation costs which the municipalities incur; |
Or. en
Amendment 79
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; proposes, in order to strengthen transparency and the democratic quality of the legislative process, the establishment of regular monthly or at least quarterly meetings between Members of the European Parliament and national parliamentarians, with the inclusion of relevant administrative and institutional actors; underlines that such engagement should be framed by the Treaty principle that decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen (Article 1 TEU); stresses that both European and national parliamentarians should be actively involved in explaining, assessing, and communicating the implications of EU decisions to the public in a timely and accessible manner. |
Or. en
Amendment 80
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; believes that the reason behind this is a lack of knowledge about the EU legislative process; recalls in this sense its latest resolution on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments (2023/2084(INI)) where it called on the Member States to ensure that national parliaments have enough resources to fulfil their constitutional roles of oversight and recommended that national parliaments use the IPEX platform more effectively and involve their regional parliaments in bringing the Early Warning Mechanism into operation; |
Or. en
Amendment 81
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is in part due to the fact that these procedures are largely unknown amongst national parliamentarians; recognizes that the current procedure is too cumbersome and leaves room for improvement; recalls, in this context, its earlier proposals to extend the deadline for ‘yellow card’ procedures to 12 weeks and to have a wider reflection on the possibility to upgrade the EWS to a tool enabling national parliaments to shape EU policies also from a political or substantive point of view; |
Or. en
Amendment 82
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; |
Or. en
Amendment 83
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; notes that this might be due in fact to the thresholds established in Protocol 2 of TFEU; recalls the findings of the Task force that a substantially lower threshold than one quarter would be necessary in order to increase significantly the number of yellow cards procedures but this in turn would raise questions about the representativeness of the concerns expressed; recalls that any changes of the established thresholds would require a treaty change; |
Or. en
Amendment 84
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn; | 8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures, mainly due to time constraints; |
Or. en
Amendment 85
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8 a. Notes that the limited number of ”yellow” and “orange” cards might be due also to the increased responsiveness by the Commission who has been working actively on making sure its proposals respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 86
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteur dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission, resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. would be collected and freely accessible; considers that the creation of an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request the Commission to propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of exclusive competence of the Member States; | 9. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteur dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission, resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. would be collected and freely accessible; |
Or. en
Amendment 87
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteur dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission, resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. would be collected and freely accessible; considers that the creation of an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request the Commission to propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of exclusive competence of the Member States; | 9. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission, European Parliament and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteurs dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission, resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. would be collected and freely accessible; considers that the creation of an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request the Commission to propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of exclusive competence of the Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 88
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9 a. Welcomes the Commission’s recent efforts to expand and perfect the subsidiarity grid as part of its ex-ante impact assessment of EU legislation as per the Better Regulation Toolkit; calls on the Commission to further mainstream the subsidiarity review in its policy cycle by, inter alia, extending the evaluation of subsidiarity after interinstitutional negotiations if the resulted amendments require. |
Or. en
Amendment 89
Salvatore De Meo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Notes the concerns raised regarding the Commission’s reactive approach to engaging with national parliaments and that this engagement is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place; | 10. Notes the concerns raised regarding the Commission’s reactive approach to engaging with national parliaments and that this engagement is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the introduction of a formal consultation phase in the early stages of the legislative process, making such consultation a systematic, structured and regular process that enables the national parliaments to participate actively and in a timely manner in the framing of legislative proposals; considers that the involvement of the parliaments must be effective, enabling them to exert genuine influence on the content of legislation from the very earliest stages of the process; |
Or. it
Amendment 90
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Notes the concerns raised regarding the Commission’s reactive approach to engaging with national parliaments and that this engagement is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place; | 10. Reiterated that the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place; |
Or. en
Amendment 91
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Notes the concerns raised regarding the Commission’s reactive approach to engaging with national parliaments and that this engagement is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place; | 10. Notes the concerns that the Commission’s engagement with national parliaments is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place; |
Or. en
Amendment 92
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10 a. Believes that interparliamentary dialogue at an earlier stage in the law making process, as well as the involvement of other relevant national institutions, are key to the correct transposition of the subsidiarity principle; this could take the form of monthly or quarterly meetings between MEPs and MPs in the spirit of Article 9 of the Protocol no. 1; |
Or. en
Amendment 93
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 94
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 95
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 96
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level; | 11. Calls on the Commission to always carefully consider whether increased coordination with national authorities would be a better solution in particular areas than the creation of new transnational agencies; |
Or. en
Amendment 97
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level; | 11. Recalls the Commission’s commitment that when evaluating the existing stock of legislation, evaluations look more closely at subsidiarity, proportionality, legislative density and the role of local and regional authorities; |
Or. en
Amendment 98
