Sittings · Document
Report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-09-09
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
9.9.2026 A10-0199/68
Amendment 68
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 77a. Expresses serious concern about the invocation of the concept of so-called militant democracy as a political justification for actions that circumvent constitutional and statutory rules, weaken institutional checks and balances and undermine legal certainty; stresses that the defence of democracy cannot justify disregarding the constitution, the separation of powers, due process or the independence of public institutions; in this context notes with particular concern developments in Poland under the government of Donald Tusk, including the unlawful takeover of public media through the use of force, including by shutting down television signals, dismissing journalists and increasing pressure on opposition and critical media; recalls that governments cannot credibly claim to defend democracy while weakening the legal safeguards and pluralism on which democracy itself depends; calls on the Commission to apply the same rule-of-law standards to Poland as it applies to all other Member States, irrespective of the political orientation of the government in power; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/69
Amendment 69
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 101a. Underlines that primary responsibility for the organisation, conduct and supervision of elections lies with the Member States, subject to applicable EU law; rejects the creation, whether through legislation, soft law or administrative practice, of any general EU-level monitoring or supervisory role over national electoral processes for which no explicit Treaty basis exists; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/70
Amendment 70
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 101b. Expresses serious concern about attempts to influence electoral competition in Poland through opaque foreign financing, state-linked foundations, non-governmental organisations and externally financed online campaigns; recalls that both the 2023 parliamentary elections and the 2025 presidential election were exposed to foreign interference, including from Russia, and notes reports concerning the financing by foreign actors, including those registered in Member States and financed by the EU, of social-media campaigns targeting particular political candidates and forces; stresses, in particular, that activities presented as neutral civic-awareness or voter-turnout campaigns must not be used as a vehicle for covert political campaigning, negative campaigning or the circumvention of national rules on electoral financing; calls for full transparency concerning the sources of financing, beneficiaries, intermediaries and expenditure of organisations conducting politically relevant campaigns during electoral periods; insists that EU institutions themselves must refrain from any action that could be perceived as favouring particular actors in national electoral competitions; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/71
Amendment 71
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 115 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 115a. Stresses that the protection of democracy must not be used as a pretext for further centralisation of decision-making at EU level or for circumventing the institutional balance established by the Treaties; strongly opposes, in particular, attempts to erode or progressively abolish the principle of unanimity in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) through a general or gradual shift to qualified majority voting, as this would weaken the sovereign prerogatives of the Member States in a core area of national foreign and security policy; reaffirms that decision-making under the CFSP must remain fully in accordance with Article 31 TEU; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/72
Amendment 72
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 132 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 132a. Stresses that the credibility of the EU’s efforts to counter foreign interference, corruption and malign influence depends first and foremost on its willingness to address vulnerabilities within its own institutions with the same determination and transparency that it expects from the Member States; recalls that foreign interference does not operate solely through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks or external influence operations, but may also exploit corruption, bribery, conflicts of interest, opaque lobbying, revolving-door practices, inadequate scrutiny of external contacts and weaknesses in the control of EU funding; recalls, in this regard, the serious institutional vulnerabilities exposed by the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal, which demonstrated the capacity of third-country interests to seek influence within Parliament through financial inducements, intermediaries and covert networks; further recalls the conviction of former MEPs for accepting bribes in return for activities promoting pro-Russian interests, including parliamentary interventions, which constitutes a particularly serious example of foreign financial influence reaching directly into parliamentary activity; considers that such cases must be treated not merely as individual instances of misconduct but as warnings concerning the resilience, integrity and security of the EU’s own democratic institutions; draws particular attention, in this context, to the money-laundering charges brought against former EU Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, and to reports of his close contacts with Russian nationals, including a sanctioned oligarch close to Putin, at a time when the Commissioner was also responsible for the implementation of sanctions; calls on the Commission to cooperate with the relevant authorities and services and to take its own steps to clarify how the allegations against Commissioner Reynders may have affected the exercise of his duties, including whether they undermined the EU’s policy towards Russia and whether they contributed to unjustified attacks against Poland, a frontline Member State and a key country in supporting Ukraine; strongly condemns revolving-door practices whereby former senior political office-holders assume remunerated positions or advisory roles in state-controlled companies or structures linked to authoritarian third countries, as illustrated by the involvement of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder with the Russian energy sector; stresses that such relationships may create dependencies, conflicts of interest and opportunities for foreign leverage and may severely damage public confidence in European decision-making; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/73
Amendment 73
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 132 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 132b. Calls on Parliament, the Commission and all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to conduct regular assessments of their exposure to corruption, covert foreign influence and conflicts of interest and to ensure appropriate follow-up where vulnerabilities are identified; underlines that democratic resilience cannot be credible if allegations or cases involving the EU institutions themselves are downplayed while increasingly intrusive standards of transparency, integrity and democratic scrutiny are demanded from Member States; insists that the same standards of accountability, transparency and institutional integrity must apply at EU and national levels and that protecting European democracy must begin with ensuring the integrity of the institutions that claim to be responsible for defending it; |
Or. en