Sittings · Document
Application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process
19.11.2025 A100224/1
Amendment 1
Kristian Vigenin
on behalf of the S&D Group
Joachim Streit
on behalf of the Renew Group
Leoluca Orlando
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Nikolas Farantouris
on behalf of The Left Group
Report A100224/2025
Marieke Ehlers
Application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process
(2025/2042(INI))
Motion for a resolution (Rule 188(3) of the Rules of Procedure) replacing non-legislative motion for a resolution A100224/2025
European Parliament resolution on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences, subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy and Article 12 on the role of national parliaments,
– having regard to Protocol No 1 to the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
– having regard to Articles 2 to 6 and Article 15 TFEU,
– having regard to its resolutions of 7 May 2009 on the development of the relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon, of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, of 19 April 2018 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliaments and of 17 January 2024 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments,
– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular the proposed amendments related to the subsidiarity principle and Protocol No 2,
– having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and relations with national Parliaments,
– having regard to the final report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 2018 entitled ‘Active Subsidiarity – A new way of working’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 23 October 2018 entitled ‘The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU’s policymaking’ (COM(2018)0703),
– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0224/2025),
A. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union acts only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level; whereas this principle safeguards the balance of power in the EU; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties;
B. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring the regulatory impact and efficiency of the EU; whereas it is essential that the EU promotes a balance between EU and national decision-making, avoids placing an unnecessary regulatory burden on the Member States and on entities and persons subject to EU law, and ensures that the Member States remain united in diversity;
C. whereas Articles 2 to 6 TFEU define the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU;
D. whereas the principle of subsidiarity was mentioned explicitly for the first time in the Treaty of Maastricht to address the proper distribution and implementation of the growing number of competences shared by the EU and the Member States; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, which was added by the Treaty of Lisbon and also introduced an early warning system and recognised the role of the European Committee of the Regions in this respect by giving it the right to take action on subsidiarity before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU);
E. whereas 577 subsidiarity checks and reasoned opinions by national parliaments, 3 803 contributions from national parliaments, three yellow cards and no orange cards have been submitted since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009;
F. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures has led to the withdrawal of a proposal, the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation, and the third had no effect, while 14 reasoned opinions were submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States;
G. whereas the early warning system has led to two procedures before the CJEU to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
H. whereas scrupulous adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission and the co-legislators, in particular the Council, can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and contribute to a more efficient law-making process;
I. whereas national parliaments are included in the EU legislative process both under the specific provisions of Protocol 2 to the TFEU and through their exercise of democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of the Member States in the Council;
J. whereas there is an established practice of each rotational presidency of the Council of the European Union having a parliamentary dimension, with national parliaments participating jointly with the European Parliament in numerous interparliamentary conferences on a variety of topics;
1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be essential elements of the Commission’s approach to better regulation, which is built on the three fundamental processes of evaluation, impact assessment and stakeholder consultation, thus safeguarding the division of powers and proper functioning of the EU;
2. Stresses that under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas that do not fall within the EU’s exclusive competence, decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens and at the most appropriate level, with the objective of maximising effectiveness while preserving the Member States’ capacity to act; recalls that intervention by the EU is justified only where the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can be better achieved at EU level by reason of the scale or effects of the action; underlines, in this context, the growing significance of transnational and global challenges, which necessitate renewed consideration of the appropriate level of governance for their resolution; recalls that the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by EU legislation; highlights that such measures must be suitable to reach the defined goal;
3. Underlines that the concept of ‘active subsidiarity’ as developed by the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ (‘the Task Force’) is based on constructive cooperation between all levels of governance during all stages of the life cycle of EU legislation, for the benefit of EU citizens;
Role of the Commission
4. Calls on the Commission to apply the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality with due diligence when proposing legislation; calls on the Commission to clearly and thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation and not to use a different legal basis to withdraw legislative proposals from the codecision procedure and reserve them for adoption by the Member States alone; points out that the increased and consistent use of the ‘intergovernmental method’ is at odds with the democratic guarantees laid down in the Treaties and slowly erodes citizens’ trust in the functioning of the EU; welcomes the work carried out by the Commission in recent years to provide additional clarity regarding the institutional implementation of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, including through the creation of the Task Force on Subsidiarity and the introduction of the subsidiarity grid;
5. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the need for action and the choice of measures; recalls the Commission’s intention, expressed in its 2018 communication, to integrate an assessment grid into its better regulation guidance and to use it as part of the impact assessments, evaluations and explanatory memoranda that accompany its legislative proposals; finds it regrettable that this has not been fulfilled in practice so far; welcomes, in this regard, the subsidiarity grid developed by the European Committee of the Regions and encourages the Commission to use it as the basis for its subsidiarity assessments; calls for a strengthened prior consultation of the national and regional parliaments before legislation is proposed at EU level; stresses the need for more rigorous scrutiny of the use of Articles 122 and 352 TFEU;
6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission, jointly with the European Parliament, to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality when assessing legislative proposals and to continue to consistently apply the subsidiarity grid; recalls that subsidiarity and proportionality checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, outlining the added value of the action and demonstrating the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives;
7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions should be carefully considered, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; calls on the Commission to provide such responses even when the reasoned opinions do not reach the established threshold; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments;
8. Points out that implementing new EU legislation can entail very high costs for municipalities, particularly in remote or sparsely populated areas; considers that municipalities must be equipped with sufficient financial and human resources to implement EU law so that they can comply with the new EU legislative norms;
9. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the yellow card or orange card procedures; notes that this might be due to the thresholds established in Protocol 2 to the Treaties, to time constraints or to the fact that these procedures are largely unknown among members of national parliaments; recalls, in this context, its earlier proposals to extend the deadline for yellow card procedures to 12 weeks and to conduct a wider examination of the possibility to upgrade the early warning system to a tool enabling national parliaments to influence EU policies, including from a political or substantive point of view; recalls the Task Force’s findings that a substantially lower threshold than one quarter would be necessary to significantly increase the number of yellow card procedures, but that this, in turn, would raise questions about the representativeness of the concerns expressed; recalls that any changes to the established thresholds would require the Treaties to be amended;