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11 a. Emphasises the key role of parliaments at the heart of democracy and the need to respect the clear division of competences between the different levels of European liberal democracy, i.e. the local, regional, national and European levels, in line with the principles of subsidiarity as laid down in the Article 5 TEU, to ensure democratic legitimacy and an efficient decision-making process and to enhance trust and cooperation between Parliaments on different levels; points out, in this regard, that national parliaments are best placed to mandate and scrutinise the actions of their respective governments in European affairs, while the European executive is held democratically accountble by the European Parliament, which also insures its legitimacy; underlines the need for regular political dialogue and exchange between parliaments in order to create awareness and understanding of parliamentary work and decisions, such as in the frameworks of the EUSC and COSAC; |
Or. en
Amendment 99
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11 a. Calls on the Commission to take greater account of the opinions expressed by the European Committee of the Regions through the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network created to facilitate the exchange of information between regional and local authorities and the Union on the various legislative proposals which, following their adoption, will have a direct impact on these bodies and on the policies for which they are responsible; |
Or. en
Amendment 100
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; | 12. Considers that a better implementation of the rights and obligations of national parliaments deriving from the Treaties can enhance their role within the European constitutional framework, including through the scrutiny mechanisms provided for in the Treaties; |
Or. en
Amendment 101
Salvatore De Meo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; | 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures, which should be revised and reinforced so as to render them clearer and more accessible, for example by introducing more precise rules on the triggering mechanisms along with a revision of the thresholds for these; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, exercising stronger and more timely oversight over legislative proposals and ensuring that these respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; |
Or. it
Amendment 102
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; | 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments, also as vessels for national, regional and local stakeholders, in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 103
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; | 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the validity and legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and sharing of competences between the EU and its Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 104
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Emphasises that the involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process will enhance the legitimacy of its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States; | 12. Emphasises that National Parliaments have a pivotal role in ensuring conformity with the subsidiarity principle, and they also have a positive contribution to make on the substance of new legislation, thus contributing to the democratic legitimacy of the Union.; stresses the need for their more active participation through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and contribute to EU legislation effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; |
Or. en
Amendment 105
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Recalls that national parliaments exercise democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of Member States in the Council; highlights that some Member States provide for more active participation of their national and/or regional parliaments in the European legislative process by, for example, the exercise of parliamentary reserve; encourages all Member States to implement measures ensuring more active participation of national parliaments in the forming of their national positions in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Council’s deliberations; |
Or. en
Amendment 106
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Welcomes the contributions of the LXXII COSAC Plenary Meeting, which recommended the strengthening of the subsidiarity review by the national parliaments, through the extension of the eight-week deadline for submitting opinions to ten weeks and through lowering the threshold for triggering the yellow card to one quarter of the votes cast. |
Or. en
Amendment 107
Salvatore De Meo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks; | 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to a minimum of twelve weeks or more, where necessary, to ensure the maximum possible time is available for those national parliaments which, due to their more complex internal legislative procedures or the need for in-depth consultation, need a longer period of time to properly assess EU legislative proposals. This would make for more effective participation and ensure greater quality and timeliness in the work of national parliaments; |
Or. it
Amendment 108
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks; | 13. Believes that national parliaments could be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks; recalls that the Commission has already provided for certain flexibility in the deadlines, by additionally excluding the period between 20 December and 10 January; |
Or. en
Amendment 109
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks; | 13. Believes that the role of national parliaments can be enhanced, for instance, by creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; acknowledges, moreover, the request by national parliaments to extend the current eight-week deadline during which they can submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1; |
Or. en
Amendment 110
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks; | 13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 to twelve weeks; |
Or. en
Amendment 111
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13 a. Reiterates the need to strengthen the structural cooperation of the EU legislator with national, regional and local law-makers; underlines that in this regard the “European Parliamentary Week” and Interparliamentary Committee Meetings have been instrumental; believes that the further development of an expanded annual European Week would allow Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and ministers of sitting Council presidencies to stand before all national and, where appropriate, regional parliaments in order to discuss and explain the European agenda alongside national parliamentarians; suggests opening a discussion on drawing up a common political declaration or framework agreement between the national parliaments and the European Parliament concerning the organisation of the proposed European Week in order to provide a more coherent framework of cooperation at political, institutional and administrative level; considers that the proposed European Week should draw lessons from current and previous forums, such as the parliamentary week held by the European Semester Conference and the IPC on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union, as well as the CoFoE; believes, further, that political family meetings and caucuses between and within national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation could bring added value in the form of authentic European political debate; |
Or. en
Amendment 112
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 113
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 114
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 115
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; undertakes to carry out an automatic and compulsory examination by its competent committee of the assessments and reasoned opinions sent by the national parliaments, and to forward the results of this examination to the Commission, in order to avoid unilateral decisions by the Commission; calls for the immediate application of an extensible interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 1, pending a revision of the treaties, allowing national parliaments to demand a reinforced examination of legislative proposals before they go to trialogue; |
