Sittings · Document
4.3.2026 A10-0016/1
Amendment 1
Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell
on behalf of the ESN Group
Report A10-0016/2026
Petras Auštrevičius
on the EU enlargement strategy
(2025/2110(INI))
Motion for a resolution (Rule 188(3) of the Rules of Procedure) replacing non-legislative motion for a resolution A10-0016/2026
European Parliament resolution on the EU enlargement strategy
– having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 to 24 June 2022, 29 to 30 June 2023, 26 to 27 October 2023, 14 to 15 December 2023, 27 June 2024 and 17 December 2024, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21 to 22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,
– having regard to the EU Association Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 32/2016 of 7 December 2016 entitled ‘EU assistance to Ukraine’,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 23/2021 of 23 September 2021 entitled ‘Reducing grand corruption in Ukraine: several EU initiatives, but still insufficient results’,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas there are nine official candidate countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine, along with Kosovo as a potential candidate;
B. whereas accession negotiations are actively moving forward with Montenegro and Albania, while negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia and North Macedonia are at various stages; whereas accession negotiations with Türkiye have effectively been frozen since 2018; whereas accession negotiations with Georgia have de facto been halted;
C. whereas according to an unpublished analysis commissioned by the European Council in 2023, enlarging the EU to include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the six south-east European countries would lead to an increase of EUR 256.8 billion in EU expenditure in the next seven-year budget, of which Ukraine would receive EUR 186 billion, or around 72.4 %;
D. whereas Türkiye has received more than EUR 10 billion in pre-accession assistance (IPA) funds and has been allocated EUR 12.3 billion for migration management and humanitarian aid for the period up to 2027; whereas the total amount of direct EU support to Türkiye, including education and civil-society programmes, will exceed EUR 24 billion by 2027;
E. whereas the EU and its Member States have already provided a total amount of EUR 104.5 billion in financial, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s invasion; whereas EU leaders decided to provide Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion loan to address the financing needs of the country in 2026 and 2027;
F. whereas all EU candidate countries are characterised by deeply entrenched, systemic, high-level corruption;
G. whereas in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Albania ranks 91st, Bosnia Herzegovina 109th, Montenegro 65th, North Macedonia 84th, Serbia 116th, Moldova 80th and Ukraine 104th out of 182 countries;
1. Calls on the European Council to stop holding out the prospect of the accession of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, Türkiye and Ukraine, to end accession negotiations with these countries and to request a Commission proposal for a new partnership with them;
2. Notes that, pursuant to Article 49 TEU, any state in Europe may apply to become a member of the EU provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principle of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law;
3. Emphasises, however, that the EU’s financial and political absorption capacity, public security in the Member States and the economic and social well-being of the citizens of the Member States must be a decisive criterion in the EU’s enlargement process;
4. Considers that an EU enlargement policy that does not consider public concerns and risks undermining the well-being of the citizens of the Member States is incompatible with the EU’s claim to be a values-based community of democracies;
5. Considers that the EU’s decision to give Ukraine the status of candidate country is fundamentally wrong;
6. Recalls that for more than 20 years, the EU has been supporting Ukraine in its reform agenda; deplores the fact that grand corruption and state capture are still endemic in Ukraine and that EU reform assistance has proven ineffective in fighting grand corruption; calls on the EU to carry out an assessment of the effectiveness of the EU funding provided to Ukraine and to link funding more closely to Ukraine’s achievements in fighting against corruption and to withdraw it if insufficient progress is made;
7. Emphasises that enlarging the EU to include Ukraine comes with serious geostrategic risks, such as the risk of importing armed conflict and an increase in the military vulnerability of the EU’s external borders;
8. Is concerned that enlarging the EU to include Ukraine would make the EU more vulnerable to the instrumentalisation of migration by foreign powers;
9. Notes that Ukraine, an agricultural powerhouse, will take a disproportionately ‘big bite’ out of the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy; is concerned that the integration of a vast, highly competitive agricultural powerhouse into the single market risks destabilising the EU’s agricultural sector;
10. Is deeply concerned by recent reports that EU leaders are considering ways of bringing Ukraine into the EU as early as 2027, before all technical accession requirements are formally completed;
11. Notes that despite the political standstill, the financial and technical cooperation between the EU and Türkiye remains functional and operational, and there is a new phase of cooperation focused on technology, connectivity and energy rather than on democracy and human rights;
