Sittings · Document
Report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-09-09
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
9.9.2026 A10-0199/74
Amendment 74
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| C. whereas the threat posed by Russia to Europe’s security and democratic integrity remains at unprecedented levels; whereas other actors, including China and Iran, also pose significant challenges; whereas it is necessary to adopt a principle of information deterrence and, where appropriate, apply restrictive measures against actors responsible for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); | C. whereas the threat posed by Russia to Europe’s security and democratic integrity remains at unprecedented levels; whereas other actors, including China and Iran, also pose significant challenges; whereas it is necessary to address Europe’s decades-long underinvestment in defence and strengthen its contribution to collective defence, while developing a credible approach to information deterrence and, where appropriate, fully apply and enforce restrictive measures against actors responsible for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/75
Amendment 75
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield contains several positive recommendations and proposals, such as the establishment of an European Centre for Democratic Resilience, the extension of its scope to accession countries and the EU neighbourhood and the full enforcement of key EU legislation; whereas both of Parliament’s Special Committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE 2) had already called for the establishment of an EU structure similar to the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience to counter FIMI and disinformation; whereas such a structure should not duplicate existing tools, capabilities and competences, but instead consolidate them into a single entity with a clear vision and mandate, real powers and financing; | D. whereas the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield contains several positive recommendations and proposals, but also a number of elements that raise concerns and objections, such as the establishment of an European Centre for Democratic Resilience; whereas such a structure lacks a clear legal basis, risks duplicating existing tools, capabilities and competences, and remains unclear as regards its mandate, powers and financing; whereas its establishment represents a shift of competences and resources away from the EEAS and existing mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation towards the Commission, contributing to an unwarranted expansion of the Commission’s role and powers; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/76
Amendment 76
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| G. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU and democratic processes in its Member States; whereas, ultimately, European citizens are the primary victims of these practices, as their access to reliable information and their capacity to form independent opinions and to participate meaningfully in democratic life are directly weakened, while public security and societal stability are also put at risk; | G. whereas the threats posed by FIMI and disinformation extend beyond individual Member States, to an attack on the very essence of the European project as well as on the transatlantic bond and the NATO Alliance, which have underpinned European security for decades; whereas weakening the transatlantic bond and diminishing the US presence and engagement in Europe are among the objectives pursued by hostile actors, in particular Russia and China; whereas FIMI operations systematically target the core democratic values of Article 2 TEU and the principle of open, transparent decision-making processes enshrined in Article 1 TEU, in a manner that adversely affects the interests of the EU and democratic processes in its Member States; whereas, ultimately, European citizens are the primary victims of these practices, as their access to reliable information and their capacity to form independent opinions and to participate meaningfully in democratic life are directly weakened, while public security and societal stability are also put at risk; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/77
Amendment 77
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital BC
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| BC. whereas in recent months, multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway; whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, including ‘smuggling balloons’ used for cross-border illicit activities, remain under investigation but are widely suspected of forming part of the same pattern of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed at Europe; | BC. whereas in recent months, multiple airspace violations and unauthorised drone incursions have been reported over several EU Member States and neighbouring NATO allies, including Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Norway;whereas a number of these incidents have been clearly attributed to Russian military aircraft and drones, while other incidents, involving unidentified aerial objects, including ‘smuggling balloons’ used for cross-border illicit activities, remain under investigation but are widely suspected of forming part of the same pattern of hybrid intimidation and destabilisation directed at Europe; whereas a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile that struck Poland on 30 July 2026 was deliberately directed into EU and NATO territory as part of Moscow’s effort to test the Alliance’s response to a potential armed attack; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/78
Amendment 78
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| BZ. whereas the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy reflect a shift in long-standing US foreign policy, marked, among other indicators, by the explicit focus of US interests in the Western hemisphere and the downplaying of the threat posed by Russia and China; whereas the National Security Strategy also includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; whereas the strategy frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades; | BZ. whereas the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy reflect a shift in long-standing US foreign policy, marked, among other indicators, by the explicit focus of US interests in the Western hemisphere and the downplaying of the threat posed by Russia and China; whereas for decades the EU and certain Member States have pursued, and sought to impose on other Member States, misguided and dangerous policies of economic, political and even military engagement with Russia and China, disregarding repeated warnings from the United States and several Central and Eastern European Member States; whereas these policies resulted in serious energy and economic dependencies on authoritarian regimes, contributed to the security crises Europe faces today, and weakened Europe’s strategic resilience; whereas the Nord Stream pipelines stand as a particularly striking example of these shameful policy failures; whereas the National Security Strategy also includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States, which the EU institutions have, for ideological and political reasons, failed to acknowledge and lacked the courage to address on their merits; whereas the strategy frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies, whom the United States has for years, largely without success, urged to fulfil their Alliance commitments and make meaningful investments in their own security and defence; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/79
Amendment 79
