Sittings · Document
Report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-09-09
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
9.9.2026 A10-0199/87
Amendment 87
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Ca. whereas Russia’s 2015 and 2021 National Security Strategies elevated the protection of ‘traditional Russian spiritual and moral values’ to a national security priority, reinforced by the 2022 presidential decree on traditional values; whereas these developments reflect the securitisation of religion and morality and provide a doctrinal basis for using religious and cultural networks to advance Russian geopolitical objectives; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/88
Amendment 88
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2a. Recognises that ‘reflexive control’, a concept originating in Soviet military theory and defined as the deliberate shaping of an adversary’s decision-making environment through the transmission of carefully calibrated information, seeks to induce the target to adopt decisions that advance the influencing actor’s strategic objectives; notes with concern that the Russian Federation has incorporated such techniques into its broader hybrid influence operations targeting democratic institutions, electoral processes and policy formation; stresses that these practices, which extend beyond conventional disinformation, exploit cognitive biases, institutional vulnerabilities and cultural narratives in order to distort perception, encourage miscalculation and influence outcomes without the use of overt coercion, thereby undermining rational decision-making and democratic governance; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/89
Amendment 89
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2b. Underlines that the method of ‘reflexive control’ operates by systematically introducing tailored informational inputs into a target’s decision-making cycle in order to subtly shape perceptions, narrow perceived options and influence choices over time in ways that are difficult to detect, attribute or counter through conventional FIMI responses; notes that such techniques have been observed in hybrid and cognitive influence operations targeting European decision-makers and public opinion; stresses that these frameworks can distort policy debates, lead to narratives being embedded and reinforced within EU institutions and Member States, and ultimately contribute to policy outcomes that inadvertently advance external strategic interests rather than the EU’s own security objectives; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/90
Amendment 90
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Expresses serious concern that the engagement-based recommendation systems of certain VLOPs often cause systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes, as they amplify divisive, polarising or misleading content, often fuelling disinformation from foreign and domestic actors, while disproportionately favouring sensationalist material over fact-based content; recalls that Articles 34 and 35 DSA oblige VLOPs to assess and mitigate such risks; maintains that effective risk mitigation measures should also ensure that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material, and that editorially independent and pluralistic media and verified sources have due prominence; calls on the Commission to investigate compliance with DSA obligations in this regard and take appropriate measures, including imposing interim measures; suggests that such interim measures include the limitation of engagement-based recommender systems that pose systemic risk, where necessary; further calls on the Commission to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, especially together with other algorithmic systems, in order to enhance user choice and ensure non-manipulative default settings, all while promoting freedom of expression and information; reminds VLOPs, in this context, of their obligation to mitigate systemic risks, which may include testing and adapting their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems, and of their obligation to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling, in line with Articles 35(1)(d) and 38 DSA; further calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and with the involvement of independent third parties through public consultations, to ensure that there are up-to-date guidelines for systemic risk mitigation, and to ensure consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation; | 21. Expresses serious concern that the engagement-based recommendation systems of certain VLOPs often cause systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes, as they amplify divisive, polarising or misleading content, often fuelling disinformation from foreign and domestic actors, while disproportionately favouring sensationalist material over fact-based content; recalls that Articles 34 and 35 DSA oblige VLOPs to assess and mitigate such risks; maintains that effective risk mitigation measures should also ensure that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material, and should focus on coordinated inauthentic behaviour, deceptive impersonation, bot-driven artificial amplification, undisclosed paid influence and manipulative platform practices; stresses that such measures must not result in public authorities determining which lawful political or journalistic sources should receive preferential algorithmic treatment; calls on the Commission to investigate compliance with DSA obligations in this regard and take appropriate measures, including imposing interim measures; stresses that any interim measures affecting recommender systems must be necessary and proportionate to a demonstrable systemic risk; further calls on the Commission to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, especially together with other algorithmic systems, in order to enhance user choice and ensure non-manipulative default settings, all while promoting freedom of expression and information; reminds VLOPs, in this context, of their obligation to mitigate systemic risks, which may include testing and adapting their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems, and of their obligation to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling, in line with Articles 35(1)(d) and 38 DSA; further calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and with the involvement of independent third parties through public consultations, to ensure that there are up-to-date guidelines for systemic risk mitigation, and to ensure consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/91
Amendment 91
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23a. Notes that fact-checking, while an important instrument to counter disinformation, can itself be misused or perceived to be a tool for manipulation if it lacks transparency, pluralism, demonstrable expertise or clear accountability; stresses therefore the need for robust safeguards, including full transparency regarding funding sources, methodologies and governance structures, strict separation from political or commercial interests, the possibility of peer review and reasoned contestation of assessments, and appropriate independent oversight mechanisms; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/92
Amendment 92
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 48. Underlines that society-based independent fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments and mitigation; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need technical support and stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could serve as a valuable tool to achieve this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence from online platform providers, and methodological objectivity; emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers; further underlines the importance of supporting networks of fact-checkers in candidate and potential candidate countries; | 48. Underlines that society-based independent fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments and mitigation; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need technical support and stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could serve as a valuable tool to achieve this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, methodological objectivity and independence in their editorial conclusions from governments, political parties and online platform providers; calls on fact-checking organisations receiving EU funding to disclose their funding sources, methodology, conflicts of interest and correction procedures; stresses that publicly funded fact-checking organisations must not exercise regulatory or content-removal powers and that their assessments must not be used as a substitute for determinations by competent regulatory or judicial authorities; emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers; further underlines the importance of supporting networks of fact-checkers in candidate and potential candidate countries; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/93
Amendment 93
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88a. Highlights the increasing instrumentalisation of the Russian Orthodox Church as a vector of Kremlin influence, including efforts to undermine democratic processes and project Russian soft power abroad; welcomes the fact that, for the first time, the European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20251a acknowledges the valuable contribution of religious actors, faith communities and interfaith dialogue, calling for systemic attention to these factors in EU missions and operations; stresses, however, that this represents only a preliminary step in counterbalancing the full scope of the Kremlin apparatus; underlines the need for the EU to create dedicated task forces, specialised training for diplomats and field personnel, and operational frameworks to anticipate, detect and mitigate the strategic instrumentalisation of religion and cultural networks in Russian hybrid influence operations; ___________________ 1a OJ C, C/2026/3689, 5.8.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/3689/oj. |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/94
Amendment 94
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88c. Underlines the importance of strengthening faith-based engagement and dialogue as part of the EU’s broader resilience strategy, promoting structured and transparent cooperation between the EU, the Member States and legitimate religious actors in order to counter hybrid threats, disinformation and the instrumentalisation of religion, while fully respecting freedom of religion or belief and pluralism; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/95
Amendment 95
Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90a. Underlines with grave concern that in March 2024, a document approved by the Russian Orthodox Church–led World Russian People’s Council officially described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a ‘holy war’; notes that this rhetoric represents a deliberate fusion of ecclesiastical authority with state military objectives, serving to sacralise crimes against humanity, legitimise territorial conquest and mobilise religious identity in support of Kremlin policy; |
Or. en