10. Notes that the limited number of yellow and orange card procedures might also be due to the increased responsiveness of the Commission, which has been making active efforts to ensure that its proposals respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that the limited usage of the yellow card procedure shows that there is still room for improvement and that better coordination between national parliaments is possible in this respect;
11. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission, the European Parliament and national parliaments, such as political dialogue, the rapporteurs’ dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as, for instance, contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission and European Parliament resolutions, would be collected and freely accessible;
12. Urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place;
Role of national parliaments
13. Emphasises that national parliaments have a pivotal role, deriving from the Treaties, in ensuring compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and that they can also make a positive contribution to the substance of new legislation, thus strengthening the EU’s democratic validity and legitimacy; stresses the need for national parliaments to participate more actively through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the yellow card and orange card procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and contribute to EU legislation effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and sharing of competences between the EU and its Member States;
14. Recalls that national parliaments exercise democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of Member States in the Council, while the EU executive is held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; highlights that some Member States provide for more active participation of their national and/or regional parliaments in the European legislative process through, for example, the exercise of parliamentary reserve; encourages all Member States to implement measures ensuring more active participation of national parliaments in the forming of their national positions in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Council’s deliberations; underlines the need for regular political dialogue and exchange between parliaments in order to create awareness and understanding of parliamentary work and decisions, such as within the EU Speakers’ Conference and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union;
15. Believes that the role of national parliaments could be enhanced by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ whereby at least one third of national parliaments could call on the Commission or the European Parliament to put forward proposals designed to contribute constructively to the EU legislative process; calls, furthermore, for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 to twelve weeks; recalls that the Commission has already provided for some degree of flexibility in the deadlines by also excluding the period between 20 December and 10 January;
16. Reiterates the need to strengthen the structural cooperation of the EU co-legislators with national, regional and local law-makers; underlines that the European Parliamentary Week and Interparliamentary Committee Meetings have been instrumental in this regard; believes that it would be beneficial for Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and ministers of sitting Council presidencies to appear before all national and, where appropriate, regional parliaments to discuss and explain the European agenda; believes, furthermore, that political family meetings and caucuses between and within national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation bring added value in the form of authentic European political debate;
17. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and stakeholders, represented by the European Committee of the Regions in particular, and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be incorporated more effectively into legislative proposals and into the evaluation of existing EU legislation; considers, in this regard, that the Commission should facilitate the organisation of public consultations at local and regional level and increase the agency and participation of citizens in EU policymaking;
18. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity;
Legal and institutional framework
19. Stresses that the CJEU plays a crucial role in applying and interpreting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legal framework;
20. Recommends that the Commission, in its consultations with the Member States, makes sure that governments provide evidence that they take into account the position of national and regional parliaments;
21. Insists that the particular characteristics of the individual Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting EU legislation; highlights that the Union operates on the principle of sincere cooperation and that all Member States have signed and ratified the Treaties and thus accepted the possibility that certain decisions will be taken by qualified majority;
22. Calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; reiterates that impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information; considers it essential, consequently, for the EU co-legislators to collect input from local and regional authorities, which are able to provide the most precise information about different issues; considers it pertinent to conduct a survey among national legislative bodies to collect their feedback on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; suggests, therefore, that the Commission conduct such a survey to identify in which areas and to what extent national legislative bodies need to be protagonists of change;
23. Underlines that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is crucial to maintain citizens’ trust in the EU and its legislation, and should be more clearly communicated to the public during communication on single legislative initiatives; recognises that it is fundamental to assess the ‘cost of non-Europe’ to showcase the added value of EU legislation;
Final observations
24. Welcomes the steps taken in recent years by EU decision-makers to provide additional clarity regarding the institutional implementation of the proportionality and subsidiarity principles, including through the establishment of the Task Force and the introduction of the subsidiarity grid; calls for a thorough, continued and consistent application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, taking into account the active subsidiarity approach developed by the Task Force and ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; recalls its position that the Treaties should be amended to enable the creation of a dedicated legal basis explicitly empowering the CJEU to review legislation to check that it respects the subsidiarity principle; underlines that such a CJEU review will help to increase compliance with EU law;
25. Demands that any loopholes be closed to increase transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments to ensure that subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed;
26. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should focus more on areas where the EU action has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; urges the EU institutions, furthermore, to select future initiatives more carefully and streamline existing legislation;
27. Suggests that all interparliamentary activities developed in the framework of Protocol 1 to the Treaty of Lisbon (including COSAC, IPEX, ECPRD, etc.) by national parliaments and the European Parliament should be better used, in an integrated and cooperative way, in order to better apply the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;
28. Points out that Members of the European Parliament, who are directly elected by the EU’s citizens, can influence the setting of the EU legislative agenda by using their right under Article 225 TFEU to propose legislation, with full respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
29. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality could facilitate better lawmaking and could reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape, thus ensuring that EU action is appropriate and necessary; insists that before making a legislative proposal, the Commission should assess whether the desired positive effect can be achieved at local, regional or national level; underlines the Task Force’s conclusions that the Commission and the co-legislators should gear their work towards delivering more effective implementation, rather than initiating new legislation or constantly amending existing legislation in areas where the existing body of legislation is mature and/or has recently been substantially revised;
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30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments of the Member States.
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