Or. en
Amendment 116
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | 14. Considers that the limited usage of the yellow card procedure and the ineffectiveness of the orange card procedure show that there is still room for improvement and that better coordination between national parliaments is possible in this respect; |
Or. en
Amendment 117
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal; | 14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; considers the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal, however notes that this may have unintended consequences given the current absence of a shared understanding of the meaning and scope of subsidiarity assessments by national Parliaments; |
Or. en
Amendment 118
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 a. Observes that many national parliaments are consistently supplementing their subsidiarity review with a proportionality review, while raising additional concerns over the choice of the legal instrument, the impact of EU legislation on sensitive areas of national sovereignty, and the substantive provisions of the concerned proposals; Suggests that a future Treaty Change should codify this practice in a new Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality and further empower national parliaments to voice their concerns as legitimate actors of EU integration. |
Or. en
Amendment 119
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals; | 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals; considers in this regard that the Commission should facilitate the organisation of public consultations on local and regional level and increase the agency and the participation of citizens in EU policy-making; |
Or. en
Amendment 120
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals; | 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities, in particular represented by the European Committee of the Regions, and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals, as well as in the evaluation of existing EU legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 121
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals; | 15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and stakeholders and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals; |
Or. en
Amendment 122
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15 a. Encourages the European institutions and regional parliaments with legislative powers to have more active engagement and direct interaction between each other, while fully respecting the role and competences of national parliaments; calls for national parliaments to include the reasoned opinions of regional parliaments with legislative powers into their final reasoned opinions that are sent to the Presidents of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission when regional exclusive competences are affected; reaffirms that Article 12 TEU and Protocol No 1 give national parliaments the right to receive information directly from the European institutions; suggests that the right to be informed be extended also to regional parliaments with legislative powers |
Or. en
Amendment 123
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15 a. Underlines the importance of effective and direct involvement of MEPs and MPs in the communication of European legislative initiatives to the citizens; in the spirit of the subsidiarity principle, citizens need to be effectively and timely informed of any such proposal; [PG1] [PG1]l-as scoate de tot pe cel nou si l-as pune pe cel de mai jos formulat de mine la textul original care e mai explicit- adica parlamentarii Eu to held meetings cu parlamentarii din statele membre, sa faca informale pentru cetateni, industrie, stakeholderi |
Or. en
Amendment 124
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 125
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 126
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; | 16. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; encourages the Commission to draw on the expertise and experience of national and regional authorities regarding the transposition and implementation of EU legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 127
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Role of the CJEU | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 128
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 129
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 130
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; | 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; underlines that the check on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is essentially a political question entrusted to the EU’s political institutions and the national parliaments and therefore it does not necessarily require enforcement by the Court; |
Or. en
Amendment 131
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; | 17. Stresses that the CJEU plays a crucial role in applying and interpreting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legal framework; |
Or. en
Amendment 132
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regrets that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions; | 17. Stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 133
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17 a. Notes that the Court of Justice and the Advocates General have preferred a conservative reading of the principle of subsidiarity as a brake to the discretionary power of the Commission due to the political nature of the principle; Encourages a more technical reading of subsidiarity, by reference to the tests employed by the Commission in the ex-ante assessment phase. |
Or. en
Amendment 134
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 135
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 136
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 137
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 138
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 139
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States; | 18. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; |
Or. en
Amendment 140
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18 a. Recommends that the Commission in its consultations with the Member States makes sure that the governments provide the evidence that they take into account the position of national and regional parliaments; |
Or. en
Amendment 141
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 142
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 143
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 144
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 145
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 146
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence; | 19. Acknowledges the perceived reluctance of the Court to robustly enforce subsidiarity as a meaningful constraint on EU legislative action; |
Or. en
Amendment 147
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19 a. emphasises the need for more rigorous judicial review of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, whereas the settled case law of the CJEU tends to broaden the scope of EU competences through a finalistic interpretation of the treaties (notably in the Pringle, AETR and Digital Rights Ireland rulings); requires that any Member State be able to challenge a decision of the Commission or the European Parliament on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, without the obligation to demonstrate direct harm, thus facilitating legal recourse against illegitimate encroachments by the EU; recommends that the CJEU systematically apply strict control of the justifications put forward by the Commission, by imposing a reverse burden of proof, obliging the EU to demonstrate the absolute necessity of its legislative initiatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 148
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20. Insists that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 149