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| BZa. whereas for years the EU has implemented agreements such as the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), opening the way to political and economic cooperation with the communist regime in Cuba; whereas, in return, the Cuban regime has failed to fulfil any of its commitments and has instead further intensified its violations of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, assembly, religion and association, as well as fundamental rights, including labour rights; whereas Havana is additionally a close partner of the regimes in Moscow and Minsk, providing them with political support and contributing negatively to European security, inter alia, by facilitating the involvement of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas, despite these facts, repeated calls from the Cuban democratic opposition, testimonies of former political prisoners, appeals by human rights defenders and repeated calls by Parliament, the EU has to date failed to activate the suspension clause of the PDCA; whereas this continued inaction is exploited by the communist regime as a form of political support and shamefully places the EU on the side of the regime rather than that of the Cuban people and their fundamental right to dignity, freedom and democracy; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/80
Amendment 80
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital CL
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| CL. whereas Parliament has been the target of espionage and foreign interference, including the conviction of an assistant to former Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Maximilian Krah, a member of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for spying on behalf of China; whereas MEPs and their staff have access to sensitive information and documents within Parliament; | CL. whereas Parliament has been the target of espionage and foreign interference, including the conviction of an assistant to former Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Maximilian Krah, a member of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for spying on behalf of China; whereas MEPs and their staff have access to sensitive information and documents within Parliament; whereas a Russian influence network operating in and around Parliament was exposed following an investigation by the Polish security services and their international partners; whereas the existence and methods of this network were subsequently confirmed by the conviction of former MEP Nathan Gill by a British court for accepting bribes in exchange for speeches in the European Parliament serving Russian interests; whereas, according to the findings of the Polish services, Russian operatives paid a network involving several MEPs to deliver speeches written on behalf of Russian interests and to participate in initiatives orchestrated by them, including the observation of sham elections and referendums in Russian-occupied territories; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/81
Amendment 81
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło, Adam Bielan
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Recital CN a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| CNa. whereas the integrity, impartiality and political independence of the judiciary are essential to the proper functioning of democracy and to maintaining citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and the rule of law; whereas allegations of corruption, conflicts of interest, political interference or abuse of judicial power must therefore be subject to thorough, independent and transparent investigation; whereas the failure to ensure such scrutiny remains a serious deficiency even in countries regarded as established democracies and risks fostering impunity at the highest levels of the judiciary; whereas a particularly alarming example is the high-level corruption scandal currently engulfing Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF), which has raised serious concerns over alleged corruption, conflicts of interest, politicisation and the weaponisation of judicial power; whereas these concerns are compounded by previous allegations concerning censorship, arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of expression, as well as by the sanctions imposed by the United States under the Global Magnitsky framework on STF Justice Alexandre de Moraes; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/82
Amendment 82
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 65. Calls for the effective criminalisation and deterrence of hybrid activities and acts of sabotage, including attack on undersea cables and connectors; encourages the Commission and the Member States to learn from the Australian example of establishing ‘cable protection zones’, providing legal safeguards and criminalising damage to submarine cables beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country partners; | 65. Calls for the effective criminalisation and deterrence of hybrid activities and acts of sabotage, including attack on undersea cables and connectors; encourages the Commission and the Member States to learn from the Australian example of establishing ‘cable protection zones’, providing legal safeguards and criminalising damage to submarine cables beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country partners, including Taiwan’s experience in protecting critical undersea infrastructure; draws attention to the inadequacy of the existing international legal framework for attributing such acts and holding accountable both their perpetrators and those who order, direct or sponsor them, particularly when attacks are carried out beyond territorial waters or through vessels sailing under flags of convenience; stresses that the current system for enforcing accountability for the deliberate destruction or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure remains insufficient and calls for concrete efforts to close these legal and enforcement gaps; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/83
Amendment 83
Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88. Stresses that repeated attempts to normalise relations with Russia, without addressing the underlying nature of the Russian state and its imperial strategic objectives, have contributed to increased instability, have weakened deterrence and have undermined European and global security; underlines that future EU and Member States’ policies must be based on a realistic assessment of this historical continuity, prioritising deterrence, resilience and the security of countries in Russia’s neighbourhood over short-term economic or political considerations; welcomes the efforts in recent years to decouple the EU economy from dependence on Russian fossil fuels; further stresses that the complete and irreversible phase-out of such dependence should be a strategic priority for the EU and its Member States; | 88. Stresses that repeated attempts to normalise relations with Russia, without addressing the underlying nature of the Russian state and its imperial strategic objectives, have contributed to increased instability, have weakened deterrence and have undermined European and global security; underlines that future EU and Member States’ policies must be based on a realistic assessment of this historical continuity, prioritising deterrence, resilience and the security of countries in Russia’s neighbourhood over short-term economic or political considerations; welcomes the efforts in recent years to decouple the EU economy from dependence on Russian fossil fuels; further stresses that the complete and irreversible phase-out of such dependence should be a strategic priority for the EU and its Member States; strongly deplores the failure of the German authorities and political elites to investigate the circumstances surrounding the development of the Nord Stream pipelines, including allegations of Russian influence, intelligence activities and corruption, while devoting considerable resources to pursuing those responsible for disabling this dangerous project; considers that, from Ukraine’s perspective as a state exercising its inherent right of self-defence against Russia’s war of aggression, infrastructure providing substantial economic support to the Russian war effort may constitute a legitimate military objective; |
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