Sittings · Document
Report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-09-09
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
9.9.2026 A10-0199/20
Amendment 20
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 44a. Stresses that the EU’s approach to digital surveillance and other technologies affecting fundamental rights should be consistent with and based on the same standards irrespective of the country of origin and irrespective of whether such technologies are developed, sold or used by third countries or by companies and authorities linked to strategic partners, including the United States and Israel; underlines that the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the rights to privacy and data protection, should be ensured without double standards; considers that such a consistent approach is essential to preserving the EU’s external credibility in promoting fundamental rights and democratic values, as well as the effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/21
Amendment 21
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63. Stresses that a range of hybrid activities that Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of an armed attack; underlines, therefore, the need to apply all available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; underlines that the EU must urgently transition from defence mode to active deterrence; urges the Member States to evaluate the legal and operational frameworks for proportionate offensive measures targeting the logistical and digital infrastructure behind Moscow’s destabilisation activities; notes that Russia is vulnerable to cyber operations, as the breach of Russia’s Aeroflot by Cyber Partisans has demonstrated; underlines Ukraine’s extensive experience in inflicting damage on Russian capabilities and the need to accelerate support for Ukraine in strengthening its offensive cyber capabilities; | 63. Underlines the need to apply all available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia’s hostile activities, which violate EU Member States’ territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/22
Amendment 22
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Notes the Commission’s announced revision of the mandate of Frontex; underlines that the revision should provide for the necessary legal basis, analytical capabilities and adequate human, financial and technical resources to enable effective assistance for Member States in the management and protection of the external borders in compliance with relevant Union law, including fundamental rights; stresses, in this context, the need to further strengthen the EU’s capacity to support Member States in matters related to home affairs under the 2028-2034 MFF, including in responding to threats of a hybrid nature; | deleted |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/23
Amendment 23
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86. Highlights that EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; calls for the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of CSDP missions and operations around the world to be enhanced, especially in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and in candidate and potential candidate countries; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include FIMI monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all relevant current and future missions and operations, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | deleted |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/24
Amendment 24
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 87. Stresses the importance of joint exercises, capacity building and technical assistance for partner countries facing persistent hybrid pressure; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the mandates of individual missions and operations, to increase the preparedness of partner countries; welcomes the deployment of EU hybrid rapid response teams and of cyber rapid response teams as useful instruments in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by cyberattacks and hybrid and FIMI attacks, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova; notes, in this context, the presence of Frontex in several relevant third countries and the potential added value of its capacities in this regard; | 87. Stresses the importance of joint exercises, capacity building and technical assistance for partner countries facing persistent hybrid pressure; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the mandates of individual missions and operations, to increase the preparedness of partner countries; welcomes the deployment of EU hybrid rapid response teams and of cyber rapid response teams as useful instruments in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by cyberattacks and hybrid and FIMI attacks, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/25
Amendment 25
Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 110 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 110a. Reiterates that Members of the European Parliament must act in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and transparency; recommends in this regard that an audit be performed on the general allowance of and all other forms of financial contributions to Members of the European Parliament on a yearly basis in order to increase Parliament’s transparency and trust in its Members among the citizens of the EU as well as reduce the risk of undue influence, interference or corruption; |
Or. en
9.9.2026 A10-0199/26
Amendment 26
Danilo Della Valle
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A10-0199/2026
Tomas Tobé
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
(2025/2069(INI))
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 116
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 116. Calls for the effectiveness and impact of EU sanctions adopted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to be improved, so as to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including sanctions targeting individuals and entities that engage in the active circumvention of the EU sanctions against Russia; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that, to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand sanctions targeting non-EU (and in particular Chinese) individuals and entities that are responsible for the active circumvention of sanctions and the facilitation of Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists who are covertly funded by Moscow; | 116. Calls for the effectiveness and impact of EU sanctions adopted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to be improved, so as to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; |
Or. en