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20. Insists that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 150
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20. Insists that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking; | 20. Recalls that, as an EU institution, the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality when interpreting and applying EU law; |
Or. en
Amendment 151
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20. Insists that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking; | 20. Notes that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking; |
Or. en
Amendment 152
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20 a. Notes that subsidiarity should not be applied in isolation as part of the Court’s judicial review; As a manifestation of the loyalty between various levels of governance, subsidiarity should be analysed together with the duty of sincere cooperation; Suggests that the Court and the Advocate General should consider merging the subsidiarity review with an evaluation of the Union’s and the Member States’ duty of loyalty. |
Or. en
Amendment 153
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. |
Or. en
Amendment 154
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. |
Or. en
Amendment 155
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; | 21. Insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation; |
| _________________ | |
| 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. |
Or. en
Amendment 156
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; | 21. Recalls the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; highlights that the Union works on the principles of sincere cooperation and that all Member States have signed and ratified the treaties and accepted the possibility certain decisions to be taken by qualified majority; |
| _________________ | |
| 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. |
Or. en
Amendment 157
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole; | 21. Takes note of the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality12 ; insists, however that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation for the EU as a whole; |
| _________________ | _________________ |
| 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. | 12 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2015, Republic of Estonia v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-508/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:403. |
Or. en
Amendment 158
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality13 ; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals do not go beyond the scope of the original impact assessment; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-482/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035. |
Or. en
Amendment 159
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality13 ; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals do not go beyond the scope of the original impact assessment; | deleted |
| _________________ | |
| 13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-482/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035. |
Or. en
Amendment 160
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality13 ; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals do not go beyond the scope of the original impact assessment; | 22. Calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments and ensure that legislative proposals respect the principles of subsidiarity; |
| _________________ | |
| 13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-482/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035. |
Or. en
Amendment 161
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality13 ; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals do not go beyond the scope of the original impact assessment; | 22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality13 ; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception; |
| _________________ | _________________ |
| 13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-482/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035. | 13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-482/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035. |
Or. en
Amendment 162
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22 a. Underlines that respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is crucial for citizens’ trust in the EU and its legislation, and should be more clearly communicated to the public during the communication on single legislative initiatives; recognises that it is fundamental to assess the “cost of non-Europe” especially in areas such as competiveness, trade, cross-border crime investigation, and others in order to showcase the added value of the EU legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 163
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 22 b. Reiterates that impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information; consequently considers it essential for the EU legislator to collect the input from the local and regional authorities who are able to provide the most precise information on different issues; |
Or. en
Amendment 164
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 165
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 166
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 167
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 168
Loránt Vincze, Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality; | 23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a conversation with the legislative bodies in the Member States in order to assess their perception of the respect for the subsidiarity principle in the EU decision-making; |
Or. en
Amendment 169
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23 a. Considers it pertinent to conduct a survey among national legislative bodies, in order to collect their feedback on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; suggests therefore that the Commission conducts such a survey in order to identify in what areas and to what extent national legislative bodies need to be protagonists of change; |
Or. en
Amendment 170
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ as part of any future Treaty revision process; | 24. Welcomes steps made in recent years by European decision-makers to cast additional clarity on the institutional implementation of the proportionality and subsidiarity principles, including through the Task Force on Subsidiarity and the introduction of the subsidiarity grid; calls for a continued and consistent application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; suggests to amend the Treaties to enable the creation of a dedicated legal basis explicitly empowering the CJEU to review EU legislation on the basis of the respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; underlines that such CJEU review will help to increase compliance with the EU law; |
Or. en
Amendment 171
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ as part of any future Treaty revision process; | 24. Calls for the thorough application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the legislative process; |
Or. en
Amendment 172
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ as part of any future Treaty revision process; | 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; |
Or. en
Amendment 173
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ as part of any future Treaty revision process; | 24. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, taking into account the active subsidiarity approach developed by the Task Force and ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; |
Or. en
Amendment 174
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 25. Demands greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments and stakeholders to ensure subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed; | 25. Demands to close any loopholes for greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments and stakeholders to ensure subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed; |
Or. en
Amendment 175
