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REPORT (COM(2025)0593 – C100232/2025 – 2025/0312(COD))

On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 as regards the economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability

A-10-2026-0097

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs · Rapporteur: Markus Ferber, Carla Tavares

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Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's amended version of the Commission proposal to amend Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on economic and budgetary surveillance of euro area Member States in financial difficulty. It aligns the rules with the 2024 economic governance reform, clarifies when enhanced surveillance applies to precautionary financial assistance, and reworks post-programme surveillance. It requires Member States receiving precautionary assistance that involves new policy measures to be placed under enhanced surveillance, and clarifies financial-sector information duties to respect the ECB's supervisory role. Post-programme surveillance would focus on repayment capacity, run until at least 75% of assistance is repaid, and follow a tiered system allowing suspension of regular assessments for five years where there are no material risks. It deletes several articles, adds an article on administrative arrangements with the ESM and other institutions, and updates the reporting duties of the Commission to Parliament and the Economic and Financial Committee.

Committee position. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopts Parliament's position at first reading with amendments to the Commission proposal, aligning Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 with the 2024 economic governance reform, clarifying enhanced surveillance for precautionary assistance, and reworking post-programme surveillance.

Key points

  1. The amended regulation covers euro area Member States that experience or are threatened with serious financial difficulties, or that request or receive financial assistance from other states, the EFSM, the ESM or institutions such as the IMF.
  2. A Member State receiving precautionary financial assistance that requires new policy measures must be placed under enhanced surveillance by the Commission, including where the assistance is not yet drawn.
  3. A Member State under enhanced surveillance must adopt measures to address the sources of its difficulties, taking into account recommendations under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 or Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
  4. On Commission request, such a Member State must communicate disaggregated financial-sector information, carry out stress tests or sensitivity analyses, submit to peer review of its supervisory capacities, and provide information on macroeconomic imbalances and budgetary surveillance.
  5. The application of the stress test and peer review duties must respect the division of responsibilities set by Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and the Commission, ECB and ESAs must treat disaggregated information as confidential.
  6. A Member State intending to request financial assistance must immediately inform the President of the Eurogroup Working Group, the member of the Commission responsible for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB.
  7. Where a Member State requests assistance from the EFSM or ESM, the Commission must assess the sustainability of its government debt and its financing needs, based on the most likely or a more prudent macroeconomic scenario.
  8. A draft macroeconomic adjustment programme must include annual budgetary targets and take into account the Member State's national medium-term fiscal-structural plan and its commitments on the Union's common priorities.
  9. The Commission must ensure that memoranda of understanding signed on behalf of the ESM are fully consistent with the approved macroeconomic adjustment programme and with the Council decision on the main policy requirements.
  10. Post-programme surveillance applies until at least 75% of the assistance received has been repaid, and the Council may extend it on a Commission proposal in the event of a persistent risk to repayment capacity.
  11. During post-programme surveillance the Commission must monitor repayment capacity, the implementation of reforms not already covered by the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, and the need for corrective measures, reporting every six months.
  12. Five years after post-programme surveillance starts, the Commission may assess repayment capacity and, after an opinion from the Economic and Financial Committee, suspend regular assessments for five years if there are no material medium-term risks.

Who is affected

  • Euro area Member States in financial difficulty or receiving financial assistance: subject to enhanced or post-programme surveillance and reporting duties.
  • Member States receiving precautionary assistance requiring new policy measures: placed under enhanced surveillance.
  • The Commission: assesses debt sustainability, monitors programmes, reports to Parliament and the Economic and Financial Committee, and seeks administrative arrangements with the ESM.
  • The European Central Bank and the European Supervisory Authorities: liaise on surveillance, stress tests and peer reviews, respecting the division of responsibilities.
  • The European Parliament: receives assessments, may invite Council and Commission representatives to a dialogue, and may offer the Member State an exchange of views.

Figures and deadlines

  • 75% of the financial assistance received: threshold below which post-programme surveillance continues.
  • 10 days: period for the Council to reject a Commission proposal to extend post-programme surveillance by qualified majority.
  • Five years: point after which the Commission may prepare a specific assessment of repayment capacity.
  • Five years: period for which the Commission may suspend regular assessments.
  • 90%: general government debt-to-GDP ratio taken into account in the specific assessment.
  • Every six months: frequency of the Commission's assessment during post-programme surveillance.
  • Every quarter: frequency of the Commission's assessment during enhanced surveillance.
  • Every three months: frequency of Commission information to the Economic and Financial Committee on programme progress.

Legal basis: Article 136 in combination with Article 121(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union