The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

11.6.2025 A10-0100/2

Amendment 2

Patryk Jaki, Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Maciej Wąsik, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Jacek Ozdoba

on behalf of the ECR Group

Report A10-0100/2025

Ana Catarina Mendes

The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

(2024/2078(INI))

Motion for a resolution (Rule 188(3) of the Rules of Procedure) replacing non-legislative motion for a resolution A10-0100/2025

European Parliament resolution on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Union is founded on the values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); whereas Article 2 TEU does not confer any material competence on the Union and only lists certain values that ought to be respected by both the institutions and the Member States of the Union when they act within the limits of the powers conferred on the Union by the Treaties, and without affecting those limits; whereas Article 2 TEU does not only apply, and does not even apply primarily, to the Member States, but to the EU as a whole, including to its institutions, and the rule of law referred to therein should predominantly apply to the EU institutions;

B. whereas according to Article 5 TEU, the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral, which means that competences not conferred on the Union by the Treaties remain competences of the Member States;

C. whereas only Article 7 TEU provides for the Union to have the competence to supervise the application of the rule of law as a value of the Union; whereas Article 7 TEU does not set out a basis for the further development or amendment of the procedure described within it;

D. whereas there is neither an agreed definition of the rule of law nor a single, EU-level system to assess compliance with the rule of law that is equally applied to all Member States with their diverse legal systems, with the result that the notion of the rule of law is interpreted differently from one Member State to another;

1. Takes note of the Commission’s rule of law reports; considers that the Commission has no competence to prepare such reports;

2. Notes that justice systems, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism and certain institutional issues related to checks and balances, including civic space, are all included in the Commission’s annual overview of the rule of law situation in the Member States; notes that the Commission has no competence to determine whether the situation in the Member States constitutes a positive or negative trend or could serve as an example for others to follow; regrets the fact that all the reports were biased and were used as political tools against certain Member States and even specific governments, as evidenced by the fact that a suspension of EU funds has been lifted without any changes having been made to the legislation that allegedly formed the grounds for the suspension;

3. Notes that the Commission monitors the independence, quality and efficiency of the Member States’ justice systems; considers that the organisation and functioning of state bodies, in particular the judiciary, is one of the areas in which the Member States have not transferred competences to the Union and notes that the Commission evaluates them despite this; regrets the creeping extension of the competences of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which undermines trust in the Union and subverts the principles of proportionality and loyalty, which stem directly from the Treaties; condemns ultra vires adjudication;

4. Underlines that health services are a matter of national competence by virtue of Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

5. Notes with concern that, in addition to reporting (objective) elements, the Commission’s rule of law reports contain evaluative (subjective) elements and do not clearly delineate them; deplores the fact that, when assessing similar legal regulations in force in different Member States, the Commission often assesses solutions designed in certain Member States differently from identical solutions already in use in other Member States; condemns the Commission’s unequal, discriminatory and politically biased treatment of the Member States described in its reports;

6. Calls for a report on the rule of law in the EU institutions, covering such issues as abuses of competence, corruption, illegal lobbying, lack of transparency, insufficient frameworks for reporting and managing declarations of assets and conflicts of interests, revolving doors situations, favouritism towards selected countries or companies, and unacceptable ideological bias;

7. Denounces the fact that the CJEU is increasingly frequently exceeding its Treaty competences and ruling ultra vires; supports the growing unwillingness of some Member States to comply with CJEU rulings on the grounds of sovereignty or unconstitutionality; believes that these developments in the CJEU pose a systemic threat to the future of the Union;

8. Calls on the Commission to present a fairer, evidence-based assessment of the rule of law situation in the Member States, fully respecting the national sovereignty and legal traditions of each Member State;

9. Notes that the large number of references to the findings of a few non-governmental organisations suggests that the Commission outsourced work on the report to these organisations without fact-checking their statements; calls on the Commission to use a more comprehensive and neutral methodology for future evaluations;

10. Considers it unacceptable that the Commission, while dedicating substantial attention and resources to fact-checking, combating disinformation and countering foreign interference, fails to apply the same standards of verification to its own official documents; stresses that the inclusion, in the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law Report, of content defending an individual publicly identified as a Russian intelligence agent and calling for his release was highly damaging and undermines the report’s credibility; notes that the organisations cited by the Commission as sources in this case revised their statements and withdrew their allegations after the individual’s espionage activities were made public, yet the Commission has so far avoided clarifying this unacceptable and damaging matter and has refrained from correcting or updating its position; calls for an urgent and thorough review of internal procedures governing information sourcing and verification and for full transparency regarding the individuals and departments responsible for the inclusion of such content in an official EU report; emphasises the urgent need to restore institutional credibility and ensure that future EU reports do not inadvertently legitimise actors involved in hostile acts against the Union and its Member States;