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 25. Demands greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments and stakeholders to ensure subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed; | 25. Demands greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments, social partners, especially trade unions, civil society and all relevant stakeholders; |
Or. en
Amendment 176
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 25. Demands greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments and stakeholders to ensure subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed; | 25. Demands greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments to ensure subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed; |
Or. en
Amendment 177
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existing legislation; | 26. Notes the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should focus more on areas where EU action has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; |
Or. en
Amendment 178
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existing legislation; | 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should focus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; |
Or. en
Amendment 179
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existing legislation; | 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to more carefully select future initiatives and streamline existing legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 180
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’ has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existing legislation; | 26. Recalls that EU policy and legislative action should focus on domains where the EU has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges EU institutions to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existing legislation; |
Or. en
Amendment 181
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26 a. Considers that the existing EU legislation should be regularly assessed in terms of proportionality and adequacy to the modern realities; underlines that artificial intelligence can be instrumental in finding legal inconsistencies or disproportionate effects, and thus facilitate the compliance and address, where applicable, the lack of proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 182
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26 a. Suggests that all interparliamentary activities developed in the framework of Protocol 1 of the Lisbon Treaty (including COSAC, IPEX, ECPRD, etc.) by national Parliaments and the European Parliament should be better used, integrated and synergistically in order to better apply the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; |
Or. en
Amendment 183
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 26 b. Points out that |Members of the European Parliament, being directly elected by the European citizens, have major powers for setting the EU legislative agenda; commits to use the right of initiative under Article 225 TFEU to propose repealing legislation to reduce the regulatory burden, in full respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 184
Nikolas Farantouris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that if a legislative objective can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, the Commission should not propose legislation and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government; | 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality facilitates better lawmaking and ensures that EU action is appropriate and necessary; |
Or. en
Amendment 185
Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that if a legislative objective can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, the Commission should not propose legislation and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government; | 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; |
Or. en
Amendment 186
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that if a legislative objective can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, the Commission should not propose legislation and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government; | 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that before making a legislative proposal the Commission should assess whether the desired positive effect can be achieved at the local, regional or national level; |
Or. en
Amendment 187
Kristian Vigenin, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Brando Benifei
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that if a legislative objective can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, the Commission should not propose legislation and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government; | 27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality could facilitate better law making and could reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; underlines the conclusions by the Task Force that the Commission and the co-legislators should balance their work towards delivering more effective implementation rather than initiating new legislation or constantly amending the existing one in areas where the existing body of legislation is mature and/or has recently been substantially revised; |
Or. en
Amendment 188
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27 a. Notes that the excessive accumulation of European standards and regulations increases the administrative burden on Member States; advocates the adoption of a principle of automatic suppression (‘one in, two out’), requiring the repeal of two European regulations for each new measure adopted, inspired by the mechanisms in force in the United Kingdom and Germany; calls for Member States to be able, through a right of collective opposition, to block the application of a directive or regulation in the event of opposition from more than one third of national parliaments; reiterates that any extension of the scope of a regulation must be subject to formal public consultation of the citizens of the Member States concerned; |
Or. en
Amendment 189
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27 a. Commends the Conference of the Future of Europe as an example of direct democracy; considers that the EU legislator should create a more permanent basis for citizens’ participation in policy-making, particularly on the local and regional level, i.a. with the use of agoras and European Citizen Initiatives; considers that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are equally applicable on the local and regional level, and that together with the principle of proximity they guarantee a meaningful involvement of citizens in public life; |
Or. en
Amendment 190
Gheorghe Piperea
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27 a. Suggests that in case of disagreement over national and European competences in a certain area, the European Council should be called to advise upon the matter; moreover, the CJEU should also be notified concerning a judicial conflict of constitutional nature between EU and member states; [PG1] [PG1]l-am modificat eu si pe acesta la paragraful G |
Or. en
Amendment 191
Jean-Paul Garraud, Alexandre Varaut
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27 b. Insists on the need to preserve the Member States' right of veto, enshrined in the principle of unanimity, in order to guarantee that any extension of the EU's regulatory powers cannot be imposed against the explicit will of one or more States; recalls that this right of veto is an essential element of national sovereignty and a guarantee of respect for the institutional balances provided for in the Treaties; |
Or. en
Amendment 192
Joachim Streit, Charles Goerens, Ľubica Karvašová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27 b. Concludes that the revision of the EU Treaties could help enable a more consistent application of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; considers that public consultations and other forms of direct democracy should contribute to shaping the new EU Treaties. |
Or. en
Amendment 193
Branko Grims
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. | 28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission and national Parliament. |
Or. en