European Central Bank – annual report 2025

4.2.2026 A10-0002/18

Amendment 18

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Recital H f (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Hf. whereas the escalating debt situation in the United States and the decline in trade settled in US dollars, as well as the reduction of US securities held by several countries, has led to a situation where the United States can no longer export its debt via the dollar easily without undermining the international value of the dollar, and this has led the United States to increasingly look for opportunities to artificially boost demand for the dollar, as well as US securities;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/19

Amendment 19

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability;

2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; criticises the fact that the ECB relies exclusively and blindly on a body subordinate to the Commission, Eurostat, to obtain a variety of essential data on which it bases its monetary policy and steers the euro, as in practice this undermines its independence, as its policy is reliant on data provided by a body subordinate to the Commission;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/20

Amendment 20

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament, as a lack of price stability is primarily to the detriment of citizens in the euro area; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/21

Amendment 21

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments; calls for the continuous publication of detailed documentation on the creation, calibration and modification of its economic forecasting models, as these are of public interest as indirectly they have a significant impact on the public and, moreover, have repeatedly shown deficiencies, and been marked by excessive optimism in support of expansionary monetary policy;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/22

Amendment 22

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical;

6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical; reiterates that the economic rationale behind Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB is to prohibit the ECB from being used, directly or indirectly, to finance government spending by the Member States on the basis of political objectives; calls on the ECB to inform Parliament whether there have already been discussions within the board of the ECB to restart future asset purchase programmes, in order to counteract possible strong increases in interest rates on sovereign bonds caused by the current excessive spending of several Member States and the national escape clause;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/23

Amendment 23

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6a. Strongly recommends the decentralisation of the ECB’s sources of macroeconomic input data, as well as the creation and use of intrinsic means for the continuous monitoring of potential systematic problems with such data, since it is so crucial for the formulation of its monetary policy and the monitoring of its primary objective;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/24

Amendment 24

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6b. Points out the feasibility and statistical necessity, after more than two decades, of reviewing Eurostat’s key annual macroeconomic data by comparing compound annual macroeconomic growth and inflation figures with data from other sources using considerably longer time intervals than the current yearly intervals, in order to identify problems, systematic distortions or errors; stresses that errors or bias in annual data are difficult to detect, but if consistent or systematic bias or errors exist, this would become apparent over such longer periods, which now exist after more than two decades; calls on the ECB to carry out such statistical investigations and checks to ensure that it is steering the euro with an unbiased compass;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/25

Amendment 25

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6c. Emphasises that the subpar performance of the ECB’s macroeconomic forecast models, especially their optimism about price stability and economic growth, might also be related to the use of systematically skewed macroeconomic data from the past, as these models are generally calibrated using past data;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/26

Amendment 26

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7. Highlights the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability, which is one of the necessary conditions for growth, competitiveness and economic stability in the Union;

7. Reiterates that the ECB’s only primary objective is maintaining price stability, which is one of the necessary conditions for growth, competitiveness and economic stability in the Union as well as the protection of people’s wealth and purchasing power, in order to counter the cost-of-living crisis;

Or. en

4.2.2026 A10-0002/27

Amendment 27

Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0002/2026

Johan Van Overtveldt

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

(2025/2182(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. Considers that the strong increase in money supply in the decade prior to the surge in inflation, which was mainly due to the zero interest-rate policy, the asset purchase programmes and, in particular, the sharp increase in money supply immediately prior to the surge, i.e. during the COVID-19 emergency measures, combined with the sudden increase in the velocity of money following the end of the COVID-19 restrictions, as well as the sudden supply contraction of essential resources as a result of EU sanctions, created a textbook case for a predictable sharp surge in inflation due to the neutrality of money;

Or. en