12. Is concerned that, in general, transparency over how EU funds are spent has sharply declined in Türkiye;
13. Is concerned that in Türkiye, millions of euro provided under the Erasmus+ programme have been redirected to pro-government organisations that promote Islamist ideology;
14. Recognises the very significant geopolitical importance of Türkiye for the EU; notes that Türkiye commands access to critical transit corridors for energy, trade and military strategy and that its control of access to the Black Sea gives it a pivotal role in naval security; notes, in this regard, that Türkiye and Azerbaijan are increasing investments to develop the Middle Corridor;
15. Notes that Montenegro’s economy faces structural vulnerabilities, primarily a high dependency on tourism, a large trade deficit, and significant public debt;
16. Notes that Montenegro continues to face significant public- and private-sector corruption;
17. Notes that institutions in Albania and North Macedonia remain fragile, and that little progress has been made on judicial reform aimed at increasing the independence, accountability and professionalism of judicial institutions;
18. Notes that high-level corruption and cumbersome regulatory procedures continue to deter investment in Albania and North Macedonia, hindering their development; is, in this regard, concerned about the very recent corruption scandal in Albania, with the (former) Deputy Prime Minister being accused of giving favoured companies preferential treatment in tender procedures;
19. Underlines that Albania and North Macedonia are suffering from a brain drain; notes that the high deficit between brain drain and brain return severely hampers the economies of both countries; emphasises that a brain drain will have further serious implications for productivity, leaving Albania and North Macedonia with a poorly qualified labour force;
20. Emphasises that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dysfunctional state, characterised by endemic corruption, complete institutional neglect and fragmented governance;
21. Notes that EU accession negotiations with Serbia are detached from reality and have created frustration; notes that the provision of massive (pre-accession and other) EU funds has not led to a growth in EU influence; notes the serious decline in public support for EU accession in Serbia;
22. Is concerned that corruption is still prevalent in many areas in Serbia, also in relation to work designated by the EU as ‘projects of interest for the Republic of Serbia’; deplores the fact that, despite the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy for the 2024-2028 period, Serbia has made only limited progress in the fight against corruption; encourages Serbia to step up the fight against corruption and to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions;
23. Emphasises the importance of Serbia as a partner in the fight against illegal migration; welcomes the operational cooperation agreement on border control and security between Serbia and Frontex; notes that Serbia has proven to be a good partner in fighting crime, migrant smuggling and illegal migration;
24. Encourages Serbia to deepen cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially in the field of cross-border road infrastructure;
25. Calls for the EU not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Serbia, to respect the democratic choice of the Serbian people and to avoid drawing stark contrasts between the different parties;
26. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; emphasises that the Western Balkans are a crucial energy and security corridor, linking Europe to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus;
27. Considers that the most effective response to instability in the Western Balkans in general is not top-down management by the Commission, but the engagement of trusted regional actors who are much better positioned to drive economic development and political stability;
28. Notes that Moldova still struggles with entrenched, high-level corruption; is concerned by a recent scandal, revealing potential corruption involving Interpol information and widespread fraud in public procurement for infrastructure;
29. Notes with concern that Moldova’s emigration waves have led to a catastrophic population decline; is concerned that the massive emigration of younger people is leading to plummeting birth rates, to worsening economic conditions and to further emigration, while an ageing population is putting a strain on pensions and healthcare;
30. Urges the EU to recognise the complexity of the situation in Georgia and not to continue its current confrontational approach, which serves only to increase the polarisation of Georgian society and politics; calls for the EU to recognise and respect the legitimate democratic processes in Georgia and the delicate balancing act being performed by the country in foreign policy; emphasises that this respect will serve as a catalyst for the promotion of institutional dialogue between the EU and the political institutions in Georgia;
31. Is deeply concerned that enlarging the EU to include countries that face high levels of corruption and economic mismanagement will negatively affect the single market and reduce its global competitiveness; is deeply concerned that further EU enlargement will trigger mass migration, leading to even more pressure on housing and public services; is deeply concerned that enlarging the EU to include Ukraine will have huge distributional implications and jeopardise the security of the EU’s external borders;
32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and the parliaments of the Member States, and the governments and parliaments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine.
Or. en