On the stock-taking of the European elections 2024

3.9.2025 A100156/1

Amendment 1

Marieke Ehlers, JeanPaul Garraud, Gerolf Annemans, Nikola Bartůšek

on behalf of the PfE Group

Report A100156/2025

Ľubica Karvašová

on the stock-taking of the European elections 2024

(2025/2012(INI))

Motion for a resolution (Rule 188(3) of the Rules of Procedure) replacing non-legislative motion for a resolution A100156/2025

European Parliament resolution on the stock-taking of the European elections 2024

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Article 223 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the 2024 European elections recorded the highest turnout of any elections to the European Parliament in the past 25 years, at 50.74 % of the electorate, which nonetheless remains significantly below the 1994 turnout of 56.67 %, despite the EU and the Member States allocating substantial funding to election awareness campaigns and some Member States lowering the voting age to 16;

B. whereas Article 223 TFEU and the 1976 Electoral Act establish only a minimal set of common principles and rules governing European elections;

C. whereas a healthy democracy requires that voters have access to a diverse range of ideas, perspectives and information; whereas freedom of expression allows candidates, parties, the media and citizens to voice opinions, debate policies and share facts, thus enabling voters to make informed choices;

D. whereas the proliferation of disinformation, particularly via social media, continues to pose a threat to European electoral and democratic processes; whereas the Commission has launched infringement procedures and investigations against several major online platforms in connection with issues including ‘deceptive’ political advertising and insufficient content monitoring; whereas freedom of expression must also encompass the right to criticise EU policies and regulatory bodies, and such criticism or alternative viewpoints should not automatically be labelled disinformation;

E. whereas the EU legal framework lacks clear definitions of ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’, with Article 3(h) of the Digital Services Act providing only a definition of ‘illegal content’;

F. whereas legal scholars have criticised the absence of a coherent definition of misinformation and disinformation within EU law, highlighting the resulting legal uncertainty;

G. whereas ongoing scandals involving EU institutions – such as Qatargate, Pfizergate, Huaweigate, Timmermansgate and Reyndersgate – and the perceived political unwillingness to address these scandals swiftly and transparently risk further alienating citizens from the EU and undermining the democratic legitimacy of its decision-making processes;

1. Emphasises that, despite unprecedented outreach and targeted campaigns, voter turnout among people under 25 declined by 6 percentage points in 2024 compared to 2019, dropping from 42 % to 36 %;

2. Finds it regrettable that it did not follow through on its own election slogan, ‘Use your vote, or others will decide for you’, by excluding its third-largest political group from membership of the Bureau, committees and delegations and from co-signing joint motions for resolutions; considers that sidelining Europe’s fastest-growing political family may make the public feel even less connected to the EU institutions;

3. Expresses concern that EUR 43 million has been allocated to promoting a pro-integrationist narrative, while eurocritical voices have been marginalised or portrayed as proxies of foreign powers, despite the fact that the recent corruption scandals have involved members of mainstream political groups; maintains that public institutions must foster open debate and neither exclude opposition nor promote a one-sided, federalist agenda;

4. Emphasises that there is currently no shared European demos and calls on public institutions to refrain from engaging in cultural engineering; considers nation-building and cultural engineering to be historically discredited strategies that should not re-emerge on the political agenda;

5. Warns that categorising citizens as ‘key’ and ‘non-key’ demographics risks further alienating them from the EU decision-making process;

6. Recognises that election campaigns in the Member States are often conducted through a national lens, even when addressing EU-wide issues; considers it legitimate for citizens to expect their representatives to defend national interests in the European Parliament;

7. Affirms that eurocritical parties and sentiments form a legitimate and integral part of the European political landscape; condemns any rhetoric inciting violence and calls for constructive, evidence-based debate grounded in democratic values, individual rights and the rule of law; recognises that citizens have the right to support policies perceived by some as anti-system or anti-EU and asserts that it borders on censorship to compel people and organisations to present only a positive narrative of the EU; maintains that public authorities should not enforce or promote a specific narrative in a democratic society;

8. Stresses that the ability to question and challenge public authorities is fundamental to a functioning democracy;

9. Encourages national and European political parties to respect the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality;

10. Emphasises that Parliament must respect the Council’s prerogatives in order to maintain citizens’ trust in the EU institutions;

11. Affirms that the diversity of electoral systems across the Member States is a democratic asset and should be preserved; respects national rules concerning the minimum age for voting and candidacy in accordance with Article 223 TFEU and the 1976 Act;

12. Underlines that findings from the European Court of Auditors’ Special Reports 35/2018 and 11/2025, as well as the revelations of the Timmermansgate scandal, should prompt national and EU lawmakers to significantly increase transparency regarding funding to non-governmental organisations and to enhance oversight of how such funds are used;

13. Maintains that the Spitzenkandidat system concentrates power in the hands of political elites; notes that candidates for the post of Commission President are selected through intra-party negotiations and backroom deals rather than by direct public mandate, thereby reducing accountability and reinforcing perceptions that EU decision-making is remote, technocratic and disconnected from citizens’ concerns;

14. Warns that labelling citizens who are critical of EU integration or concerned about national sovereignty ‘victims of disinformation’ may deepen disengagement and erode the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions; asserts that portraying the democratically elected representatives of such citizens as foreign agents constitutes an attack on democracy, effectively silencing millions of voters;

15. Reiterates serious and ongoing concern regarding both foreign and domestic interference in EU democratic processes; considers efforts by Parliament’s administration to influence voter turnout through advertising campaigns to be a form of domestic interference, which inevitably affects electoral outcomes; stresses that it is not Parliament’s role to influence the composition of the institution itself;

16. Emphasises the importance of a free and pluralistic media environment, especially during electoral cycles; recognises that digital platforms are a vital component of this environment and welcomes the emergence of new media as healthy competition for the dominant conglomerates;

17. Cautions against the political consequences of dismissing eurocritical voters as ‘digitally illiterate’; acknowledges the increasing appeal of online platforms among the electorate because of the perceived ideological homogeneity of legacy media; stresses that online platforms enable free expression and are thus essential to democratic pluralism;

18. Recalls that Europe’s constitutional tradition is grounded in the principle of limiting government power, as demonstrated by foundational documents such as the Magna Carta (1215), the Joyous Entry (1356), the Act of Abjuration (1581), and the Constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 3 May 1791;

19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the national parliaments of the Member States.

Or. en