11. Stresses that Member States’ participation in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Dialogue is not mandatory; shows understanding for those Member States that have decided to suspend cooperation with the Commission, in particular given the methodological errors made in the preparation of the reports, the politically biased approach taken and the unequal treatment of Member States;

12. Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s silence in the face of the undemocratic measures implemented by the Tusk government under the pretext of ‘militant democracy’, which constitute an assault on human rights, the constitutional order and the rule of law on a scale not seen since 1989, as documented in the 2025 report of the Team of Experts of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal entitled ‘The Process of “Restoring the Rule of Law in Poland” from the Perspective of the Rule of Law: Unlawful Actions Against the Constitutional Tribunal Since 13 December 2023’;

13. Declares that the so-called rule of law conditionality mechanism, in its current form, has failed in both purpose and implementation and is structurally unfit for achieving the objective of fair and impartial oversight; believes that the current conditionality mechanism is not genuinely designed to protect the financial interests of the Union, but rather serves as a political instrument used by the Commission and certain Member State governments to impose their own ideological and political agendas on Member States; strongly condemns the use of this mechanism as a means of applying political pressure and engaging in blackmail against democratically elected governments, which constitutes a clear violation of the principles of sovereignty, subsidiarity and equality among Member States;

14. Condemns the blatantly political way in which Article 7 TEU is being used to blackmail Member States and thus fulfil the political objectives of certain other Member States and political powers and extend the EU’s competences beyond the scope of the Treaties; regrets the unjustified launch of an Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland and the subsequent use thereof to play politics; notes with disgust that the procedure against Poland was closed immediately after the parliamentary elections in Poland and immediately prior to the elections to the European Parliament and that this move, in spite of the attempts to blackmail the former government, was not preceded by the adoption of any legislative amendments whatsoever, which is a clear indication that the use of alleged rule-of-law infringements has a political dimension;

15. Denounces the blocking of cohesion and other EU funds on the basis of politically biased and non-transparent criteria rather than objective and merit-based assessments, as seen with the unjustified withholding of funds from the previous government of Poland; demands the immediate cessation of any politicisation of EU funds, including through the so-called rule of law conditionality mechanism, which must be definitively abolished as a tool of political coercion; calls instead for strict adherence to clear, legal, objective and non-discriminatory rules and criteria in all decisions related to the allocation of EU funding, with full respect for the institutional autonomy and constitutional identity of all Member States;

16. Expresses deep concern over the allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; likewise deplores the fact that Commission officials allegedly accepted gifts from a country with which the Union was negotiating an agreement; considers it unacceptable that, in this context, individuals holding top-level director positions and who are the subject of ongoing investigations or proceedings are being rewarded with transfers to highly paid advisory roles, as in the case of the former Director-General of the Commission Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE); stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the competent national authorities; considers it unacceptable that, in the case of the allegations against the former Director-General of DG MOVE, neither OLAF nor the Commission forwarded the case to the EPPO, which only launched an investigation after the matter was uncovered by the media; calls on the Commission to strengthen the relevant rules and procedures to ensure that all cases are handled strictly, correctly and efficiently;

17. Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

18. Calls on the Commission to stop using the pretext of protecting the rule of law and fundamental rights to exert political pressure on certain Member States to change democratically approved measures that lie within the competences of the Member States;

19. Stresses that the only possibility for interference by the Union in matters related to the Member States’ respect for the Union’s values as such is Article 7 TEU; emphasises that Article 7 TEU is complete and exhaustive; recognises the leading role played by the Council in ongoing Article 7 TEU procedures;

20. Strongly condemns the Commission’s persistent lack of transparency regarding the COVID-19 vaccine contracts, especially in light of the July 2024 ruling of the CJEU, which found that the Commission had failed to ensure public access to crucial contractual details and had not provided sufficient justification for such secrecy; recalls that this lack of transparency undermines democratic accountability and erodes public trust in EU institutions; demands the immediate and full disclosure of all related documents and negotiations and stresses that secrecy in matters of public health and massive public spending is unacceptable in a democratic Union;

21. Demands immediate and full access to all grant contracts, financial transfers and cooperation agreements between the Commission and non-governmental or so-called civil society organisations; stresses that this transparency must be guaranteed not only for Parliament, but also for Member States and EU citizens, as a prerequisite for the effective exercise of democratic oversight;

22. Expresses serious concern over recurring allegations that the Commission has channelled EU funds to organisations with explicit political agendas, particularly organisations promoting left-wing or ideologically progressive narratives, and has thereby influenced policy debates and electoral dynamics in certain Member States; further calls for full disclosure regarding any cases where such organisations were granted access to legislative processes, consultation mechanisms or media campaigns financed by the EU and demands clarity on the selection criteria, political affiliations and declared objectives of these entities; strongly warns against the use of public funds for covert lobbying or soft-power influence, including any potential financial inducements or preferential treatment for MEPs or parliamentary groups, which would constitute a fundamental breach of democratic ethics and institutional neutrality;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

Or. en